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Abstract 
For organisations in crisis, an effective response is central to their ability to protect 
their stakeholder relationships and minimise the financial and resource penalties that 
may be incurred post-crisis.   Calls have been made within the academic and 
practitioner literature in public relations for a better understanding of how an 
organisation’s response during a crisis event affects its reputation and legitimacy.  In 
particular, those calls focus on a clearer mapping of what factors might help or 
hinder the outcomes of this response (see for example, Benson, 1988; Coombs & 
Holladay, 2001; Ihlen, 2010, Massey, 2001). 
This study works within one of the major crisis management paradigms, the 
Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) developed initially by Coombs 
and Holladay (2001).  Based on the SCCT model, the goal of this current study is to 
refine the theory’s explanatory power on the influences of organisational and 
environmental factors at the time of a crisis event and to unpack the scope and 
limitations of the protective powers of an organisation’s response.  In particular, it 
focuses on the ability of an organisation’s relationship history to change or intensify 
the frame through which the crisis event and the organisation’s response is assessed.  
This frame has the potential to influence stakeholder perceptions of an organisation’s 
responsibility for different crisis events and subsequent judgments on its reputation 
and legitimacy.   
Previous crisis research in stakeholder relationships has focused on evaluative 
quality, however, such positive and negative relationships are built over time.  
Research in organisational studies has demonstrated that new organisations have 
limited stakeholder relationships, thereby placing them at risk of challenges to their 
legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).  Thus, an organisation’s age may play an 
important part in understanding the quality of its relationships with the external 
community.  The liability of newness (Hannan & Freeman, 1989) may be 
compounded during a time of crisis when legitimacy is challenged, therefore, 
organisational age may be an important situational factor for crisis managers to 
consider (Rhee and Valdez, 2009).  This study investigates whether an organisation’s 
age has this effect during a crisis and whether this interacts with the evaluative 
quality of an organisation’s stakeholder relationships (relationship character) to 
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strengthen or weaken any intensifier effect.  If this effect is demonstrated, it would 
suggest new organisations with poor stakeholder relationships should enact different 
crisis responses than mature ones with positive relationships to achieve better 
stakeholder support following a crisis.   
This study works within a positivist experimental framework to test the influences of 
an organisation’s response strategy and its relationship history in different crisis 
events on stakeholder perceptions of its reputation and legitimacy.  In particular, it 
assesses how these perceptions are influenced by judgments of the organisation’s 
responsibility for the crisis event.  It uses a pre- and post-testing methodology to 
systematically interrogate the changes in stakeholder perceptions as new information 
becomes available to better understand the influence of each organisational and 
environmental variable on the basic propositions of the SCCT model.  This 
methodology is then used to consider the intensifier effect of relationship history and 
its effect on strategy outcomes.  This study incorporates the measurement of changes 
in reputation as well as legitimacy, recognising the importance of both these 
intangible assets to an organisation.   
Four stages of research incorporating six interrelated experimental studies with 
student samples were used to address the different foci for the project.  Stage One 
tested the impact of organisational response strategy on reputation and legitimacy in 
different crisis situations categorised into crisis clusters.  The role of responsibility in 
mediating this relationship was also considered.  Stage Two focused explicitly on the 
variable of organisational responsibility for the crisis event given its centrality to the 
SCCT model.  The third stage tested the impact of the potential intensifier of 
relationship history.  The two attributes of relationship history (relationship character 
and organisational age) were considered separately and tested for their impacts on 
crisis responsibility, organisational reputation and legitimacy.  Having established 
the impact of the separate independent variables of crisis cluster, strategy and 
relationship history in the first three stages, Stage Four examined the hypothesised 
interaction of all of the independent variables to ascertain the presence and impact of 
the predicted intensifier effect of relationship history and to better understand the 
role of responsibility in stakeholder judgments on reputation and legitimacy.   
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Combined, the findings of the six experiments illustrate the specific damage to 
reputation and legitimacy from different crisis events and the intensity of this 
damage based on the conditions of the event.  In the absence of an intensifier effect, 
the SCCT recommended approach to strategy selection resulted in no further damage 
to an organisation’s reputation and legitimacy once the crisis event occurred, 
however, the recommended response strategies were not able to repair the damage.  
The results from this study suggest limited differences in outcomes for non-
recommended strategies in the absence of further information about the organisation.  
This lack of impact appears to be tied to the limited effect of organisational strategy 
to influence judgments of crisis responsibility.  A strong association between 
organisational responsibility and judgments on reputation and legitimacy was 
established throughout the study. 
From the results, a continuum of the intensifier effect of relationship history was 
developed.  A positive relationship character was beneficial to an organisation both 
before a crisis and following one.  While not as important prior to a crisis event, the 
influence of organisational age on reputation and legitimacy became apparent once 
the crisis event occurred.   Maturity provided protection to the organisation.    An 
interaction effect was established for these attributes with maturity and positive 
relationships forming a positive frame through which the crisis event was perceived.  
In contrast, newness and negative relationships formed a negative frame. 
The positive intensifier effect of relationship history strengthened the reparative 
powers of the response strategies within the SCCT.  This benefit appeared mostly 
linked to the ability of the relationship character attribute of relationship history to 
influence judgments on responsibility.  The negative intensifier effect created a very 
strong negative frame through which the organisation was seen and this countered 
the recommendations for effective strategy selection within the SCCT.   
Recognising its stated limitations, this study provides further explanatory depth to 
the explication and refinement of the SCCT model and the protective and reparative 
capacities of different response strategies in particular circumstances.  The findings 
contribute to a stronger understanding of relationships identified in the model and 
provide guidance for crisis managers on effective response selection.   
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Chapter 1  An Introduction 
Significant resources are applied within modern organisations to detect and prevent 
crises given the high risk to organisational survival that comes with such events.  
According to Coombs (1999), these resources are devoted to such tasks because, ‘the 
best crisis is the one that is avoided’ (p. 125).  However, organisations increasingly 
face the reality that crises will and do happen, despite the best planning.  For these 
organisations, an effective crisis response is central to their ability to protect 
relationships with their stakeholders and minimise the financial and resource 
penalties that may be incurred post-crisis.   Responding effectively can protect the 
organisation from further damage and may even lead to opportunistic benefits.  
However, an ineffective response can lead to serious consequences for the 
organisation, which at the extreme, may threaten its continued operations. 
Background to the Research Problem 
Given the high stakes in effective resource commitments for crisis management, 
calls have been made within the academic and practitioner literature in public 
relations for a better understanding of how an organisation’s response during a crisis 
event affects its reputation and legitimacy.  In particular, those calls focus on a 
clearer mapping of what factors might help or hinder the outcomes of this response 
(see for example, Benson, 1988; Coombs & Holladay, 2001; Coombs, 2004, 2006; 
Ihlen, 2010, Seeger et al, 1998; Massey, 2001).  Further explication of the impact of 
crisis response is necessary as current studies are limited (Coombs & Schmidt, 2000; 
Coombs, 2006, McDonald, 2005; Pace et al, 2010, Claeys & Cauberghe, 2012) and 
contradictory (Bradford & Garrett, 1995; Dean, 2004; Kim et al, 2009; Lee, 2004).   
This study helps refine our understanding of the influence of crisis response 
strategies used in particular crisis situations on stakeholder perceptions of an 
organisation’s reputation and legitimacy, and the role organisational responsibility 
for the crisis plays in shaping those perceptions.   
The presence and influence of co-varying organisational and environmental factors 
at the time of a crisis event suggest that the effectiveness of crisis response is 
situational.  In these terms, certain organisational attributes and the specific nature of 
the crisis event affect stakeholder perceptions of organisational action and 
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responsibility and, therefore, the outcome of any response.  The recognition of these 
influencing factors and the calls for a better understanding of their impact led to the 
development by Coombs and Holladay (1996) of the Situational Crisis 
Communication Theory (SCCT) that seeks to provide predictive advice to crisis 
managers in different crisis situations.  At the heart of the SCCT model is the 
proposition that different crisis events lead to different levels of stakeholder 
attribution of responsibility for that crisis.  These events can be grouped together in 
crisis clusters based on these levels of responsibility.  Further, SCCT suggests crisis 
managers should use these clusters as a guide and try and match the level of 
attributed responsibility when selecting a response strategy.  Hence, the model 
recommends ‘matched’ strategies for use at different times and dissuades crisis 
managers from using other ‘mismatched’ strategies.  While there is increasing 
research within this frame, it is widely acknowledged (Coombs, 2010; Coombs & 
Holladay, 2010, Fediuk et al, 2010) that considerably more research is needed on the 
interactions and effects of the component parts of the SCCT to improve its predictive 
powers.      
Organisational attributes within the SCCT model to date have been operationalised 
through the overarching construct of performance history that may affect perceptions 
of the crisis event or the organisation, or both (Coombs & Holladay, 2001).  A multi-
dimensional construct, performance history includes a consideration of financial 
performance (operating history), any previous crises the organisation has 
experienced (crisis history) and an examination of its past relationships with key 
stakeholders (relationship history).  This last construct has particular importance for 
the study of public relations which is largely predicated on managing relationships 
between an organisation and its various stakeholders (Cutlip et al, 2010; Ledingham 
& Bruning, 1998; Bruning & Ledingham, 2000).  Through this lens, a crisis is 
viewed as an episode in a larger relationship between an organisation and its 
stakeholders (Coombs, 2000).  Any preceding relationships and post-crisis 
relationships become important in understanding the overall organisation-
stakeholder relationship.   
The limited studies to date on relationship history in crisis (see for example Brown 
& White, 2011; Coombs & Holladay, 2001; Lyon & Cameron, 2004; Jeong, 2009) 
focus on relationship history as operationalised through the evaluative quality of 
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relationship character, that is, whether the organisation has positive or negative 
relationships with its stakeholders.  Research in organisational studies has 
demonstrated the importance of stakeholder relationships to an organisation’s 
survival (e.g. Hannan & Freeman, 1989).  New organisations have limited 
stakeholder relationships, thereby placing them at risk of challenges to their 
legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).  They are operating without the ‘safety net of 
interorganisational linkages and trust’ that comes with age (Kor & Misangyi, 2008, 
p. 1347) and have a higher risk of failure (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994, Singh et al, 1986).   
As organisations age, they are more likely to develop stronger exchange 
relationships and, consequently, come to have their actions endorsed by powerful 
collective actors, thus being more likely to be viewed as legitimate (Stinchcombe, 
1968).   New organisations are less likely to be seen among stakeholders as 
legitimate.  Thus, an organisation’s age may play an important part in understanding 
the strength and quality of its relationships with the external community prior to a 
crisis and may influence the perception of the organisation when a crisis event 
occurs.   
The liability of newness (Hannan & Freeman, 1989) that operates on new 
organisations may be compounded during a time of crisis when legitimacy is 
challenged, therefore, organisational age may be an important situational factor for 
crisis managers to consider in planning their response strategies to protect 
organisational legitimacy.  Massey (2004) provided some preliminary explanations 
on this link through his work on how different types of firms experience the impact 
of a crisis on their legitimacy but his focus was on specialist vs generalist 
organisations.  Rhee & Valdez (2009) have also raised the variable of organisational 
age in their theoretical mapping of potential contextual factors impacting an 
organisation’s reputation during a crisis event.  This study adds explanatory depth to 
the current focus in crisis research on relationship character within the relationship 
history construct by considering the related influence of organisational age on levels 
of attributed responsibility, organisational reputation and legitimacy during crisis.   
If situational factors such as relationship history are present during a crisis, Coombs 
(1998) suggests they may change or ‘intensify’ the attributions made by stakeholders 
during the crisis which could impact the outcomes for the organisation.  This 
becomes an important consideration in the selection of an effective response strategy 
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as a previously recommended response (i.e. the match) may no longer have the 
desired effect.  Early findings in the research literature suggest the relationship 
character aspect of relationship history may have an intensifier effect (see, for 
example, Coombs, 1998) albeit a weak one. This study furthers this line of research 
by considering whether an organisation’s age has this effect during a crisis and 
whether this interacts with relationship character to strengthen or weaken any 
intensifier effect.  If demonstrated, this would suggest new organisations with poor 
relationships with their stakeholders should enact different crisis responses than 
mature ones with positive relationships to achieve better stakeholder support 
following a crisis.   
An understanding of the paths by which an intensifier effect works is emerging from 
empirical studies.  Higher responsibility for a crisis event is generally linked with a 
less favourable organisational reputation (Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Lyon & 
Cameron, 2004; Verhoeven et al, 2012).  Therefore, if situational factors change the 
attributions of responsibility, there should be a subsequent change to judgments on 
reputation.  Earlier research favoured an indirect effect (Coombs & Holladay, 2001) 
through responsibility for this effect whereas later research favoured a direct effect 
on reputation (Coombs, 2006) without change to responsibility.  More recent 
explanations have again implied a mediated effect through responsibility (Coombs, 
2010).  Further work is needed to better understand how people attribute crisis 
responsibility to an organisation given its central focus within crisis models such as 
the SCCT (Coombs, 2010) as well as other related models  (An et al, 2011).  Fediuk 
et al (2010) argue that crisis research needs to become more sophisticated in its 
modelling and investigate more causal and meditational analysis.  This study 
responds to this call by directly investigating the mediation effect of responsibility 
within the SCCT framework to refine our understanding of the paths of influence.  
When an organisation forms and uses its communication strategy to respond to a 
crisis event, it either implicitly or explicitly has an inherent goal for that 
communication.  Fediuk et al (2010) have described crisis responses as persuasive 
communication designed to repair or re-establish organisational reputation and 
legitimacy and thus, the study of these responses should focus on how they impact 
the perceptions of the organisational stakeholders to whom they are addressed.  
Coombs, Frandsen, Holladay and Johansen (2010) suggest this requires a focus on 
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audience-oriented research (see for example, Jorgensen, 1996; Lee, 2004; Dean, 
2004) as opposed to much of the earlier informal crisis research which focused on 
descriptive studies.  Fediuk et al (2010) argue that the SCCT model, which is widely 
used by crisis researchers and represented in the crisis management literature, is 
more focused on identifying the choices for an organisation in crisis than identifying 
the impact of the choices made.   They suggest the model helps to explicate when to 
use different strategy options but research to date within the framework has not 
largely shown what the impact of any choice will be.  To assess impact, a change in 
methodological approach is needed with one suggested change being the 
introduction of pre- and post-testing of the dependent variables (Fediuk et al, 2010; 
Pace et al, 2010).  By doing so, a richer understanding of the relationships among the 
constructs in the model can be achieved.  Without greater explication of these 
relationships, Ihlen (2010) warns that existing crisis management tools will be 
ineffective in guiding managers facing future risks and crises.   
This study responds directly to this call for a change in methodological approach.  It 
uses a pre- and post-test methodology to confirm the basic propositions of the SCCT 
model concerning the influence of the crisis cluster on stakeholder perceptions of 
organisational responsibility and the matching of crisis strategy to a crisis cluster on 
the basis of these initial attributions.  Having reaffirmed the foundations of the 
model, it further uses the pre- and post-test methodology to extend the SCCT model 
to consider the particular area of interest of the intensifier effect of relationship 
history and its effect on strategy outcomes.  This study also incorporates 
measurement of changes in legitimacy as well as changes in reputation, recognising 
the importance of both these intangible assets to an organisation.  This provides 
further explanatory depth to the current explication of the SCCT model.     
This study is informed by four major research streams:  
1) the influence of crisis response on organisational outcomes post- crisis 
(Brocato et al, 2012; Claeys et al, 2010; Claeys & Cauberghe, 2012; Coombs, 
2004, 2006; Lee, 2004; Lyon & Cameron, 2004; Verhoeven et al, 2012),  
2) the importance of pre-crisis organisational attributes on post-crisis 
organisational outcomes (Brown & White, 2011; Coombs & Holladay, 1996; 
Kim et al, 2009; Lyon & Cameron, 2004; Rhees & Valdez, 2009),  
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3) the impact of the liability of newness on organisational outcomes (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1989; Singh et al, 1986) and  
4) the organisational impacts of challenges to legitimacy in a crisis situation 
(Elsbach, 1994; Massey, 2004; Suchman, 1995).   
The relevant literatures from these streams are reviewed and gaps identified to 
progress research into more effective response models with which to better guide 
managerial decision-making during a crisis event.   
Establishing the Research Problem and Research Questions  
This thesis is guided by the overall research problem: 
How does an organisation’s selection of a crisis response strategy and that 
organisation’s relationship history influence stakeholder perceptions of its 
responsibility in different crisis situations, and, subsequently, its intangible 
assets of reputation and legitimacy? 
From this central problem, a range of research questions were derived to guide each 
stage of the overall research project. These research questions are:  
Research Question 1 
How do crisis response strategies used in response to crises from different crisis 
clusters influence stakeholder perceptions of organisational reputation and 
legitimacy?   
Research Question 2 
How does responsibility mediate the influence of response strategies used during 
crises from different clusters on stakeholder perceptions of organisational reputation 
and legitimacy? 
Research Question 3 
How does an organisation’s responsibility for a crisis affect stakeholder perceptions 
of its reputation and legitimacy? 
 
7 
 
Research Question 4  
How does an organisation’s relationship history with its stakeholders influence 
stakeholder perceptions of its reputation and legitimacy? 
Research Question 5  
How do stakeholder perceptions of an organisation’s responsibility mediate the 
influence of its relationship history on its reputation and legitimacy? 
Research Question 6  
How does an organisation’s relationship history and its response to a crisis from 
different crisis clusters influence stakeholder perceptions of its reputation and 
legitimacy? 
Research Question 7  
How does responsibility mediate the influence of an organisation’s relationship 
history and its response to a crisis from different crisis clusters on stakeholder 
perceptions of its reputation and legitimacy? 
An Overview of this Study’s Research Methodology 
Based on the research questions posed and previous empirical work in related areas 
(see for example, Brocato et al, 2012; Coombs & Holladay, 2001; Coombs & 
Schmidt, 2000; McDonald, 2005; Verhoeven et al, 2012), this study works within a 
positivist experimental framework to test the hypothesised causal relationships 
among the factors under study.  Four stages of research incorporating six interrelated 
experimental studies were planned to address the different foci for the project. While 
each stage was designed to meet a specific set of objectives, the first three stages also 
acted as pilot studies for the successful manipulation of the independent variables in 
the stimuli material used in the final stage, and for testing the reliability of the scales 
for the measured variables of reputation, legitimacy and responsibility. 
Stage One comprised three experiments to test the impact of organisational response 
strategy on stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy in different crisis 
situations.  The role of responsibility in mediating this relationship was also 
considered.  Stage Two focused explicitly on the variable of responsibility given its 
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centrality to the model.  One experiment was undertaken where crisis responsibility 
was manipulated as an independent variable to ascertain its impact on organisational 
reputation and legitimacy.  The third stage then shifted the focus to the contextual 
environment during crises (Rhee & Valdez, 2009), testing the impact of the potential 
intensifier of relationship history.  Stage Three involved one experiment where the 
two attributes of relationship history (relationship character and organisational age) 
were considered separately and tested for their impacts on crisis responsibility, 
organisational reputation and legitimacy.  Having established the impact of the 
separate independent variables of crisis cluster, strategy and relationship history in 
the first three stages, Stage Four examined the hypothesised interaction of all of the 
independent variables to ascertain the presence and impact of the predicted 
intensifier effect of relationship history and to better understand the role of 
responsibility in stakeholder judgments on reputation and legitimacy.   
A nonprobability sampling strategy was used for all experiment in this project, 
drawing from students across a diverse range of disciplines at four major Australian 
universities.  Approximately 1,600 students participated in the study, with sample 
sizes for each of the six experiments ranging from 107 – 559.  The students 
represented the non-victim audiences of a crisis event. While victims have an 
intimate link with the crisis situation and are generally well informed of the specific 
nature of the crisis event, non-victim stakeholders are likely to have much less 
specific knowledge and interest in the crisis event, however, their post-crisis impact 
on the organisations in crisis can be just as important as that of victims.  In addition, 
there are usually more non-victims than victims so their views can have a major 
effect.      
The use of student cohorts follows the crisis response studies of Massey (2001), 
Coombs (2004), Coombs and Holladay (1996), Dean (2004), Haigh and Brubaker 
(2010), Haigh and Dardis (2008) and Pace et al (2010).  While caution is always 
needed in utilising students as representatives of the broader community given the 
different demographic and psychographic characteristics of each group, Coombs 
(2004) and Lyon and Cameron (2004) found limited difference between students and 
community members in their tests of crisis model experiments.   
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The experiments used a multi-factorial design approach to allow the examination of 
the simultaneous effects of more than one independent variable (Neuman, 2006).  A 
pre-test post-test design (Campbell & Stanley, 1963) was used within this framework 
to explicate the causal factors and to better explain the change in stakeholder 
judgments in light of new information which has been identified as important for 
further theoretical development within the crisis literature (Haigh & Brubaker, 2010; 
Pace et al, 2010).  Written stimuli in the form of media articles were used across the 
different experiments.  The media articles included relevant information on a 
hypothetical food manufacturing company used for this study (BellaFoods Pty Ltd), 
the crisis events experienced by the company and their response to the crisis event.  
After reading each media article, the participants completed a questionnaire.  The 
questionnaires contained items to measure reputation, legitimacy and responsibility 
as well as manipulation checks for the independent variables and questions to 
capture basic demographic information to help describe the sample.  
Ethics approval was sought and achieved prior to the collection of any data.  
Participation in the study was completely voluntary with participants free to 
withdraw at any point. 
Data from each of the experiments was entered into SPSS Version 19.  Descriptive 
statistics, correlation analysis and a series of multivariate and univariate analysis of 
variance measures (ANOVA/MANOVA) and co-variance measures 
(ANCOVA/MANCOVA) were used to test the relevant hypotheses for each 
experiment.         
Theoretical Contributions and Managerial Implications from this Study   
This study seeks to make a number of specific theoretical contributions to the 
ongoing development of one of the dominant models in crisis communication and 
the refinement of our understanding of the relationships between organisational and 
environmental conditions contained within the model.  Firstly, this study will address 
the calls for a better understanding of how stakeholders perceive a company’s 
response during crisis by looking at changes in stakeholder assessments over time 
(Fediuk et al, 2010; Pace et al, 2010).  The methodological approach used in this 
study will assess directly the protective capacity of the organisational response.  This 
assessment will show whether the strategy mitigates or aggravates the damage 
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caused by the crisis event (Rhees & Valdez, 2009) and whether similar or different 
outcomes are established across different crisis events and when used by 
organisations with different backgrounds.  In doing so, this study is building on the 
theoretical development of response strategy researchers such as Bradford and 
Garrett (1995), Coombs and Holladay (1996), Coombs and Schmidt (2000), Dean 
(2004), Lee (2004, 2005) and Lyon and Cameron (1998, 2004) who have mapped 
out the initial influence paths used in common crisis models. 
Secondly, this study will reassess the accepted notions within the Situational Crisis 
Communication Theory (SCCT) of matched versus mismatched strategies and their 
impact on reputation and extend the model to assess whether the same theoretical 
matching of strategy can be applied to protect an organisation’s legitimacy.  
Reputation and legitimacy have been theoretically defined as distinctive constructs 
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Staw & Epstein, 2000), however, most testing within 
crisis models such as the SCCT focus on reputational outcomes.  Given the 
increasing focus within the public relations discipline on legitimacy management 
(Bartlett et al, 2007; Holmstrom, 2005) and the suggestion of An et al (2011) that 
organisations select response strategies ‘not only to minimize organisational crisis 
responsibility and damage to the organisation’s reputation, but also to re-establish 
the organisation’s legitimacy’ (p. 71), the analysis of this path of influence is of 
interest to crisis researchers and managers.  
Thirdly, this study will help progress the understanding of the role of organisational 
responsibility for a crisis in stakeholder judgments of an organisation’s reputation 
and legitimacy.  While the logic of many of the crisis response models implies 
mediation through responsibility, there has been limited empirical testing of this 
specific relationship.  Fediuk et al (2010) have called for a greater research focus on 
the role of mediators in crisis models to better understand the complexity of 
decision-making during crisis. 
Finally, this study will respond to the call for more consideration to be given to the 
role of intensifiers in strategy selection (Coombs & Holladay, 2001; Crandall et al, 
2010).    This study focuses on the crisis intensifier of relationship history but 
extends its current representation in the crisis literature as an organisation’s 
relationship with the community to also include the influence of an organisation’s 
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age.   Organisational age has been identified as both an asset and a liability to an 
organisation (Stinchcombe, 1968), thus, it is important to ascertain the impact of this 
construct during a crisis situation and how this factor might strengthen or weaken 
stakeholder assessments of an organisation’s response (Rhees & Valdez, 2009) with 
a subsequent effect on its reputation and legitimacy. 
In terms of management practice, this study will provide crisis managers with a 
greater understanding of the potential outcomes of different crisis response strategies 
based on specific characteristics of their organisation and the crisis they are facing.   
This knowledge should help to reduce the risk of inappropriate strategy selection and 
thereby better protect the organisational assets of reputation and legitimacy. 
Navigating the Thesis 
Chapter 2 of this thesis reviews relevant literature to establish the importance of 
crisis management as a field of inquiry and contextualise the danger that crisis events 
bring to the organisational assets of reputation and legitimacy.  The established crisis 
model of Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) and related emergent 
models that explore contextual factors for organisations in crisis are considered and 
the need for a stronger understanding of the impact of organisational response in a 
crisis event established.   The identified contextual factors that change or intensify 
the conditions under which stakeholders make judgments on organisational 
reputation and legitimacy are reviewed, drawing from theoretical modelling by crisis 
researchers and reported empirical studies.  The contextual factor of relationship 
history as a potential intensifier is discussed in depth and the benefit of considering 
relationship history as a multi-component construct which brings together 
organisational age and an organisation’s relationships with the community 
established.  Relevant literature on the role of organisational responsibility as an 
influencing factor in stakeholder judgments during crisis events is also reviewed, 
confirming the need for greater clarification for a potential mediation role for 
responsibility.       
Chapter 3 outlines in detail the research methodology used for this study.  It explains 
the overall research design and research instruments used, as well as the analysis 
strategy applied to determine the results.  Ethical considerations and research 
limitations for this study are also addressed. 
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Chapters 4 – 7 outline the main research results from the six experiments in this 
study, addressing the relevant research questions and hypotheses for each 
experiment.  Each experiment is described in detail including the sample used, the 
success of the various manipulation checks for independent variables and reliability 
measures for the dependent variables.  The strength of support for each hypothesis is 
established and implications for future experiments in the series considered.  Chapter 
4 focuses on the three experiments within Stage One which test the basic 
propositions of the SCCT model on match vs mismatched strategy across different 
crisis clusters using the pre and post-crisis methodology of this study.  Chapter 5 
reports on Stage Two where the role of organisational responsibility in stakeholder 
assessments of reputation and legitimacy was investigated. Chapter 6 outlines the 
results for Stage Three which focused on the potential intensifier of relationship 
history, treating the subattributes of relationship character and organisational age 
separately.  Chapter 7 reports the results for the Stage Four experiment which tested 
the separate factors under investigation in the previous stages  -  crisis cluster, 
response strategy and relationship history (relationship character; organisational age) 
– to identify interaction effects and the mediating role of responsibility.    
Chapter 8 brings together the relevant literature from Chapter 2 and the results from 
Chapters 4-7 to discuss the similarities and differences in findings across the six 
mini-studies.  In doing so, it addresses the seven research questions that guided this 
study.  Conclusions are drawn on the influence of a company’s organisational 
response and its relationship history on stakeholder judgments on its reputation and 
legitimacy during different crisis events and the role organisational responsibility 
plays is explained.  The theoretical contributions of this study are highlighted and the 
implications for practice established.  Further avenues for research in the field are 
discussed and the limitations of this study noted. 
Conclusion 
Planning and implementing an effective crisis response during a period of 
uncertainty is a critical goal for crisis managers.  This study responds to calls from 
the academy and industry for more empirical testing of the foundations on which 
crisis response models are built and progresses our understanding of the factors that 
influence the effectiveness of such models. This chapter has outlined the background 
13 
 
to this study by establishing the importance to organisations of effective crisis 
response models and the factors that influence their effectiveness, and highlighting 
the need for more research in this area.  The research problem and research questions 
were identified and the research approach explained.  The major contributions for 
this study have been identified while recognising the project’s limitations. 
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Chapter 2  Review of Relevant Literature 
Introduction 
This literature review synthesises previous research that informs contemporary crisis 
response models within the disciplines of public relations and management.  
Specifically, this discussion outlines key concepts critical to the overall research 
problem around which this study is organised: 
How does an organisation’s selection of a crisis response strategy and that 
organisation’s relationship history influence stakeholder perceptions of its 
responsibility in different crisis situations, and, subsequently, its intangible assets of 
reputation and legitimacy? 
This review presents and analyses relevant literature, and identifies and documents 
important gaps in those literatures.  These are addressed through seven specific 
research questions.  This review also presents the hypotheses that were tested in this 
study.   
As outlined in Figure 1, the review firstly confirms the importance of crisis 
management in contemporary organisations to protect their competitive positions.  
Next, it demonstrates the growing importance of the intangible assets of reputation 
and legitimacy to organisations and the threat to such assets during crisis.  The 
review then considers four major factors that have been identified in the literature as 
influencing stakeholder perceptions of an organisation in crisis and are relevant to 
the development of effective crisis response models.  These factors include the crisis 
event experienced by the organisation, its actual and perceived responsibility for 
such a crisis and its subsequent response to the crisis.   The theoretical links among 
these first three factors and their impact on stakeholder perceptions of organisational 
reputation and legitimacy will be discussed in the context of contemporary crisis 
response models. Finally, relevant literature on the fourth major factor - the 
situational factor of performance history as operationalised in this study through an 
organisation’s relationship history with its stakeholders - is reviewed.  This factor is 
considered in terms of how the presence of a situational factor may change 
stakeholder perceptions of the crisis event and the subsequent organisational 
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response and thereby influence the effectiveness of that response in protecting 
intangible organisational assets in a crisis event.   
 
 
Figure 1:  Overview of literature review 
The Importance of Crisis Management to Contemporary Organisations 
Given the high cost of failure for organisations involved in dealing with crisis, 
significant attention has been paid within the public relations discipline to crisis 
management over the past twenty years.  While the risk of experiencing a crisis has 
not necessarily increased, the potential damage from one has, given the growth in 
technology-led global information transfer.  This has led organisations to focus more 
on their crisis planning and decision-making.  Both danger and opportunity, the two 
words reflected in the Chinese characters for crisis (Dowling, 2002), are abundant in 
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times of crisis, perhaps leading to organisational failure (Lerbinger, 1997) or 
organisational renewal (Fall & Massey, 2005; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2002).  For many 
organisations, the crisis situation represents a significant turning point (Fink, 1986) 
and the decisions made by the organisation during the early stages of a crisis will 
guide it towards either the possibility of a desirable or an undesirable outcome 
(Coombs & Holladay, 2009; Hermann, 1963; Pauchant et al, 1991; Sarstedt, 2009). 
Decision-making is the essence of crisis management (Fink, 1986).  Tracing its roots 
back to the Greek word, “krisis” which means decision (Laufer, 2007), crises have 
been described frequently as ‘occasions for decisions’ (Rosenthal, 1991, p. 17).  
Crisis decision-making involves the ‘strategic selection of public announcements and 
policy decisions made by the organisation to alleviate a crisis and restore public 
confidence’ (Williams & Olaniran, 1994, p. 8).  As such, crisis managers must make 
decisions on both the operational and communicative components of a crisis 
response, often during times of uncertainty and intense pressure to act quickly 
(Coombs, 2007b).  Recognising this dynamic nature, Coombs and Holladay (2009, 
p.119) describe the crisis situation as a ‘mosaic’, the composition of which is still 
being identified through contemporary crisis research.  It is the communicative 
components of the crisis response which is the focus of this study.    
Organisational Crises Defined 
An organisational crisis is defined as an unexpected, nonroutine event that creates 
uncertainty and threatens an organisation’s priority goals (Seeger, Sellnow & Ulmer, 
1998) or its very survival (Lerbinger, 1997).  The crisis can represent an actual threat 
to the organisation (Allen & Caillouet, 1994; Barton, 2000) or simply a potential 
threat (Lerbinger, 1997).  The perceptual nature of crisis supports the co-creation 
aspects of public relations (Botan & Taylor, 2004) where meaning is socially 
constructed.  Outside of physical harm and the disruption to operations, a crisis has 
the potential to do damage to an organisation’s reputation through lowering 
perceptions of its trustworthiness (Coombs & Holladay, 1996) and by raising 
questions as to whether the organisation is conforming to the social expectations of 
stakeholders (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Heath et al, 
2009) which thereby threatens its legitimacy. 
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These threats to organisational reputation and legitimacy during a crisis have been 
explored by a number of researchers in public relations and management.  Lerbinger 
(1997) argues that the erosion of a company’s reputation is the greatest danger in a 
crisis.  Reputation is widely recognised as a valued resource (Winkleman, 1999; 
Roberts & Dowling, 2002; Walker, 2010) and has been rated in a number of studies 
as the most important intangible asset of an organisation (Gibson et al, 2006; Hall, 
1993; Haywood, 2002).  Given the value of reputation as an organisational asset, its 
potential erosion during a crisis should be of major concern and the crisis period 
brings significant challenges to an organisation’s desire to stabilise any further 
damage to its reputation (Highhouse et al, 2009). Thus, reputation management is a 
critical goal for the organisation and serves as a foundational area in considering an 
organisation’s crisis response.   
To protect its reputation, an organisation needs to consider carefully its response to a 
crisis situation.  It must recognise the importance of not only its own view on its 
response but the perceptions of its stakeholders (Dowling, 1994).  Penrose (2000) 
highlights the importance of the public’s perception of a crisis, suggesting that 
ultimately, such public perception is reality.  Coombs (2009) reaffirms this position 
stating: “if stakeholders believe there is a crisis, the organization is in a crisis unless 
it can successfully persuade stakeholders it is not” (p. 99).   
While a strong reputation may have the ability to somewhat ‘immunise’ an 
organisation (Raithel et al, 2010, p.389) prior to a crisis, its communicative response 
to the crisis can serve to limit and even repair the reputational damage (Sisco, 2010).   
A strategic communicative response can best protect the reputational resource by 
assessing the crisis situation and selecting a crisis response strategy that fits the crisis 
situation (Coombs & Holladay, 2002).   Kim, Avery and Lariscy (2009) suggest 
though that, following a review of 18 years of published research in crisis 
communication, the ‘bridge between theory and practice’ (p.448) that would support 
such appropriate selection may not be as strong as would be expected.  A study of 
media reports following chemical accidents in the United States (Holladay, 2009) 
goes further, suggesting that in many cases, no organisational spokesperson is 
featured, challenging not just the notion of an appropriate selection of strategy by 
organisations in danger but the position that any strategy was being selected at all.  
Ongoing empirical research with specific implications and advice to managers on the 
18 
 
outcomes of strategy selection is important to progress this field and close the gap 
between theory and practice. 
Ulmer and Sellnow (2000) have conceptualised a crisis as a threat not only to an 
organisation’s reputation but also to its legitimacy.  To counter any loss of 
legitimacy, the organisation must re-establish congruency between the values 
implied by its actions and accepted societal norms (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975).   An 
organisation’s underlying character is likely to be revealed in a time of crisis (More, 
1995) and its response must demonstrate the importance of its underpinning 
organisational values.  An organisation can use communication strategically as a 
response to legitimacy threats because corporate discourse shapes how stakeholders 
view an organisation (Allen & Caillouet, 1994; Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Crandall et 
al, 2010; Marcus & Goodman, 1991).   
Over the last three decades, many authors (see for example, Caywood & Stocker, 
1993; Fearn-Banks, 1996; Heath & O’Hair, 2009; Lerbinger, 1997, Regester & 
Larkin, 2008; Ulmer, Sellnow & Seeger, 2007) have provided operational 
frameworks for developing crisis preparation plans for organisations.  These 
frameworks identify critical elements of crisis planning including assessing pre-crisis 
reputation, identifying organisational risk, preparing organisational resources for 
crisis response and implementing recovery and evaluation processes as part of post-
crisis management.    However, as Williams and Olaniran (1994) point out, there has 
been a strong focus in the academic and practitioner literature on providing 
prescriptive processes organisations should follow in crisis.  This has been at the 
expense of a greater focus on exploring the fundamental complexities of crisis 
decision-making.  The true value of crisis response guidelines cannot be realised 
unless appropriate decisions are made by organisations.    In making these decisions, 
organisations need to consider the anticipated reactions of their stakeholders, not just 
their own concerns (Coombs, 2010).  Specifically, this means that organisations need 
to be mindful of receiver-oriented versus sender-oriented crisis approaches (Coombs, 
Frandsen, Holladay & Johansen, 2010).   This imperative requires empirical research 
with receivers of messages to better explore their reactions.  This approach is the 
framework under which this study operates. 
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Benson (1988) challenged crisis researchers to thoroughly explore the variables that 
impact the effectiveness of a crisis response to ensure that contemporary 
organisations facing crisis can make informed decisions.  With this research still in 
its infancy, Coombs and Holladay (2002) note that crisis researchers have only just 
begun to ‘unpack how to use communicative responses to protect reputations’ (p. 
166).  This study helps to inform this gap in public relations literature and practice 
by providing further evidence on which to better understand the stakeholder 
perceptions of an organisation’s crisis response.  In particular, it considers the impact 
of crisis response strategies used in different crisis situations on stakeholder 
perceptions of the organisational assets of reputation and legitimacy as well as the 
influence of judgments on organisational responsibility for the crisis event on these 
perceptions.  It considers these influences in the context of an organisation’s pre-
crisis relationships with its stakeholders and how the presence of such relationship 
history may lead to different stakeholder perceptions and therefore, different 
outcomes for the organisation.  Managing an organisation’s response to a crisis is a 
complex management task and one that is undertaken within a high risk 
environment.  Without further study, Ihlen (2010) suggests there is a danger that 
existing crisis management tools will be ‘insufficiently sophisticated to grapple with 
risk and crisis in the 21st Century’ (p. 101), thus further research to unpack the 
complex decision-making environment is needed. 
Given this context of crisis management and response, this review now considers 
how the organisational assets of reputation and legitimacy, so valued by 
organisations, are developed and highlights the consequences of challenges to these 
assets during a crisis event. 
The Organisational Assets of Reputation and Legitimacy 
Increased competition in a globalised economy has demonstrated the need to identify 
drivers of sustainable competitive advantage (Schwaiger, 2004). This search is no 
longer restricted to tangible assets with organisations now increasing their attention 
on the intangible assets that provide a major contribution to their success or failure.  
Social capital theory argues that interpersonal and interorganisational networks are 
vitally important in enabling organisations to access needed resources that others 
control (Amburgey & Rao, 1996; Burt, 1992; Lin, 2002).  Organisations that are 
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viewed as being accountable and reliable are likely to be highly sought in exchange 
relationships (Hager et al, 2004), hence the ever increasing focus on the 
organisational assets of reputation and legitimacy which are built from these 
constructs.  These assets, like tangible assets, need to be established and maintained 
over the life of the organisation and, when trouble strikes, defended and rebuilt to re-
establish the desired levels.  Schwaiger (2004) argues that increasing an 
organisation’s ability to create and exploit these intangible assets helps the 
organisation to drive its key markets, rather than to be market driven.   
Corporate Reputation: Providing Immediate and Long-Term Benefits 
Fombrun and van Riel (1997) define corporate reputation as an ‘overall estimation of 
a firm’s past actions and results that describes its ability to deliver valued outcomes 
to multiple stakeholders’ (p. 6).  A strong reputation is critical for modern 
organisations when competing for resources within a heavily populated environment.  
Public relations and management scholars suggest that a firm’s reputation is an asset 
vital to its future economic success (Kitchen & Laurence, 2003; Weigelt & Camerer, 
1998) and executives worldwide have identified corporate reputation as one of the 
most substantial drivers of corporate success (Dunbar & Schwalbach, 2001; Kitchen 
& Laurence, 2003; Schwaiger et al, 2009).  Some management academics (see for 
example, Jones, Jones & Little, 2000) suggest that considerations of reputation are 
no less significant in today’s complex business environment than those involved 
with operational, legal and financial decisions. While Argenti and Druckenmiller 
(2004) argue that organisations increasingly recognise the importance of their 
reputation, recent research suggests most organisations still do an inadequate job of 
managing their reputation and the associated risks that may damage it (Eccles et al, 
2007; Sarstedt, 2009) .  One recent research report (Heil & Whittaker, 2011) 
described the current environment as a state where ‘corporate reputations lie all 
around us in tatters’ (p. 1363). 
Favourable reputations allow organisations to attract attention and resources from 
key stakeholders over and above their competitors (Boyd et al, 2010; Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1982).  Favourable reputations also have been linked to a range of activities 
including purchasing of an organisation’s products, investing in its shares, attracting 
top employee talent, motivating workers to achieve higher levels of productivity, 
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increasing job satisfaction and being recommended by other businesses (Alsop, 
2004; Davies, Chun, da Silva & Roper, 2003; Deephouse, 2000; Dowling, 2002; 
Fang, 2005; Fombrun & van Riel, 2004; Hearit, 2001; Lerbinger, 1997; 
McCorkindale, 2008; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006; Schwaiger et al, 2009; Walsh et al, 
2009).  Such supportive behaviour can provide better access to capital markets which 
decreases capital costs (Beatty & Ritter, 1986), enhances customer retention and 
increase purchase rates  (Klein & Leffler, 1981; Preece et al, 1995), allows price 
premiums (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986), reduces staff turnover and increases 
productivity (Nakra, 2000).   All of this can create competitive barriers for 
organisations without such favourable reputations (Boyd et al, 2010; Deephouse, 
2000; Fombrun, 1996; Milgrom & Roberts, 1982; Walsh et al, 2008) and supports 
the view of reputation as a ‘potentially priceless asset’ (Highhouse et al, 2009, p. 
1481). 
Within the public relations literature, reputation management is defined as the 
management of relationships between the organisation and its various stakeholders to 
build a strong reputation (Ledingham & Bruning, 1998).  Organisational success is 
predicated on maintaining an effective balance in these relationships (Bruning et al, 
2006; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Rowley, 1997; Savage, Nix, Whitehead & Blair, 
1991; Yang, 2007).  This places considerable pressure on the reputation management 
function.  In the early 1990s, reputation management was predicted to be the key 
focus of public relations (Patterson, 1993).  However, reputation management has 
also been a key focus of scholarly work in a range of disciplines including 
economics, sociology, accounting and organisational studies (Fombrun & van Riel, 
1997; Highhouse et al, 2009).   While this work has advanced the interest in 
corporate reputation as an organisational asset, there is no general agreement on 
what a corporate reputation actually is (Barnett et al, 2006; Schwaiger; 2004; Sobol 
et al, 1992; Walker, 2010).  Many definitions exist which increase the difficulty of 
comparing research in this ‘multidisciplinary and disconnected’ area (Highhouse et 
al, 2009, p.1481) and a major study of 27 years of reputation research found limited 
repeat citations for any one definition (Walker, 2010).   
Weigert and Camerer (1988) emphasise the importance of past organisational actions 
by suggesting that reputation is a set of attributes ascribed to a firm inferred from 
these past actions.  This reflects the etymological roots in Latin of reputation as ‘re-
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putare’ or ‘to think back upon’ (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008, p.70).  By knowing 
about an organisation’s past, we can make assumptions about its future. Such a 
‘think backward, act forward’ position (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008, p. 70) is 
important to this study where the assessment of an organisation’s relationship history 
potentially moderates the stakeholder perception of its crisis response.    
Conceptualised through the Perceptions of Others 
Walker (2010) notes that one of the key reputational attributes found across most 
major studies is that reputation is based on the perceptions of a range of stakeholders 
and, as such, is socially constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).  While the 
organisation may undertake considerable efforts to present itself in a positive light 
(Basdeo et al, 2006; Brooks et al, 2003; Highhouse et al, 2009), reputation is 
generally considered as ‘an evaluation stakeholders make about the organisation’ 
(Coombs, 2007b, p. 24), and as such is not completely under anyone’s control 
(Walker, 2010).  Hall (1992) extends these definitions by suggesting that reputation 
consists of the knowledge and emotions held by individuals about the organisation.  
Recently this approach has been refined by Schwaiger (2004) who suggests that 
reputation has a cognitive component of competence and an affective component of 
sympathy.  He suggests performance aspects drive competence whereas 
organisational responsibility for particular actions has a positive impact on 
sympathy.  This highlights the influence of both corporate communication and 
corporate behaviour on stakeholder assessments (Raithel et al, 2010).  A major 
multistakeholder study of large German firms before and after the financial crisis of 
2008 using primary and secondary data sources showed that the emotive or affective 
component of corporate reputation was at least as important as the cognitive 
component in understanding the protective nature of corporate reputations (Raithel et 
al, 2010).   
In groups such as the general public, the affective component becomes even more 
important as these heterogeneous groups are less likely to be abreast of key 
information drivers when compared with specialist groups such as investors or 
opinion leaders.  Thiessen and Ingenhoff (2011) have supported this multi-
dimensional concept of reputation in their work towards a systematic integrative 
crisis communication framework, highlighting the cognitive-functional, the 
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cognitive-social and the affective-emotional reputational dimensions.  Given the 
importance of both the cognitive and affective aspects in a crisis situation and the 
explicit link to performance history and organisational responsibility, the study has 
been mindful of Schwaiger’s and Thiessen & Ingenhoff’s definitions in its design.  
Communication messages designed to remind stakeholders of competency and/or 
address levels of organisational responsibility for a crisis may either protect or 
further damage an organisation’s reputation during a crisis event.  Greater empirical 
research in this area is needed to better understand the extent of this damage and the 
value of mitigation strategies.       
Research shows that reputations are multi-dimensional (Zyglidopoulos, 2003) and 
are built through the direct and indirect experiences stakeholders have with the 
organisation (Brown & Roed, 2001; Fombrun & van Riel, 2004; Romenti, 2010).  
Direct experiences come through the specific interactions a stakeholder has with an 
organisation, for example, as a customer or shareholder (Lloyd, 2011; Walsh et al, 
2008).  Indirect interactions are mediated reports of how the organisation treats its 
stakeholders.  This could include news reports (Einwiller, Carroll & Korn, 2010; 
Wry, Deephouse & McNamara, 2006) or comments from family or friends.  
Information and comments are given salience when the reputation is formed (Carroll 
& McCombs, 2003) with some attributes providing more impact than others (Kiousis 
et al, 2007; Meijer & Kleinnijenhuis, 2006). Despite the best efforts of organisational 
policy and procedures to try and control as many of the direct experiences as 
possible, Carroll & McCombs (2003) suggest that indirect experiences are highly 
powerful when stakeholders are called upon to make reputational judgments.     
Many researchers (see for example, Coombs, 2004; Doorley & Garcia, 2006; Mahon 
& Wartick, 2003) argue that reputations are critically linked to the expectations of 
stakeholders, however, understanding the different expectations within 
organisational contexts is complex (Watson & White, 2010).  When expectations are 
exceeded, the organisation’s reputation is seen as more favourable.  Likewise, when 
expectations are breached, stakeholders perceive the organisation less positively and 
the reputation is harmed.   This link to expectations explains why corporate 
reputation is of such interest to crisis researchers.   A crisis is an event that threatens 
or violates the expectancies of stakeholders (Coombs, 2007b) and, thus, is a danger 
to the organisation’s reputation (Barton, 2000; Dilenschneider, 2000).  The 
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reputation management function will fail if the crisis destroys the relationship 
between the organisation and its stakeholders or if the organisation fails to meet 
stakeholder expectations (Finet, 1994) through its crisis response.  As organisations 
place more emphasis on their reputation, Coombs and Holladay (2002) argue that 
they need to place a similar emphasis on crisis management as a means of protecting 
reputational assets.  
Reputation as a Defensive Shield 
As reputations are built over time through direct and indirect experiences, 
organisations build reputational capital (Alsop, 2004).  This capital can act as a 
defensive shield (Coombs & Holladay, 2006) to protect the organisation from harm.  
Often described through the metaphor of an intangible bank account (Dowling, 
2002), reputational capital is designed to help organisations navigate difficult times 
such as a crisis.  The goodwill established through building strong stakeholder 
relationships will be called upon when a negative event happens.  Alsop (2004) 
suggests that a crisis will ‘tax any reputation and rob a company of some of its 
stored-up reputation capital’ (p. 17), however, with a strong capital base of 
reputation, the organisation’s reputation suffers less and recovers more quickly.  
Fombrun and van Riel (2004) propose that the critical link to recovering the 
dissipated value is the crisis response strategy, that is, how the crisis is handled once 
it has erupted.  Thus, refining the understanding of the effectiveness of crisis 
response strategies in different crisis situations is critical to crisis managers and is a 
central goal of this study. 
Walker (2010) highlights that reputations can be positive or negative, preferring to 
focus on the perspectives of different stakeholders compared with Fombrun’s 
traditional and most highly cited approach (1996) which suggests reputation is an 
aggregation of the perceptions of all stakeholders.  Regardless of the method, a 
positive reputation can provide what has been described as the ‘halo effect’ in which 
a generally positive attitude toward the company gives the company immunity to a 
certain extent (Bromley, 1993).  People want to believe good things of companies 
that have strong reputations and therefore, they are less likely to judge such 
companies negatively.   
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Stakeholders may ignore bad news about organisations that have a favourable 
reputation (Balzer & Sulsky, 1992), providing such companies with the benefit of 
the doubt during the initial phases of a crisis (Coombs, 2007b).   This may reduce 
negative speculation that crises often produce and makes it easier for the 
organisation to enact its response.  The reverse is also true.  Organisations with poor 
reputations may suffer from the ‘velcro effect’ (Coombs & Holladay, 2001), that is, 
people are more likely to believe bad things of companies that have bad reputations 
and this can reduce the effectiveness of response strategies designed to protect 
corporate reputation.  After reviewing more than 25 years of research in corporate 
reputation, Walker (2010) suggests more research is particularly needed in the area 
of how stakeholder groups perceive positive and negative signals such as those 
employed in crisis response strategies and the influence of such signalling on 
reputation. 
Investigating Reputational Damage: A Different Challenge for Crisis Researchers 
Fediuk et al (2010) and Pace et al (2010) have recently identified the limited depth of  
explanatory power of the mainstream crisis research which has led to most of the 
recognised crisis response models (see for example, Coombs, 2007b; Coombs and 
Schmidt, 2000; Lyon & Cameron, 2004; Pace et al, 2010).  While the theoretical 
development of the models often discuss the protective powers of crisis response 
strategy in reducing reputation damage, most studies only assess reputation (or any 
of the other variables of interest) at a point in time.  This allows for the impact of 
comparative approaches to be assessed at that point in time (so for example, does 
strategy (a) lead to a different outcome to strategy (b)) but it fails to uncover what 
impact strategy (a) was actually having on the variable under study.  The use of 
controls in studies has gone some way to addressing this impact but Fediuk et al 
(2010) and Pace et al (2010) have echoed a more distinct call for studies to look at 
the impact on reputation damage by doing pre- and post- testing of the variables 
under study.   
This change in methodology helps crisis researchers get closer to understanding the 
actual dynamics of the crisis situation and has been used as the stimulus for the 
design of this study.  Reputation has been assessed prior to a crisis event to provide 
baseline data to understand the impact of the variables under study at the time of the 
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crisis as well as at multiple times during the application of different independent 
variables.  This allows for an analysis of the impact not only on reputation as a 
discrete measure but on reputation change over time, thus providing a better 
explanation of the risk of reputational damage and the ability of organisational 
interventions to reduce this damage.   In doing so, this study provides a significant 
contribution to the crisis research literature through greater explanatory depth of the 
dynamics of the crisis situation.   
Summary 
An organisation’s reputation is recognised as a valuable asset that must be built and 
nurtured through corporate action and messaging that matches stakeholder 
expectations.  During a crisis event, this valuable asset is under threat.  This study 
extends the current research within public relations and management on how a crisis 
can damage an organisation’s reputation.  By taking a relationship management 
perspective, the study explores the potential influence of past relationships with the 
community on stakeholder perceptions of reputation, recognising an organisation’s 
relationship history can be positive as well as negative.  This study also investigates 
the outcomes of different crisis response strategies designed to protect organisational 
reputation when used in different crisis situations and demonstrates how reputational 
damage is increased or decreased through the application of these strategies.  It also 
examines the influence of stakeholder perception of crisis responsibility on 
judgments of organisational reputation. 
Having explored the concept of reputation and how it is threatened in a crisis event, 
this review will now address the related but separate concept of organisational 
legitimacy and its importance in crisis management.     
Organisational Legitimacy: Underpinning an Organisation’s Ability to Thrive and 
Survive 
Organisational legitimacy is defined as ‘a generalized perception or assumption that 
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 
574).   Organisational legitimacy is linked to an organisation’s ability to thrive and 
survive (Scott et al, 2000), hence its challenge during a crisis may have important 
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consequences.  To better understand these consequences and how to mitigate them, it 
is first important to understand how legitimacy is constructed and its role in 
influencing organisational outcomes.  
Tracing its routes back to Weber’s analysis of the legitimacy of different authority 
types and the importance of social practice conforming to social rules (Johnson et al, 
2006), legitimacy has been defined in terms of acceptance (Brown, 1994; Knoke, 
1981), taken-for-grantedness (Carroll & Hannan, 1989; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), and 
reasonableness, appropriateness and congruence (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977).  It is an asset that sustains the flow of resources from the environment 
to the organisation (Hannan & Freeman, 1989).  Legitimate organisations survive 
because stakeholders are more likely to supply resources to those that are perceived 
to be desirable, proper or appropriate (Parsons, 1960) and organisations that can 
convince their stakeholders of the illegitimacy of competitors can enhance their 
competitive advantage (Brown, 1998; Henisz & Zelner, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978).   
Recent research has tested how legitimacy can impact a range of organisational 
performance measures including initial public offering values (Cohen & Dean, 2005; 
Higgins & Gulati, 2003), stock prices and stock market risk (Bansel & Clelland, 
2004; Zuckerman, 2000) and stakeholder support (Choi & Shepherd, 2005).   These 
studies showed the benefit of positive legitimacy to organisations and the 
disadvantages of negative impacts on legitimacy.  For example, Cohen and Dean 
(2005) when studying more than 200 firms which listed in the United States in the 
late 1990s showed that the greater legitimacy status of an organisation’s top 
management team allowed that organisation to extract more value from investors at 
the time of its initial listing.  For negative impact, Bansel and Clelland (2004) 
analysed media reports and stock prices of 100 firms over a five year period and 
concluded that when new information was released that negatively impacted 
legitimacy, share price volatility increased for the organisation which was seen as 
unfavourable to investors (Aaker & Jacobson, 1987) and had the potential to lead to 
difficulty in managing funding structures for the business (Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 
1994).    
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Conferral and Withdrawal: The Importance of Stakeholder Expectations 
Organisational legitimacy can be broadly conceptualised as being derived from an 
organisation’s form (Dacin, 1997; Ruef & Scott, 1998;) or its actions (Parsons, 1960; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This study focuses on the latter meaning and adopts a 
normative/moral approach to legitimacy (Scott et al, 2000; Suchman, 1995).  This 
approach better reflects judgments of legitimacy by the general public (Deephouse & 
Carter, 2005) as opposed to more specifically characterised stakeholders such as 
regulators who have a major impact on regulatory legitimacy or those who have an 
explicit self interest as demonstrated through pragmatic legitimacy.  Under a 
normative/moral approach, legitimacy is closely linked to the expectations of 
stakeholders on organisational action, in particular whether the actions represent ‘the 
right thing to do’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 579), are acceptable (Elsbach, 1994) and 
whether the organisation has a right to continue operations (Bedeian, 1989; Dacin et 
al, 1999). Legitimacy within this frame is a perceived attribute of the organisation 
(Massey, 2001) and can be judged by evoking the value systems of the stakeholders 
(Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001) around ‘collectively valued purposes, means and goals’ 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 349).   If achieved, this legitimacy represents affective 
congruence where there is consistency between the organization’s goals and values 
and those of its stakeholders (Choi & Shepherd, 2005).   As with the 
multidimensional nature of reputation (Schwaiger, 2004), this affective approach 
shows that organisational competency is important but it ‘may not, on its own, 
naturally lead to the attainment’ (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001, p. 555) of legitimacy. 
A conferred status, organisational legitimacy is influenced substantially by those 
outside the organisation and thus is predicated on the organisation’s capacity to  
maintain a coalition of supportive stakeholders who have legitimacy-determining 
power (Galaskiewiez, 1985; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Once conferred, legitimacy 
can also be withdrawn should stakeholder judgments turn unfavourable.  Such 
withdrawal may be total, resulting in the organisation being judged as illegitimate, or 
partially withdrawn.   Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and Habermas (1975) suggest it is 
the absence of legitimacy that makes the concept more readily known rather than its 
presence.  This focus on the influence of the negative status of illegitimacy is picked 
up by Deephouse and Suchman (2008) in trying to define legitimacy in relation to 
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other focal constructs, suggesting that the ‘absence of negative problems is more 
important than the presence of positive achievements’ (p. 60). 
Meyer and Scott (1983) developed a continuum of organisational legitimacy, 
suggesting that organisations can be judged as completely legitimate through to 
completely illegitimate.  Completely legitimate organisations have no threat of 
negative stakeholder evaluation (Child, 1972) as they are seen as organisations 
‘about which no question could be raised’ (Meyer & Scott, 1983, p. 201).  Their 
‘perfect legitimation’ (Meyer & Scott, 1983, p. 201) provides ‘insulation from 
scrutiny’ (Bansal & Clelland, 2004, p.95), helping to reassure stakeholders that any 
untoward event such as a crisis is unusual.  In the likelihood of such an event, Bansal 
and Clelland (2004) suggest stakeholders will rally around the organisation, thereby 
significantly lessening the effect of the environmental incident.  On the other hand, 
completely illegitimate organisations are likely to continually face threats both 
internally and externally.  As outlined by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), ‘when 
activities of an organization are illegitimate, comments and attacks will occur’ 
(p.194).   
The continuum approach to legitimacy has been used in a number of studies 
including Choi and Shepherd (2005) who assessed stakeholder perspectives on 
cognitive legitimacy in young and mature firms and Elsbach (1994) who investigated 
how effective different accounts were in protecting and increasing impressions of 
organisational legitimacy.  It has also been used by researchers such as Vergne 
(2011) in describing how organisations may be more legitimate in one geographic 
region than another or more legitimate at one point in time over another.  The 
continuum approach was adopted in this study to assess how stakeholder perceptions 
of organisational attributes and crisis response strategies used in particular crisis 
events may influence an organisation’s position on such a continuum and any shifts 
it might experience immediately following a crisis event.   In doing so, it illuminates 
the threat of legitimacy damage from a crisis event and the ability of an 
organisation’s response strategy to mitigate or aggravate such damage. 
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Legitimacy Management:  Organisational Choices and the Role of the Corporate 
Narrative  
The dynamic nature of legitimacy management creates considerable opportunities 
for managers to respond strategically to their environment (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; 
Oliver, 1991), taking advantage of both opportunities and threats (Elsbach & 
Kramer, 1996).  Suchman (1995) suggests that managerial initiatives can make a 
‘substantial difference in the extent to which organisational activities are perceived 
as desirable, proper and appropriate within any given cultural context’ (p. 8).  
Despite the recognition of this importance, limited attention has so far been given in 
the empirical literature to identifying the processual aspects of legitimacy or to 
understanding how it is acquired, maintained and lost (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; 
Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005 ).  Key legitimacy researchers, Deephouse and 
Suchman (2008) highlight this challenge, confirming that with a focus to date on 
theory building rather than theory testing: ‘only a handful of investigations have 
employed legitimacy as a variable in hypothesis testing’ (p. 49).  This study 
contributes to this gap by considering potential influences on legitimacy during a 
time of crisis and the effectiveness of protection strategies employed by the 
organisation in crisis.  As with reputation, legitimacy is measured in this study at 
different points in time, allowing an assessment of the impact on legitimacy at such a 
point as well as seeing the effect on legitimacy damage as measured across time 
periods.    
An organisation can build legitimacy in three ways: conform to existing social norms 
by adapting its output, goals and methods of operation, alter social norms to better 
align with the company’s practices, and identify with symbols, values or institutions 
that have strong social values (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). Dowling and Pfeffer 
(1975) suggest the latter two strategies are attempted through communication while 
acknowledging that the changing of social norms is very difficult.   Vaara et al 
(2006) also emphasise the importance of discursive legitimation strategies that 
organisations can use including moralization and narrativization.  Such 
communication may take the form of ‘stories’ (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001, p. 546) 
which can explain, rationalise and promote organisational activity.  Suchman (1995) 
argues a similar range of strategies and suggests that legitimacy building is a 
proactive enterprise where organisations are seen to conform to the environment, 
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select among the environment, or manipulate the environment.  According to 
Ashforth and Gibbs (1990), once legitimacy is gained, its maintenance is often 
routinised into organisational activity.  
Organisational and environmental actions and changes can lead to the questioning or 
loss of legitimacy. This can create a legitimacy gap (Sethi, 1977) where key public 
support for the organisation’s actions is lost and resources withdrawn (Habermas, 
1975) and may lead, in extreme circumstances, to organisational death (Hamilton, 
2006).  In her study of three major American corporations that suffered crises and 
ceased operations, Hamilton (2006) suggests management is often forced into a 
reactive response when crisis hits and often seeks to use denial and counterclaims 
rather than engaging in problem solving or meaningful change.  Suchman (1995, p. 
597) suggests three broad approaches to managers facing such a loss of legitimacy: 
‘offer normalising accounts, restructure, and don’t panic’.  Given its relevance to this 
study, the first of these approaches will be explored in more detail later in this 
chapter in relation to response strategies. 
While Suchman (1995) and others provide guidance on organisational strategy to 
build legitimacy, the process of external legitimation takes time and not all 
legitimation attempts meet with equal success.  Hannan and Freeman (1989) suggest 
that longevity may be the key component in organisations achieving legitimacy, 
particularly for those who reach the taken-for-granted stage where the organisation is 
legitimate by assumption (Henisz & Zelner, 2005), as the conferral process is a long 
one.  Older organisations develop dense webs of exchange relationships with 
relevant sectors of the environment and this provides protection to organisations by 
reducing selection pressures.  These organisations are ‘relationally embedded in 
social networks’ (Amburgey & Rao, 1996, p. 1274) and thus have built significant 
social capital.  Newer organisations, however, operate in an environment of 
uncertainty (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001) without the social networks that can 
‘stabilize the new firm as a player in its targeted markets’ (Larson, 1992, p. 100).  
This has led to research on how the age of an organisation is linked to its legitimacy 
standing and its ongoing survival in the face of threats which will be explored further 
in this chapter as it is related to the formulation of this study. 
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Audience-oriented Legitimacy Research: Examining the Protective Effects of 
Discursive Practice through Measuring Legitimacy  
As a critical feature in organisational survival, organisational legitimacy has been 
explored through a diverse range of theoretical lenses, including institutional theory 
(Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Ruef & Scott, 1998; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 
2000), resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), and organisational 
ecology (Aldrich, 1979; Aldrich & Marsden, 1988; Hannan & Freeman, 1989).  
Perhaps because of this diversity, there is no one accepted definition of legitimacy 
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008) and therefore, no one accepted way of measuring it 
within organisational environments. 
While some researchers have highlighted the difficulties in manipulating legitimacy 
at the empirical level (Hudson, 2008; Vergne, 2011). studies have demonstrated 
legitimacy through assessing media coverage (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Deeds et al, 
2004; Deephouse & Carter, 2005; Lamertz & Baum, 1998) governmental records 
(Oborn, 2007) and organisational records (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  While 
important in building knowledge of organisational legitimacy, these studies share a 
common approach in that the perceptions of stakeholders are judged through a 
mediated form or through a proxy (Schneiberg & Clemens, 2006). For example, an 
assumption that an organisation has legitimacy with the public is made on the basis 
that media reports about the organisation are favourable and this directly impacts the 
perception of the public as consumers of that media.  In addition, these studies are in 
danger of shifting the focus to the means of legitimation through examining what 
organisations are doing (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Milne & Patten, 2002) rather than 
what effect the means are producing.   
In more recent times, studies (see for example, Elsbach, 1994; Elsbach & Sutton, 
1992; Foreman & Whetten, 2002; Massey, 2001) have started to address these issues 
by focusing on gathering the perspectives of stakeholders directly through surveys 
and focus groups which has required the development of new measures of 
legitimacy.  This study extends this line of research by seeking directly stakeholder 
perceptions of legitimacy.   Following the approach of Vergne (2011) in selecting the 
most relevant dimensions of organisational legitimacy to answer the research 
question and design, the stakeholder-driven legitimacy measures developed by 
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Massey (2001) and Elsbach (1994) were used to inform this study.  These measures 
encapsulate elements of organisational endorsement and organisational normativity 
which underpin the normative/moral approach to organisational legitimacy that best 
reflects legitimacy judgments by the general public (Deephouse & Carter, 2005). 
While described as an “anchor-point” for understanding organisation-environment 
conditions (Suchman, 1995, p.571) and clearly focused on stakeholder perceptions 
and the importance of building communication links with stakeholders, 
organisational legitimacy has not been recognised widely within the public relations 
discipline as a long term goal of building organisation-public relationships. A 2005 
study demonstrated very limited attention to organisational legitimacy in public 
relations texts and research journals over the prior decade (Mehta, Xavier & Broom, 
2005).  However, more recently there is growing interest in the area (see for 
example, Ihlen et al, 2011).  Heath (2001) suggests that “legitimacy gaps” (p. 3) will 
be part of the emerging vocabulary of public relations scholars and practitioners as 
the discipline focuses more on relationship management and will be informed by the 
work of scholars such as Everett (2001) in organisational ecology and Metzler 
(2001a) in rhetorical strategy.  Researchers such as Bartlett et al (2007), Boyd 
(2000), Gower (2006), Holmstrom (2005), Ihlen, Bartlett and May (2011),  
Merkelsen (2011) and Metzler (2001a,b) have started to form a body of knowledge 
that presents organisational legitimacy as a “foundational concept” (Boyd, 2000, p. 
342) of public relations and central to its continued practice. This study contributes 
to the growing scholarly commitment to legitimacy research by further exploring and 
detailing the links between crisis response strategy and perceptions of legitimacy in a 
crisis situation.  
Summary 
A challenge to an organisation’s legitimacy during a crisis event threatens its 
competitive advantage and may result in the withdrawal of support from important 
stakeholders.  Faced with this threat, the organisation can use its communication 
strategy to respond to the crisis event and, in doing so, try and again achieve greater 
congruence between the stakeholders’ expectations of its behaviour and its actual 
performance.  Despite the importance of legitimacy to organisational performance, 
limited research to date has been focused on capturing the perspectives of 
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stakeholders directly and on measuring the impact of different communication 
strategy options.  This study extends the current limited research within public 
relations and management on the legitimacy damage brought through a crisis event 
and how an organisation’s past relationships with the community may affect its 
legitimacy standing.  This study also examines the impact on legitimacy of different 
communication responses following a crisis event and investigates whether this 
impact is also influenced by an organisation’s relationship history.  The role of 
stakeholder perceptions of organisational responsibility for the crisis event is 
considered in all of these judgments. 
Reputation and Legitimacy: Different or the Same 
While both reputation and legitimacy depend on stakeholder perceptions of an 
organisation and can lead to the increased ability of that organisation to acquire 
resources, Deephouse and Carter (2005), Highhouse et al (2009) and Vergne (2011) 
argue that they are different concepts and should be treated differently by 
researchers.  Reputation refers to stakeholder favourability of an organisation against 
others within a system whereas legitimacy refers to acceptability of that organisation 
within the same social system (Zyglidopoulis, 2003).  Thus, reputation is more 
comparative than legitimacy with organisations seeking to enhance their reputation 
by achieving at excellent levels.  Legitimacy, on the other hand, can be seen as a 
minimum set of standards and thus, is ‘fundamentally non-rival’ (Deephouse & 
Suchman, 2008, p.60).   Legitimacy is a level of social acceptance resulting from the 
adherence to norms and expectations of relevant stakeholders.  While both concepts 
draw from the same source, described by Highhouse et al (2009, p.1497) as a ‘shared 
perception of knowledgeable constituents’, their focus is different and therefore the 
constructs require different attention in the management literature. 
The majority of crisis studies have focused on reputational outcomes (see for 
example, Coombs, 2006; Coombs & Holladay, 2001; Lyon & Cameron, 2004; Pace 
et al, 2010), however, there have been some crisis researchers who have sought to 
establish legitimacy impacts (see for example, Allen & Caillouet, 1994; Elsbach, 
1994; Massey, 2001).  This study builds on the work of these scholars to refine the 
understanding of the impact of crisis on legitimacy through direct measurement of 
stakeholder perceptions.  It also brings the two concepts of reputation and legitimacy 
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together in the one study to test how stakeholder perceptions on each construct may 
differ in the one crisis event and how these perceptions of each might change during 
the crisis event.  This study tests both concepts at the time of crisis with the 
assumption that both exist to some extent at that time.  In doing so, it is focusing on 
the maintenance or rebuilding aspects of reputation and legitimacy management 
(Suchman, 1995) rather than its establishment.  The results from this study will show 
whether the assumptions of the SCCT framework on how to use crisis response to 
protect an organisation’s reputation are also valid in protecting an organisation’s 
legitimacy.  This not only strengthens the value of the SCCT model to crisis 
managers but is useful for the future development of crisis response models that are 
targeted to achieving organisational goals on one or both of these constructs.    
Given the identification of the key components of the organisational assets of 
reputation and legitimacy and their reliance on stakeholder perceptions, this review 
now addresses four key factors that operate during a crisis event that may enhance or 
inhibit an organisation’s ability to protect these assets.     
Key Influencing Factors During a Crisis Event: Articulating Influences on 
Stakeholder Perceptions 
Central to this study’s goals is an emerging line of research that demonstrates that for 
organisations to effectively protect their intangible assets during a crisis, they need to 
consider a range of factors that might influence stakeholder perceptions of the crisis, 
the organisation involved, and its response to the crisis (Frandsen & Johansen, 2011; 
Hobbs, 1995; Sharkey & Stafford, 1990).  Coombs and Holladay (2001) argue that 
the crisis situation is both a constraint and an asset when articulating a crisis 
response, reflecting Fink’s turning point analogy of crisis decision-making.  The 
success of the organisation’s response during a crisis relies on management’s ability 
to evaluate the specific situation and select the most appropriate crisis response 
strategy to achieve the goals it has set.  This involves complex decision-making in a 
time of great ambiguity which is why crisis managers valued the advice provided 
through applied crisis research (Ihlen, 2010).  
Early research in this area focused on the crisis itself as the key determinant of 
stakeholder perceptions, primarily using the specific type of crisis as a key variable.  
Originally using inventories of different crisis types in planning (Fearn-Banks, 
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1996), crisis type was then recast to identify different categories or groupings of 
crisis through some identifying factor (Lerbinger, 1997; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993).  
These categories represented the early moves towards understanding the frames 
through which publics or stakeholders could interpret the crisis event, drawing from 
the key attributes of intention and control identified in social cognition theory 
(Weiner, 1985). 
While an important move in progressing the understanding of how best to protect an 
organisation during crisis, the focus on the crisis situation was found to be 
insufficient to guide crisis managers as variables relating to the crisis itself did not 
appear to explain all the impacts on stakeholder perceptions (Coombs & Holladay, 
1996).  Specific attributes of the organisation and its relationship with its 
stakeholders also had an influence.  Researchers looked to the relational management 
approach that was becoming central to public relations theory development to help 
explore the related variables in crisis response.  According to Broom, Casey and 
Ritchey (1997), the organisation-stakeholder relationship was at the centre of public 
relations practice with relationships held to be the core defining aspect of public 
relations as a discipline.   These relationships were built through an organisation 
meeting or failing to meet stakeholder expectations (Bruning et al, 2006; Finet, 
1994). Within crisis research, Coombs (1999) also suggests organisations build 
favourable relationships by meeting and exceeding stakeholder expectations.  A 
favourable stakeholder relationship has been strongly linked to a positive reputation 
(Coombs & Holladay, 2001; de Castro et al, 2006; Ki & Hon, 2007; Yang, 2007) and 
the survival properties of organisations influenced by the duration of 
interorganisational relationships (Stinchcombe, 1965).  These relationships 
contribute to the social capital (Coleman, 1988) of an organisation and serve as 
conduits for resources.  
The relational management perspective suggests that consideration of relationship 
history is an important component when developing public relations actions 
(Ledingham & Bruning, 1998).  For the relational approach to be useful in crisis 
research, however, the context of the crisis in an organisation-stakeholder 
relationship had to be addressed.  Coombs and Holladay (2001) suggest that a crisis 
should be considered as ‘one event or interaction within a larger relationship 
between an organisation and its stakeholders’ (p. 324).  The assessment of the 
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current interaction, that is the crisis, will be influenced by views on former 
interactions and may also influence future interactions.  This may work for or against 
the organisation in protecting its reputation and its relationships with key 
stakeholders. 
Situational Crisis Communication Theory (the SCCT) 
Further development of the relationship management approach saw the emergence of 
the Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) (Coombs & Holladay, 2002).  
The SCCT model (see Figure 2) was designed to provide guidance to crisis managers 
on how to select an effective response strategy when faced with a crisis.  It did this 
by taking into consideration a range of factors that might be affecting how 
stakeholders perceived the crisis event and the organisation.  First proposed in the 
late 1990s, it continues to be researched and modified as new evidence from the field 
is assessed (see, for example, Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Coombs, 2010; Fediuk et 
al, 2010; McDonald et al, 2010; Schwarz, 2008).  SCCT has at its core the ability to 
protect organisational reputation during a crisis.  To do this, crisis managers need to 
be able to identify all relevant variables that influence stakeholder perceptions during 
a crisis and consider how these influences may interact to affect the outcomes.    
Emotions
Reputation
Behavioural 
Intentions
Response 
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Crisis
Responsibility
Crisis 
History
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Relationship 
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Figure 2:  Crisis situation model of SCCT (Coombs, 2007a) 
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The SCCT model focuses on four main factors that influence stakeholder perceptions 
of reputation:  the crisis itself, the organisation’s responsibility for the crisis, the 
response strategies used in the crisis and the performance history of the organisation 
in crisis as evidenced through crisis history and prior relationships.   A detailed 
review of relevant research on each of these factors is needed as this study 
investigates the interaction of these factors and their particular ability to mitigate or 
aggravate damage to the organisation following a crisis event.   
Influencing Factor 1: Crisis Type 
As outlined earlier, crisis type was one of the first influences in a crisis situation to 
be considered by crisis researchers.  These researchers developed long lists of 
individual crisis types (see for example, Fearn-Banks, 1996) and suggested 
organisations consider each of the types in their planning.  Recognising the extensive 
resources required for such an exercise, Pearson and Mitroff (1993) recommended 
the clumping or categorising of crises according to some similar feature such as their 
cause or their level of damage.  Their assumption was that the planning for one crisis 
type within a category would serve as a model for each of the crises within that 
category, thereby reducing significantly the pre-crisis preparation process.  This 
assumption continues to underlie many of the crisis categorisation schemes in use 
today.   
While crisis categorisation started as a convenience factor, its predictive nature as a 
frame through which stakeholder perceptions and behaviour could be understood 
became of more interest to crisis researchers.  Coombs and Holladay (2002) in the 
development of the SCCT model recognised the disjuncture between the typologies 
created for crisis and the typologies created for crisis response.  In seeking 
integration, they revisited the crisis type categories to look for integrating factors that 
could guide the model development.  Responsibility was identified as one such 
integrating factor, leading to a master list of nine crisis types (Coombs, 1999) which 
was later expanded to 13 (Coombs & Holladay, 2002) and then reduced back to 10 
(Coombs, 2004, 2007, 2009) as outlined in Table 1.  These crisis types and their 
associated descriptors were used to guide this study and were used in the 
development of the stimuli material for the six experiments.   
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Table 1: Crisis types by definition (Coombs, 2004, 2007; 2009) 
Type Description 
Natural disaster Acts of nature that damage an organisation such as an 
earthquake.  Some environmental/weather event impacts 
the organisation. 
Rumours False and damaging information about an organisation is 
being circulated.  Evidence that the information is false. 
Workplace violence Current or former employee attacks current employees 
onsite.  An employee or former employee injures or 
attempts to injure current employees. 
Product tampering/malevolence External agent causes damage to an organisation.  Some 
actor outside of the organisation has altered the product 
to make it dangerous. 
Challenges Stakeholders claim an organisation is operating in an 
inappropriate manner.  There is a public challenge based 
on moral or ethical, not legal, grounds. 
Technical error accidents A technology or equipment failure causes an industrial 
accident.  
Technical error recalls/product 
harm 
A technology or equipment failure causes a product to be 
recalled.  A product is deemed harmful to stakeholders.  
The cause of the recall is equipment or technology 
related.   
Human error accidents. Human error causes an industrial accident. 
Human error recalls/product 
harm 
Human error causes a product to be recalled.  A product 
is deemed harmful to stakeholders.  The cause of the 
recall is a person or people not performing job properly. 
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Organisational misdeed Stakeholders are deceived without injury. 
Laws or regulations are violated by management. 
Stakeholders are placed at risk by management and 
injuries occur.    
 
The link between the crisis types and the second factor of the attributed level of 
responsibility for a crisis will be discussed in the next section as it leads to a 
recasting of the crisis types as crisis clusters within the SCCT model. 
Influencing Factor 2: Organisational Responsibility for a Crisis 
The second key factor in the SCCT model is responsibility, often described as the 
heart of the model (Coombs, 2007b, 2010).    To best protect a company’s reputation 
and legitimacy in a crisis, it is important to understand stakeholder perceptions of 
that organisation’s responsibility for the crisis.  Sisco (2010, p.2) identifies this 
attribution of responsibility as ‘one of the most important underlying elements for 
public relations practitioners to consider’ in crisis management, highlighting its 
importance also for crisis research.  As outlined by Coombs and Holladay (2011), 
this importance is confirmed by the impact of organisational responsibility on other 
outcome variables in the crisis situation. 
Theories of social cognition help explain how stakeholders develop their perceptions 
of organisational responsibility for a crisis.  Social cognition involves a detailed 
analysis of how people think about themselves and others.  In particular, social 
cognition research by applying attribution theory tries to identify how people 
attribute specific traits and qualities to others, and how they use individual 
perceptions to arrive at overall impressions.  Lee (2004) notes that this original 
person-to-person behaviour has been anthropomorphized to now explain how an 
individual makes sense of an organisation’s behaviour.  Empirical research in areas 
such as corporate apologia has demonstrated that organisations can be ‘perceived as 
personlike social entities’ (Schwarz, 2008, p. 40).   
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Attribution theory has been used by a growing group of crisis researchers (see e.g. 
Bradford & Garrett, 1995; Coombs & Holladay, 1996; Lyon & Cameron, 2004; 
Schwarz, 2008; Williams & Treadaway, 1992) to identify how stakeholders develop 
causal explanations for events and form impressions of organisations.  As outlined 
by Heider (1958) and Weiner, Perry & Magnusson (1988), people are motivated to 
engage in attributional behaviour because of a need to predict and control their 
environment.  Crises by nature are events which involve unpredictability and a 
general lack of control.  Therefore, attributional behaviour is likely to be at a 
heightened state, particularly for those directly impacted by the crisis event, the crisis 
victims.    
McAuley, Duncan & Russell (1992) identified four causal dimensions people use 
when making attributions:  stability, external control, personal control and locus with 
both control dimensions later being collapsed into one factor (Wilson et al, 1993).    
Stability identifies whether the event’s cause happens frequently or infrequently, 
control indicates whether or not the event’s cause is controllable by the actor or not 
and locus impacts on whether the event’s cause is something about the group 
involved or the situation (Russell, 1982).  In a crisis event, stakeholders will analyse 
the different factors to form their impression of the organisation and the situation, 
therefore, the presence of multiple factors will intensify the overall impression.   
While all of the attributes can affect perceptions of responsibility, of particular 
interest to this study are the attributes of control and locus.  Stronger perceptions of 
external control should lessen crisis responsibility as the organisation could do little 
to prevent the crisis.  Similarly, stronger perceptions of the locus of causality should 
increase crisis responsibility because the cause is directly linked to the organisation.  
The level of responsibility assigned is important as research has shown that greater 
attributions of responsibility lead to stronger feelings of anger and more negative 
views of organisations (Coombs & Holladay, 2007; McDonald & Hartel, 2000; 
Weiner, Amirkhan, Folkes, & Verette, 1987) and their reputations (Coombs & 
Schmidt, 2000; Laufer & Gillespie, 2004; Pace et al, 2010; Verhoeven et al, 2012). 
It is important to note the distinction between stakeholder perception of 
responsibility which is the focus in the SCCT model and actual responsibility for the 
crisis.  An organisation may be responsible for the cause of a crisis but its 
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stakeholders believe other parties are responsible.   Alternatively, an organisation 
may hold no actual responsibility for a crisis but be seen as responsible by key 
stakeholders because of its actions or inactions or the actions of others.    
In a study on the influence of responsibility on regard for a firm and the comparative 
influence of prior reputation and response, Dean (2004) showed that responsibility 
was the single, strongest influencing factor in a crisis situation.  While an important 
finding, it needs to be considered that Dean differed in the approach taken by earlier 
crisis researchers in that he used third party endorsement to signal responsibility on 
the basis of the discounting principle (Kelley, 1973) contained within attribution 
theory.  The discounting principle holds that an apparent causal inference will be 
discounted if an alternative, plausible explanation is present.  Thus, in his stimulus 
material, Dean used a statement by a regulatory agency which passed judgment on 
the organisation’s responsibility to test stakeholder perception of responsibility.  This 
removed the ambiguity often surrounding responsibility in an unfolding crisis 
situation. While his research is useful in demonstrating the importance of 
responsibility as an influencing factor and its relative status compared with other 
factors, it remains to be tested as to whether such a high proportion of variance in 
regard for an organisation would be found without direct third party statements on 
responsibility.  The study reported in this thesis tested responsibility in two ways:  
firstly through leaving open the question of actual responsibility for a crisis event 
which it could be argued more closely mirrors a real crisis situation and then in one 
experiment, assigning responsibility in a similar way to Dean (2004).  The results of 
each approach are outlined in Chapters 4-7. 
Weiner (1995) notes that responsibility is not a yes-or-no proposition.  It is a matter 
of degree or magnitude and perceptions of responsibility may vary greatly among 
different stakeholders.    However, Coombs (1998) suggests that if crisis managers 
can estimate where the stakeholder perception of responsibility sits on a continuum 
of highly responsible to not responsible, they are in a better position to select an 
appropriate response.  Thus, crisis managers can use an analysis of the multiple 
factors to predict stakeholder perceptions of responsibility and then design a message 
strategy to protect or repair organisational image.  They may attempt to do this by 
altering how stakeholders perceive each or all of the three attribution dimensions 
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outlined earlier.  For example, the organisational response may be designed to 
strengthen the positive attributions and/or address the negative attributions.   
Enhancing Predictive Powers by Linking Crisis Types and Attributed 
Responsibility: Developing the Crisis Cluster 
While organisations could test stakeholder perceptions of responsibility prior to 
designing their communicative responses, the realities of the dynamic crisis situation 
make this possibility a remote one.  Thus, an alternative method of predicting 
responsibility was sought by researchers.  Coombs (2004) suggests that while 
different perspectives of responsibility are found among individuals, certain levels of 
responsibility can be predicted on the basis of the crisis type.    Coombs and 
Holladay (2002) tested this proposition in an experimental study with 130 
undergraduate students. The students read two crisis case outlines from a possible 13 
different types (representing the 10 major types presented in Table 1 plus three 
additional types) and completed a questionnaire on organisational responsibility.  
From this study, Coombs and Holladay (2002) identified three major clusters of 
types that produce significantly different levels of attribution for responsibility.  
These clusters are shown in Table 2.   Thus, to overcome the need for direct research 
at the time of crisis, Coombs (2007b) suggests organisations consider the crisis 
clusters into which the crisis type falls as these clusters represent the frame through 
which the stakeholders perceive the crisis event. 
Table 2: Crisis clusters based on stakeholder attributions of responsibility 
Cluster Crisis Type 
Victim (very little attribution of crisis responsibility) Natural disasters 
Rumours 
Workplace violence 
Malevolence 
Accidental (low attribution of crisis responsibility) Challenges 
Technical-error accidents 
Technical-error product harm 
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Preventable/Intentional* (strong attributions of crisis 
responsibility) 
Human-error accidents 
Human-error product harm 
Organisational misdeeds 
*Coombs has used these terms interchangeably (see for example, Coombs, 2009, p. 111 vs p.112).  
This study has used ‘preventable’ throughout. 
In the victim cluster, stakeholders see the organisation as the victim not the cause of 
the crisis and therefore assign little crisis responsibility.  In the accident cluster, the 
crises are seen as outside the control of the organisation and unintentional.  In the 
preventable or intentional cluster, crisis responsibility is much stronger as the 
organisation is seen to have wilfully engaged in behaviours that led to the crisis.  
Coombs and Holladay (2002) also show that assumed organisational reputation 
varies by cluster with the victim cluster showing the highest level of reputation and 
the preventable cluster showing the lowest level of reputation.    Considered another 
way, the victim cluster presents the lowest threat to reputation whereas the 
preventable cluster presents the highest threat to reputation.   
In a more recent study with 162 undergraduate students using hypothetical media 
reports, Kim et al (2009) retested the main effect of crisis clusters on attributions of 
organisational responsibility, focusing specifically on the accident and transgression 
(preventable) clusters.  They confirmed that the transgression cluster led to higher 
responsibility attributions, however the effect size for the influence on responsibility 
was small (ηp2  0.03 – 0.08 across two tests).  Claeys et al (2010) also provide 
support for the clusters’ link with responsibility testing all three clusters, albeit with 
only one crisis type being tested within each cluster.   In a study with 300 Belgian 
consumers, they showed that significantly different levels of responsibility were 
assigned to a crisis from each of the victim, accidental and preventable clusters.  
While effect size was not reported, lower levels of responsibility were assigned to 
the victim cluster and higher levels to the preventable cluster.  The individual crisis 
types used in their experiment were product tampering (victim), a technical error 
product harm (accident) and organisational misdeed with injury (preventable).  The 
project reported in this thesis extends Claeys et al’s work by investigating additional 
crisis types of workplace violence (victim), technical error accidents (accidental), 
and human error product harm and organisational misdeed management misconduct 
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(preventable) to establish that the levels of responsibility operate across different 
crisis types within each cluster.   
Verhoeven et al (2012) also recently tested two of the clusters (accidental and 
preventable) in assessing the impact of crisis responsibility on corporate trust and 
reputation and spokesperson trust and reputation.  Their study involved 84 
respondents randomly assigned to one of four conditions with the response stimuli 
being an 85 second video news clip of a fictitious non-medical crisis event at a 
hospital.  The respondents attributed more responsibility to the organisation that 
experienced the preventable cluster crisis than the organisation that experienced the 
accident cluster crisis. Verhoeven et al’s study also confirmed that corporate 
reputation was ‘more harmed by a preventable crisis than by an accidental crisis’ (p. 
502), thus supporting the negative effect of the greater attribution of responsibility. 
Assessment of responsibility through analysis of the cluster is just the first step for 
the crisis manager as the initial attributions of responsibility are assumed without 
knowledge of the additional situational factors that may influence stakeholder 
perceptions or the organisation’s response.  The same is true for the assessment of 
reputational threat.  In essence, these clusters are theoretical assumptions of 
stakeholder perspectives and while they may guide crisis managers in the field, they 
do not provide sufficient detail for well informed decision-making during a crisis 
situation.  For example, workplace violence in the victim category may be seen as 
the fault of a single individual, however if the company is found to have poor 
security measures or to have promoted or tolerated an environment of bullying, then 
stakeholder perceptions of responsibility are likely to grow.  The influence of such 
contextual factors will be discussed later in this section as they are relevant to the 
design of this study.     
Research has shown that as perceptions of crisis responsibility strengthen, the threat 
of image damage strengthens (Coombs, 1998, 2004; Coombs & Holladay, 1996, 
2002, 2004, 2009).  The majority of work on the link between crisis responsibility 
and the subsequent influence on organisational image has focused on the 
organisation’s reputation.  This study seeks to confirm the earlier research findings 
on crisis clusters and the links to responsibility and reputation (see for example, 
Coombs, 1998, 2004; Coombs & Holladay, 2001, 2002; Dean, 2004 and Lyon & 
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Cameron, 2004) and extend this to legitimacy, as well as consider the impact on 
reputation and legitimacy damage by assessing these constructs over time.  This 
addresses the deficiencies in current crisis modelling identified by Fediuk et al 
(2010) where the construct of reputation at a point in time has been assessed as 
opposed to reputational damage which looks at pre- and post-crisis reputation.  
Having ascertained the level of assumed responsibility, the organisation can then use 
theoretically predicted strategy options available in the SCCT model to select a 
strategy that matches this level of attributed responsibility and thereby minimise any 
further damage to the organisation.  This approach should match the stakeholder 
expectations of action based on responsibility and this congruency should not lead to 
a negative impact on reputation assets.  Building on this assumption, this study 
investigates how crisis cluster and an organisation’s response might interact to 
change the initial attributions from cluster alone.   Kim et al (2009) in an 
experimental study using two crisis clusters and two responses found mixed support 
for such an interaction, albeit using slightly different strategies to those proposed by 
SCCT.  They used different contexts (food poisoning and a laptop battery explosion) 
through which to describe each of the crisis clusters and this demonstrated 
inconsistent results across crisis clusters.  Thus further research is needed in this area 
to help understand the effects of response strategies in different circumstances.  The 
importance of crisis response strategies in influencing stakeholder perspectives will 
now be outlined.   
Influencing Factor 3: Crisis Response Strategies 
The third key factor in the SCCT model is the crisis response strategy.  The goal of 
the model is to prescribe crisis response strategies to protect reputational assets 
(Coombs, 2007a).  By understanding the reputational threat from the crisis cluster, 
its associated attributed responsibility and any additional situational factors that 
might be affecting stakeholder views, Coombs (2007b) suggests it should be possible 
to determine the most effective response strategy to ‘maximise reputational 
protection’ (p. 166).  However, as Coombs (2006) acknowledges, research that 
demonstrates this effectiveness is limited (Coombs & Holladay, 1996; Coombs & 
Schmidt, 2000), even though the ramifications of poor strategy are serious (Coombs, 
Frandsen, Holladay & Johansen, 2010).   Fediuk et al (2010) also suggest that 
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research to date has not truly addressed reputational protection as the effect on 
reputation across time has not been shown through the methodological designs used.  
The research project described in this thesis employs a design to enable this type of 
testing, thereby adding to the current literature on protection strategies in crisis 
events. 
The following sections briefly outline the key conceptualisations of response 
strategies in the public relations literature as these are used by different crisis 
researchers in their empirical tests of the impact of response strategy in a crisis 
event.  This makes comparison of empirical tests difficult, however, many of the 
conceptualisations share common elements which are drawn out through this review 
to aid comparative analysis.  A synthesis of the key research on the impact of 
strategy selection on stakeholder perceptions of responsibility and the organisational 
assets of reputation and legitimacy that informs this study will then be provided. 
Developing Strategy Options  
Following Benson’s (1988) challenge to better understand the crisis management 
approach, considerable work was undertaken by crisis researchers (see for example 
Allen & Caillouet, 1994; Benoit, 1992, 1997; Coombs, 1995, 1998, 1999; Hobbs, 
1995; Ice, 1991; Sherrell & Reidenback, 1986)  to map a range of crisis response 
strategies.  Some of these approaches incorporate detailed descriptions of discrete 
response strategies while others suggest the response types form a continuum.  
As with the development of crisis clusters, the main focus of these early typologies 
was to cover the field in terms of identifying all possible alternatives.  To achieve 
this, researchers borrowed extensively from different disciplines including ‘hazard 
management, risk assessment, engineering, social psychology, sociology, political 
science, economics, public relations and general management’ (Lerbinger, 1997, p. 
xi).   Marsh (2006) suggests that a significant proportion of the early research on 
crisis response strategies had its origins in apologia theory, which was influenced by 
the work of Ware and Linkugel (1973) and conceptualised extensively by Hearit 
(1995, 1997, 2001) with latter developments also drawing from impression 
management.  
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Building on the work of Allen and Caillouet (1994) and Benoit (1992) in impression 
management, Coombs (1995) synthesised individual lists of crisis response strategies 
to develop a crisis response map that addressed the levels of responsibility drawn 
from the crisis clusters.  Lyon and Cameron (2004) extended the categories of crisis 
response focusing specifically on defensive and apologetic responses.   McLauglin, 
Cody and O’Hair (1983) in conceptualizing accounts or explanations that people 
offer for their negative behaviour developed the mitigation-aggravation continuum 
where mitigation showed concern for those affected by the event whereas 
aggravation looked to defend the company.  Marcus and Goodman (1991) developed 
a similar continuum using accommodative or defensive responses which was later 
adapted by Lyon and Cameron (2004) to include defensive and apologetic responses.  
Siomkos and Shrivastava (1993) used the continuum of denial to corrective action.    
Hearit (2001) added the concept of dissociation to the continuum formation, 
suggesting three categories of dissociation that help an organisation reduce the threat 
to its reputation.   
While establishing the range of response strategies was a useful step in helping guide 
crisis managers, further guidance was needed on how to select the appropriate 
strategy when faced with the crisis event.  Crisis researchers became interested in 
why different strategies would be used and the effect they would have on 
organisational outcomes post crisis (Coombs, 2004; Lyon & Cameron, 2004).  Early 
work in this field emerged from crisis researchers using impression management 
theory (Marcus & Goodman, 1991; Scott & Lyman, 1968) to focus on how message 
strategy as symbolic resources could be used to achieve different outcomes.  Rather 
than simply explain the facts about what happened, message strategy could be used 
to create different impressions of the crisis and the link to the relevant organisation.   
Allen and Caillouet (1994) suggest message strategies can be used, for example, to 
show a challenge to legitimacy is invalid or to persuade stakeholders to judge the 
crisis more mildly and evaluate the organisation more positively.  If a crisis cannot 
be shown to be invalid, crisis managers should use strategies that show how the 
organisation has returned to the norms held by its stakeholders.  Thus, crisis response 
strategies can be used to re-establish legitimacy, thus increasing an organisation’s 
survival chances.   
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Communication resources can also be used to influence the attributions assigned in 
the crisis situation (Coombs & Holladay, 1996; Lyon & Cameron, 2004; Schwarz, 
2008) as stakeholders seek to develop causal explanations for the event.  As outlined 
by Heider (1958) and Weiner, Perry & Magnusson (1988), people are motivated to 
engage in attributional behaviour because of a need to predict and control their 
environment.  As demonstrated earlier, crisis managers attempt to use an analysis of 
the underlying factors influencing attributions such as control and causality to 
predict stakeholder perceptions and design a message strategy to repair 
organisational image by altering how stakeholders perceive each or all of the 
attribution dimensions.   
Two major sets of strategy types emerge from this research: those that protect the 
organisational image by modifying public perception of the responsibility for the 
crisis (e.g. nonexistence and distance strategies) and those that try and modify the 
impressions of the organisation itself (mortification and ingratiation strategies).  
Thus, the strategy will try and achieve one of three outcomes:  convince stakeholders 
there is no crisis and thus no challenge to legitimacy, have stakeholders see the crisis 
as less negative and therefore attribute less responsibility to the organisation for the 
damage caused and have stakeholders see the organisation more positively with 
remedial action helping to re-establish legitimacy by demonstrating organisational 
concern for societal norms (Coombs & Holladay, 1996).  This aligns with the work 
on normalising accounts established through the management literature. At least four 
types of normalising accounts have been established:  denial, excuses, justifications 
and explanations (Elsbach, 1994; Marcus & Goodman, 1991; Staw, McKechnie & 
Puffer, 1983).  These can be applied either individually or collectively to form the 
basis of the communication strategy between the organisation and its stakeholders 
following the crisis event.  A summary of these approaches is provided in Table 3.  It 
is important to consider the different literatures from which crisis response is drawn 
as crisis researchers often draw from across these different response options in their 
empirical tests making comparison across studies more difficult.      
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Table 3: Strategy categorisation by focus 
Approach Crisis Response 
Strategy 
Normalising Account 
Category 
Focus 
Defensive Nonexistence 
strategies 
Denial Modify public 
perceptions of 
responsibility 
 Distance strategies Excuse/Justification  
 Ingratiation 
strategies 
Explanation Modify perceptions of 
organisation 
Accommodative Mortification 
strategies 
  
 
Refocusing on Responsibility: Drawing Strategy and Responsibility Together 
Taking the approach outlined in Table 3 one step further, Coombs (2007) refocused 
on the paramount positioning of attributions of responsibility in a crisis event.  He 
suggests all crisis strategies be considered in light of the way they influence 
stakeholder impressions of responsibility and signal the organisation’s position on its 
level of responsibility.  Hence, the SCCT model has reconfigured the previous 
categorisations of strategy (see Table 3) to better emphasise the links with 
responsibility (see Table 4).   Coombs (2007a; 2007b) has suggested three major 
categories or postures for crisis response be adopted:  deny, diminish and deal with 
the latter renamed and split into two categories of rebuilding and bolstering 
(although the original name of ‘deal’ continues to be accepted in recently published 
literature, see for example, Thiessen & Ingenhoff, 2011). 
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Table 4: Categories of response and their recommended use in a crisis situation  
Continuum 
Approach 
SCCT 
Category of 
Response 
Option 
Level of responsibility 
demonstrated by 
organisation in 
response 
Recommended for use at 
assumed level of 
stakeholder attribution of 
responsibility 
Defensive Deny 
 
Low Low 
 Diminish*   
Accommodative Deal (Rebuild)* High High 
*Supplemental bolstering strategies available 
Strategies within the denial posture seek to frame the crisis by removing any 
connection between the organisation and the crisis or suggesting the crisis doesn’t 
exist.   Specific strategies within this category include attacking the accuser (which 
may also include a threat to use legal force), denying that any crisis exists or 
scapegoating where blame is based to a third party.  Tests of these strategy options 
(Coombs, 2006) suggest they all cluster together in showing low levels of 
responsibility taken for the crisis and no support for victims.  A content analysis of 
of news coverage in three major American newspapers (New York Times, 
Washington Post, USA Today) of crisis events in 2006 found that the denial strategy 
was the most prevalent of the three postures reported (An et al, 2011).  This type of 
evidence suggests the strategy is well used as a response strategy by corporations.   
Strategies within the diminish posture suggest that the crisis is not as serious as 
people may expect or that the organisation lacked control over the crisis.  These 
strategies include providing an excuse which may encompass denying intention to do 
harm or suggesting that the organisation had no control over the events that led to the 
crisis (Coombs, 2007b) or providing a justification which tries to minimise the 
perceived damage from the crisis.  Tests of these strategy options (Coombs, 2006) 
showed that they also clustered together with higher levels of responsibility taken for 
the crisis and more support provided for the victims than the deny strategies. 
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The deal/rebuilding/bolstering strategies accept responsibility and either try to shift 
attention to things other than the crisis (bolstering posture) or try to bring the 
negativity associated with the crisis to an end by offering compensation or 
apologising (rebuilding posture).  Specific strategies included in this category vary in 
different formulations of the SCCT (see for example, Coombs, 2006; Coombs, 
2007b).  Generally however, the rebuilding posture includes strategies such as 
compassion/compensation where the organisation provides money or gifts to the 
victims and apology where the organisation takes full responsibility for the crisis and 
asks forgiveness (Coombs, 2007b).  Pace et al (2010) have identified challenges with 
research on the apology strategy as different studies over time have used different 
formulations of an apology, either with or without responsibility stated and/or with 
or without forgiveness requests.   While the rebuilding posture reinforces full 
apology (Coombs, 2007b) and Pace et al (2010) confirmed the strength of the full 
apology in achieving the strongest reputational protection, the earlier version of the 
full deal response options included concern and regret (Coombs, 2006) where the 
organisation expressed concern for the victims and a later study used sympathy 
(Coombs & Holladay, 2009) where expressions of sadness, thoughts and prayers for 
the victims were used.  Taken together, these additional strategies may be considered 
a ‘partial’ apology (Coombs, 2007b; Patel & Reinsch, 2003) and therefore may not 
have the weight of a full apology (Pace et al, 2010), however, such a partial apology 
may reduce the legal liability for the organisation and therefore provide other 
benefits.   
The bolstering posture has been presented as including reminding/ingratiation where 
the organisation praises stakeholders or reminds them of past good works by the 
organisation,  and victimage where the organisation explains how it too is a victim of 
the crisis.   Very limited use of the last strategy is recommended (Coombs, 2007b).  
While Coombs (20007b) suggests the bolstering strategies, sometimes referred to as 
the reinforcing strategies (Coombs, 2009) are supplemental to the other three 
postures and can be used with both the diminish and rebuilding areas, a number of 
the specific bolstering strategies were found in an earlier study to cluster with the 
rebuilding strategies on levels of responsibility (see for example, ingratiation in 
Coombs, 2006) suggesting the need for further understanding of the stakeholder 
perspectives of these supplemental strategies.   Thus, in this study, strategies will be 
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selected from both the rebuilding and bolstering postures to aid in the confirmation 
of similarities or differences in these approaches.   
While responsibility judgments are central to finding congruence between 
stakeholder expectations and organisational action, it is also still important to 
consider how an organisation can use its own characteristics and actions to protect its 
reputation and legitimacy.  By using the deny and diminish categories, the 
organisation is trying to reduce the responsibility assigned to it as the ascribed levels 
of responsibility are still relatively low in stakeholders’ minds.  Coombs (1998) 
suggests an organisation should focus more on its characteristics and actions when 
the perceived level of responsibility is high.  Stakeholder attributions are difficult to 
change generally but at heightened levels of negativity, attempts to lower 
responsibility may be fruitless (Coombs, 2007).  While the deal strategy category 
does not reduce responsibility, it helps the stakeholders to assess the organisation 
with regard to its acceptance of the need to take greater responsibility for violating 
societal norms.    
Kim et al (2009) have suggested caution may be needed in dealing with the more 
accommodative end of the response spectrum and predicting the benefits of 
achieving congruence with stakeholder expectations on responsibility.  Their 
experimental research with undergraduate students examined the impact of an 
organisational response framed around corporate ability which focuses on product-
relevant dimensions such as quality and service orientation compared with an 
organisational response framed around social responsibility and ethical orientation.  
Both responses involved an apology and then focused on the particular aspect as 
described.  These responses were tested in two crisis clusters (accident and 
preventable) but also used two contexts for the crisis (food poisoning and laptop 
battery explosion).  Their findings provided limited support for the theoretically 
proposed positive outcomes on organisational responsibility of using accommodative 
strategies.  In particular cases such as in the accident cluster when the context was 
food poisoning, their findings suggested that organisations providing responses that 
encapsulated a socially responsible approach were penalised more than companies 
that didn’t and just focused on their past product quality.  As the researchers suggest, 
‘making nice does not always offer a return on investment when particular crisis 
circumstances arise’ (Kim et al, 2009, p.88).   The results were not stable across the 
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crisis contexts and clusters which may suggest the confounding influence of the 
context itself, that is, stakeholder judgments may be influenced by their assumptions 
behind food poisoning when compared with a laptop battery explosion, so further 
research across clusters and contexts is needed. 
The methodological challenges highlighted by Fediuk et al (2010) impact research 
on how crisis strategy might influence the assignment of responsibility in a crisis 
event.  Coombs (2006) tested stakeholder understanding of the accepted level of 
responsibility in different strategy options (see Table 4).   The theoretically 
developed strategy postures were found to accurately predict different levels of 
accepted responsibility, however, the sample size for the experiment was relatively 
small as acknowledged by the researcher (Coombs, 2006).  While it is important to 
test all assumptions of the model, it was perhaps not unexpected that a statement by 
an organisation claiming full responsibility was seen by stakeholders as 
demonstrating a high acceptance of responsibility by the organisation.  It could be 
argued that of greater interest to crisis managers is how stakeholders perceive the 
organisation’s strategy in terms of their original attributions of responsibility as 
determined by the crisis type and the subsequent effect this has on their impressions 
of the organisation.  This raises the question of whether the strategy achieves 
congruence by meeting their expectations of organisational responsibility or whether 
the strategy influences their views so that the company was seen as less responsible 
or more responsible.  Coombs (2006) has acknowledged that a clearer understanding 
of how stakeholders react to crisis response strategies is needed in order to better 
predict their relevance in different situations and this is the focus of this study.  
Measures of organisational responsibility are taken at different time points to see the 
impact of strategy on these assessments. 
While there is some preliminary evidence in the crisis research literature to support 
the perspective that different crisis responses lead to different stakeholder 
impressions of organisations, the explicit link with organisational legitimacy is less 
clear.  Much of the crisis research is based on reputational theory and uses 
reputational scales to identify impact (see for example, Benoit, 1995; Dean, 2004; 
Lyon & Cameron, 2004).    This study seeks to confirm the validity of the 
theoretically predicted responses for reputation protection (see Table 4) where the 
response is matched with the level of initial attribution of responsibility while also 
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testing the applicability of the response categorisation to legitimacy protection.  This 
builds on the legitimacy and crisis research of Massey (2001) and Allen and 
Caillouet (1994).  In doing so, it will revisit whether the primary influence of 
strategy on reputation and legitimacy is a direct one or an indirect one through the 
mediating factor of attributions of responsibility.  Retesting this proposition for 
clarity is appropriate given the centrality of responsibility to the SCCT model and its 
key focus in determining the response postures.   
Given a crisis strategy is never enacted without a particular crisis in operation and 
the first level of stakeholder attribution of responsibility has been demonstrated to be 
linked with crisis type through its crisis cluster (Coombs, 1998), this study also 
examines the cluster and strategy components together, thus testing the predictions 
of the SCCT model for both matched and mismatched strategies as outlined in Table 
5.  Tests of these interaction effects are limited (Claeys et al, 2010; Kim et al, 2009) 
and not clearly demonstrating the theoretical assumptions of the SCCT.  Further 
testing is important to guide the further development of crisis communication models 
if they are to be used confidently by crisis managers. 
Table 5:  Matched and mismatched response recommendations in SCCT based on 
crisis cluster 
Crisis 
cluster  
Assumed Level of 
Stakeholder Attribution 
of Responsibility by  
Crisis Cluster 
SCCT recommended 
response based on 
first level attribution 
of responsibility by 
cluster (matched 
response) 
Mismatched 
response 
Victim Low Deny Diminish/Deal 
Accidental Medium Diminish Deny/Deal 
Preventable High Deal Deny/diminish 
 
While Coombs (2007) has continued to develop the SCCT model along the logic 
chain that the crisis cluster predicts early levels of responsibility which can be used 
to predict the reputational outcome based on different strategies, research by others 
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suggests the predictive powers of the SCCT model need further refinement.  In an 
earlier study of how responsibility and response lead to stakeholder evaluations and 
resultant images of organisations, Bradford and Garrett (1995) reported that 
theoretically matched categories which are nearly identical to those of the SCCT 
model did not show the outcomes expected, with the exception of one category of 
matched response which closely aligns with the preventable/deal match in SCCT.  In 
using the language of the SCCT model, the majority of matched responses showed 
no statistically different outcomes on images of organisations than the mismatched 
responses.      
Lee’s (2004) study of matching in impression management strategies also showed 
that different categories of strategy did not always show statistically different 
outcomes as predicted, nor support the intention of favourable outcomes through 
matched responses.  Using 385 participants responding to hypothetical scenarios 
describing a plane crash in Hong Kong, Lee investigated the outcomes of five 
different strategies and a no comment condition on judgments of organisational 
responsibility and impression of the organisation which is closely linked to its 
reputation.   The minimisation strategy of claiming the consequences of the crisis 
were not as bad as portrayed aligns with the diminish strategy in the SCCT.  In the 
accident situation described above, this strategy saw a significantly higher level of 
responsibility assigned by the participants when compared with the mismatched 
denial strategy of scapegoating and the mismatched strategies of apology and 
compensation.  The recommended strategy also recorded a higher level of 
responsibility than the no comment condition. There was no significant difference on 
negative impression of the organisation between the minimisation strategy and the 
denial strategy.   
A more recent study by Haigh and Dardis (2008) similarly found inconclusive 
results for matched and mismatched responses on reputation.  Their study with 189 
undergraduate students tested five strategy options in an accidental cluster crisis 
which involved the recall of a chocolate bar by a fictitious company.  While the 
matched strategy produced a positive outcome, the two most accommodative 
strategies (corrective action and mortification) did not consistently produce 
significantly different outcomes than the most defensive strategies (denial and evade 
responsibility), despite trying to do very different things.     
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Given the match vs mismatched structure relies on a matching of cluster and 
strategy, an interaction effect in experimental studies would be expected to 
demonstrate the predicted outcomes.  Claeys et al’s (2010) study with Belgian 
consumers also found no interaction of crisis cluster and crisis response strategies on 
reputation when testing all three crisis clusters against different crisis responses 
drawn from each of the response postures.  Claeys et al study differed slightly from 
the earlier tests as it used a combination of strategies instead of single responses, 
however the combinations were drawn from within the same posture so theoretically 
they should have been communicating similar positions.   
While primarily focusing on strategy in relation to corporate versus spokesperson 
reputation, Verhoeven, Hoof, Keurs & Vurren (2012) also recently found non-
significant results for the effect of response strategy on corporate reputation across 
two crisis clusters of accidental and preventable crisis.   Their study using 
hypothetical events at a hospital focused on the mortification strategies and found a 
significant main effect for crisis cluster (which linked to levels of corporate 
responsibility) but no statistically significant interaction of strategy and crisis cluster 
on corporate reputation (Verhoeven et al, 2012).   
Another recent study by Brocato et al (2012), also primarily considering the 
difference in stakeholder perceptions of the corporation versus its CEO 
spokesperson, confirmed no statistical difference between the outcomes for the 
match/mismatch process across different crisis clusters.   However, in the large scale 
Brocato et al study with nearly 800 participants, the strategies themselves did lead to 
differences in organisational impression and stakeholder satisfaction with the 
response when the clusters were collapsed.   Further explanation of the impact of 
strategies will be enabled through the project described in this thesis as the variables 
will be measured across key time periods.  This will help clarify the detailed impact 
of the individual strategies in their match and mismatch conditions within each of the 
three clusters.  
While the focus of SCCT is on the matched response when compared with the 
mismatched responses, the differences in outcomes between the mismatched 
responses themselves also remain unclear.  Depending on the particular crisis cluster 
being tested, one mismatch category may be considered an insufficient response and 
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the other mismatch category is considered an overreaction to the level of attributed 
responsibility for the selected crisis cluster.  As such, significantly different 
outcomes would be expected.  However, Dardis and Haigh (2009) found no 
significant differences between the two mismatched responses of denial and 
accommodation in an experimental condition despite them trying to achieve totally 
different ends.  This study will retest this proposition through the full testing of the 
match and mismatch conditions across the three crisis clusters as well as the testing 
of any impact across time. 
Current research would suggest that within a strategy category, individual strategies 
do not produce statistically significant difference in outcomes (Coombs & Schmidt, 
2000; Lee, 2004).  This is the assumption under which they are clustered together.  
However, the legal implications of selecting the different recommended strategies to 
be used in a crisis from the preventable category for example are quite significant 
and, therefore, further guidance in this area is needed to give comfort to crisis 
managers.  Strategic ambiguity may be the main legal focus for any communication 
during a crisis (Huang & Su, 2009) which is more possible with some of the 
strategies than others.  Claeys et al (2010) have called for further research on the 
strategies within each cluster given the potential impacts of strategy selection on 
organisational outcomes.   Responding to this call, the impact of a number of 
different individual response strategies from the deal category have been tested in 
this study.  They have been applied in their matched cluster of preventable crises. 
Cluster, Strategy and Responsibility: Relevant Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The literature review has highlighted the gaps in the relevant literature surrounding 
the protective powers of crisis response strategy when enacted in different crisis 
events and the role attributions of responsibility plays in enhancing or reducing these 
powers.  Of particular note is the need to seek further clarification of the impact of 
strategy on reputation and legitimacy damage which can be assessed more 
specifically by looking at shifts in reputation and legitimacy from pre-crisis states 
through to post-crisis response.    
These shifts may highlight three potential outcomes and goals for strategy 
implementation:  a lack of protection against damage through a lowering in 
assessments of reputation and legitimacy over time; protection of reputation and/or 
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legitimacy through no further damage outside that associated with the event itself; 
and repair to reputation and legitimacy which would see a return of these measures 
to pre-crisis levels or above.  Protecting itself from further damage is the minimum 
goal of an organisation in crisis immediately following the crisis event.  Recovery to 
its original position or enhancement of this position through the opportunistic nature 
of crisis are more lofty goals and may also take some period of time post-crisis to 
achieve.  Given the immediacy of the pre and post-crisis timeframe being assessed in 
this study, hypotheses have been set to reflect the minimum goals as predicted by the 
relevant crisis models.  This also reflects Elsbach’s (1994) study on legitimacy 
which considered the protective powers of strategy in maintaining legitimacy 
following negative events.  Such an approach accepts a decline in stakeholder 
perceptions of reputation and/or legitimacy following a crisis event which represents 
the first measurement of the damage potential but expects no further increase in 
damage potential if the strategy is appropriate to the situation.   Thus the 
theoretically matched strategies should do nothing to increase this damage potential 
as congruence with stakeholder expectations is achieved.  As an added benefit, they 
may be successful in reducing the damage level as evidenced by improvements to 
stakeholder assessments of reputation and legitimacy over time.     
From this review, the following questions have been posed and hypotheses 
determined to guide this study’s exploration of the protective powers of different 
crisis response strategies.  
Research Question 1 
How do crisis response strategies used in response to crises from different crisis 
clusters influence stakeholder perceptions of organisational reputation and 
legitimacy? 
Hypothesis 1.1 
A matched crisis response (as outlined in Table 6) will maintain the level of 
stakeholder perceptions of organisational reputation and legitimacy recorded 
immediately following the crisis event. 
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Hypothesis 1.2 
A mismatched crisis response (as outlined in Table 6) will not maintain the 
level of stakeholder perceptions of organisational reputation and legitimacy 
recorded immediately following the crisis event. 
Hypothesis 1.3 
All of the matched crisis responses used in a crisis from the preventable 
cluster will have the same influence on organisational reputation and 
legitimacy. 
Table 6:  Matched response by crisis cluster 
 Crisis type cluster Matched response Mismatched response 
Victim Deny Diminish/Deal 
Accidental Diminish Deny/Deal 
Preventable Deal Deny/diminish 
 
Given the centrality of responsibility to crisis models in general and the formulation 
of both the crisis clusters and the theoretically determined response strategies within 
the SCCT framework, research questions and hypotheses have also been developed 
to clarify the role that responsibility plays in stakeholder assessments of 
organisations in crisis.  While the first set of research questions consider the main 
effects within the SCCT model, the second set of questions consider the indirect 
effects through the potential mediating role of responsibility.  Previous tests have 
shown support for both the direct and indirect effects within the model (Coombs & 
Holladay, 2002; Coombs, 2007), however, the direct tests have been stronger.   The 
focus in this study of examining these effects over time through the lens of 
reputation and/or legitimacy damage rather than at a post-crisis point used in the 
earlier studies invites a revisiting of these relations and a retesting of the mediation 
role. 
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Research Question 2 
How does responsibility mediate the influence of response strategies used during 
crises from different clusters on stakeholder perceptions of organisational 
reputation and legitimacy? 
To capture the essence of this research question, this study hypotheses that:  
The effect of response strategies used during crises from different clusters on 
stakeholder perceptions of organisational reputation and legitimacy is 
mediated by perceptions of organisational responsibility.   
Thus when perceptions of responsibility change, a subsequent change in perceptions 
of reputation and legitimacy should be seen.   The direction of this subsequent 
change is dependent on two aspects: the implied purpose of the strategy and the 
impact of the assumptions underlying the different clusters.  Therefore a strictly 
linear relationship for all cases is not hypothesised.  Different tests of this hypothesis 
are represented across the different experiments in this overall study as they allow 
the discrete testing and interrogation of each part of the mediation path.  Read 
together, these experiments provide a detailed context through which to understand 
the mediating effect of responsibility between strategy and cluster and reputation and 
legitimacy and the levels of influence of this effect. Rather than create discrete 
hypotheses for each possible combination of cluster and strategy researched across 
the six experiments in this study, two broad hypotheses are used in this study to 
recognise the relationship between changes in responsibility and reputation and 
legitimacy.  While not specifying the complete mediation path, they should be read 
in the context of an expectation that changes in responsibility will lead to changes in 
reputation and legitimacy.  Similarly, a lack of change in responsibility should lead 
to no change in reputation and legitimacy.  The third hypothesis supports the 
approach of the two broader hypotheses but deals with the conditions in one 
particular experiment, Experiment 3. 
Hypothesis 2.1  
A matched crisis response will maintain the level of stakeholder perceptions 
of organisational responsibility and will subsequently maintain the level of 
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stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy recorded immediately 
following the crisis event. 
Hypothesis 2.2 
A mismatched crisis response will not maintain the level of stakeholder 
perceptions of organisational responsibility and will subsequently not 
maintain the level of stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy 
recorded immediately following the crisis event. 
Hypothesis 2.3 
All of the matched crisis responses used in a crisis from the preventable 
cluster will have the same influence on organisational responsibility, 
reputation and legitimacy. 
Research Question 3 
How does an organisation’s responsibility for a crisis affect stakeholder 
perceptions of its reputation and legitimacy? 
Hypothesis 3.1 
An organisation that is fully responsible for a crisis will be judged by 
stakeholders as having a lower level of reputation and legitimacy than an 
organisation that is not responsible for a crisis. 
The key research on the first three influencing factors of crisis cluster, organisational 
responsibility and crisis response strategy has been summarised and the role this 
study will play in progressing the understanding of these factors through further 
empirical testing explained.  The literature review will now address the fourth key 
influencing factor on stakeholder perceptions during a crisis event and demonstrate 
its relevance to this study. 
Influencing Factor 4:  Situational Factors and their Roles as Intensifiers 
While the initial goal of the research informing SCCT and other crisis models (see, 
for example, Rhee & Valdez, 2009) was to identify the relevant factors that might 
influence the crisis situation, the more advanced goal was to understand how their 
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influence worked.  This led to Coombs (2006) suggesting that some factors at the 
time of crisis may change the way the initial mapping of a crisis cluster and its 
matched strategy operated.  Because these factors might lead to a different outcome, 
they were deemed to have an intensifier effect (Coombs, 2006), that is, they 
intensified the environment in which stakeholder perceptions were made.  Rhees and 
Valdez (2009) have considered these factors as contextual as they provide the 
context through which the judgments are made.  Kim et al (2009) also emphasised 
the need to consider a wide range of influencing factors involved in any crisis 
situation albeit they position this need through the lens of contingency theory 
(Cancel, Cameron, Sallot & Mitrook, 1997; Cameron, Pang & Yin, 2008).  This 
theory suggests that when conflict arises, the parties involved need to select an 
approach to how they will respond with the options for this ranging from 
accommodative approaches or making concessions through to advocacy approaches 
which involve advancing the organisation’s position.  These factors all contribute to 
the way stakeholders understand the organisation in crisis through the value of 
salience as they are derived from an individual’s experiences and reinforcements 
from previous situations (Cutlip, Center & Broom, 2009). 
When intensifiers are acting on the crisis situation, the organisation will suffer 
greater reputational damage than when they are absent.  The intensification effect 
may act indirectly by intensifying attributed responsibility which then affects 
reputation or intensifying the reputational threat directly.  A range of situational 
factors have been suggested as having potential intensifier effects including severity 
of damage (Coombs, 1998);  source credibility (Lyon & Cameron, 1998; Verhoeven 
et al, 2012), and performance history as a superconstruct with the subparts of crisis 
history (Coombs & Holladay, 2001) and relationship history (Coombs & Holladay, 
2001).  Based on the theory of image cultivation where an organisation builds its 
image credits with positive performance (Coombs, 1998), organisations with a 
history of positive operating performance and good deeds should find it easier to 
maintain a positive image during a crisis. When a crisis hits, image credits are used 
to offset the reputational damage generated by the crisis (Birch, 1994; 
Druckenmiller, 1993; Siomkos & Shrivastava, 1993).  Conversely, an organisation 
with a history of poor performance will see the image damage amplified rather than 
offset.  The poor performance history leads the public to be more critical because the 
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crisis is part of a negative pattern of behaviour.  Some support has been found for 
this assumption (Coombs & Holladay, 1996; Griffin, Babin & Attaway, 1991).  In 
their experiment with 196 university students, Griffin et al used a crisis scenario of 
food contamination to test the effects of a crisis event as an isolated incident or part 
of a pattern of events for a fast food chain.  They were interested in how this crisis 
history affected consumer attitudes towards companies and purchase intentions.  
Their results showed the crisis history affected consumer attitudes but there was no 
significant difference between the purchase intentions of those in the group who 
were told the crisis event was an isolated incident and those who were told the 
company had experienced a number of previous crises.  
Experimental treatment of the intensifier factors has led at best to weak if not 
inconsistent effects being shown (see for example, Lee, 2004 in rejecting severity of 
damage) and in some cases, no effects at all (Brown & White, 2011) resulting in the 
need for a more detailed analysis of the intensifier phenomena.  This study 
contributes to the refinement of the influence of intensifier effects.  It focuses on one 
of these effects - the relationship history construct.  The direct effects of relationship 
history were tested not only on reputation as in previous experiments but also on 
legitimacy as well as the indirect effects through the mediating variable of 
responsibility.  The pre and post-test nature of this study’s design can help clarify the 
effects of this important construct. 
The development of the relationship history construct will now be discussed and this 
study’s approach to an expanded nature of the relationship history variable 
explained.   
Relationship History as an Intensifier 
Relationship history, or what has also been defined as prior relationship reputation 
(Coombs, 2007, 2010), remains an under-researched intensifier (Brown & White, 
2011).    Where a crisis is viewed as an episode in a larger relationship between an 
organisation and its stakeholders (Coombs, 2000), the preceding relationships and 
the post-crisis relationships become important in understanding the overall 
organisation-stakeholder relationship.  Marra (1998) proposed that the maintenance 
of pre- and post-crisis relationships is important to the success of crisis 
communication planning and execution.  Drawing from the relational perspective 
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outlined earlier, crisis researchers (see for example, Kim & Lee, 2005; Lee, 2007; 
Seeger, 2006) have sought to understand the impact of prior relationships on the 
organisation’s ability to effectively manage its crisis response.   
In one of the first major tests of the construct, Coombs and Holladay (2001) found 
that relationship history accounted for nearly three times the amount of the variance 
in organisational reputation than that accredited to a different intensifier of crisis 
history. Using crisis vignettes to test the impact of relationship history, organisations 
judged by stakeholders to have poor stakeholder relationships prior to a crisis event 
were perceived as having greater responsibility for that crisis event whether they 
were responsible or not, however, the variable effect was small and requires further 
testing.  Such organisations also suffered a stronger effect on their reputation post 
crisis than those with good stakeholder relationships, however, their study did not 
assess changes in judgments on reputation, just comparative measures of different 
treatments on reputation at a point in time.   
Jeong (2009) examined relationship history through the lens of distinctiveness with 
high distinctiveness (positive relationship history) being assessed against low 
distinctiveness (poor relationship history) in relation to its impact on internal and 
external attributions of responsibility for a crisis event.  Jeong designed an online 
experiment based on a real case study following an oil spill incident in South Korea 
in late 2007. A barge owned by the multinational conglomerate, Samsung, hit an oil 
tanker.  The 180 South Korean adults who participated in the study read a news 
article that either showed Samsung as having a history of good corporate social 
responsibility (high distinctiveness), being involved in unethical management (low 
distinctiveness) or no information at all (control condition). The results from the 
experiment showed that information on a negative relationship history led to greater 
internal attributions of responsibility for a crisis event which mediated the effect of 
distinctiveness on punitive opinions and behaviour against the organisation.  The 
greater internal attributions mean that the participants were holding the organisation 
more responsible for the crisis event.  This study is informative on the possible path 
of influence of an intensifier, however, Schwarz (2008) cautions about conflating the 
distinctiveness construct from Kelley’s co-variation theory with relationship history 
without recognising the complexities of both constructs.  In a further study, Brown 
and White (2011) investigated organisation-public relationships by examining actual 
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relationships within their experiments.  This differed from most other studies where 
imagined relationships are used through case studies or hypothetical company 
designs.  Brown and White tested the student-university relationship and found that 
students who had a positive relationship with their university were less likely to 
blame it for a crisis.  Interestingly, this lower attribution of responsibility was found 
regardless of the crisis response strategy used by the university, leading Brown and 
White to conclude that maintaining positive relationships may be more important 
than the response strategy a company in crisis uses. 
The Confounding Nature of Multistakeholder Perceptions of Relationship History 
Organisations have relationships with many different stakeholders and the status of 
each relationship is likely to vary depending on the organisational goals.  For 
example, a company may have good relationships with its shareholders because it 
makes high profits and dividend payouts but it may do so by treating its employees 
poorly, hence its relationship with its employees may be poor.  A contemporary 
example of this paradox can be found in the Australian banking industry where 
rewards for shareholders through high interest rates are heavily criticised by 
consumers and various levels of government.  While a number of researchers (see for 
example, Brown & White, 2011; Coombs & Holladay, 2001; Lyon & Cameron, 
2004; Kim & Lee, 2005) have sought to advance research in this area by exploring 
the influence of relationship history in a crisis event, this research rarely addresses 
the multistakeholder nature of organisation-public relationships directly. 
While informative in considering the impact of relationship history in crisis events, 
the results of Coombs and Holladay’s (2001) major test of relationship history cited 
in crisis research using the SCCT framework may be confounded by this multi-
stakeholder relationship frame.  In their research, they took a multi-component 
approach to the variable of relationship history without subsequent analysis of the 
component parts.  In the description of relationship history, the researchers describe 
two separate relationships with two separate stakeholder groups, employees and the 
community.  However, the testing of the variable collapsed these two components to 
one. This approach was also followed by Lyon and Cameron (1998; 2004) in their 
two experiments on relationship history.  The assumption in the findings appears to 
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be that organisations either have all good or all bad relationships with their 
stakeholders.   
The ability to explore relationships with every type of stakeholder is outside the 
scope of the study described in this thesis. However, the study design has attempted 
to avoid the challenges that arise by assuming the evaluative nature of relationships 
with one set of stakeholders is the same as with every other set of stakeholders.   
This study has restricted the description of the stakeholder relationship to one 
stakeholder type:  the community.   Thus the nature of relationship character within 
organisation-community relationships was explored to retest the assertions made in 
the previous limited research on relationship history in crisis events.  
Reconsidering the Nature of Relationship History: Relationship Character and 
Organisational Age 
The test of relationship history in the previously cited experiments is one of the 
evaluative quality of relationship character, that is, how good or bad is the 
relationship between an organisation and its stakeholders.  While relationship 
character has the pre-eminent position within the relationship history construct, 
Rhees & Valdez (2009) have identified organisational age as a further contextual 
factor which may work with the evaluative quality of the pre-crisis reputation in 
impacting an organisation’s reputation-repairing activity.   
Organisational age has been theoretically linked with the development of 
organisation-stakeholder relationships (Hannan & Freeman, 1989) as well as their 
evaluative quality (Stinchcombe, 1968).   New organisations have limited 
stakeholder relationships, thereby placing them at risk of challenges to legitimacy 
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).  Given the importance of relationships on stakeholder 
perceptions post-crisis (Coombs & Holladay, 2001), a new organisation may face a 
higher risk of poor stakeholder perceptions than an established organisation as it is 
yet to not only develop a network of relationships but establish those relationships as 
positive.  It is, in effect, operating without the ‘safety net of interorganizational 
linkages and trust’ that comes with age (Kor & Misangyi, 2008, p. 1347). Therefore, 
a new organisation will need to consider its response options carefully to try and 
minimise the potential intensifier effects of negative relationship history on its 
legitimacy standing.  Stakeholder attitude to organisational age has not been tested 
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explicitly in the crisis research on relationship history (see, for example, Brown & 
White, 2011; Coombs & Holladay, 1996; Lyon & Cameron, 2004).  Different 
stakeholder perceptions informed by the age of an organisation may provide further 
explanatory depth to the impact of stakeholder relationships prior to a crisis event 
and the effect of an organisation’s actions to deal with the impact of the crisis on its 
reputation and legitimacy.   
Initial work in this area has been done by Massey (2004) in testing the effects of 
different types of operations on the legitimacy standing of organisations in crisis.  
Using niche-width theory, Massey investigated whether generalist organisations with 
a broad spread of operations would be seen as more legitimate in a crisis situation 
than specialist organisations with a limited focus.  He characterised specialist 
organisations as young and generalist organisations as older and included this 
information in his experimental stimuli material.  Massey’s experiments showed a 
difference for the specialist versus generalist firms on legitimacy judgments. 
However, the age factor was not specifically controlled for in the methodology and 
therefore the results could have been confounded by the multi-faceted nature of the 
constructs being tested.  The study reported in this thesis extends the theoretical 
modelling of Rhee & Valdez (2009) on the importance of an age related variable in 
the crisis context and Massey’s (2004) initial testing on impacts on legitimacy during 
crisis by specifically testing for age under an experimental design.  It extends 
Massey’s test on legitimacy to ascertain if the age related variable is important to the 
other components of the SCCT model:  responsibility and reputation. 
Exploring Age-Related Variables through the Liability of Newness Concept and its 
Implications for Crisis Research 
New organisations are vulnerable to shifts in their environment as they possess 
limited supportive exchange relationships with other significant organisations and 
stakeholders and they lack endorsement by powerful associates.  They are ‘isolated’ 
(Hager et al, 2004, p.160) without the stakeholder connections to overcome the 
hazard that comes with their youth.  Organisational ecologists have undertaken 
extensive studies on the founding and death rates of organisations.  The impact of 
age on organisational death rates has been theorised and tested empirically by many 
researchers (see for example, Carroll & Delacroix, 1982; Freeman, Carroll, & 
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Hannan, 1983; Hager, Galaskiewiez & Larson, 2004; Halliday, Powell & Granfors, 
1987; Singh, Tucker & House, 1986;),  in many contexts including for-profit and 
nonprofit entities, labor unions, semiconductor producers, trade associations, bar 
associations and local newspapers and withstood controls for liabilities of size 
(Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Audretsch & Mahmood, 1994; Freeman, Carroll & 
Hannan, 1983) and population heterogeneity (Carroll & Delacroix, 1982).    This 
long history of research has established that younger organisations have a greater 
propensity to die, suffering from what has been termed a liability of newness 
(Stinchcombe, 1965).   
A review of the research on the relationship between organisational age and survival 
rates for organisations suggests three possible models.  The liability of newness 
model suggests an exponential relationship with the death risk declining 
monotonically with increased age (Freeman, Carroll & Hannan, 1983; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1989).  While Stinchcombe (1965) claimed the liability to be universally 
applicable, other research suggests a curvilinear relationship between organisational 
age and rates of failure.  This relationship has been termed the ‘liability of 
adolescence’ (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; Fichman & Levinthal, 1991; Mahmood, 
2000; Strotmann, 2007) and suggests that the risk is low at very young ages from a 
few months to about two years (the honeymoon period) before rising to a peak and 
then declining, reflecting an inverted U-shaped pattern.  This low start risk may be 
dependent on the initial stock of resources acquired at founding which provides an 
initial buffer (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990).  Such resources could include a range of 
organisational assets such as favourable prior beliefs, trust, goodwill, financial 
resources and psychological commitment (Fichman & Levinthal, 1991).   
The exact length of the liability period is difficult to establish and may vary among 
industry sectors and the technology status of the organisation, however, some studies 
(see for example Mahmood (2000) who studied four major industry sectors in the 
United States across a decade) have suggested the maximum effect of the hazard to 
be around two to three years post-founding while Cafferata et al (2009) in their 
extensive literature review of relevant empirical studies point to the hazard of the 
first three to four years of organisation life.  Massey (2001) in his study of 
organisational niche theory and its link to legitimacy used a similar period, setting 
the hypothetical company age for a new organisation at three years as did Choi and 
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Shepherd (2005) in their study of stakeholder perspectives of the different 
dimensions of newness. This two to three year period common in the empirical 
research was used to guide the scenario developments in this study.   
Common to both the newness and the adolescence perspectives is that the early years 
of a firm’s life are the most hazardous and failure rates eventually decline with age 
with the main difference between the models looking at when the liability peaks.  
The third model however refutes this proposition and suggests that as firms age, their 
inertia leads them to become increasingly misaligned with their environment.  This 
liability of obsolescence leads to higher failure rates so increased age increases the 
liability (Baum, 1989; Barnett, 1990; Barron, West, & Hannan, 1994; Ranger-
Moore, 1997).  Despite their differing approaches, Baum (1996) argues that these 
three perspectives should be treated as complementary rather than competing 
theoretical perspectives.  He argues that this reconciliation of views relies on 
understanding contingency factors such as a firm’s technology strategy which cause 
one or other of the models to predominate (Henderson, 1999). Sorensen and Stuart 
(2000) also highlight the firm specific nature of the obsolescence path, in particular 
exploring innovative activity.   
Stinchcombe (1968; 2000) identified four main reasons to explain the liability of 
newness:  new roles and tasks have to be learned at some cost to the organisation; 
new roles have to be invented which may conflict with constraints on capital or 
creativity; social interactions within a new organisation resemble those with 
strangers and a common information structure may be lacking; and, stable links to 
clients, supporters or customers are not yet established.  It is the last two of these 
four reasons which emphasise ‘relational wealth based on long-term relationships’ 
(Preston & Donaldson, 1999, p. 619) that substantially inform this study. 
As Stinchcombe (2000) argues, relations with strangers lack trust, thus relations are 
‘much more precarious in new than old organisation’ (p.232).  Social structures such 
as the rule of law can be used to reduce some of the liability of newness attached 
with dealing with strangers.  The stability of ties between organisation and customer 
for an older organisation is one of its major resources (Stinchcombe, 2000) and one 
which creates significant barriers of entry to new ventures.  Choi and Shepherd 
(2005) established that there was a stronger relationship between age and customer 
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support than for other types of stakeholders such as employees or investors.  In their 
study, customers had a stronger preference for older organisations than did 
employees and investors, perhaps reflecting the reliability of product quality and 
service associated with older companies.   
Organisations can overcome the vulnerability to newness by developing internal and 
external legitimation processes, thus cementing the links with key stakeholders and 
gaining powerful supporters (Stinchcombe, 1965).   Rao (1994) found that issues of 
legitimacy were likely to be of paramount importance both prior to creation and 
early in the life of an organisation. In a study of social service organisations, Singh et 
al (1998) found that the acquisition of external legitimacy corresponded to a 
substantial reduction in the ‘hazard of death’ (p. 174).  Organisations that were 
externally legitimate saw a reduction in their operational risk earlier in their 
development whereas organisations that were not externally legitimated continued to 
operate in a high risk environment or were placed at an even higher risk rate as they 
aged.  More importantly for this study, the loss of legitimacy through some event 
changed the benefit that came from maturity to a further liability for the organisation 
(Singh et al, 1986, p. 189).  Thus, the liability of newness is not an invariant law 
(Fichman & Levinthal, 1991).  Instead, it is contingent on factors such as external 
legitimacy.  For these tests, Singh et al relied on institutional support as a 
demonstration of external legitimacy as assessed through event-history analysis 
(Tuma, Hannan & Groeneveld, 1979) of regulatory forms such as business 
registration or official directory listings.  The perspectives of other key stakeholders 
such as the consuming or shareholding publics were not tested. 
A crisis event is a threat or challenge to an organisation’s legitimacy (Coombs & 
Holladay, 1996) by potentially challenging the relationships built with stakeholders 
over time (Chakravarthy & Gargiulo, 1998).  A crisis event increases environmental 
pressures for new and established organisations, however, a new organisation faces 
such an event without the assistance of an established network of supportive 
stakeholders.  Highlighting the dangers, Choi and Shepherd (2005) characterise the 
stakeholders of new organisations as ‘voluntary risk bearers’ who invest in the 
organisation through some form of capital at a time of significant risk.  These 
stakeholders are likely to not be as ‘numerous, well-established, prestigious or rich in 
resources’ as those with an interest in supporting well established firms (Henisz & 
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Zelner, 2005, p.367). Thus, new organisations have few legitimacy reserves to buffer 
them from the shocks of environmental pressures (Galbraith, 1973).   
Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) suggest that an organisation suffering from the liability 
of newness will be scrutinised more closely by its constituents.  This may be critical 
in a time of crisis when organisational scrutiny is at its peak.  Stakeholders will 
question whether an organisation is meeting normative expectations (Coombs & 
Holladay, 1996).  Stakeholders will also consider the history of the organisation, 
taking into account not just its age but its actions since its inception (Freeman, 
Carroll & Hannan, 1983) which may be assessed through the evaluative nature of its 
relationships.  A line of research on familiarity and visibility of an organisation has 
established this impact on an organisation’s reputation and corporate equity (see for 
example, Brooks et al, 2003; McCorkindale, 2010), however such familiarity and 
visibility takes time to establish, hence favouring organisations with longer 
development histories. 
If young organisations are more likely to be scrutinised in a time of crisis and they 
have not had sufficient time to build positive relationships with key stakeholders, 
there is an increased risk that their lack of a positive relationship history may create a 
negative frame through which their role in the crisis event is seen.   Thus, 
organisational age (young or mature) and evaluative quality (positive or negative 
relationship character) may act together to influence the perceptions of stakeholders 
at the time of a crisis event and this influence may change the frame through which 
the crisis event would normally be assessed.   
The Role of Relationship History: Relevant Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This review has highlighted the need to better understand the dynamics of the 
relationship history construct given the relational management approach to crisis 
management.  It has proposed a reconceptualisation of relationship history as 
incorporating both an evaluative judgment on relationship character and a 
consideration of an organisation’s age recognising that relationships are built over 
time.  For relationship history to act as an intensifier as proposed by Coombs and 
Holladay (2001), its influence on stakeholder perceptions of reputation and 
legitimacy either directly or through the construct of organisational responsibility 
needs to be established.  This study not only retests the existing relationship history 
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construct in the SCCT model (Coombs, 2007) to refine our understanding of the 
potential intensifier effect but also tests the expanded version of the construct 
through also testing the impact of organisational age.  Both components of the 
relationship history construct were identified and tested separately in the quasi-
experimental design so that their specific influence can be identified.  While most 
empirical tests for relationship history have assessed its impact on reputation, this 
study also tests the influence of relationship history on organisational legitimacy to 
identify whether legitimacy is impacted by intensifier effects in a similar way to 
reputation.   
A further set of research questions and hypotheses were established to guide this 
study’s testing of this area.   
Research Question 4 
How does an organisation’s relationship history with its stakeholders influence 
stakeholder perceptions of its reputation and legitimacy? 
Hypothesis 4.1 
A mature organisation is more likely to have higher reputation and legitimacy 
scores than a new organisation. 
Hypothesis 4.2 
An organisation with positive prior stakeholder relationships is more likely to 
have higher reputation and legitimacy scores than an organisation with 
negative prior stakeholder relationships. 
Research Question 5  
How do stakeholder perceptions of an organisation’s responsibility mediate the 
influence of its relationship history on its reputation and legitimacy? 
Hypothesis 5.1 
A new organisation is more likely to be perceived as responsible for a crisis 
and is less likely to maintain its reputation and legitimacy from the time of 
the crisis than a mature organisation. 
74 
 
Hypothesis 5.2 
An organisation with negative prior stakeholder relationships is more likely 
to be perceived as responsible for a crisis and is less likely to maintain its 
reputation and legitimacy from the time of the crisis than an organisation 
with positive prior stakeholder relationships. 
The Influence of Intensifier Effects on Strategy Outcomes 
If an intensifier effect is operating and the frame through which the organisation and 
the crisis event are assessed is being influenced, the ability of a response strategy to 
influence stakeholder perceptions of responsibility for a crisis event and the 
organisation’s reputation and legitimacy may be affected.  That is, the ‘protective 
powers’ (Coombs, 2006, p. 245) of the strategy may be reduced. As outlined earlier, 
the intensifier effect increases the risk to reputational damage either indirectly by 
increasing or decreasing attributed responsibility (Coombs, 2004; Coombs & 
Holladay, 2001) or by acting directly on reputation (Coombs, 2006).  Both these 
possibilities are explored in this study. 
Lyon and Cameron (1999) raised the prospect of intensifier factors that could 
influence the effectiveness of crisis response strategies based on the results of an 
experiment which tested good and bad reputation with an apologetic and a defensive 
response strategy used by a company experiencing a crisis.  The participants in the 
study assessed the reputation of the organisation.  Their findings suggested that 
organisations with a negative reputation that undertook a theoretically predicted 
appropriate response (matched response) achieved the antithesis of the theoretically 
predicted outcome:  that is, they suffered even further damage to their reputation. 
Termed the paradox effect, this outcome raised two important points for crisis 
researchers:  the validity of predictive models and the presence of a previously 
unidentified intensifier effect which modified stakeholder perceptions of the same 
action by two different organisations.  A later experiment with 80 student and 
nonstudent adults (Lyon & Cameron, 2004) again testing positive and negative pre-
crisis reputation for a clothing company with an apologetic or a defensive response 
strategy delivered through fictitious new stories failed to replicate the intensifier 
effect.  It was again identified by Dean (2004) in his experimental study assessing 
how consumers react to negative publicity.  While still in the early stages of being 
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fully tested within a crisis framework, this paradox may be explained by a trait 
negativity bias, that is, some information is weighed more heavily than others and, in 
certain combinations, may overshadow the impact of that other information 
(Kanouse & Hanson, 1972).   The appearance of the paradox reinforces the need for 
further research in this area to explore the presence and impact of an intensifier 
effect on response strategy. 
Table 6 has outlined the theoretically predicted response strategy based on the crisis 
cluster in which the crisis event falls.  These have been termed the matched 
responses within the SCCT model and rely on congruence being achieved between 
the organisation’s actions and stakeholder expectations.  However, if an intensifier 
factor is changing the perceived level of responsibility for a crisis, the matched 
response may no longer be appropriate to match the initial stakeholder attributions of 
responsibility from the crisis event and therefore will no longer provide protection 
for the organisation’s reputation and legitimacy.   Despite their potential importance, 
Brown and White (2011) suggest few empirical studies have been undertaken on 
intensifier factors and their impact on attributions of responsibility for a crisis, 
whereas this information is needed to provide appropriate guides to crisis managers 
who are faced with selecting an appropriate response. 
Reconsidering Strategy Selection 
Coombs (2004) suggests that where an intensifier effect has been identified, a higher 
level response than the original matched response is required by the organisation to 
protect its reputation.  For example, the intensifier effect requires an organisation 
categorised in the victim cluster to use the strategies recommended for an 
organisation in the accidental cluster because of the negative impact on stakeholder 
perceptions of responsibility caused by the intensifier variable.  This can be 
illustrated by considering the intensifier variable of crisis history.  An organisation 
which had previously been exposed to crisis events and was experiencing a crisis 
which would normally be characterised in the victim cluster would now be 
recommended to use a strategy that would normally be used for a crisis from the 
accidental cluster if it wanted to protect is reputation.   A well cited case using this 
approach is the Johnson & Johnson Tylenol poisonings where the company used a 
higher cluster response in the second poisoning of Tylenol capsules, despite the fact 
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that it was a victim in both poisonings.  The company realised that the same response 
would be inappropriate given it had a previous crisis in its history. 
If relationship history acts as an intensifier effect as predicted by the SCCT model 
(Coombs, 2007), then it has the potential to impact the outcomes of theoretically 
predicted matched responses.  If relationship history acts to increase responsibility 
and/or increase reputation damage, then an organisation being affected by the 
intensifier factor would need to implement a different strategy to that of an 
organisation that is not affected by the intensifier factor if similar protective 
outcomes are sought.  The impact of the intensifier effects on response strategy 
selection is outlined in Table 7. 
Table 7:  Response strategy selection in the presence of intensifier effects 
Crisis Cluster Matched Response Recommended Response 
where intensifier effect is in 
operation 
Victim Deny Diminish 
Accidental Diminish Deal 
Preventable Deal Deal* 
* There is no clear guidance on the intensifier effect once in the highest cluster.  Neither Coombs and 
Schmidt (2000) nor Haigh and Dardis (2008) found any significant difference in effect for a range of 
accommodative strategies associated with the Deal category. 
Coombs (2007), through the SCCT model, suggests crisis managers only use a one 
step up strategy selection in the presence of an intensifier effect.  In contrast to this 
approach to strategy selection, crisis managers could consider always implementing 
the highest level accommodative responses as this would appear theoretically to be 
the safest way to achieve the best outcome (Elsbach, 2004).  However, this response 
may prove to be the most costly in financial and legal terms.  Empirical research, 
albeit limited, has shown that increased reputational gains from such a selection may 
also be a fallacy.  Coombs (2007) notes that using overly accommodative strategies 
produces no greater reputational benefits than those identified as matched responses 
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under SCCT.  Similarly, Siomkos and Kurzbard (1994) have shown that stakeholders 
may judge the crisis as worse than it is if the organisation responds so aggressively.  
While not testing the concept of an intensifier effect, Haigh and Dardis (2008) also 
found no benefit for an organisation in employing highly accommodative strategies 
over more mid-continuum ones, albeit their experiment used Benoit’s image 
restoration strategies which vary slightly from the strategies proposed in the SCCT 
model.  Their recommendation on the use of mid-continuum strategies is based on 
the assumption that these strategies allow the organisation to demonstrate 
engagement in the crisis situation without ‘begging for forgiveness which may come 
across as a rather pitiful (or weak) stance’ (p. 22), and thus not appeal to 
stakeholders.  However, they acknowledge that empirical explanations of these 
dynamics are very limited and they and others have called for more testing of 
strategy options generally within a crisis cluster as well as across different crisis 
clusters (see for example, Haigh & Brubaker, 2010).  These points illustrate the 
importance of further research in this area to provide stronger guidance on the most 
appropriate strategy selection in the presence of intensifier effects.   
Examining the Protective Powers of an Organisation’s Crisis Response in an 
Intensified Environment: Relevant Research Questions and Hypotheses  
The final research questions and hypotheses for this study bring together the 
elements explored throughout this literature review to better understand the 
intensifier effect and the protective powers of strategy responses.  This study tests 
the interaction of the crisis cluster, the strategy selection and the intensifier effect of 
relationship history, which considers both relationship character and organisational 
age, and its influence on stakeholder perceptions of an organisation’s reputation and 
legitimacy.  It examines this influence both as a direct effect and through the 
proposed mediator of organisational responsibility for the crisis event.  For this 
study, a positive intensifier is proposed to operate for an older organisation that has a 
positive relationship character.  A negative intensifier is proposed to operate on a 
new organisation that has a negative relationship character.  This perspective retests 
and extends the initial work of Brown and White (2011) who failed to identify 
significant effects of different strategies on stakeholder attributions of responsibility 
in the presence of positive or negative organisation-public relationships.    Their 
study did not extend to the impact of the intensifier effect on reputation or legitimacy 
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and only tested one particular crisis event.  However, they have suggested that crisis 
managers should be focused on the ‘perception of relationship predicted attribution 
of responsibility’ (p.88) rather than any individual crisis response strategy, 
suggesting that ‘positive relationships trump strategy’ (p.88).  As their study only 
measured responsibility at one time, it is still unclear whether there is discrimination 
by stakeholders between crisis event related attributions of responsibility and 
relationship predicted attributions of responsibility and how this difference may 
influence the specific outcomes of strategy options.  This study will test stakeholder 
perceptions across different time periods allowing for better explanatory depth of the 
intensifier phenomena if it is present. 
Research Question 6 
How does an organisation’s relationship history and its response to a crisis from 
different crisis clusters influence stakeholder perceptions of its reputation and 
legitimacy? 
Hypothesis 6.1  
In the presence of a positive intensifier, a matched strategy will at least maintain 
stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy from the time of the crisis 
event. 
Hypothesis 6.2 
In the presence of a negative intensifier, a matched strategy will not maintain 
stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy from the time of the crisis 
event. 
Hypothesis 6.3 
In the presence of a negative intensifier, a step up strategy will provide a more 
positive outcome than a matched strategy on stakeholder perceptions of 
reputation and legitimacy. 
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Research Question 7 
How does responsibility mediate the influence of an organisation’s relationship 
history and its response to a crisis from different crisis clusters on stakeholder 
perceptions of its reputation and legitimacy? 
In line with the discussion under Research Question 2, this study hypothesises that:  
The effect of an organisation’s relationship history and its response 
strategies used during crises from different clusters on stakeholder 
perceptions of organisational reputation and legitimacy is mediated by 
perceptions of organisational responsibility.   
As suggested under Research Question 2, rather than create discrete hypotheses for 
each possible combination of relationship history, cluster and strategy researched 
across the six experiments in this study, two broad hypotheses have been used to 
recognise the relationship between changes in responsibility and reputation and 
legitimacy.  While not specifying the complete mediation path, they should be read 
in the context of an expectation that changes in responsibility will lead to changes in 
reputation and legitimacy.  Similarly, a lack of change in responsibility should lead 
to no change in reputation and legitimacy.   The final hypothesis addressing 
Question 7 supports the first two but deals with one specific test in Experiment 6. 
Hypothesis 7.1  
In the presence of a positive intensifier, a matched strategy will at least maintain 
stakeholder perceptions of responsibility and subsequently will at least maintain 
stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy from the time of the crisis 
event. 
Hypothesis 7.2 
In the presence of a negative intensifier, a matched strategy will not maintain 
stakeholder perceptions of responsibility and subsequently will not maintain 
stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy from the time of the crisis 
event. 
 
80 
 
Hypothesis 7.3 
In the presence of a negative intensifier, a step up strategy will provide more 
positive outcomes than a matched strategy on stakeholder perceptions of 
responsibility and subsequently provide more positive outcomes than a matched 
strategy on stakeholder perceptions of  reputation and legitimacy. 
Conclusion 
This review of foundational literature demonstrates the importance of reputation and 
legitimacy to an organisation in crisis and documents the gap in the extant literature 
on the effects of different organisational and situational factors that influence 
stakeholder perceptions of these organisational assets.  Three specific factors - crisis 
cluster, crisis response strategies and relationship history (which represents both an 
evaluate quality through relationship character and an organisation’s age) - have 
been reviewed and relevant empirical research that has guided theoretical 
development reported.  Importantly for this study, it is the interaction of these factors 
that is proposed as an essential influence on reputation and legitimacy.   
The role of stakeholder perception of organisational responsibility in a time of crisis 
has also been reviewed.  This factor is identified as an important component in 
understanding the way stakeholders make judgments on reputation and legitimacy.  
This study will provide explanatory depth to the role of responsibility and its links to 
an intensified environment which may act as a frame through which stakeholders 
perceive the organisation in crisis and its actions.  In doing so, this study refines the 
interactions of key organisational and situational factors currently suggested within 
the theoretical development of the SCCT model.  While working primarily within 
this model, such research can inform the crisis management and response literature 
more generally as the components within the SCCT framework are contained in 
various forms in most crisis models.   
The review has identified the gaps in the relevant literature which limit the ability of 
the current SCCT model and related crisis models to provide guidance on the 
protective powers of crisis response strategies.  The empirical testing of the research 
questions and hypotheses drawn from these gaps will help maximise such protective 
powers through demonstrating the outcomes of the strategic selection of appropriate 
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strategies designed to protect reputation and legitimacy.  The design for the testing of 
the presented research questions and hypotheses is outlined in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3  Research Methodology 
Based on the relevant literatures and the key research questions and hypotheses of 
this study, this chapter outlines the research methodology.   This study contributes to 
knowledge of the factors that shape the selection of effective crisis response 
strategies and the impact of such crisis response on key organisational assets.  The 
important role of stakeholder assessments of organisational responsibility for a crisis 
is a key focus as is how stakeholder perspectives change during the crisis period, 
reflecting the damaging nature (Coombs, 2006) of a crisis event. 
Firstly, a rationale for the research design is provided.  This discussion provides a 
rationale of the selection of the positivist paradigm on which the study is based.  The 
research strategy and specific quantitative research methods used are then outlined, 
documenting the systematic approach taken to gather data that informs the research 
questions.  Data analysis strategies are discussed to provide a framework for 
understanding the research findings outlined in Chapters 4-7.  Strengths and 
limitations of the approach are recognised and presented for consideration, as well as 
ethical issues appropriate to the design. 
Selecting a Research Paradigm 
Research paradigms help researchers determine what problems are worthy of 
exploration and, most importantly, what methods are best suited to address such 
problems (Deshpande, 1983).  Guba (1990, p.17) defines a paradigm as an 
‘interpretive framework or a basic set of beliefs that guides action’.  As there is no 
agreed one way of knowing (Moses & Knutsen, 2007), researchers need to be aware 
of different frameworks and the impact of those frameworks on the interpretation of 
outcomes.   
Different paradigms can be understood using a framework that denotes the research 
purpose, process, logic and outcomes (Hussey & Hussey, 1997).  As outlined by 
Hussey and Hussey (1997), paradigms are grounded on a range of assumptions 
relating to areas such as ontology which looks at questions as to the nature of reality 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2011), epistemology which explores what constitutes acceptable 
knowledge by understanding the relationship between the inquirer and the known 
(Lincoln et al, 2011), axiology which explores the role of values in research (Brynan, 
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2004) and method which looks more specifically at research process (Walliman, 
2006). While many paradigms exist, Denzin and Lincoln (2011) propose four major 
interpretive paradigms that structure much of contemporary research: 
naturalist/positivist and postpositivist, constructivist-interpretivist, critical/Marxist 
and feminist-poststructuralist.  Two of these major research paradigms are discussed 
to explore their relevance to this study:  the naturalist/positivist paradigm and the 
constructivist/interpretivist paradigm. 
The naturalist or positivist paradigm is based on the ontological assumption that the 
world exists independent of our experience with it and that we can gain access to it 
by observing and recording our experiences objectively (Lincoln et al, 2011; Moses 
& Knutsen, 2007; Walliman, 2006).    The epistemological assumption is that only 
observable and measurable phenomena can constitute knowledge.  Naturalists 
believe there are regularities or patterns in nature that can be observed and described.  
Statements based on these regularities can be tested empirically.  Based on this 
belief, naturalists employ logic and reason supported by direct experience.  They 
seek to evaluate the reliability of the knowledge produced in their studies through 
falsification and predictive capacity with hypotheses generated and then tested. In 
these terms, the scientific project should be aimed at explaining the general 
(nomothetic) at the expense of the particular (idiographic) (Babbie, 2004).   
Given their external position to the research, the positivist researcher takes on the 
axiological assumption that science and the process of research is value free (Hussey 
& Hussey, 1997).   Research phenomena are objects to be studied with the positivist 
researcher interested in the interrelationship of these objects.  Quantitative research 
methods including experiments, surveys and longitudinal studies lend themselves to 
uncovering these relationships although the relationship between nomothetic 
explanations and quantification is not absolute (Babbie, 2004).  Quantitative 
researchers usually follow a deductive cause and effect process (Robson, 1993).  
Under this deductive approach, generalisations lead to prediction, explanation and 
understanding, while accuracy is assessed by validity and reliability.     
Presenting an alternative to positivism, Lincoln et al (2011) suggest that the 
constructivist perspective is founded on the ontological assumption that each person 
sees different things and what is seen is determined by a combination of social and 
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contextual influences.  Within this perspective, patterns are constructed by the 
participant, the observer and society (Moses & Knutsen, 2007).  Generally, in these 
approaches, the nature of scientific investigation is aimed at perceptions of the 
world, rather than the world as it is and therefore there are multiple perceptions of 
the world that can be experienced (Remenyi et al, 1998).  The focus is on the 
reflective and idiosyncratic nature of knowledge held by participants (Neuman, 
2006). Because they recognise such ontological diversity and complexity, 
constructivists tend to draw on more and different types of evidence and proof.  
While they recognise experience and reason as useful epistemological devices, they 
also contend that both of these can be influenced by many contextual factors, 
undermining any claims that these are objective transmitters of truth (Moses & 
Knutsen, 2007).  Hence, the need for a broader set of epistemological tools.  As 
outlined by Skinner (1975, p.216), constructivists try to understand action ‘not in 
causal and positive terms as a precipitate of its context, but rather in circular and 
hermeneutic terms as a meaningful item within a wider context of conventions and 
assumptions’.  Rather than uncovering a true account, constructivists seek to capture 
and understand the meaning of a social action for the agent performing it.   
The axiological assumption in these approaches is that the researcher has values and 
those values influence the phenomena being investigated (Remenyi et al, 1998).  
This is made clear in the research design and reporting of results.  Qualitative 
methods are often associated with the constructivist/interpretivist paradigm (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2011) and include case studies, ethnographies, life histories and 
participative inquiry.  As outlined by Saunders et al (2000), qualitative researchers 
usually follow an inductive process.  The research design emerges and categories are 
identified during the research process (Patton, 1990).    Accuracy is assessed through 
verification, often using member checks (Lindlof, 1995) and triangulation strategies 
to increase the confidence in the research outcomes (Fielding & Fielding, 1986). 
As well as the orientation towards human behaviour adopted by the researcher, 
Neuman (2006) suggests good research design should take account of the topic, the 
purpose of the research and the intended use of the results.  As both quantitative and 
qualitative research have strengths and weaknesses (Forster, 1994), the nature of the 
problem is a key criteria on which to select a quantitative or qualitative paradigm for 
a research project (Cresswell, 1994; Forster, 1994).  Cresswell (1994) suggests that 
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in a quantitative study, the problem evolves from the literature, thereby necessitating 
a substantial body of literature on which the researcher can build.   On the other 
hand, one of the key reasons for selecting a qualitative study is the exploratory 
nature of the study (Cresswell, 1994), ideally suited to situations where there is 
limited literature and the researcher seeks to ‘listen to the informants’ and ‘build a 
picture based on their ideas’ (p.21).   
Social research is usually designed to address one or more of three main purposes:  
exploration, description and/or explanation (Babbie, 2004).  Exploration is used to 
examine a new interest or when the subject of study itself is relatively new.   While 
useful in yielding new insights into a topic or suggesting relevant methods for further 
research (Cresswell, 1994), exploratory studies are not definitive in themselves in 
terms of answering research questions, primarily because they lack 
representativeness with a larger population (Patton, 1990).  Descriptive studies allow 
the researcher to observe a research situation and then describe what has been 
observed.  They are usually designed to answer questions of what, where, when and 
how, but not why which is the field of explanatory studies.   
The organising research problem for this study is: 
How does an organisation’s selection of a crisis response strategy and that 
organisation’s relationship history influence stakeholder perceptions of its 
responsibility in different crisis situations, and, subsequently, its intangible assets of 
reputation and legitimacy? 
Based on consideration of the research problem, the foundation literature,  previous 
research in the field and the ability of both approaches discussed to yield valuable 
data, this project takes a positivist deductive approach.  This approach guides the 
exploration of a series of hypotheses to refine existing preliminary explanations of 
the relationships among crisis cluster, crisis response and pre-crisis organisational 
conditions such as relationship history and their impact on stakeholder perceptions of 
organisational reputation and legitimacy either directly or through organisational 
responsibility as a mediator.   It builds on the existing and substantial literature base 
provided by crisis researchers such as Benson (1988), Brocato et al, (2012), Coombs 
and Holladay (2001), Lyon and Cameron (1998), Massey (2001), McDonald (2005), 
Pace et al (2010), Seeger et al (1998) and Verhoeven et al (2012).  These researchers 
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have mapped preliminary measures of the relationships between factors that shape 
effective response strategies in crisis and help to explain how changes in these 
conditions affect an organisation’s intangible assets including reputation and 
legitimacy.   As this study seeks to refine and extend work from previous studies, the 
approach used to collect the data must have adequate validity and reliability, which 
are central features of the value claims for quantitative approaches.  These 
approaches allow measurable phenomena in the form of different variables to be 
used to investigate the hypothesised relationships. 
Selecting a Research Strategy 
A number of research strategies are most commonly used within the positivist 
deductive paradigm (Saunders et al, 2000).  The strategy helps the researcher ‘move 
from their paradigm to the empirical world’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011, p.14) as well 
as connecting the researcher to specific methods of collecting and analysing 
empirical material.  Moses and Knutsen (2007) suggest that at the top of the 
hierarchy for positivist research approaches is the experimental method.  The 
experimental method is followed in preference by the statistical approaches, the few-
N comparative approaches and then historical or case study approaches (Moses & 
Knutsen, 2007).  Each method has its own benefits and limitations and the researcher 
needs to consider the practicality of implementing each method as well as the 
potential ethical issues involved. 
The suggested experimental preference can be linked to the method’s relationship to 
observation as observation is the ‘premier epistemological device’ (Moses & 
Knutsen, 2007, p. 16) used by positivists.  Inspired by theoretical concerns, 
experimentation helps the researcher answer questions through a research procedure 
that sets up a representation of the world by isolating component parts in terms of 
conditions and variables (Moses & Knutsen, 2007).    The researcher can then 
manipulate these variables and record empirical results through deliberate and 
planned observation to show causal and temporal relationships (Fisher, 1971; Stacks, 
2002).   
While the common feature of all experiments is the control of treatment (Mostellar, 
1990), different types of experiments can be constructed.  Shadish et al (2002) 
suggest there are four broad subtypes of experiments in modern social science:  
87 
 
randomised, quasi, natural and nonexperimental design.  The randomised experiment 
is the most clearly defined drawing from the early work of Fisher (1925) with its 
distinguishing feature being random assignment of the treatments under study 
(Shadish et al, 2002).  The quasi-experiment, drawing from the work of Campbell & 
Stanley (1963), lacks this distinguishing feature and thus is described as ‘an 
experiment in which units are not assigned to conditions randomly’ (Shadish et al, 
2002, p. 12).  By employing quasi-experimental designs, the researcher accepts a 
lesser degree of internal validity relative to a randomised experiment.  In doing so, 
however, the researcher can avoid some of the more difficult practical and ethical 
problems associated with experimentation when employed in the social sciences. 
The natural experiment involves a study comparing a naturally occurring event with 
some type of comparison condition (Fagan, 1990) and may be seen as ‘not really an 
experiment’ (Shadish et al, 2002, p. 12) as the cause is not really manipulated.  The 
final category is a catch all for a number of designs in which there is a presumed 
cause and effect and this is identified and measured but ‘other structural features of 
experiments are missing’ (Shadish et al, 2002, p. 18).  This study uses the 
randomised approach with participants in each experiment randomly assigned to 
different treatments.   
Based on the organising research problem, this study addresses a number of research 
questions: 
Research Question 1 
How do crisis response strategies used in response to crises from different crisis 
clusters influence stakeholder perceptions of organisational reputation and 
legitimacy? 
Research Question 2 
How does responsibility mediate the influence of response strategies used during 
crisis from different clusters on stakeholder perceptions of organisational reputation 
and legitimacy? 
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Research Question 3 
How does an organisation’s responsibility for a crisis affect stakeholder perceptions 
of its reputation and legitimacy? 
Research Question 4 
How does an organisation’s relationship history with its stakeholders influence 
stakeholder perceptions of its reputation and legitimacy? 
Research Question 5 
How do stakeholder perceptions of an organisation’s responsibility mediate the 
influence of its relationship history on its reputation and legitimacy? 
Research Question 6 
How does an organisation’s relationship history and its response to a crisis from 
different crisis clusters influence stakeholder perceptions of its reputation and 
legitimacy? 
Research Question 7 
How does responsibility mediate the influence of an organisation’s relationship 
history and its response to a crisis from different crisis clusters on stakeholder 
perceptions of its reputation and legitimacy? 
Given the identified strengths of the method, previous research in the field and the 
nature of the research questions outlined, this study works within the experimental 
method and tradition.  It uses a series of interrelated experimental studies to examine 
and establish causality between variables as specified in the research questions.  A 
factorial design approach is used across the experiments to allow the examination of 
the simultaneous effects of more than one independent variable (Neuman, 2006). 
In the study, the isolation and manipulation of the independent variables and the 
ability to measure their impact on the dependent variables strengthens the refinement 
of Coombs’ (2007) SCCT model and related crisis response models (Bradford & 
Garrett, 1995; Dean, 2004; Lyon & Cameron, 2004) and informs the research 
questions posed.  As initial tests of the SCCT and related models have involved 
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experimental and quasi-experimental methods (see, for example, Brocato et al, 2012; 
Coombs & Holladay, 1996, 2001, 2009; Coombs & Schmidt, 2000; McDonald, 
2005; Verhoeven et al, 2012), it is appropriate to continue this approach when 
refining these models. 
To enhance the experimental design, the study incorporates a pre-test post-test 
design in which measures of the dependent variables are taken before the 
introduction of the experimental stimuli (Campbell & Stanley, 1963).  The pre- and 
post-test design helps to define, locate and test causal factors, providing a defence 
against alternative explanations of variation (Moses & Knutsen, 2007).   This is one 
form of approximation of the true counterfactual (Dannels, 2010) in the absence of a 
control group.  However, as outlined by Babbie (2004), it is still possible that some 
other factor might be causing the change between the pre- and post-tests which is a 
recognised limitation of experimental approaches.   
The test and retest method has the possibility of the respondents becoming more 
sensitive to the issue being tested and being more thoughtful in their answers than 
they would normally be (Babbie, 2004).  This is recognised as a limitation for the 
study, however, the approach is particularly important in this study to focus in on the 
‘protective powers’ (Coombs, 2006) of the strategy and the implication that 
intensifiers such as relationship history increase reputational damage.   As outlined 
by Pace et al (2010), the strong focus in the literature of measuring reputation 
(and/or other outcomes) at a point in time only shows the comparative value of one 
approach against another.  It does not help to unpack the impact of the crisis 
variables as they work on stakeholder perspectives during the crisis event as baseline 
attributes were not established pre-crisis or pre-experimental stimuli. The repeated 
measures approach has a greater potential in helping crisis researchers better 
understand what protection through organisational response actually entails and what 
impact this has on reputational damage which is potentially changing during the 
crisis event as new information comes to hand.  Not testing may lead to a 
fundamental attribution error (Russell, 1982) where the researcher assumes 
respondents have perceived a cause in the same way the researcher has.  Haigh and 
Brubaker (2010) have recognised this limitation in their testing of the crisis strategy 
models, calling for more pre- and post-test research in this area. 
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A study of this nature that uses the experimental method is advocated by Benson 
(1988), Coombs (2004) and Seeger et al (1998) who all suggest crisis research needs 
to move from theoretical modelling and description through case studies to 
quantitative testing of relevant variables.   Pearson et al (2007) question whether 
there has been a true focus on theoretical modelling in crisis research at all, 
suggesting a heavy reliance on description alone. Early research in crisis 
management was heavily case study oriented (Seeger, 2006), which did not allow for 
predictive value and causal inference (Botan, 1989).    Campbell and Stanley (1963) 
suggest the knowledge gained from this approach is generally illusory as there is no 
basis for comparison (Coombs & Schmidt, 2000).   
This criticism of crisis research reflects a wider criticism of public relations research 
in general as reflected in two recent studies.  A study of a decade of public relations 
research found a paucity of experimental design, leading to the authors suggesting 
systematic avoidance of this approach (Boynton & Dougall, 2006).  This suggestion 
was supported by a more recent study of close to two decades of published public 
relations research which presented a stronger use of quantitative studies over the 
period, however, experimental design still represented less than 10 percent of total 
research presented in three key US-based journals (Pasadeos, Lamme, Gower & 
Tian, 2011). Seen as a limiting factor in the discipline’s progression and its relevance 
to external parties (Stacks, 2002), public relations researchers have started to address 
this concern, however, research appears limited to particular areas such as crisis 
management and health communication (Boynton & Dougall, 2006).  This study 
helps to advance the use of experimental design in public relations research as 
recommended by Brocato et al (2012), albeit in the area that has a strong record for 
use of this method.    
This study examines the influence of crisis cluster, response strategy and the 
situational factor of relationship history on stakeholder perceptions of organisational 
responsibility, reputation and legitimacy.  It has been designed amid a call for more 
stakeholder-oriented approaches in crisis research (Coombs, 2006).  While most 
reputational studies have involved direct research with stakeholders, organisational 
legitimacy studies have mostly favoured the use of secondary sources such as mass 
media reports (Barron, 1998; Brown & Deegan, 1998; Deephouse, 1996), corporate 
documents (Allen & Caillouet, 1994), and regulatory registers and reports (Baum & 
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Oliver, 1991; Deephouse, 1996; Singh et al, 1986) to assess legitimacy states and, in 
some cases, infer different stakeholders’ perceptions of legitimacy.  While seemingly 
in conflict with the original Weberian intent of focusing on ‘characteristics of the 
citizens’ beliefs, not to characteristics of the system’ (Waerass, 2009, p. 308), this 
past research supports the inferred notion of stakeholder in Suchman’s seminal 
definition of organisational legitimacy as the ‘generalised perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within a social 
system’ (1995, p. 574). As such, there are limited primary source legitimacy studies 
with stakeholders, particularly community and consumer stakeholders. This study 
builds on the primary source research work of Massey (2001), Elsbach (1994), 
Foreman and Whetten (2002) and Milne and Patten (2002) to address this gap in the 
literature.  By collecting primary data from the study’s participants, this study 
provides information on the specific influence of stakeholder perceptions of 
particular variables on their subsequent perceptions of organisational legitimacy.   
Research Design 
Described as ‘the glue that holds the research project together’ (Trochim, 2006, as 
cited in Dannels, 2010), good research design provides a plan to integrate all the 
elements of a study so that the results are ‘credible, free from bias, and maximally 
generalizable’ (Dannels, 2010, p.343).  Such outcomes result from issues such as 
effective participant recruitment, how variables are manipulated, how data are 
collected and analysed and how to control extraneous variability (Brynan, 2004). 
These areas will now be discussed to show how the research questions were 
addressed through a series of six inter-related experiments. 
Population and Sampling Strategy 
In a crisis situation, organisations need to consider the perceptions of both victim 
and non-victim stakeholders (Coombs, 2004).   While victims have an intimate link 
with the crisis situation and are generally well informed of the specific nature of the 
crisis event, non-victim stakeholders are likely to have a much less specific 
knowledge and interest in the crisis event, however, their post-crisis impact on the 
organisation in crisis can be just as important as that of victims.  In addition, there 
are usually more non-victims than victims so their views can have a major effect.  
Given the size and potential importance of this group to organisational recovery, the 
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non-victim category has been selected for study in this project.  In doing so, it 
follows the work of other crisis researchers such as Brocato et al (2012), Coombs 
and Holladay (2011), and Haigh and Brubaker (2010).  It uses undergraduate and 
postgraduate students from four large Australian universities to represent the non-
victim stakeholders.  Students are an appropriate research participant category as 
they fill a range of direct stakeholder positions with organisations including 
consumer, employee and investor as well as influence the broader social community 
in which organisations operate.    
This nonprobability sampling strategy with reliance on available subjects such as 
students (Babbie, 2004) brings restrictions in terms of the generalisability of the 
study’s results to a broader population.  However, this approach follows the crisis 
response studies of Massey (2001), Coombs (2004), Coombs and Holladay (1996), 
Dean (2004), Haigh and Brubaker (2010), Haigh and Dardis (2008) and Pace et al 
(2010) who also used student samples. An analysis of nearly two decades of crisis 
communication research using the major crisis models of Benoit and Coombs found 
that close to half of the published articles used student samples (Avery, Lariscy, Kim 
& Hocke, 2012) with a further study showing all reported experiments in a selection 
of key journals over nearly two decades used a non-probability sampling strategy 
(Pasadeos et al, 2011).  Caution is always needed in utilising students as 
representatives of the broader community given the different demographic and 
psychographic characteristics of each group, for example, the sample is over-
represented by individuals with high levels of education.  Coombs’ (2004) 
experiments on response trends in different societal cohorts provide some comfort in 
this area.  Importantly, when asked to identify the impact of a range of crisis 
variables on organisational reputation, no significant difference was identified 
between the responses of undergraduate students and those of randomly selected 
community members.  This is supported by Lyon and Cameron (2004) who found 
very limited difference between students and community members in crisis response 
experiments. 
Sample 
The sample for the different experiments in this study varied from 107 to 559 
university students.  The students were drawn from both undergraduate and 
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postgraduate classes and covered a range of disciplines including business, 
engineering and creative and liberal arts to enhance diversity of the sample.  
Lecturers at each of the universities were approached to provide access to their 
classes for the purpose of undertaking the experiments.  Participation in the study 
was voluntary as outlined in the host university’s research protocols and in line with 
the basic principles of ethical social research (Babbie, 2004).  Participants were 
provided a small confectionary treat for completing the survey.   
The sample size for each experiment was determined based on the number of 
preferred participants in each cell, the practicality of accessing large numbers of 
participants at particular periods and the desire to detect effects within the proposed 
model.  The sample size influences the identifiable levels of power and effect size 
within the experiments with a larger sample showing increased power (Gravetter & 
Wallnau, 2004).  The power of a statistical test lies in the probability that it will 
correctly reject a false null hypothesis.  It is a function of its sensitivity, the size of 
the effect in the population and the standards used to test statistical hypotheses.  
Studies in social sciences are often conducted with low levels of power (Murphy, 
2010).   Cohen (1988) and Murphy and Myors (1999) suggest studies should, where 
possible, be designed to achieve a power level of .80 or greater which provides an 
80% chance of rejecting a false null hypothesis.   
Murphy (2010) advises that while there are various guides available to researchers, 
most power analyses depend on the conventions of particular research communities 
to define expected effect sizes and the influence of this on designing studies.  While 
there is not consistent reporting of study details in applicable studies (Pasedeos et al, 
2011), some reports on previous experiments using the SCCT model detected effect 
sizes using eta squared levels that could be seen to align with medium effects using 
Cohen’s scale (1988), however, such comparisons are not always useful as they hold 
only when sample size is very large and this is not the case with most previous 
experiments involving this model.  Taking a more conservative approach, Murphy 
(2010) suggests that to detect small to medium levels of effect size with a power 
level of .80 and significance criterion of α=.05, sample sizes would need to range 
from approximately 150 – 400.  This range was used as a guide for the study, 
however, the nature of each individual experiment given the range of variables 
included was also considered.  Recommendations by Bernard (1994) and Tabachnik 
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and Fidell (2001) of at least 20 participants in each cell to detect significant 
differences and protect against most violations of assumptions under analysis of 
variance models was also followed as was the guidance from one of the more recent 
large scale studies of crisis variables which saw 32 different scenarios developed 
with an average cell size of 25 (Brocato et al, 2012).  However, power and effect 
sizes were not reported in this recently reported study.  Cell sizes were kept 
approximately equal, recognising the problems that may occur in analysis when the 
ratio of each cell is more than 1:1.5 (Coakes & Steed, 2003). 
The Experimental Method 
A series of interrelated experimental studies were used to address the research 
questions and test the hypotheses as outlined in Chapter 2.    
The overall study involved the controlled manipulation of the independent variables 
of crisis cluster, crisis response strategy and relationship history (representing both 
relationship character and organisational age).  Participants were randomly 
assigned to the manipulated treatments of the independent variables.  A control 
group was used in one experiment (Experiment 5) to test the variable of relationship 
history to ascertain whether no information on relationship character and/or 
organisational age made any difference to some information on these constructs.  As 
this variable has not been tested before in crisis research with these specified 
attributes, this was considered a useful step in the reporting of the impact of this 
variable.  Control groups were not used for the five experiments that involved 
response strategy.   
The empirical tests took the form of six interrelated experimental studies.  These 
tests progressed through four main stages.   Stage One focused on the strategy 
aspects of crisis management and the impact of strategy in different crisis situations.  
Coombs (2006) has called for more explicit testing of the strategy as it is one of the 
most under-researched parts of the SCCT and other crisis communication models.  
As suggested by Coombs (2009) ‘much of the existing reputation repair research has 
generated more speculation about what should be done rather than testing of actual 
prescriptive claims’ (p.113). The second stage focused explicitly on the variable of 
responsibility given its centrality to the model.  Responsibility was manipulated as 
an independent variable to ascertain its impact on reputation and legitimacy.  The 
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third stage then tested the impact of the relationship history variable, accounting for 
both relationship character and organisational age on crisis responsibility, 
organisational reputation and legitimacy.  Having established the impact of the 
separate independent variables in the first three stages, Stage Four examined the 
interaction of all of the independent variables to ascertain the presence of the 
predicted intensifier effect for relationship history as outlined in Chapter 2 and to 
better understand the role of responsibility in stakeholder judgments on reputation 
and legitimacy.  Each study is now described in detail and linked to the relevant 
research questions being tested. 
Stage One:  Focus on Effects of Crisis Response Strategy 
Stage One of the study involved testing specifically the impact of crisis response 
strategy used in different crisis situations on stakeholder perspectives of 
organisational reputation and legitimacy.  This impact was assessed both directly and 
through the potential mediator of organisational responsibility.  As different crisis 
situations were used, the focus in this stage was on refining the impact of the 
interaction of the crisis cluster (victim, accident, preventable) from which the 
particular crisis was drawn and the crisis response strategy which was also drawn 
from different strategy categories (deny, diminish, deal).  A full discussion of these 
independent variables is contained in Chapter 2.  Three experiments were run during 
this stage to allow for the testing of the full range of crisis clusters and response 
strategies and the interaction effect.  This was important to ground first in the 
experimental design before adding the intensifier variable of relationship history to 
the model.   
Figure 3 outlines the specific part of the overall study being tested in Stage One and 
shows the relevant research questions being tested.   As well as testing the relevant 
hypotheses, the Stage One experiments acted as pilot studies, testing the 
development of the experimental stimuli used in the final experiment which saw all 
variables tested in the one experiment. 
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Figure 3:  Variables and research questions tested in Stage One 
 
Experiments 1 and 2 
These experiments tested the effect of the interaction of crisis cluster and crisis 
response strategy on stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy and the 
indirect effect on these perceptions through the mediator of organisational 
responsibility.    This work helps to refine Coombs (2006) test of the impact of 
strategy on responsibility which was undertaken with a small sample and was done 
without the context of different crisis types.  Kim et al (2009) further explored 
cluster and response on responsibility but only applied it to a limited number of 
responses and two clusters and failed to establish consistent interaction effects across 
the clusters.   
Independent Variables – Strategy and Crisis Cluster 
As noted in Chapter 2, Coombs (2006) identified 10 possible response strategy 
options, clustered into three response categories according to the acceptance of 
responsibility by the organisation.  Category 1, deny, assumes limited levels of 
responsibility through to Category 3, deal, which assumes a high level of 
responsibility.  Experiments 1 and 2 tested three of the 10 possible response options 
with one response selected from each of the three categories of deny, diminish and 
deal.  These responses were scapegoating (deny), excuse (diminish) and 
compassion/compensation (deal).    
The response strategies were applied within the contexts of the three different crisis 
clusters of victim, accident and preventable (Coombs & Holladay, 2002) as 
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described in Table 5 in Chapter 2.  Previous experiments have suggested that these 
clusters can predict the level of responsibility assigned by stakeholders to the 
organisation in the absence of any response.  The response then has the potential to 
modify the level of reputational damage that comes from this attributed 
responsibility. 
Experiment 1 used a mixed model (between subjects and within subjects) 1 x 3 (x3) 
way multi-factorial design for crisis cluster and response strategy as outlined in 
Figure 4.   The between subjects design tested the effects of the different response 
strategies whereas a within subjects design was used to measure the dependent 
variables across three time periods.   The crisis cluster of accident was applied, with 
the crisis subtype of technical error accident (a factory explosion) used for the 
scenario.  This was held constant for Experiment 1.    
1 3         (x3)
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Strategy
Accident Deny Diminish Deal
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Figure 4:  Multi-factorial design of Experiment 1 
In Experiment 2, a mixed model 2 x 3 (x3) way multi-factorial design (see Figure 5) 
was used to test the other two crisis clusters, victim and preventable with the 
subtypes of workplace violence (a shooting at the factory) and organisational 
misdeeds (bribery allegations around a major contract) respectively used for the 
scenarios.  This allowed not only the direct comparison on the effects across 
different crisis clusters but also facilitated the full testing of the potential scenarios 
for the final experiment.  As with Experiment 1, the between subjects design tested 
the different clusters and strategies and the within subjects design was used to 
measure the dependent variables across three time periods. 
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Figure 5:  Multi-factorial design of Experiment 2 
 
Dependent and Mediator Variables – Reputation, Legitimacy and Responsibility 
Following the rationale outlined earlier, a pre- and post-test design was used to test 
the impact of the independent variables on the dependent variables and the potential 
mediator variable of responsibility.   A full description of the research instrument 
used to test these variables is contained in a later section of this chapter.     
Participants read a short news story outlining company information and completed 
the first questionnaire which measured reputation and legitimacy.  The participants 
then read a news story covering a crisis event from one of the crisis clusters (victim, 
accident or preventable) and completed the second questionnaire which again 
measured reputation and legitimacy as well as organisational responsibility for the 
crisis event.  The participants read a third news story which included information on 
one of the possible company responses (scapegoating, excuse or compensation) to 
the crisis.    The final questionnaire was then completed which measured 
responsibility, reputation and legitimacy.  Manipulation checks were undertaken as 
appropriate within the questionnaires. 
In summary, responsibility was tested before and after the exposure to the 
organisational response providing two measures for comparison and the dependent 
variables of reputation and legitimacy were tested firstly before the introduction of 
the crisis event and then twice more in line with the tests for responsibility. 
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Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 extended the work of Coombs and Schmidt (2000) and Haigh and 
Dardis (2008) who found limited differentiation between the effects of the 
accommodative strategies, usually associated with the deal/rebuild category of crisis 
response strategy.    As the deal category potentially carries the largest legal liability 
for an organisation as it gets closest to admitting responsibility, understanding the 
impact of the different options in this category is important.  Coombs and Schmidt 
(2000) also only tested the effects of the different strategies on one of the three crisis 
subtypes within the preventable cluster (the organisational misdeeds or transgression 
crisis), thereby leaving the other two subtypes in this cluster (human error-accident 
and human error-product harm) untested.   
 
Independent Variables – Strategy and Crisis Cluster (subtype) 
This experiment used a 2 x 3 (x3) mixed model design (see Figure 6) to test two 
subtypes of crisis in the preventable cluster (organisational misdeeds and human 
error product harm (HEPH)) with three crisis response strategies from the deal 
category including both the rebuilding posture strategies of compensation and 
apology and one from the bolstering posture, ingratiation.  As outlined in Chapter 2, 
the bolstering posture is now seen as technically separate to the rebuilding posture 
(Coombs, 2007) and therefore perhaps inadequate to fully address the attributed 
responsibility, however, the bolstering strategy of ingratiation did cluster with the 
rebuilding postures in an earlier study (Coombs, 2006) and, consequently, further 
investigation is warranted.  At the cluster level, the set used in Experiment 3 allowed 
comparison with Coombs and Schmidt (2000) on transgression/organisational 
misdeed as well as furthering knowledge on an additional subtype.  The two crisis 
events used in Experiment 3 were fraud allegations within a contract for 
organisational misdeeds and product contamination caused by employee error for 
HEPH.  At the response level, the design of Experiment 3 also allowed for further 
comparison with Pace et al (2010) who tested outcomes from a full apology which 
accepted responsibility.  The between subjects design tested the different subtypes 
and strategies while the within subjects design was used to measure the dependent 
variables across three time periods. 
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Figure 6:  Multi-factorial design of Experiment 3    
 
Dependent and Mediator Variables – Reputation, Legitimacy and Responsibility 
As with the earlier experiments, responsibility, reputation and legitimacy were tested 
before and after the exposure to the organisational response providing two tests for 
responsibility and three for reputation and legitimacy.   
Participants read a short news story outlining company information and completed 
the first questionnaire which measured reputation and legitimacy.  The participants 
then read a news story covering a crisis event drawn from one of the two possible 
crisis types within the preventable crisis cluster (organisational misdeeds and human-
error product harm) and completed the second questionnaire which again measured 
reputation and legitimacy but also included a test for organisational responsibility.  
The participants read a third news story which included information on the company 
response to the crisis which included either a strategy of ingratiation, compensation 
or apology.    The final questionnaire was completed and measured responsibility, 
reputation and legitimacy.  Manipulation checks were undertaken as appropriate 
within the questionnaires. 
Stage Two:  Focus on Responsibility 
Stage Two of the research process focused on the variable of responsibility as it is 
central to the model under examination (see Figure 7).  Under the Stage One 
experiments, responsibility was assessed by the participants based on the information 
pertaining to the crisis event and then reassessed following the crisis response 
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strategy.  This most closely mimics real crisis events where the early stages of the 
crisis involve significant uncertainty as to the cause of the crisis event.  However, to 
try and establish as strong an effect size as possible for the benefit of the 
experimental model, the Stage Two experiment was designed to directly assign a 
level of responsibility to the organisation to identify the impact of this on reputation 
and legitimacy.  This more closely mirrors the work of Dean (2004) and Verhoeven 
et al (2012) whose work provides directives in the scenarios on responsibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7:  Variables and research question tested in Stage Two  
Experiment 4 
Independent Variable –Responsibility 
Experiment 4 used a 1 x 2 (x3) mixed model  design to test two dimensions of 
assigned responsibility for a crisis event (see Figure 8).  Instead of reading a crisis 
response and determining levels of attributed responsibility, participants were told 
that a third party had either assigned complete or no responsibility to the 
organisation for the crisis event.  These extremes were selected to illicit as strong an 
effect as possible.  As some details of a crisis event were needed to provide a context 
for the assessment of responsibility, one crisis cluster was used (accident – factory 
explosion) with the subtype of technical error accident.  This was the same event as 
used in Experiment 1 which had already met the tests for correct manipulation.  The 
between subjects design tested the different levels of responsibility while the within 
Responsibility
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subjects design was used to measure the dependent variables across three time 
periods. 
1 2         (x3)     
Crisis 
Cluster Responsibility
x
Full NoneAccident
 
Figure 8: Multi-factorial design of Experiment 4 
Dependent Variables – Reputation, Legitimacy and Attributed Responsibility 
Pre- and post-test within subjects design was used for measures of reputation and 
legitimacy as well as attributed responsibility for the crisis event (i.e. stakeholder 
perceptions of responsibility) and also as a manipulation check on the assigned 
responsibility presented in the scenarios. 
Participants read a short news story outlining company information and completed 
the first questionnaire which measured reputation and legitimacy.  The participants 
then read a news story covering a crisis event and completed the second 
questionnaire which again measured reputation and legitimacy as well as attributed 
responsibility based on the crisis event.  The participants read a third news story 
which included information from a third party which either assigned full or no 
responsibility to the company for the crisis.  The final questionnaire was then 
completed which measured responsibility, reputation and legitimacy.  Manipulation 
checks were undertaken as appropriate within the questionnaires. 
Stage Three: Focus on Relationship History 
The third stage of the study focused on the variable of relationship history which was 
designed in this study to incorporate both relationship character and organisational 
age.  Figure 9 outlines the specific parts of the overall model being tested in Stage 
Three and shows the relevant research questions to be tested. 
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Figure 9:  Variables and research questions tested in Stage Three  
Experiment 5 
Experiment 5 used a 1x5 (x2) way mixed  multi-factorial design to test the influence 
of different attributes of relationship history.  As some of these are additional 
attributes to the standard presentation of relationship history (Coombs & Holladay, 
2001; Lyon & Cameron, 2004), each condition was tested separately within a 
scenario.  Combinations of the attributes were tested in the final sixth experiment.    
The between subjects design tested the different aspects of relationship history while 
the within subjects design was used to test the dependent variables across two time 
periods. 
Independent Variable – Relationship History 
Unlike the previous experiments in this series, Experiment 5 used a control group to 
identify the influence of information on the sub attributes of relationship history 
(relational character and organisational age) in comparison with no information.  The 
four specified relationship history conditions used in Experiment 5 included two 
related to relationship character (positive and negative) and two for organisational 
age (new and mature) (see Figure 10).  This builds on the work of Coombs and 
Holladay (2001) who examined the impact of a poor or favourable relationship 
character on responsibility and reputation.  This experiment retested this influence to 
clarify the direct or indirect effect of relationship character on reputation through 
responsibility, applied this test to the theoretically separate variable of organisational 
legitimacy as well as tested the influence of organisational age as part of the overall 
relationship history construct.  Organisational age was assessed as either new or 
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mature, following the earlier discussion in Chapter 2 of the liability of newness 
(Singh et al, 1986) and the protection of maturity.   
To avoid the issues discussed in Chapter 2 related to Coombs and Holladay’s (2001) 
and Lyon and Cameron’s (2004) treatment of relationship character as a composite 
variable, only one description of relationship character was provided, centring on 
relationships with the community.  This description was informed by Dean (2004) 
who used similar information in his crisis experiment. 
The control condition contained no information on either the company’s relationship 
with the community nor its age and reflected the basic company information used in 
the previous experiments. 
Crisis 
Cluster
Accident Age
Relationship 
History
Relationship 
Character
New Mature +ve ‐ve Control
 
Figure 10:  Multi-factorial design of Experiment 5  
Dependent and Mediator Variables – Reputation, Legitimacy and Responsibility 
The first part of this experiment tested relationship history’s impact on reputation 
and legitimacy prior to a crisis event.  Participants read a short news story outlining 
company information which included one of the four treatments of relationship 
history or the no information control scenario and completed the first questionnaire 
which measured reputation and legitimacy. Participants were then exposed to a 
second news story covering a crisis event which repeated the relevant company 
information for the particular treatment.  The participants then completed the final 
questionnaire which tested the organisation’s level of responsibility as well as 
retested reputation and legitimacy.  Manipulation checks were undertaken as part of 
the final questionnaire.  An accident was used as the crisis type for the descriptor to 
allow for the greatest comparability with Coombs and Holladay’s (2001) main test of 
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relationship history in the SCCT model development.  This scenario used the same 
accident description (factory explosion) as outlined for Experiments 1 and 4. 
Stage Four:  Focus on All Variables 
The final stage tested all of the variables in this study through a complete factorial 
design (Collins, Dziak & Li, 2009).  The interaction of the independent variables of 
crisis cluster, crisis response strategies and relationship history (with its two 
subattributes) was tested to ascertain main effects of this interaction on reputation 
and legitimacy as well as a mediated effect through responsibility.  The final 
experiment involved two crisis clusters to allow for comparisons across the different 
clusters.  The majority of testing of Coombs’ SCCT model has been done in parts, 
matching different variables at different stages.  The final experiment brings together 
the key variables in SCCT to be tested in the one experiment. Figure 11 outlines the 
full model as tested in Stage Four and the relevant research question. 
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Figure 11:  Variables and research questions tested in Stage Four    
Experiment 6 
Experiment 6 tests how certain conditions present in a crisis situation change (or 
‘intensify’) the judgments made by stakeholders about an organisation in crisis and 
therefore change the impact of any response strategy run by that organisation.  This 
experiment explicitly tests how during different crisis situations, an organisation’s 
crisis response strategy and its relationship history (as an intensifier condition) 
impact stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy directly through a main 
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effect and/or indirectly through the mediator of responsibility.  This extends the 
work of Coombs and Holladay (2001) on the intensifier effect of the variable of 
relationship history.  Under Coombs’ proposition (2004), if a negative intensifier 
effect is present, organisations should move from a theoretically matched response 
(matching crisis cluster and response) to a step-up strategy which sees the selection 
of a strategy originally designed for a higher order crisis cluster.  For example, a 
deny strategy is theoretically predicted to match the requirements of a victim crisis.  
However, if an intensifier effect is in operation such as that associated with a 
negative relationship history, a strategy from the next highest category (diminish) 
should be used to match the higher level of assumed organisational responsibility 
(see Table 7 for full explanation of options).   
Independent Variable – Crisis Cluster 
Importantly, while the intensifier effect can be tested with a crisis type from one 
crisis cluster, there is little guidance on whether it operates at all levels of crisis 
responsibility as inferred by the three crisis clusters (Coombs & Holladay, 2001).  To 
address this, the final experiment in this series uses crisis types from within two 
different crisis clusters (workplace violence within the victim cluster and technical 
error accident within the accident cluster) to allow for the full effects of the step up 
strategies to be tested.  The third cluster of preventable is not needed to demonstrate 
the intensifier effect as there is no step up possible from the highest level of 
responsibility assigned to this cluster.  Guidance on the impact of organisational 
response in this cluster was provided through Experiment 3. When a negative 
intensifier effect is present, the victim-deny matched response should yield a less 
positive outcome on reputation and legitimacy than the stepped up victim-diminish 
response and the accident-diminish matched response should yield a less positive 
outcome on reputation and legitimacy than the stepped up accident-deal response.  
Experiment 6 will also provide guidance on the contention that stepping up two 
categories (victim type with deal strategy) is unnecessary and may provide no greater 
benefit to the organisation than the one step up strategy (victim type with diminish 
strategy) (Coombs, 2007).  Most discussion in the literature focuses on the role of 
negative intensifiers given their contribution to additional damage, however, this 
study will also investigate potential positive intensifiers to provide guidance to 
organisational managers during a crisis. 
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Independent Variable – Relationship History (Relationship Character and 
Organisational Age) 
The intensifier selected for study in this project - relationship history - was tested 
through combinations of relationship character and organisational age building on 
the results of the singular treatment conditions as outlined in Experiment 5.   The 
addition of organisational age tests explicitly the work of Massey (2001) where 
organisational age was implicitly mixed with niche width (specialist vs generalist 
organisations) to assess measures of legitimacy following a crisis.   It also addresses 
the contrary findings of Lyon and Cameron (2004) who found no interaction 
between relationship character and response in terms of effect on reputation and 
Dean (2004) who found that a strong relationship character may work against an 
organisation when stakeholders assess the appropriateness of response. 
Independent Variable – Strategy 
Three crisis responses were used, representing one response from each of the three 
crisis response strategy categories (deny: scapegoating; diminish: excuse; deal: 
compensation).  This allowed for a theoretically predicted response if relationship 
history had no negative intensifier effect (original matched response), a theoretically 
predicted response if relationship history had a negative intensifier effect (step up 
matched response), and an unmatched response for the organisation (see Tables 6 
and 7 for a full explanation of options).  
Interaction Effect 
Experiment 6 used a 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 (x3) mixed model  design to test the interaction of 
crisis cluster (2), relationship history (2) x (2) and response strategy (3) on 
stakeholder perceptions of responsibility, reputation and legitimacy (see Figure 12).  
It tested the four possible combinations within the relationship history construct 
(new and positive; new and negative; mature and positive; mature and negative) 
against one response strategy from each of the three strategy categories and applied 
this within two different crisis clusters (victim and accident).   The between subjects 
design tested the impact of the different treatments for cluster, relationship history 
and response strategy while the within subjects design was used to test the dependent 
variables across three time periods. 
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Figure 12:  Multi-factorial design of Experiment 6     
 
Dependent and Mediator Variables – Reputation, Legitimacy and Responsibility 
Pre- and post-test design was used for measures of reputation, legitimacy and 
responsibility.  Reputation and legitimacy were measured three times and 
responsibility twice.  As the previous experiments in this study had shown a strong 
and consistent change to perceptions of reputation and legitimacy immediately 
following the crisis event, the pre-crisis period was not included in this experiment 
to reduce the amount of time needed for participants to complete the questionnaires.   
Participants read a short news story outlining company information and a news story 
covering a crisis event and completed the first questionnaire which measured 
reputation and legitimacy as well as organisational responsibility for the event.  The 
participants then read a third news story which included information on the 
company’s response and completed the second questionnaire which measured 
reputation, legitimacy and responsibility.   Participants then read a final news story 
which included information on the company’s relationship history and reiterating the 
company’s response to the crisis.  This allowed the impact of relationship history on 
the protective powers of the response strategy to be demonstrated and assessed.  The 
final questionnaire was then completed which measured responsibility, reputation 
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and legitimacy.  Manipulation checks were undertaken as appropriate within the 
questionnaires. 
Instrumentation: Data Collection Tools 
Response Stimuli 
An organisational profile of a hypothetical company, BellaFoods was written and 
used throughout each stage of the study.  This follows the work of other crisis 
researchers such as Haigh and Dardis (2008) and Pace et al (2010) who also used 
hypothetical companies in their studies.  The organisation was set up as a generic 
food manufacturing company to limit any confounding effects through pre-
conceived associations that might come from the students (Claeys et al, 2010).   
Information on the company was kept to a minimum.  It is possible that the use of a 
hypothetical company may influence the way stakeholders view the negative aspects 
of an organisational profile when assessing its impact on reputation and legitimacy.  
Because the students cannot have had any personal experience of the organisation, 
they may be more easily persuaded by unfavourable information (Dean, 2004; 
Henard, 2002; Wu & Shaffer, 1987).   This is recognised as a limitation of the 
design, however, this has been considered in light of the alternative concerns of 
using a real organisation that some but not all of the students may have had an 
experience with which may also affect their comments. 
Individual scenarios using the base organisational profile were written to represent 
the manipulation of the different variables under study (crisis cluster, crisis response 
strategy, assigned responsibility and relationship history).  This follows standard 
practice in the crisis research cited elsewhere, however, it is recognised that the 
prepackaging of such information to elicit a response might deviate significantly 
from the way people perform causal analysis during a real crisis (Hewstone, 1989). 
The number of scenarios used in each experiment went from 2 in Experiment 4 to 24 
in Experiment 6 depending on the factors being manipulated in each experiment.  
These are outlined in Table 8.    
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Table 8:  Factorial design informing scenario development 
Experiment Factors Number of 
Scenarios Used 
1 Crisis Cluster (1) x Response (3) 3 
2 Crisis Cluster (2) x Response (3) 6 
3 Crisis Cluster (2) x Response (3) 6 
4 Crisis Cluster (1) x Responsibility (2) 2 
5 Crisis Cluster (1) x Relationship History (4) plus control 5 
6 Crisis Cluster (2) x Relationship History (2x2) x 
Response (3) 
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Given the complexity of the factorial design in the final experiment, the crisis 
scenarios were pretested through two methods.  Firstly, the manipulation checks 
undertaken in Experiments 1-5 were used to ensure the relevant independent 
variables were identified correctly by the participants. Secondly, a final pre-test of 
the 24 scenarios developed for Experiment 6 was run with 20 participants each 
assessing six of the scenarios and identifying the manipulated variables.  This led to 
one change in the operationalisation of the ‘new’ condition to two years instead of 
three years which was used in Experiment 5 to give better discrimination between 
the age conditions.  As outlined in Chapter 2, the two to three year period is 
commonly used in the literature for the liability of newness condition so both 
specific periods have been tested across this series of experiments. 
Following the research designs of Coombs (1998), Coombs and Holladay (2001), 
Lyon and Cameron (2004), Lee (2004), Haigh and Brubaker (2010) and Brocato et al 
(2012), mock newspaper reports of the crisis scenarios were constructed to represent 
the information gained by stakeholders on the crisis event and response.  Deephouse 
(2000) in his work on organisational legitimacy suggests that newspapers are the 
source most people use to retrieve information about corporations.  Supporting his 
view, Coombs (2004) suggests non-victim stakeholders will generally encounter 
information about crisis events through the mass media, making this a valuable 
experimental tool to identify stakeholder impressions and response.  This draws from 
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media systems dependency theory (DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1975) which suggests 
that during particular situations such as crises, people tend to become more 
dependent on the media for information.  As artificiality is a concern of the 
laboratory setting common in experiments (Babbie, 2004; Schwarz, 2008), the use of 
media articles in the experiment is one way to bring the assessment process closer to 
a natural social setting.  In today’s environment, media considerations would include 
not only mass media but social media, however, for consistency and to limit 
complexity, only one type of media, the print mass media, was used in this study.   
Damage due to the crisis has been identified by Coombs (2006) as a potential 
influencer within the SCCT model.  Although not confirmed experimentally, there is 
a suggestion that the more severe crises have a greater negative impact on reputation.  
While damage is not the focus of this study, the design has mirrored the approach of 
Claeys et al (2010) in controlling for actual damage through keeping the same stated 
outcomes in all scenarios. 
Questionnaire and Measures 
A series of questionnaires were developed to capture stakeholder impressions of the 
dependent variables of reputation and legitimacy, the predicted mediator variable of 
responsibility as well as the manipulation checks needed.   
As part of the study builds on the work of Coombs (2004, 2006, 2007) in developing 
the SCCT model, wherever possible, the original scales used to develop the model 
were replicated to enhance comparability.    Responsibility was measured through a 
3-item scale from Griffin et al (1991) which included items on responsibility and 
blame as associated with the organisation or the surrounding circumstances and has 
been used in a number of prior studies (Coombs, 1998, 2004; Coombs & Holladay, 
2001, 2002).  Sample items included:  Circumstances, not BellaFoods, were 
responsible for the crisis, and The blame for the crisis lies with BellaFoods. 
Reputation was measured using a 5-item scale from McCroskey (1966) as adapted 
by Coombs and Holladay (2002) which includes items on honesty and concern for 
stakeholders.  Sample items included:  BellaFoods is concerned with the wellbeing 
of its stakeholders and the general public, and Under most circumstances, I would be 
likely to believe what BellaFoods says.  Legitimacy was measured using a 
combination of a 6-item scale from Massey (2001) which includes items on the 
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qualities of the organisation and its permission to operate and a 6-item scale from 
Elsbach (1994) which included items on external endorsement and normative 
activity.  Sample items included: BellaFoods is a safe organisation, BellaFoods is a 
credible organisation, BellaFoods should be allowed to make prepared meals, and 
Most of the general public would approve of BellaFoods’ operating procedures.   
Scale development in legitimacy is in its infancy so further attention to the use of 
relevant scales was provided in Experiment 2 (see Chapter 4 for full discussion on 
scale testing). 
Crano and Brewer (1986, as cited in Crano (2000)) recommend that scale 
constructors attain Cronbach alpha co-efficient scores of internal reliability of at 
least .75 when developing attitude or trait measures.  Three of the four scales 
described above have shown high internal consistency in previous studies with 
Cronbach alpha scores for the reputation scale reported in the range of .80 - .92 (see 
for example, Coombs & Holladay, 2002, 2009, 2011), responsibility in the range of 
.81 - .91 (see for example, Coombs, 1999; Coombs & Holladay, 2001, 2002) and 
legitimacy of .90 (Massey, 2001).  Internal consistency was assessed across all 
studies in this project.   
Each dependent variable was measured as a continuous variable, captured on a 7 
item Likert scale with 1 on the scale representing strong agreement with the 
statement and 7 representing strong disagreement with the statement.  This followed 
the approach of Brocato et al (2012), Coombs and Holladay (2011), and Kim et al 
(2009).  The scales were reversed in the data entry stage so that higher scores 
represented stronger agreement on the constructs to aid in the description of the 
results. 
Administration of Data Collection 
Data for each experiment were collected in classes at one or more of the four 
selected universities as outlined earlier.  In each experiment, respondents were 
assigned to one of the constructed scenarios and provided with a research package 
which consisted of an instruction sheet including consent information, the 
organisational profile for BellaFoods, a newspaper article(s) which included the 
relevant independent variables being tested as outlined earlier and a questionnaire 
(s).  The respondent was asked to complete each questionnaire immediately after 
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reading the relevant material and return the package to the lecturer.  This took 
approximately 15-25 minutes per student depending on the complexity of the 
experiment.   
Data Analysis  
Data from the completed questionnaires for each experiment were entered into SPSS 
Version 19 and checked for entry errors and omissions prior to analysis.   
Descriptive statistics were run to identify each sample and to check cell sizes.  The 
manipulation of the independent variables contained in the relevant scenarios were 
then checked.  The mean scores of the manipulation questions were compared using 
t-tests where there were two treatment groups and ANOVA where there was more 
than two levels of the variable.     
Hypothesis testing for the different experiments required multivariate analysis which 
simultaneously analysed the relationships among several variables.  Assessment of 
direct and indirect effects of the independent variables on the dependent variables 
was needed. 
For the direct effects, a series of multivariate and univariate analysis of variance 
measures (ANOVA/MANOVA) were used across the experiments depending on the 
number of dependent variables being considered.   While recognising the description 
in Chapter 2 of the theoretical differences between the two main dependent variables 
of reputation and legitimacy under study, MANOVA was used first within each of 
the analysis protocols recognising the possible combined operation of these 
variables.    
A repeated measures design was adopted for the univariate and multivariate 
ANOVA analysis as the participants were observed at multiple points in time (Lix & 
Keselman, 2010).  The pre- and post-test strategy was explained previously in this 
chapter.  The repeated measures ANOVA F test is the conventional procedure for 
testing hypotheses about omnibus within-subjects effects.  There are four different 
test statistics that can be used to test the within-subjects interaction: Pillai-Bartlett 
trace, Roy’s largest root criterion, Wilk’s lambda and the Hotelling-Lawley trace 
(Lix & Keselman, 2010).  Pillai’s trace was used in this study following 
recommendations from previous research on its robustness over the other tests when 
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normality assumptions are not tenable (see for example, Olson, 1976).  To assist 
with understanding the data, post hoc multivariate multiple comparisons were 
undertaken using Tukey’s HSD test which is one of the most common post hoc tests 
in management research (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2004).  Effect size was assessed 
within the ANOVA model using partial eta squared (partial η2). 
To assist with addressing the hypotheses and support the repeated measures analysis, 
change scores were also analysed at particular points in the analysis across the 
experiments.  Change scores (sometimes referred to as difference scores or gain 
scores (Gupta et al, 1988) are calculated by deducting the pre-test scores from the 
post-test scores to create a new dependent variable (Dimitrov & Rumrill, 2003).   
These scores can be calculated for individual participants or as means across the 
group.    Change score analysis has been criticised for being susceptible to poor 
reliability under certain circumstances (e.g. Rogosa, 1988; Cronbach & Furby, 1970; 
Cohen et al, 2003) such as when pre and post test scores have equal variances 
(Dimitrov & Rumrill, 2003).  Others (such as Anderson et al, 1980; Fitzmaurice et 
al, 2004; Maxwell & Delaney, 1990) are more supportive of its use, suggesting the 
mathematical difference between outcomes in  change score method and repeated 
measures may be overstated.   Recognising this caution, both methods have been 
used in this study with the change score method used to confirm the results from the 
repeated measures approach (Lee et al, 2010) and any difference in outcomes 
highlighted.   
In this study, reputation and legitimacy were proposed and tested as discrete 
variables.  Correlation analysis using Pearson product moment correlation 
coefficients was used to examine the linear relationships between these two variables 
(Osborne, 2010).  Descriptions of correlations were based on the guidelines 
suggested by Cohen (1988), that is: r=.10 (weak); r=.30 (moderate) and r≥.50 
(strong).  Two tailed tests were used in correlation analysis. 
Reflecting the examination of indirect effects, a number of research questions 
guiding this study are based on three independent variables (crisis cluster, response 
strategy and relationship history), two dependent variables (reputation and 
legitimacy) and one mediator (responsibility).  Drawing from the relevant literature, 
the study hypothesises a 4-way interaction effect among the three independent 
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variables (one variable has two parts) and a mediation effect on reputation and 
legitimacy through the variable of responsibility.     
Because of the presence of both interaction and mediation in the model being 
studied, analysis of co-variance (ANCOVA/MANCOVA) under a repeated measures 
design was also used to analyse the data.  ANCOVA and MANCOVA are part of the 
ANOVA tradition and were developed to improve the power of the test of the 
independent variable (Miller & Chapman, 2001).  These tests bring together the 
analysis of variance and regression (Fisher, 1948 as cited in Porter & Raudenbush, 
1987) to allow for covariation of the independent variables.  This can increase the 
statistical power of the analysis over that of analysis of variance alone.    
It is important to consider the presence of measurement error in the mediator as this 
tends to produce an underestimate of the effect of the mediator and an overestimate 
of the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable (Baron & Kenny, 
1986).   Thus, achieving high internal reliability on the measurement of 
responsibility was important in the design of this study and the testing of the variable 
as not achieving this may lead to a meaningful mediator not showing significant 
effect.  
It is also important in mediation models to try and limit confounding variables which 
limit the ability to demonstrate the causal relationship (Stone-Romero & Rosopa, 
2008).  In the experiments, information in the scenarios was kept to critical 
information to provide a context for the manipulation of the independent variables 
and the treatments were presented in as similar way as possible.  This was designed 
to reduce distractions for the participants which may lead to different perceptions of 
the key dependent variables of reputation and legitimacy. 
The statistical tests used in each experiment to analyse the data and test the 
hypotheses are outlined in the reporting of results in Chapters 4 - 7.  
Limitations 
In terms of the research problem around which this study is organised, there are a 
series of limitations for this study.  Where possible, these have been considered in 
the research design and controlled, however, others are inherent in the design and are 
noted in analysing the data. 
116 
 
The experimental nature of the design creates an artificial experience for the 
‘recruited’ stakeholder which may not be replicated by the lived experience.  Rather 
than live the crisis experience, participants in the study are reading about the crisis 
event in media articles and asked to provide their views on certain factors.  Some 
crisis researchers (for example, Coombs & Holladay, 2001) suggest that this may be 
quite a close representation of how many non-victim stakeholders experience a 
crisis, therefore the method may not be as dissimilar from the lived experience as 
first thought.  What is dissimilar in this method is the use of a hypothetical company.  
Use of a real company would take this experiment closer to the field however, it 
could come with the disadvantage of participants responding on the basis of their 
knowledge and experience of that company rather than attending to the variables 
under study.   
The topic selected as the basis for the scenario may also influence the participant 
responses, depending upon the level of resonance with the topic.  Topics may appear 
more relevant to the sample group or more distant. 
The experimental method used in this study has limitations as formal control groups 
were not used in each experiment which may limit internal validity (Rosnow & 
Rosenthal, 1996), however, this limitation was weighed against the practical issues 
of introducing control mechanisms in all experiments thereby substantially 
increasing the required sample size. 
The use of a test-retest methodology may also lead participants to focus more closely 
on the variables under study than they would in a field environment (Babbie, 2004).  
However, this approach has been selected for its importance in being able to test the 
changes in the key variables as outlined earlier which is a major contribution of this 
study to the crisis management literature. 
The ability to access a large enough sample size to achieve appropriate levels of 
power given the complexity of the model design is a further limitation of the study.  
As effect sizes are often low in social sciences research (Murphy, 2010), a larger 
sample may have seen increased levels being achieved (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2004). 
The use of a student sample as opposed to a randomly selected sample from the 
wider community has already been discussed as a limitation of the study and will 
limit the generalisability of the findings to the wider population.  However, previous 
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crisis studies (Coombs, 2004; Lyon & Cameron, 2004) have provided comfort on the 
use of this sample with their experiments finding no significant differences in 
responses between undergraduate students and community members.   
The analytical tests used in this study rely on the soundness of the measures of the 
dependent variables and the mediator variable.  If insufficiently high levels of 
reliability are present in the tests for these variables, the ability to show the effect is 
limited (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  Given there are no universally accepted measures 
for the variables under study as outlined in Chapter 2, reliance in the first instance 
has been based on scales already in use in similar experiments. 
The possibility of confounding variables (Stone-Romero & Rosopa, 2008) also limits 
the study’s findings.  The decisions of stakeholders in a crisis situation are complex 
and may involve a range of factors.  The experimental nature of the study tried to 
focus attention on the variables under study with care taken to limit any additional 
information that was provided as contextual information on the company and the 
crisis event.     
Ethical Considerations 
Prior to commencing any of the studies, approval was obtained from the University 
Human Research Ethics Committee at Queensland University of Technology for 
Level 1 Low Risk Ethical Clearance (QUTHREC ethical clearance no: 0900001098).    
The project complied with the National Statement for the Ethical Conduct of 
Research Involving Humans and the QUT Code of Conduct of Research.  
Participation in the study was voluntary and participants could withdraw from the 
project at any time.  A written explanation of the project details, its goals and 
benefits was provided to each participant in the data collection package.  a sample 
participant information and consent form is presented in Appendix 1. 
 All participation was on an anonymous basis.  Basic demographic data were 
collected during the study to help describe the sample but as the study was conducted 
on an anonymous basis with large sample sizes, there was no way of relating this 
back to individual participants. 
A powerpoint summary explanation of the theoretical modelling behind the study 
was offered to lecturers who administered the questionnaires in their classes.  The 
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lecturers could use this material to prompt further discussions on the importance of 
crisis management in today’s business environment and its relationship to the topics 
of study in their individual subjects to help add value to the time spent by the 
students undertaking the study. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the methodology used to collect data for this study and 
provided a rationale for the approach. The appropriateness of a quantitative approach 
taken was established and data collection methods for the experimental design 
explained.  The limitations of this approach were discussed and information on 
ethical clearance for the study provided. The data analysis procedures were 
explained as a framework for understanding the research findings in Chapters 4 – 7 
and conclusions drawn in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 4  Stage One Results 
This chapter reports on the results from Stage One of this study as described in 
Chapter 3.  Three experiments are outlined in this chapter.  Each experiment is 
described in detail including a summary of the aims of the experiment, the sample 
accessed for the experiment and the key data analysis techniques that were 
employed. The independent and dependent variables used in each experiment are 
presented.  The results of hypothesis testing through the use of multivariate statistical 
analysis are outlined.   Support for the hypotheses is discussed where appropriate and 
forms the basis for the further analysis and discussion of the research questions in 
Chapter 8. 
Stage One Focus  
The focus for Stage One of this study was on the effects of crisis response strategy 
during different crisis events.  Stage One involved three experiments that tested 
various forms of the main effect of the interaction of crisis cluster and response 
strategy on stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy over time.  This 
stage also tested the indirect effect on these perceptions through the proposed 
mediator of organisational responsibility.   The results of each of these experiments 
are reported separately, noting the key focus and hypotheses for each experiment. 
Research Questions  
Collectively, these experiments address the following research questions: 
Research Question 1 
How do crisis response strategies used in response to crises from different crisis 
clusters influence stakeholder perceptions of organisational reputation and 
legitimacy?   
Research Question 2 
How does responsibility mediate the influence of response strategies used during 
crises from different clusters on stakeholder perceptions of organisational reputation 
and legitimacy?   
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Experiment 1 Results 
Experiment 1 was a multi-purpose experiment designed to test the relevant 
hypotheses and serve as a pilot study to test the scenarios to be used in future 
experiments.  In addition, the experiment was intended to confirm the reliability of 
scales used to measure the dependent variables and the proposed mediator of 
responsibility, and consider the theoretical claim of difference between the two 
variables of reputation and legitimacy. 
Experiment 1 used a 1 (crisis cluster: accident) x 3 (response strategy: deny, 
diminish, deal) way design.  To operationalise the crisis cluster of accident, the 
subtype of technical error accident was used as the stimulus in all of the written 
scenarios (see Appendix 7).   As there is only one cluster being tested, there is no test 
for interaction with strategy in Experiment 1.  The three response strategies were 
scapegoating (from the deny category), excuse (from the diminish category) and 
compassion (from the deal category).  Three different scenarios were developed (see 
Appendices 8-10). 
The sample for Experiment 1 was 143 students drawn from undergraduate and 
postgraduate classes.  Their ages ranged from 20 – 37 years (M = 25, SD 3.77) and 
included 70% female and 30% male respondents.  Cell size for each of the three 
treatments described earlier ranged from 45 – 50, above the level recommended to 
meet the reliability measures for analysis (Bernard, 1994). 
Manipulation Checks 
The success of the independent variables’ manipulation in the scenarios was checked 
by independent t tests and ANOVA.  The first manipulation check was conducted to 
determine if the participants were selecting the theoretically described crisis cluster 
(accident).   As outlined in Table 9, the highest level of agreement was recorded for 
the accident cluster (M=4.93, SD 1.44).  T-tests among each of the pairs showed 
significant differences among the clusters (Victim – Accident t (142)=-9.824, p<.05; 
Accident-Preventable t (142)=-3.987, p<.05; Victim – Preventable t (142)=6.011, 
p<.05). 
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Table 9: Manipulation check on crisis cluster 
Treatment  
(Crisis Cluster) 
M SD 
Victim 3.65 1.55 
Accident 4.93 1.44 
Preventable 4.41 1.53 
M≥4.0=agree 
While participants correctly identified that the event as described did not position 
BellaFoods as a victim (M<4.0 where 4.0 = agree), there was agreement (M>4.0) that 
the event as described matched not only the accident category but could also have 
matched the preventable category (M= 4.41) which reflects the uncertainty at the 
time of an event as to whether an accident could or could not be preventable.   
Signals in the scenarios for accidents need to remain strong in future experiments to 
ensure this does not weaken the selection of the accident cluster. 
A second manipulation check using a one way ANOVA was conducted to determine 
whether the participants were selecting the theoretically described response strategy 
(deny, diminish, deal) as each participant only read one of the strategy descriptions.  
The deny treatment saw the company using the scapegoat strategy of blaming 
someone else; the diminish treatment had the company offering an excuse for the 
accident; and the deal strategy involved the company using the compassion strategy 
which includes offering some form of compensation as described by Coombs (2006). 
As outlined in Table 10, for the diminish treatment, the overall effect for the 
manipulation check item was significant (F(2,140)=4.056, p<.05) and the correct 
strategy was selected (M=5.80, SD =1.37).  The correct strategy was also selected for 
the deal treatment (M=5.29, SD = 1.61) and the overall effect for the deal treatment 
was significant (F(2,140)=15.76, p<.05).  However, there was no significant 
difference for the deny treatment (F(2,140)=.250, p>.05).  In this condition, the 
incorrect strategy of deal was marginally favoured by the participants (M=4.14, 
SD=1.28).   
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Table 10: Manipulation check on strategy 
Treatment 
(Response 
Strategy) 
Deny 
M (SD) 
Diminish 
M (SD) 
Deal 
M(SD) 
F df 
Deny 3.96 (1.51)^ 3.95 (1.69) 4.14 (1.28) .250 2,140 
Diminish 4.96 (1.66) 5.80 (1.37)^ 5.54 (1.36) 4.056* 2,140 
Deal 3.44 (1.40) 4.08 (1.92) 5.29 (1.61)^ 15.768* 2,140 
^= correct strategy, *p<.05 
Further analysis of the deny condition in the scenario suggested that the wording of 
the denial statement (The supplier of the tank caused the crisis.) may have been seen 
by participants as focusing on a third party taking responsibility rather than 
BellaFoods shifting the blame to another party which is the essence of the deny 
strategy.  The focus on the company was consistent across the other two categories 
but inconsistent in this one.  Rewording the question in the following experiments to 
maintain a focus on the company (e.g. BellaFoods blamed someone else for the 
explosion.) was used to help clarify that it was the company denying responsibility 
rather than someone else taking responsibility.   
Reliability Analysis 
Internal reliability analyses were run on the items used to operationalise the two 
dependent measures of reputation and legitimacy and the proposed mediator of 
responsibility (see Table 11).   
Responsibility was measured at two times and used a three item scale adapted from 
Griffin, Babin and Darden (1991).  The inter-item reliability for responsibility using 
Cronbach alpha was moderate (α = .695-.756) and slightly lower than in the Griffin 
et al experiments (α = .81-.91).   
Reputation was measured across three time periods and was assessed using a five-
item scale developed from McCroskey (1966) and adapted by Coombs & Holladay 
(1992) which has been tested across a range of experiments at α = .80-.92.   The 
inter-item reliability for reputation measured by Cronbach alpha (α = .621-.794) was 
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slightly lower than Coombs & Holladay but within a reasonable range for the 
experiment. 
Legitimacy was also measured across three time periods and was assessed using a 
six item scale developed by Massey (2001) and reported with high internal 
consistency (α = .90).  The inter-item reliability for legitimacy was high in 
experiment 1 (α = .815-.883) and close to that reported by Massey. 
Table 11: Internal reliability checks on dependent variables across time 
Time Reputation 
M (SD) 
Reputation 
α 
Legitimacy 
M (SD) 
Legitimacy 
α 
Responsibility 
M (SD) 
Responsibility 
α 
1 4.44 (.85) .638 4.45 (.96) .815 n.a. n.a. 
2 4.23 (.90) .621 4.03 
(1.04) 
.820 3.84 (1.24) .695 
3 4.20 
(1.08) 
.794 3.96 
(1.16) 
.883 3.93 (1.21) .756 
 
Testing for Discrete Dependent Variables 
This study has followed the theoretical lead of Deephouse and Carter (2005), Rao 
(1994), and Zyglidopoulos (2003) by considering reputation and legitimacy as 
discrete constructs albeit related.  To test this proposition, correlation analysis using 
a two-tailed test was conducted at each of the relevant time periods to test the 
association between reputation and legitimacy. Pearson r was significant at all time 
periods with correlation lowest at Time 1 and highest at Time 3 (see Table 12).  
Time 1 is an indicator of the relationship before the other independent variables 
which are designed to impact the dependent variables are added and, as such, 
provides an important time point for this assessment. 
Table 12: Correlation analysis of reputation and legitimacy across time 
Time Reputation  
M (SD) 
Legitimacy 
M (SD) 
Pearson r 
1 4.42 (.84) 4.40 (.86) .490** 
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2 4.19 (.80) 3.96 (.92) .590** 
3 4.20 (1.08) 3.90 (1.07) .668** 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Using Cohen’s (1988) guidelines, the variables have a strong correlation as expected, 
however, the level of association allows for different impacts by the independent 
variables.  The levels of discriminant validity as outlined in Table 12 were monitored 
across the different experiments in this study.   
Hypothesis Testing 
There are two parts of the overall model being tested in Experiment 1. 
The first part tests propositions around how different responses in the accidental 
crisis cluster influence stakeholder perceptions of organisational reputation and 
legitimacy.  
Relevant Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1.1  
A matched crisis response will maintain the level of stakeholder perceptions 
of organisational reputation and legitimacy recorded immediately following 
the crisis event. 
Hypothesis 1.2  
A mismatched crisis response will not maintain the level of stakeholder 
perceptions of organisational reputation and legitimacy recorded 
immediately following the crisis event. 
As the accident crisis cluster is being tested in Experiment 1, the matched response 
under Coombs (2007) is drawn from the diminish category with the responses from 
the deny and deal categories representing mismatched strategies (see Table 6 for full 
explanation). 
A series of statistical tests were undertaken to test the hypotheses.   A repeated 
measures MANOVA was undertaken with both dependent variables (reputation and 
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legitimacy) across all time periods.  This was followed by repeated measures 
ANOVA tests on each of the two dependent variables and the proposed mediator 
variable of responsibility.  A second ANOVA test was undertaken using a change 
score for each dependent variable and the mediator.  The change score represented a 
computed mean based on the change in variable over specific time periods.   These 
tests are described further in the relevant sections.  Unless indicated elsewhere, 
significance levels were set at p<.05 within the different tests.    Where no change in 
a particular dependent variable was hypothesised, the absolute level of change in the 
variable has been examined and reported as well as the specific levels of significance 
which are expected to be well outside the null hypothesis testing level of p<.05. 
To assess whether stakeholder perceptions of organisational reputation and 
legitimacy were being maintained at the level following the crisis event, a repeated 
measures test was run across time periods as outlined in Chapter 3.   The dependent 
variables were measured at time 1 (only company information), time 2 (crisis event) 
and time 3 (organisational response strategy).  The measurement at time 1 gives a 
baseline measure of reputation and legitimacy and should not show any significant 
differences between subject groups as all participants have received the same 
information.  Any change in the reputation and legitimacy scores at time 2 should be 
related to the crisis event with a significant decline in the scores from the time 1 
baseline expected due to the crisis.  However, there should still not be any significant 
differences between subject groups at time 2 as all information is similar across the 
groups.  The level of reputation and legitimacy recorded at time 2 is important as it is 
this level from which the ability of the response strategy to maintain or not maintain 
reputation and legitimacy is being assessed.  This requires measurement of 
reputation and legitimacy at time 2 and time 3 to ascertain any change in the scores.  
A positive change would signify an improvement in stakeholder perceptions of 
reputation or legitimacy and a negative change would show a degradation in 
stakeholder perceptions.  Significant differences should be seen across the 
participant groups at time 3 as different response strategies have been read by the 
groups.   
To test how reputation and legitimacy were being influenced across the time periods, 
a repeated measures MANOVA was run incorporating both dependent variables.  
Using Pillai’s Trace as the multivariate test statistic, time was shown to be having a 
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significant effect on reputation and legitimacy (F(4,135)=8.249, ηp2=.196, p<.05, 
observed power .998).  As this covers all time periods, a further omnibus check was 
done focusing on the effect from time 2 to time 3.  This check used computed 
variables for the difference in means for reputation and legitimacy from time 2 to 
time 3 which is the focus period for the hypotheses.  The scores at time 2 were 
subtracted from the scores at time 3.  The results of the one way MANOVA 
demonstrated that strategy was having a statistically significant main effect on 
changes in reputation and legitimacy scores across time 2 to time 3 (F(4,278)=4.000, 
ηp2=.054, p<.05, observed power .907).  To determine how reputation and 
legitimacy were being influenced at each time period by the different independent 
variables and the different strategy treatments, each dependent variable is now 
examined separately. 
Reputation 
Using Pillai’s Trace as the univariate test statistic across all time periods, time was 
shown to have a significant effect on reputation (F(2,138)=4.115, ηp2=.054, p<.05, 
observed power .700).  Looking at the different time periods, reputation declined 
across the three strategy groupings from time 1 to time 2 suggesting information on 
the crisis event negatively affected perceptions of reputation.  There was no 
significant difference in reputation scores across the three strategy groups at time 1 
(F(2,139)=1.732, ηp2=.024, n.s., observed power .355) or time 2 (F(2,139)=.012, 
ηp2=.000, n.s., observed power .052) as predicted.  However, a significant difference 
was present at time 3 as predicted (F(2,139)=6.171, ηp2=.08, p<.05, observed power 
.879) which suggests strategy is having a main effect on perceptions of reputation. 
Posthoc analysis using Tukey’s HSD test among the three strategy types at time 3 
showed significant differences between the diminish strategy (M=3.93, SD=1.10) 
and the deal strategy (M=4.62, SD=.97, Mdiff=-.695, SE=.216, p<.05); and the deny 
strategy (M=4.03, SD=1.06) and deal strategy (M=4.62, SD=.97, Mdiff=-.597, 
SE=.210, p<.05); but not between the deny (M=4.03, SD=1.06) and the diminish 
strategies (M=3.93, SD=1.10, Mdiff=.098, SE=.214, n.s.).  Earlier analysis had 
showed difficulty in the participants identifying the deny strategy correctly which 
may be affecting this outcome.  The deny and diminish strategies are also closest to 
each other on the strategy continuum (deny, diminish, deal) so this lack of 
127 
 
significance may be related to the test instruments and, consequently, was 
reconsidered prior to the next experiment.  The deal strategy resulted in the highest 
reputation score at time 3 (M=4.62, SD.97). 
While the analysis shows that different strategies result in different scores for 
reputation, the focus for the hypotheses is on whether each strategy maintains the 
reputation level at that of time 2 or not.  It is therefore important to check how 
reputation scores have moved from this time point.  The omnibus ANOVA test using 
the difference in reputational means from time 2 to time 3 showed strategy was 
having a significant main effect on the shift in reputation scores (F(2,139)=8.255, 
ηp2=.106, p<.05, observed power .959).  Having established this significance, each 
strategy can be examined to establish whether its effect was as predicted.  Three 
options are possible:  an increase in reputation scores representing an improvement 
in reputation, a decrease in reputation scores representing a degradation in reputation 
or no change in reputation scores representing maintenance at the level of the crisis 
event.    
Post hoc analysis from the repeated measures ANOVA with Tukey’s HSD test was 
used to assess each strategy (see Figure 13).  The match strategy of diminishing 
responsibility for the crisis was predicted to maintain reputation.  As this prediction 
is examining no change in the position of the level of the dependent variable, the 
absolute level of change in the variable has been examined to ensure any change is 
very minimal and a strongly non-significant result sought.    There was a very slight 
decline in reputation scores from time 2 (M=4.17, SD .82) to time 3 (M=3.93, 
SD=1.10, Mdiff = -.244, SE=.132, n.s.) and as expected, this result had a high level 
of non-significance at p=.187.  Thus using these combined factors, reputation was 
considered to be maintained and the hypothesis supported.  The other two strategies 
are hypothesised to not maintain reputation, that is, reputation scores should increase 
or decrease.   
The mismatched strategy of denying responsibility for an accident is seen as an 
insufficient response under the SCCT model and therefore should have a detrimental 
effect on reputation.  There was a slight decline in reputation scores as hypothesised, 
however, the result was not significant (M time 2 =4.20, SD=.80, M time 3 = 4.03, 
SD=1.06, Mdiff=-.171, SE=.125, n.s.). Dealing with responsibility, another 
128 
 
mismatched response, saw a statistically significant increase in reputation scores 
confirming the initial hypothesis of match vs mismatched responses (M time 2 =4.19, 
SD=.81, M time 3 = 4.62, SD=.97, Mdiff=.434, SE=.129, p<.05). The participants 
rewarded the company for doing more than was needed so there was a positive effect 
on reputation as evidenced by higher scores at time 3 than at the baseline of time 2.  
However, this improvement in reputation score needs to be considered in light of the 
financial and resource costs to the company of this compensation strategy and 
therefore, a significantly more positive effect on reputation would be expected than 
just doing what was required (the match strategy of excuse).  The deal strategy saw a 
complete recovery of the organisation’s reputation from the crisis event with the 
reputation at time 3 (M = 4.62, SD=.97) being higher than the reputation at time 1 
(M=4.39, SD=.73).  This did not occur for any of the other strategy options. 
Figure 13:  Impact of different strategies on reputation over time    
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Legitimacy 
Using Pillai’s Trace as the univariate test statistic across all time periods, time was 
shown to also be having a significant effect on legitimacy (F(2,137)=16.400, 
ηp=.193, p<.05, observed power 1.00).  Like reputation, legitimacy scores also 
declined across the three strategy groupings from time 1 to time 2 again confirming 
that information on the crisis event negatively affected perceptions of legitimacy.  
There was no significant difference in legitimacy scores across the three strategy 
groups at time 1(F(2,138)=.077, ηp2=.001, n.s., observed power .057) or time 2 
(F(2,138)=.422, ηp2=.006, n.s., observed power .117) as predicted.  However, unlike 
reputation, there was also no significant difference at time 3 (F(2,139)=1.739,  
ηp2=.025, n.s., observed power .368). Therefore, no main effect of crisis response 
strategy on legitimacy was established. 
The omnibus ANOVA test using the difference in legitimacy means from time 2 to 
time 3 confirmed this finding by showing that strategy was not having a significant 
main effect on the shift in legitimacy (F(2,139)=2.952, ηp2=.041, n.s., observed 
power .567).   
As the significance level was p=.056, just outside the established level of p<.05 used 
in this experiment, and this was the preliminary experiment in this series, the data 
was analysed further to identify possible trends in movement, albeit not significant 
shifts.  Movements in the legitimacy means across the different strategy types from 
time 2 to time 3 were assessed through post hoc analysis from the repeated measures 
ANOVA.  Each strategy was assessed as to whether it maintained legitimacy at the 
baseline measure at time 2 or not (see Figure 14).  The match strategy of diminishing 
responsibility for the crisis was predicted to maintain legitimacy which was 
established with a non-significant movement across time (M time 2 =3.87, SD=.94, M 
time 3 = 3.71, SD=1.04, Mdiff=.163, SE=.120, n.s.). As with reputation, the absolute 
level of change for the matched strategy was miniscule and the significance level 
was well outside the parameters set at p=.440.  The other two strategies are 
hypothesised to not maintain legitimacy, that is, a significant change is sought.     
The mismatched deny strategy resulted in a slight decline in legitimacy scores as 
hypothesised, however the result was not significant. (M time 2 =4.05, SD=.89, M time 3 
= 3.84, SD=1.05, Mdiff=-.204, SE=.115, n.s.).   Denying responsibility for an 
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accident is seen as an insufficient response under the SCCT model and, therefore, 
should have a detrimental effect on legitimacy.  Dealing with responsibility, another 
mismatched response, saw an improvement in legitimacy scores (M time 2 =3.94, 
SD=.96, M time 3 = 4.12, SD=1.10, Mdiff=.177, SE=.117, n.s.), so while the trend was 
correct, the initial hypothesis cannot be established as the result was not significant.  
Based on the trend, as with reputation, the participants appear to reward the company 
for doing more than was needed through the deal response so there was an 
improvement in judgments on legitimacy over the time period.  However, the same 
considerations of doing more than necessary apply here as well.   Unlike reputation, 
the deal strategy did not see a full recovery to the pre-crisis event legitimacy status 
so some damage to legitimacy occurred. 
 
Figure 14:  Impact of different strategies on legitimacy over time 
In summary, the hypothesis for the match strategy was supported, however, the 
hypothesis for the mismatched strategies can only be supported on trend data with 
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non-significant results achieved.  Findings of significance in the impact of strategy 
on changes to reputation but not on changes to legitimacy provide further support to 
considering these two dependent variables as being associated yet substantively 
different as demonstrated earlier through the correlation analysis (see Table 12).  
Responsibility 
The second part of the overall model being tested in Experiment 1 involves the 
proposed mediator of responsibility.  This part of the study tests propositions around 
how different response strategies used in a crisis from the accidental cluster 
influence stakeholder perceptions of organisational reputation and legitimacy 
through responsibility.  In other words, if the response strategy changes the level of 
responsibility assigned to the organisation at the time of the crisis, there should be a 
subsequent change to its reputation and legitimacy scores.   
Relevant Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 2.1  
A matched crisis response will maintain the level of stakeholder perceptions 
of organisational responsibility and will subsequently maintain the level of 
stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy recorded immediately 
following the crisis event. 
Hypothesis 2.2 
A mismatched crisis response will not maintain the level of stakeholder 
perceptions of organisational responsibility and will subsequently not 
maintain the level of stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy 
recorded immediately following the crisis event. 
To assess whether stakeholder perceptions of crisis responsibility were being 
maintained or changed by a particular strategy, a repeated measures ANOVA was 
run across time periods with responsibility as a dependent variable.   Responsibility 
was measured at time 2 (crisis event) and time 3 (organisational response).  The 
measurement at time 2 gives a baseline measure of attributed responsibility based on 
the crisis event and should not show any significant differences between subject 
groups as all participants have received the same information.  The ability of the 
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response strategy to maintain responsibility requires measurement of this variable at 
time 2 and time 3.  Significant differences should be seen across the participant 
groups at time 3 when different response strategies are read by the groups.   
For the first test of responsibility as a dependent variable using Pillai’s Trace as the 
univariate test statistic, the full model analysis showed time was not having a 
significant effect on responsibility (F(1, 139)=.043, ηp2=.000, n.s., observed power 
.055).  Looking at the strategy groups, there was no significant difference between 
the groups at time 2 (F(2,139)=.539, ηp2=.008, n.s., observed power .138) as 
expected, however, there was also no significant difference at time 3 (F(2,139)=.302, 
ηp2=.004, n.s., observed power .098).  This was confirmed by testing the effect of 
strategy on the mean difference in responsibility from time 2 to time 3 as the only 
difference between these time periods is the introduction of the response strategy.  
The one way ANOVA showed no significant main effect for strategy 
(F(2,139)=.518, ηp2=.007, n.s., observed power .134).   
While significant shifts were not demonstrated, the movement in attributed 
responsibility from time 2 to time 3 by individual strategies was examined to 
ascertain trend data for the subsequent experiments (see Figure 15).  The matched 
strategy of diminishing responsibility was hypothesised to maintain responsibility 
which was confirmed with a very small absolute decline which had a very high level 
of non-significance at p=.932 (M time 2 =3.73, SD=1.20, M time 3 = 3.71, SD=1.18, 
Mdiff=-.015, SE=.173, n.s.).  The mismatched deny strategy did provide a slight 
increase in perceptions of responsibility as predicted (M time 2 =3.74, SD=1.21, M time 3 
= 3.90, SD=1.18, Mdiff=.153, SE=.164, n.s.) although the result was not significant.  
The mismatched deal strategy provided a slight decrease in responsibility (M time 2 
=3.95, SD=1.09, M time 3 = 3.87, SD=1.29, Mdiff=-.078, SE=.169, n.s.) but the change 
was not significant. 
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Figure 15: Changes in responsibility over time  
As no significant effect of strategy on responsibility could be established, the 
planned further testing of mediation using MANCOVA was not undertaken.  Instead, 
the trend data on the relationships previously established through the main effects 
analysis were compiled. 
Under the second set of hypotheses, the matched response of diminish responsibility 
should maintain stakeholder perceptions of crisis responsibility and subsequently 
maintain organisational reputation and legitimacy across time periods 2 and 3 and 
the mismatched deny and deal responses shouldn’t. 
As noted earlier, the diminish strategy maintained responsibility from time 2 to time 
3 with a subsequent slight decline in reputation scores and no movement in 
legitimacy scores therefore the predicted link between responsibility and the 
dependent variables of reputation and legitimacy was largely supported. 
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The mismatched deny strategy was predicted to not maintain responsibility since the 
deny strategy has less credibility in the accident case and therefore reputation and 
legitimacy should be influenced.  Responsibility did increase with this strategy and 
there was a slight decline in reputation and legitimacy scores although the movement 
in these variables is not significant. The final deal response saw a slight decrease in 
responsibility against prediction and a subsequent improvement in reputation which 
was significant and a non-significant improvement in legitimacy so while the initial 
part of the hypothesis was not supported, the effect of responsibility on reputation 
and legitimacy supports the broader hypothesis, that is, if responsibility decreases, 
reputation and legitimacy should be maintained or improved.  As the deal strategy is 
considered more than needed on the assumption of responsibility through the 
accident type, the participants have rewarded the company for this strategy through 
providing more positive scores for reputation and legitimacy.  It should be 
remembered that the deal strategy used in this experiment, compassion, doesn’t 
explicitly accept responsibility, rather it provides compensation for those involved.  
Only one of the strategies in the deal category, apology, explicitly accepts 
responsibility for the crisis.  The effect of this strategy is tested in Experiment 3. 
One further test on the relationship between responsibility, reputation and legitimacy 
was undertaken to inform the following experiments.  Correlation analysis was 
undertaken with the three variables across two time periods to further identify 
associations.  As reported earlier in Table 12, reputation and legitimacy have 
moderate and significant correlation at time 2 (r=.590, p=0.01) and time 3 (r=.668, 
p=0.01).  As this is stable across the time periods, shifts in correlation of these 
dependent variables with the third variable, responsibility, should not be due to 
changes in this initial relationship. 
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Table 13:  Correlation analysis of responsibility with reputation and legitimacy 
across time 
 Reputation 
Time 2 
Pearson r 
Legitimacy 
Time 2 
Pearson r 
Reputation 
Time 3 
Pearson r 
Legitimacy 
Time 3 
Pearson r 
Responsibility 
Time 2  
-.393** -.488** -.274** -.342** 
Responsibility 
Time 3 
  -.535** -.643** 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
At time 2, responsibility as identified by the participants is the attributed 
responsibility based on the crisis event.   As outlined in Table 13, this is showing 
low to moderate correlation with reputation and legitimacy at time 2, however, this 
correlation decreases at time 3 suggesting something else has impacted the 
association between the attributed responsibility and the subsequent reputation and 
legitimacy.  The different factor at time 3 is the crisis response strategy which is 
designed to act on the initial attributed responsibility of the crisis type and change 
the attributed responsibility in line with the response strategy (that is, to deny 
responsibility, diminish it or deal with it).  The newly attributed responsibility at 
time 3 is showing a higher correlation with reputation and legitimacy at time 3 than 
the original attributed responsibility of time 2.  This suggests judgments about 
responsibility have changed despite no significant shifts in responsibility in the 
earlier analysis.  A higher association between responsibility and reputation and 
legitimacy at time 3 suggests the strategy has started to reshape the level of attributed 
responsibility and this influences the participants’ judgments on reputation and 
legitimacy albeit the effect size may be too small to be picked up in the repeated 
measures analysis.     
Summary of Experiment 1 Results 
Experiment 1 provided initial partial support for the research hypotheses, confirming 
the predicted relationship between response strategy and changes in reputation scores 
in the accident crisis cluster.  The matched strategy of diminishing responsibility 
maintained reputation from the time of the crisis event as predicted.  The 
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mismatched strategy of dealing with responsibility through the compassion strategy 
led to an improvement in reputation scores from the time of the crisis event as 
predicted and the insufficient mismatched strategy of denying responsibility saw a 
non-significant decline in reputation scores. 
The predicted significant relationship between response strategy and changes in 
legitimacy scores was not established, however trend data suggested the 
relationships were in the right direction with the maintenance of legitimacy scores 
for the matched diminish strategy, a slight decline in legitimacy scores for the deny 
strategy and a slight improvement in legitimacy scores for the deal strategy.   
In addition, significant results were not established for the relationship between 
strategy and changes in responsibility, thus the important first step in establishing the 
hypothesised mediation effect was not supported.  Support was provided for the 
impact of changes in responsibility on changes in reputation and legitimacy scores, 
however, the level of change in responsibility being achieved in response to the 
individual scenarios may not be sufficient to show a significant relationship between 
strategy and responsibility.   
Experiment 1 also provided support for the impact of the crisis event on reputation 
and legitimacy with significant main effects established for the crisis cluster of 
accident on these variables.   This is further explored in Experiment 2 which allowed 
for comparison of the impact of different crisis clusters. 
Experiment 2 Results 
While Experiment 1 used the accident crisis cluster for its scenario development, 
Experiment 2 tested the other two crises clusters: victim and preventable, thereby 
ensuring that after the two experiments, all three possible crisis clusters had been 
analysed.  As with Experiment 1, the experiment was multi-purpose, designed to test 
the relevant hypotheses, test the remaining scenarios to be used in future experiments 
and confirm the reliability of scales used to measure the dependent variables and the 
proposed mediator.  The experiment also provided a further test of discriminant 
validity for reputation and legitimacy and tested the reliability of an expanded scale 
for legitimacy recognising the debate in the literature on the appropriateness of 
different scales (see for example, Deephouse & Carter, 2005; Massey, 2001).    
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Experiment 2 employed a 2 (crisis cluster: victim and preventable) x 3 (response 
strategy: deny, diminish, deal) way design.  To operationalise the crisis cluster of 
victim, the subtype of workplace violence was used as the stimulus in the scenarios 
(see Appendix 11).  For the preventable crisis cluster, the crisis subtype of 
organisational misdeeds was used (see Appendix 15).  The three response strategies 
were scapegoating (from the deny category) which had been strengthened from 
Experiment 1, excuse (from the diminish category) and compassion (from the deal 
category).  Six different scenarios were developed (see Appendices 12-14; 16-18).   
The sample for Experiment 2 was 233 students drawn from undergraduate and 
postgraduate classes.  Their ages ranged from 18 – 60 years (M = 23, SD 4.52) and 
included 77% female and 23% male respondents.  Cell size for each of the six 
treatments ranged from 34-42, above the level recommended to meet the reliability 
measures for analysis (Bernard, 1994). 
Manipulation Checks 
A series of ANOVA tests were used to check the success of the independent 
variables’ manipulation.  The first manipulation check was conducted to determine if 
the participants were selecting the theoretically described crisis cluster (victim or 
preventable) present in the different scenarios.   As the manipulation check questions 
had been included at time 2 and time 3, tests for selection of crisis cluster were run at 
both times. 
Each participant was asked whether the scenario they had read fell in the category of 
victim, accident or preventable.  Significant differences were expected on the 
question relating to the victim category as only three of the six possible treatments 
had read this category and a similar result was expected for the question relating to 
the preventable category.  None of the groups read a scenario relating to the accident 
category so no significant difference across the sample was expected.   At time 2 and 
time 3, significant differences were found in the victim and preventable categories 
but not in the accident category as outlined in Table 14 so the manipulations were 
supported. 
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Table 14: Manipulation check on crisis cluster across time 
Time Manipulation 
Check on 
Crisis Cluster 
Victim Crisis 
Cluster 
Scenario 
M(SD) 
Preventable 
Crisis Cluster 
Scenario M(SD) 
F df 
2 Victim 4.77 (.82) ^ 3.30 (1.21) 114.838* 1,231 
 Accident 2.72 (1.16) 2.62 (1.30) .362 1,231 
 Preventable 3.23 (1.05) 5.50 (1.08) ^ 260.670* 1,231 
3 Victim 4.59 (1.16) ^ 3.41 (1.23) 55.572* 1,231 
 Accident 2.81 (1.44) 2.96 (1.28) .766 1,231 
 Preventable 3.10 (1.27) 5.31 (1.11) ^ 203.286* 1,231 
^= correct cluster *p<.05; M>4.0=agree 
The crisis cluster was tested across time 2 and time 3 to determine if the presence of 
strategy response at time 3 was leading to participants reconsidering their cluster 
selection.  Given the importance of cluster selection for the subsequent model, any 
change at this level would be important and would need to be reconsidered in terms 
of its impact on the ability to select a matching strategy.  The results suggested no 
change with similar results found across both time periods. 
A second manipulation check using a one way ANOVA was conducted to determine 
whether the participants were selecting the theoretically described strategy (deny, 
diminish, deal) as each participant only read one of the strategy types.  These 
treatments were held steady from Experiment 1 except for the deny treatment which 
was strengthened based on weak findings.  The deny treatment involved the 
company using the scapegoat strategy of blaming someone else; the diminish 
treatment involved the company offering an excuse; and the deal strategy involved 
the company using the compassion strategy which includes offering some form of 
compensation.  The check was carried out at time 3.  As outlined in Table 15, 
participants selected the correct strategy in each treatment category with a significant 
difference demonstrated among the strategies in each of the groupings. These results 
suggested the rewording of the deny treatment from Experiment 1 was successful 
and provided a good foundation for the scenario wording for the final experiment.   
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Table 15: Manipulation check on strategy 
Treatment 
(Response 
Strategy) 
 
Deny 
M (SD) 
Diminish 
M (SD) 
Deal 
M(SD) 
F df 
Deny 5.77 (1.42)^  4.06 (1.41)  4.12 (1.43) 36.424* 2,230 
Diminish 4.40 (1.32) 6.00 (1.05)^ 4.84 (1.38) 34.647* 2,230 
Deal 2.87 (1.39) 3.65 (1.34) 5.69 (1.28)^ 887.805* 2,230 
^= correct strategy, *p<.05 
 
Reliability Analysis 
As with Experiment 1, internal reliability analyses were conducted on the items used 
to operationalise the two dependent measures of reputation and legitimacy and the 
proposed mediator of responsibility.   
Responsibility was measured at two times and used a three item scale adapted from 
Griffin, Babin and Darden (1991).  The inter-item reliability for responsibility using 
Cronbach alpha was moderate (α = .785-.804) and slightly stronger than in 
Experiment 1 (α = .695-.756).   
Reputation was again measured across three time periods and was assessed using a 
five-item scale developed from McCroskey (1966) and adapted by Coombs & 
Holladay (1992). The inter-item reliability for reputation measured by Cronbach 
alpha is within a reasonable range for the experiment (α = .690-.818) and also 
improved from Experiment 1 (α = .621-.794). 
The legitimacy scales were examined further in this experiment with the use of a 
combination of Massey (2001) and Elsbach (1994) legitimacy scales.  Both these 
scales add components of the legitimacy definition as outlined in Chapter 2. 
Factor analysis was run across each scale individually and the combined scale.  With 
the Massey scale of 6 items, there was one dominant factor accounting for 66% of 
the variance in the scale and the scree test showing an Eigenvalue of 4.007 for that 
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factor.  The exploratory factor analysis in Table 16 showed a high loading of the 
individual items on the factor of between .75 and .87.    
Table 16:  Component matrix of Massey scale (1) 
Component items Component 1a 
Safe .759 
Legitimate .825 
Credible .875 
Good .825 
Continue specific business .767 
Continue operations generally .846 
a. 1 component extracted 
A further factor analysis was run on Massey’s scale to examine a two factor solution 
representing the two main factors explained theoretically in its development:  the 
qualities of the organisation and its permission to continue operations.  The analysis 
in Table 17 showed that while the permission to operate items are loading together 
on the second factor, there is still strong support for the principal factor. 
Table 17:  Component matrix of Massey scale (2) 
Component items Component 1a Component 2a 
Safe .759  
Legitimate .825  
Credible .875  
Good .825  
Continue specific business .767 .568 
Continue operations generally .846 .399 
a. 2 components extracted 
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With the Elsbach scale of 6 items, there was one dominant factor accounting for 56% 
of the variance in the scale and the scree test showing an Eigenvalue of 3.392 for that 
factor.  The exploratory factor analysis in Table 18 showed a high loading of the 
individual items on the factor of between .58 and .81.    
Table 18:  Component matrix of Elsbach scale (1) 
Component Items Component 1a 
External endorsement 1 .753 
Normative activity 1 .785 
Internal endorsement 1 .761 
External endorsement 2 .790 
Normative activity 2 .816 
Internal endorsement 2 .583 
a. 1 component extracted 
 
A further factor analysis was run on Elsbach’s scale to consider the three main 
factors explained theoretically in its development:  internal endorsement of the 
organisation, external endorsement of the organisation and normative activity by the 
organisation to align with standards and regulations. While the analysis presented in 
Table 19 is not as clear as that for Massey, there is strong support for one underlying 
factor. However, the two items on internal endorsement are loading together with 
one of the items having a considerably lower relationship with the other scale items 
in terms of the dominant factor.  While this supports the theoretical difference of the 
component factors of internal and external endorsement, the scenario did not provide 
any information on the perspectives of employees and therefore the participants are 
not in a position to make an informed judgement on these items.  They can 
contribute to external endorsement as they are representative of an organisation’s 
external stakeholders such as potential customers or community members.  
Therefore, these two scale items were deleted from the analysis in the remaining 
experiments.   
  
142 
 
Table 19:  Component matrix of Elsbach scale (2) 
Component items Component 1a Component 2a Component 3a 
External endorsement 1 .753   
Normative activity 1 .785   
Internal endorsement 1 .761  -.477 
External endorsement 2 .790   
Normative activity 2 .816   
Internal endorsement 2  .727 .324 
a. 3 components extracted 
The two scales were then collapsed to confirm the support for reporting the 
combined legitimacy scale as one concept in the analysis. There was one dominant 
factor accounting for 54% of the variance in the scale and the scree test showing an 
Eigenvalue of 6.519 for that factor.  The exploratory factor analysis showed a high 
loading of the individual items on the factor of between .50 and .82.  As outlined in 
Table 20, a second factor analysis with two factors again confirmed the different 
performance of the two internal endorsement items, supporting their removal from 
the final scale. 
Table 20:  Component matrix of Combined scale 
Component items Component 1 Component 2a 
Safe .719  
Legitimate .766  
Credible .824  
Good .792  
Continue specific business .719  
Continue operations generally .827  
External endorsement 1 .765  
Normative activity 1 .726  
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Internal endorsement 1 .642 .566 
External endorsement 2 .744  
Normative activity 2 .758  
Internal endorsement 2  .532 
a. 2 components extracted 
Overall, the combination of the legitimacy scales demonstrated strong content 
validity while allowing for a better sense of the complex measure of legitimacy than 
did individual scales.  The items representing the range of elements on organisational 
qualities, permission to operate, external endorsement and normative activity 
continue to load strongly on one factor supporting the use of a combined legitimacy 
scale in future analysis.  The two items of internal endorsement did not show as clear 
a position on this factor and therefore were eliminated from future consideration.   
As a final check, the reliability of the different legitimacy scales were checked using 
Cronbach α, confirming strong reliability for the revised scale across the time 
periods as outlined in Table 21.   
Table 21: Internal reliability checks on the different legitimacy scales across time 
Scale Time 1  
M (SD) 
Time 1  
α 
Time 2 
M(SD) 
Time 2  
α 
Time 3 
M(SD) 
Time 3  
α 
Massey 4.79 (.99) .898 4.14 
(1.05) 
.891 4.26 (.85) .905 
Elsbach 4.50 (.78) .867 3.62 (.90) .808 3.64 (1.00) .852 
Combined 4.65 (.83) .921 3.88 (.88) .896 3.95 (.81) .915 
Revised 4.72 (.89) .922 4.01 (.94) .904 4.05 (1.10) .920 
 
Reliability measures for all of the dependent variables are strong across the time 
period as outlined in Table 22. 
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Table 22: Internal reliability checks on dependent variables across time 
Time Reputation 
M (SD) 
Reputation 
α 
Legitimacy 
(revised) 
M (SD) 
Legitimacy  
(revised) α 
Responsibility 
M (SD) 
Responsibility 
α 
1 4.73 (.85) .690 4.72 (.89) .922 n/a n/a 
2 4.09 (.89) .726 4.01 (.94) .904 4.08 (1.37) .805 
3 4.22 
(1.02) 
.818 4.05 
(1.10) 
.920 3.91 (1.27) .785 
 
Based on this analysis, the 10 item revised scale for legitimacy was used in all 
subsequent experiments and analysis. 
Testing for Discrete Dependent Variables 
As with Experiment 1, correlation analysis was conducted at each of the relevant 
time periods to test the association between reputation and legitimacy. For this 
experiment, the analysis was also done for each of the different legitimacy scales 
(Massey, Elsbach, Combined, Revised).  Pearson r remained between .431 - .690 
and was significant across the different scales and different time periods, thus 
confirming that reputation and legitimacy are strongly related yet discreet as per the 
theoretical discussion in Chapter 2.   
Table 23: Correlation analysis of reputation and legitimacy across time 
Time Reputation  
M (SD) 
Legitimacy 
(Revised) 
M (SD) 
Pearson r 
Time 1 4.73 (.85) 4.72 (.89) .572** 
Time 2 4.09 (.89) 4.01 (.94) .592** 
Time 3 4.22 (1.02) 4.05 (1.07) .690** 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Hypothesis Testing 
As with Experiment 1, there are two parts of the overall model being tested in 
Experiment 2. 
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The first part tests the propositions around how different responses in the different 
crisis clusters of victim and preventable influence stakeholder perceptions of 
organisational reputation and legitimacy.  
Relevant Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1.1  
A matched crisis response will maintain the level of stakeholder perceptions 
of organisational reputation and legitimacy recorded immediately following 
the crisis event. 
Hypothesis 1.2  
A mismatched crisis response will not maintain the level of stakeholder 
perceptions of organisational reputation and legitimacy recorded 
immediately following the crisis event. 
For the victim crisis cluster, the matched response is from the deny category and for 
the preventable crisis cluster, the matched response is from the deal category.  All 
other combinations are mismatches. 
A series of statistical tests were undertaken to test the hypotheses.   A repeated 
measures MANOVA was undertaken incorporating both dependent variables 
(reputation and legitimacy) across all time periods.  This was followed by a 
MANOVA using change scores for the two  dependent variables.  As outlined 
earlier, the change score was computed and represented the change in dependent 
variable over specific time periods.  Repeated measures ANOVA tests were then run 
separately for each of the two dependent variables and the proposed mediator 
variable of responsibility.  A second series of ANOVA tests was undertaken using a 
change score for each dependent variable and the mediator.    In addition, a 
MANCOVA test was run to assess responsibility as a mediator.  These tests are 
described further in the relevant sections.  Unless indicated elsewhere, significance 
levels were set at p<.05 within the different tests.    Where no change in a particular 
dependent variable was hypothesised, the absolute level of change in the variable has 
been examined and reported as well as the specific levels of significance which are 
expected to be well outside the null hypothesis testing level of p<.05. 
146 
 
To assess whether stakeholder perceptions of organisational reputation and 
legitimacy were being maintained at the level following the crisis event, a repeated 
measures test was run across time periods.  The dependent variables were measured 
at time 1 (only company information), time 2 (crisis event) and time 3 
(organisational response).  The measurement at time 1 gives a baseline measure of 
reputation and legitimacy and should not show any significant differences between 
the subject groups as all participants have received the same information.  Any 
change from the baseline in these variables at time 2 should be related to the crisis 
event so there should be significant difference between the clusters but within a 
cluster, there should not be any significant differences between the subject groups as 
all information is similar across these groups.  The ability of the response strategy to 
maintain the levels of reputation and legitimacy requires measurement of these 
variables at time 2 and time 3.  Significant differences should be seen across the 
participant groups segmented by cluster and strategy at time 3 as different response 
strategies have been read by the groups.   
Two types of analysis are done in Experiment 2: across crisis clusters and within 
each cluster.  The results from this first analysis across the two clusters of victim and 
preventable allow a further comparison with the results from Experiment 1 which 
looked at the accident crisis cluster.  This comparison will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
To test the effect of the interaction of crisis cluster and response strategy on 
reputation and legitimacy prior to the consideration of the proposed mediator 
(responsibility), a repeated measures MANOVA was run incorporating both 
dependent variables.  Using Pillai’s Trace as the multivariate test statistic, time was 
shown to be having a significant effect on reputation and legitimacy (F 
(4,223)=35.053, ηp2=.386, p<.05, observed power 1.000) across the participant 
group.  Crisis cluster had a significant main effect (F (2,225)=3.701, ηp2=.032, 
p<.05, observed power .675 ), however, response strategy did not show a significant 
main effect (F (4,452)=.951, ηp2=.008, n.s., observed power .302).  The two-way 
interaction of crisis cluster and response strategy as hypothesised was not significant 
(F (4,452)=.864, ηp2=.008, n.s., observed power .276), nor was the three-way 
interaction across time (F (8,448)=.630, ηp2=.011, n.s., observed power .294).   
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As with Experiment 1, a further check was undertaken focusing on the period from 
time 2 to time 3.  This check used computed variables for the difference in means for 
reputation and legitimacy from time 2 to time 3.  The results of the one way 
MANOVA for this specific time period showed that strategy was having a 
statistically significant main effect on the changes in reputation and legitimacy 
(F(4,452)=4.462, ηp2=.038, p<.05, observed power .939).  Crisis cluster, however, 
was not having a statistically significant main effect (F(2,225)=.545, ηp2=.005, n.s., 
observed power .140).  Nor was there a significant interaction effect of crisis cluster 
and response strategy on the changes in reputation and legitimacy over this time 
period (F(4,452)=1.169, ηp2=.010, n.s., observed power .368).   
The effects of the independent variables on the two dependent variables were then 
examined separately through post hoc analysis using Tukey’s HSD test.  Each crisis 
cluster is reported separately to demonstrate any key differences. 
Reputation 
The full model analysis suggested a significant difference between the two crisis 
clusters used in Experiment 2 (F(1,226)=7.201, ηp2=.031, p<.05, observed power 
.762 ).  There was also a significant difference among these clusters over time 
(F(1,226)=4.572, ηp2=.02, p<.05, observed power .726).  Looking at the individual 
time periods in Table 24, there was no significant difference at time 1 as expected 
because the crisis cluster was not introduced until time 2. At time 2, the clusters are 
significantly different and they remain significantly different at time 3 when the 
crisis response strategy is being assessed. The individual crisis clusters were then 
examined to identify the influence of particular strategies within each crisis cluster. 
Table 24:  Differences in reputation scores for each crisis cluster over time 
Time Victim M(SD) Preventable M(SD) Mdiff (SE) 
1 4.751 (.081) 4.704 (.077) .047 (.112) 
2 4.251 (.084) 3.941 (.080) .310 (.116)* 
3 4.421 (.095) 4.057 (.091) .364 (.132)* 
*p<.05 
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Victim Crisis Cluster 
Within the victim crisis cluster, the full model analysis showed time was having a 
significant effect on reputation (F(2,225)=13.669, ηp2=.108, p<.05, observed power 
.998).  Looking at the different time periods, reputation declined across the victim 
category from time 1 to time 2 suggesting information on the crisis event negatively 
affected perceptions of reputation (Mtime1 4.75,  SD .80, Mtime2 4.25, SD .83, MDiff -
.500, SE .096, p<.05).  There was no significant difference in reputation scores 
across the three strategy groups at time 1 (F(2,226)=.983, ηp2=.009, n.s., observed 
power .220) or time 2 (F(2,226)=1.866, ηp2=.016, n.s., observed power .386) as 
predicted.  However, there was also no significant difference present at time 3 across 
the victim crisis cluster (F(2,226)=2.40, ηp2=.021, n.s., observed power .482) which 
does not support a main effect for strategy on reputation.  While not showing 
significant differences at time 3, the deal strategy resulted in the highest score for 
reputation (M=4.68, SD 1.07), followed by the diminish strategy (M=4.41, SD .83) 
with the deny strategy providing the lowest score for reputation (M=4.16, SD.87).  
This suggests the most accommodative strategy of dealing with responsibility could 
provide the best reputation score, however, it doesn’t take into account the 
movement in reputation from the point of crisis at time 2.  The strategy most 
recommended for this category (deny) provided the lowest score which suggests the 
denial was not believed, making it inappropriate for this type of crisis cluster.  While 
not significant, the largest difference between the strategies was deny to deal 
(Mdeny=4.16, SD.879, Mdeal=4.68, SD1.07, MDiff=-.520, SE.237, n.s.) which 
represent the ends of the response continuum (deny, diminish, deal). 
While the different strategies were not showing a significant effect overall at a point 
in time, the individual strategies were examined to see if the movement in 
reputational means across the different strategy types from time 2 to time 3 showed 
the ability of each strategy to maintain reputation or not.  The omnibus ANOVA test 
using the difference in reputational means from time 2 to time 3 showed that strategy 
was having a significant main effect on the shift in reputation in the victim cluster 
(F(2,226)=3.773, ηp2=.032, p<.05, observed power .684).  Having established this 
significance, each strategy can be examined to establish whether its effect was as 
predicted.   
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Post hoc analysis from the repeated measures ANOVA using Tukey’s HSD test 
allowed the assessment of each strategy as presented in Figure 16.  The match 
strategy of denying responsibility for the crisis cluster of victim was predicted to 
maintain reputation.  This was supported with a miniscule movement in mean of .01 
from time 2 to time 3 and a significance test showing p=1.000 which was well 
outside the p<.05 used for the hypothesis testing (Mtime2=4.15, SD .72; Mtime3=4.16, 
SD.87, Mdiff = 0.01, SE.17, n.s.) The other two strategies are hypothesised to not 
maintain reputation, that is, reputation scores should increase from time 2 to time 3 
representing an improvement in stakeholder perceptions of reputation or decrease 
from time 2 to time 3 representing a degradation in such perceptions.   
The mismatched strategy of diminishing responsibility for a victim crisis cluster is 
seen as a step up response under the SCCT model and therefore should have a 
positive impact on reputation scores from time 2 to time 3.  The results show no 
movement in reputational mean (M time 2 =4.47, SD.81, M time 3 = 4.41, SD.83, Mdiff=-
.058, SE.166, n.s.) so the company providing an explanation that they didn’t intend 
the incident to happen did not provide additional benefits in terms of an 
improvement in reputation scores.  The final strategy, dealing with responsibility, 
another mismatched response, did see a statistically significant movement in 
reputation scores in support of the initial hypothesis of match vs mismatched 
responses.  (M time 2 =4.12, SD.92, M time 3 = 4.68, SD1.07, Mdiff=.559, SE.177, 
p<.05). The participants rewarded the company for providing benefits to victims.  
While this may have had reputational benefits, it may bring other costs to the 
company and would need to be considered against the other two strategies which at 
least held reputation with no further damage suffered.  The participants rewarded the 
company for doing well more than was needed so there was an improvement in 
judgments on reputation, however, the strategy saw the company offering 
compensation to people involved in a crisis event where the company itself was a 
victim. 
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Figure 16:  Impact of different strategies on reputation over time in a victim crisis 
cluster 
 
Preventable Crisis Cluster 
Within the preventable crisis cluster, the full model analysis showed time had a 
significant effect on reputation (F(2,225)=37.582, ηp2=.250, p<.05, observed power 
1.000).  Looking at the different time periods (see Figure 17), reputation declined 
across the preventable category from time 1 to time 2 suggesting information on the 
crisis event negatively affected perceptions of reputation (Mtime1 4.70,  SD .07, Mtime2 
3.94, SD .08, MDiff -.763, SE .091, p<.05).  There was no significant difference in 
reputation scores across the three strategy groups at time 1 (F(2,226)=.458, 
ηp2=.004, n.s., observed power .124) or time 2 (F(2,226)=.497, ηp2=.004, n.s., 
observed power .131) as predicted.  However, there was also no significant 
difference present at time 3 across the preventable crisis cluster (F(2,226)=2.215, 
ηp2=.019, n.s., observed power .449) which does not support a main effect for 
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strategy on reputation.  At time 3 on non-significant trend data, the deal strategy 
resulted in the highest score for reputation (M=4.24, SD1.06), followed by the 
diminish strategy (M=4.13, SD1.01) and the deny strategy providing the lowest score 
for reputation (M=3.79, SD1.09).  While not significant, the largest difference 
between the strategies was deal to deny (Mdeal=4.24, SD1.06, Mdeny=3.79, SD1.09, 
MDiff=-.447, SE.224, n.s.), again representing the two ends of the response 
continuum.  As with the victim crisis cluster, this suggests the most accommodative 
strategy of dealing with responsibility could provide the best reputation outcome in 
terms of stakeholder perceptions, however, it doesn’t take into account the 
movement in reputation scores from the point of crisis at time 2.   
While the different strategies were not showing a significant effect overall at a point 
in time, individual strategies were examined to see if the movement in reputational 
means across the different strategy types from time 2 to time 3 showed the ability of 
each strategy to maintain reputation.  The omnibus ANOVA test using the difference 
in reputational means from time 2 to time 3 showed that strategy was having a 
significant main effect on the shift in reputation in the preventable cluster 
(F(2,226)=4.128, ηp2=.035, p<.05, observed power .726).  Having established this 
significance, post hoc analysis from the repeated measures ANOVA using Tukey’s 
HSD test allowed the assessment of each strategy.  The match strategy of dealing 
with responsibility for the crisis cluster of preventable was predicted to maintain 
reputation which was supported with a non-significant result for a shift in mean from 
time 2 to time 3(Mtime2=3.87, SD 1.13; Mtime3=4.24, SD=1.06, Mdiff = .363, SE=.168, 
n.s.)  The change in mean score was slightly larger than expected at .363 and the 
significance test showed p=.09 which was not as strongly non-significant as some of 
the other results to date.  The slightly higher mean was recorded at time 3 so no 
negative effect was attributed to the organisation by running this strategy.  The other 
two strategies are hypothesised to not maintain reputation, that is, reputation scores 
should increase or decrease from time 2 to time 3.   
The mismatched strategy of diminishing responsibility for a preventable crisis cluster 
is a step down response from the recommended matched response under the SCCT 
model and therefore should see a degradation in reputation scores over the time 
period.  The results show no significant movement in reputational mean (M time 2 
=3.89, SD=.817, M time 3 = 4.13, SD=1.01, Mdiff=.243, SE=.160, n.s.) so the 
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hypothesis was not supported.  This raises an interesting outcome as the company 
appears to have ended up at the same position in terms of reputation scores with an 
excuse strategy which diminished responsibility to that of when it provided 
compensation with the higher strategy. Denying responsibility, another mismatched 
response, saw a slight decrease in reputation scores, however, the shift was not 
statistically significant (M time 2 =4.05, SD=.837, M time 3 = 3.79, SD=1.09, Mdiff=-
.257, SE=.160, n.s.).  So while the trend was correct, the effect was not sufficient and 
thereby the initial hypothesis of match vs mismatched responses was not supported.  
This may suggest that some of the participants in this category believed the denial 
and therefore did not punish the company any further. 
 
Figure 17:  Impact of different strategies on reputation over time in a preventable 
crisis cluster 
Regardless of cluster type, the most accommodative strategy response – deal - 
resulted in the highest reputational score compared with the other strategies.  For the 
preventable category, this was the match strategy and therefore was expected to 
maintain reputation and for the victim category, this was two steps up the response 
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chain and therefore brought benefits for the organisation in reputation terms, 
however, other liability issues may arise from this strategy.  Given that the next 
category down, diminish, maintained reputation scores in both crisis clusters without 
taking on the additional burden of responsibility associated with the higher deal 
level, the benefits of the higher strategy may not outweigh the risks.    
The matched response in both categories performed as hypothesised and maintained 
reputation.  For the victim category, the two step up strategy of dealing with 
responsibility through compassion gave the highest reputation score and in the 
preventable category, the two step down strategy of denying responsibility gave the 
worst outcome in absolute measures of reputation.  In the first instance, this benefit 
came from doing more than was expected and in the latter, the penalty to reputation 
came from doing less than was expected.  Across both types, the comparison of 
reputation means for strategies of deny with deal represented the largest differentials 
across the various combinations (deny:diminish; deny;deal; diminish:deal). 
As a final test on the influence of strategy on reputation, Experiment 2 included a 
direct question to participants on this influence.  The participants agreed that the 
company response did influence their perception of reputation (M=5.09, SD1.4 
where 4.0=agree), thereby the effect size within the model may be limiting the 
ability to see significance among strategy options. 
Legitimacy 
As with reputation, the full model analysis of legitimacy suggested a significant 
difference between the two crisis clusters used in Experiment 2 (F(1,227)=5.179, 
ηp2=.022, p<.05, observed power .646).  There was also a significant difference 
among these clusters over time (F(2,226)=3.174, ηp2=.027, p<.05, observed power 
.726).  Looking at the individual time periods, there was no significant difference at 
time 1 as expected because the crisis cluster was not introduced until time 2. At time 
2, the clusters are significantly different and they remain significantly different at 
time 3 when the crisis response strategy is being assessed (see Table 25).  The 
individual crisis clusters were then examined to identify the influence of particular 
strategies within each cluster.    
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Table 25: Differences in legitimacy scores for each crisis cluster over time 
Time Victim M(SD) Preventable M(SD) Mdiff (SE) 
1 4.74 (.08) 4.71(.08) .032 (.118) 
2 4.20 (.08) 3.84 (.08) .361 (.120)* 
3 4.19 (.09) 3.90 (.09) .292 (.132)* 
* p<.05 
Victim Crisis Cluster 
Within the victim crisis cluster, the full model analysis showed time was having a 
significant effect on legitimacy (F(2,226)=17.850, ηp2=.136, p<.05, observed power 
1.000).  Looking at the different time periods, legitimacy declined across the victim 
category from time 1 to time 2 suggesting information on the crisis event negatively 
affected perceptions of legitimacy (Mtime1 4.74,  SD .08, Mtime2 4.20, SD .08, MDiff -
.542, SE .094, p<.05).  There was no significant difference in legitimacy scores 
across the three strategy groups at time 1 (F(2,227)=2.272, ηp2=.020, n.s., observed 
power .459) or time 2 (F(2,227)=1.969, ηp2=.017, n.s., observed power .405) as 
predicted.  However, there was also no significant difference present at time 3 across 
the victim crisis cluster (F(2,227)=1.739, ηp2=.015, n.s., observed power .363) 
which does not support a main effect for strategy on legitimacy.  At time 3 on the 
non-significant trend data, the diminish strategy resulted in the highest score for 
legitimacy (M=4.43, SD .90), followed by the deal strategy (M=4.15, SD 1.05) and 
the deny strategy providing the lowest score for legitimacy (M=4.01, SD1.16).  
While no significant differences were found, the trend data suggests that the first step 
up strategy of diminish provided the best outcome rather than doing the two step up 
strategy of dealing with the crisis through compensation.  Siomkos and Kurzband 
(1994) have suggested that doing more than is needed such as moving two steps up 
the response chain may be seen by participants as the company hiding something so 
a negative effect is attached.  However, this analysis doesn’t take into account the 
movement in legitimacy from the point of crisis at time 2.  It also suggests the 
strategy most recommended for this category (deny) was not judged to be 
appropriate as it provided the lowest score.  While not significant, the largest 
difference between the strategies was deny to diminish (Mdeny=4.01, SD1.16, 
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Mdiminish=4.43, SD.90, MDiff=-.419, SE.230, n.s.), rather than deny to deal which 
represent the ends of the response spectrum. 
While the different strategies were not showing a significant effect overall at a point 
in time, the individual strategies were examined to see if the movement in legitimacy 
means across the different strategy types from time 2 to time 3 showed the ability of 
each strategy to maintain legitimacy or not.  The omnibus ANOVA test using the 
difference in legitimacy means from time 2 to time 3 showed that strategy was not 
having a significant main effect on the shift in legitimacy scores in the victim cluster 
(F(2,226)=.989, ηp2=.009, n.s., observed power .221).  As this was the first time 
these relationships had been assessed in the victim category, each strategy was still 
examined.    
Post hoc analysis from the repeated measures ANOVA using Tukey’s HSD test 
allowed the assessment of each strategy.  As demonstrated in Figure 18, the match 
strategy of denying responsibility for the crisis cluster of victim was predicted to 
maintain legitimacy which was supported with a very small decline in the absolute 
legitimacy scores from time 2 to time 3 at a significance level of p=.657(Mtime2=4.14, 
SD .97; Mtime3=4.01, SD.87, Mdiff = -0.13, SE.12, n.s.) The other two strategies are 
hypothesised to not maintain legitimacy, that is, legitimacy scores should increase or 
decrease from time 2 to time 3.   
The mismatched strategy of diminishing responsibility for a victim crisis cluster is 
seen as a step up response under the SCCT model and, therefore, should have a 
positive impact on legitimacy scores.  The results show no movement in legitimacy 
mean (Mtime 2 =4.43, SD.80, Mtime 3 = 4.43, SD.90, Mdiff=.00, SE.123, n.s.).which 
suggests there was no benefit of undertaking the step up albeit mismatched strategy.  
The final strategy, dealing with responsibility, another mismatched response, also 
did not see a statistically significant movement in legitimacy so did not support the 
initial hypothesis of match vs mismatched responses (Mtime 2 =4.02, SD.82, Mtime 3 = 
4.15, SD1.05, Mdiff=.126, SE.133, n.s.).  The organisation was not penalised for 
undertaking more than was required, however, there were no significant benefits in 
doing this either. 
156 
 
 
Figure 18:  Impact of different strategies on legitimacy over time in a victim crisis 
cluster 
Preventable Crisis Cluster 
Within the preventable crisis cluster, the full model analysis showed time was having 
a significant effect on legitimacy (F(2,226)=48.384, ηp2=.300, p<.05, observed 
power 1.000).  Looking at the different time periods, legitimacy scores declined 
across the preventable category from time 1 to time 2 suggesting information on the 
crisis event negatively affected perceptions of legitimacy (Mtime1 4.71,  SD .08, Mtime2 
3.84, SD .08, MDiff -.871, SE .090, p<.05).  There was no significant difference in 
legitimacy scores across the three strategy groups at time 1 (F(2,227)=.036, 
ηp2=.000, n.s., observed power .055) or time 2 (F(2,227)=2.585, ηp2=.022, n.s., 
observed power .512) as predicted.  However, there was also no significant 
difference present at time 3 across the preventable crisis cluster (F(2,227)=.251, 
ηp2=.002, n.s., observed power .089) which does not support a main effect for 
strategy on legitimacy.  At time 3, the diminish strategy resulted in the highest score 
for legitimacy (M=3.99, SD.93), followed by the deal strategy (M=3.88, SD.95) and 
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the deny strategy providing the lowest score for legitimacy (M=3.84, SD1.03).  
While not significant, the largest difference between the strategies was deny to 
diminish (Mdeny=3.84, SD1.03, Mdiminish3.99, SD.93, MDiff=-.152, SE.220, n.s.).  
This was similar to the victim crisis cluster.  In both categories, the deny strategy 
resulted in the lowest score for legitimacy. 
While the different strategies did not show a significant effect overall at a point in 
time, individual strategies were examined to see if the movement in legitimacy 
means across the different strategy types from time 2 to time 3 showed the ability of 
each strategy to maintain legitimacy or not.  The omnibus ANOVA test using the 
difference in legitimacy means from time 2 to time 3 showed that strategy was 
having a significant main effect on the shift in legitimacy in the preventable cluster 
(F(2,226)=5.902, ηp2=.049, p<.05, observed power .873).   
Post hoc analysis from the repeated measures ANOVA using Tukey’s HSD test 
allowed the assessment of each strategy.  These results are demonstrated in Figure 
19.  The match strategy of dealing with responsibility for the crisis cluster of 
preventable was predicted to maintain legitimacy which was supported with a very 
small increase of 0.179 in the absolute measures of legitimacy from time 2 to time 3 
at a significance level of p=.399.(Mtime2=3.70, SD 1.02; Mtime3=3.88, SD=.95, Mdiff = 
.179, SE=.126, n.s.). The other two strategies are hypothesised to not maintain 
legitimacy, that is, legitimacy scores should increase or decrease.   
The mismatched strategy of diminishing responsibility for a preventable crisis cluster 
is seen as a less than required response under the SCCT model and, therefore, should 
result in a degradation in perceptions of legitimacy.  The results show no statistically 
significant movement in legitimacy (Mtime 2 =3.70, SD=.870, Mtime 3 = 3.99, SD=.93, 
Mdiff=.286, SE=.120, n.s.). Denying responsibility, another mismatched response, 
saw a slight decrease in legitimacy scores, however, the shift was not statistically 
significant (Mtime 2 =4.10, SD=.97, Mtime 3 = 3.84, SD=1.03, Mdiff=-.264, SE=.120, 
n.s.).  So while the trend was correct, the effect was not sufficient and thereby the 
initial hypothesis of match vs mismatched responses was not supported. 
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Figure 19:  Impact of different strategies on legitimacy over time in a preventable 
crisis cluster 
Regardless of cluster type and unlike the outcome for reputation, the diminish 
strategy response resulted in the highest legitimacy score at time 3 compared with 
the other strategies although this result needs to be assessed cautiously given the lack 
of significance among the strategy scores.  For the preventable category, this strategy 
was one step down from the match strategy of deal and for the victim category, this 
was one step up the response chain from the match strategy of deny so was expected 
to bring some benefits to the organisation.  Of interest is the lack of additional 
benefits brought by the highest response category of dealing with responsibility, 
although this can only be assessed on trend as the results between the strategies was 
not significant.  This will be tested further in the final experiment.  Further 
clarification will also be sought in Experiment 3 which will test the various sub 
strategies contained within the overall deal strategy category.  This experiment only 
tested compassion which may not be seen as fully dealing with responsibility and, 
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therefore, may not be providing a statistically significant difference to the diminish 
strategies. 
The matched response in both categories performed as hypothesised and maintained 
legitimacy scores across time 2 and time 3.  For the victim category, the two step up 
strategy of dealing with responsibility through compassion did not hurt the 
organisation in that legitimacy scores were not reduced, however, it gave no greater 
benefit than that of the next closest strategy of diminish.  In the preventable category, 
the two step down strategy of denying responsibility gave the worst outcome in 
absolute measures of legitimacy, suggesting some level of penalty to legitimacy for 
doing less than was expected.  Across both types, the comparison of means on 
strategies of deny with diminish represented the largest differentials across the 
various combinations (deny:diminish; deny;deal; diminish:deal) which was different 
than those associated with reputation. 
As a final test on the influence of strategy on legitimacy, Experiment 2 included a 
direct question to participants on this influence.  The participants agreed that the 
company response did influence their perception of legitimacy (M=4.81, SD1.39 
where 4.0=agree), thereby the effect size within the model may be limiting the 
ability to see significance among strategy types.  The influence on reputation was 
judged as slightly higher by the participants (M=5.09, SD1.40 where 4.0=agree). 
Responsibility 
The second part of the overall model being tested in Experiment 2 involves the 
potential mediator of responsibility. 
This part tests propositions around how different responses in the victim and 
preventable crisis clusters influence stakeholder perceptions of organisational 
reputation and legitimacy through responsibility.  Thus if the response strategy 
changes the level of responsibility that was assigned to the organisation at the time of 
the crisis, there should be a subsequent change to its reputation and legitimacy 
scores.   
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Relevant Hypotheses 
Research Question 2  
How does responsibility mediate the influence of response strategies used 
during crises from different clusters on stakeholder perceptions of 
organisational reputation and legitimacy?  
Hypothesis 2.1  
A matched crisis response will maintain the level of stakeholder perceptions 
of organisational responsibility and will subsequently maintain the level of 
stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy recorded immediately 
following the crisis event. 
Hypothesis 2.2  
A mismatched crisis response will not maintain the level of stakeholder 
perceptions of organisational responsibility and will subsequently not 
maintain the level of stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy 
recorded immediately following the crisis event. 
A number of tests were run to consider the role of responsibility.  To assess whether 
stakeholder perceptions of crisis responsibility were being maintained or changed by 
the strategy within each crisis cluster, a repeated measures ANOVA was run across 
time periods.   Responsibility was measured at time 2 (crisis event) and time 3 
(organisational response).  The measurement at time 2 gives a baseline measure of 
attributed responsibility based on the crisis event and should show significant 
differences between subject groups based on the crisis cluster (victim vs 
preventable).  The ability of the response strategy to maintain responsibility requires 
measurement of this variable at time 2 and time 3.  Significant differences should be 
seen across the participant groups at time 3 based on the different crisis cluster and 
then within each cluster, the difference should be based on the different response 
strategies read by the groups.   
For the first test, the full model analysis using Pillai’s Trace suggested a significant 
difference between the two crisis clusters used in Experiment 2 (F(1,226)=29.728, 
ηp2=.116, p<.05, observed power 1.000).  At time 2, the clusters are significantly 
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different as predicted and they remain significantly different at time 3 when the crisis 
response strategy is being assessed (see Table 26).   
Table 26:  Differences in responsibility scores for each crisis cluster over time 
Time Victim M(SD) Preventable M(SD) Mdiff (SE) 
2 3.58 (1.19) 4.53 (1.36) .953 (.171)* 
3 3.56 (1.17) 4.23 (1.28) .670 (.163)* 
* p<.05 
The impact of the crisis cluster on responsibility is stronger at time 2 when the event 
occurs (F(1,227)=31.280, ηp2=.121, p<.05, observed power 1.000) than at time 3 
when the strategy is introduced (F(1,226)=16.864, ηp2=.069, p<.05, observed power 
.983).   
 Looking then just at time 3 when the strategy is in place, strategy is not having a 
significant effect on responsibility (F(2,226)=.674, ηp2=.006, n.s., observed power 
.163), nor is the interaction of strategy and cluster (F(2,226)=.111, ηp2=.001, n.s., 
observed power .067).  Cluster is the only significant independent variable at this 
time (F(1,226)=16.864, ηp2=.069, p<.05, observed power .983).   
Assessing whether the introduction of the strategy has influenced any change in 
responsibility is also important given the influence of responsibility on reputation 
and legitimacy.  To test this, the effect of strategy on the mean difference in 
responsibility from time 2 to time 3 was assessed.  A one way ANOVA showed no 
significant main effect for strategy on the change in responsibility (F(2,226)=.357, 
ηp2=.003, n.s., observed power .107), nor cluster (F(1,226)=3.429, ηp2=.015, n.s., 
observed power .454), nor an interaction of strategy and cluster (F(2,226)=.014, 
ηp2=.000, n.s., observed power .052).   
Based on this initial analysis showing an effect for cluster on responsibility but not 
for strategy, a MANCOVA test for the mediation effect of responsibility on the 
direct relationship between the independent variables of cluster and strategy on 
reputation and legitimacy were undertaken.  This test used the measured variables 
for responsibility, reputation and legitimacy at time 3 and is reported in Table 27.  
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As outlined in this table, the introduction of responsibility at time 3 as a covariate 
changes the significant relationship between cluster and reputation and legitimacy to 
a non-significant relationship, reducing the effect size to close to nil.  Thus, this test 
is suggesting full mediation for cluster through responsibility which is expected 
given the importance of judgments on responsibility to the theoretical design of the 
crisis clusters.   This result is consistent in the univariate analysis with each of the 
separate dependent variables of reputation and legitimacy.   
There are no substantial changes for the independent variable of strategy or the two-
way interaction of cluster and strategy which supports the initial analysis which did 
not find a significant effect for the independent variable of strategy on responsibility 
as a dependent variable. Once again, the univariate analysis showed a consistent 
result on reputation and legitimacy. 
Table 27:   Results of MANOVA/MANCOVA using responsibility at time 3 as 
covariate 
Variable df F Effect ηp2 Observed Power 
Cluster  1,226 7.676* .033 .788 
Cluster (with responsibility 
as co-variate) 
1,225 .272 .001 .081 
Responsibility (Time 3) 1,225 105.995* .320 1.000 
Strategy 2,226 4.516* .038 .766 
Strategy (with responsibility 
as co-variate) 
2,225 5.087* .043 .817 
Cluster * strategy 2,226 .144 .001 .067 
Cluster *strategy (with 
responsibility as co-variate) 
2,225 .296 .003 .097 
*p<.05; Dependent variables: reputation and legitimacy at time 3 
As this was the first test of cluster and strategy together in this series of experiments, 
post hoc analysis was used to examine the potential influence of individual strategies 
on the movement in responsibility from time 2 to time 3 within each individual crisis 
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cluster.  Significant results were not expected given the interaction effect had not 
been found, however, trend data was examined to inform the remaining experiments.    
Victim Crisis Cluster 
Within the victim crisis cluster, there was no significant difference in responsibility 
scores across the three strategy groups at time 2 (F(2,226)=.026, ηp2=.000, n.s., 
observed power .054) as predicted as there is no information on the response at this 
time period.  However, there was also no significant difference in responsibility 
scores at time 3 (F(2,226)=.231, ηp2=.002,  n.s., observed power .086) which does 
not support a main effect for strategy on responsibility in this cluster.   
At time 3, the matched deny strategy resulted in the highest score for responsibility 
(M=3.63, SD1.30) although this was still under the agree point on the Likert score 
(M=4.0).  This means that the strategy did work in denying responsibility as the 
participants disagreed with the company being responsible.  The first step up strategy 
of diminish responsibility had the lowest score for responsibility (M=3.45, SD.90) 
and therefore was well received by the participants in terms of not assigning 
responsibility to the organisation.  The two step up strategy of dealing with 
responsibility saw a higher mean (M=3.60, SD 1.30) which suggests that by 
providing compensation for victims, the company was judged to be more responsible 
than when it used the strategy of diminish, however, the responsibility mean also 
remained under the point of agreement on the scale so the company was still being 
judged overall as not responsible.  This is likely due to the underlying effect of the 
cluster (victim) which resulted in lower responsibility scores overall than the other 
cluster (preventable) (see Table 26). 
 While not significant, the largest difference between the strategies on responsibility 
scores at time 3 was deny to diminish (Mdeny=3.63, SD1.30 Mdiminish=3.45, SD.90, 
MDiff=.178, SE.284, n.s.). 
While the different strategies were not showing a significant effect overall at time 3, 
the individual strategies were examined to see if the movement in responsibility 
means across the different strategy types from time 2 to time 3 showed the ability of 
each strategy to maintain responsibility or not.  The one way ANOVA using the 
mean difference in responsibility as the dependent variable showed no significant 
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influence of strategy in the victim category (F(2,226)=.114, ηp2=.001, n.s., observed 
power .067).    
As a final check, each strategy was assessed.  The matched strategy of denying 
responsibility was hypothesised to maintain responsibility which was supported with 
next to no movement in the absolute measures of the mean for responsibility from 
time 2 to time 3 at a significance level of p=.888  (M time 2 =3.60, SD=1.37, M time 3 = 
3.63, SD=1.30, Mdiff=.027, SE=.191, n.s.) as shown in Figure 20.  The mismatched 
strategies were hypothesised to not maintain responsibility.  The mismatched 
diminish strategy saw no significant difference (M time 2 =3.54, SD=.96, M time 3 = 
3.45, SD=.90, Mdiff=-.094, SE=.186, n.s.), thereby not supporting the hypothesis.  
The mismatched deal strategy also saw no movement in responsibility thereby not 
supporting the hypothesis (M time 2 =3.60, SD=1.26, M time 3 = 3.60, SD=1.30, 
Mdiff=.00, SE=.199, n.s.).   
 
Figure 20:  Impact of different strategies on responsibility over time in a victim 
crisis cluster 
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The final analysis within the victim cluster brought together the impact of cluster and 
strategy on responsibility and the subsequent impact on reputation and legitimacy 
building on the earlier tests for mediation.   
The matched response of deny is hypothesised to maintain stakeholder perceptions 
of crisis responsibility and maintain organisational reputation and legitimacy.  As 
outlined above the deny strategy within the victim cluster led to no shift in the 
attribution of responsibility from time 2 to time 3.  Reputation was maintained as 
was legitimacy from time 2 to time 3.  Thus the hypothesis for the match response 
was supported.   
The second hypothesis dealt with the mismatched crisis responses which were 
predicted to not maintain perceptions of responsibility, reputation and legitimacy.  
As there were no significant movements in responsibility across the mismatched 
strategies and almost no significant movements in reputation and legitimacy as 
shown in Table 28, there was no support for this hypothesis. 
Table 28:  Responsibility, reputation and legitimacy scores by response strategy in 
the victim cluster across time 2 and 3 
Response 
Strategy 
Variable Time 2 
M(SD) 
Time 3 
M(SD) 
Mdiff (SE) 
Deny Responsibility 3.60 (1.37) 3.63 (1.30) .027 (.191) 
 Reputation 4.15 (.72) 4.16 (.87) .011 (.17) 
 Legitimacy 4.14  (.97) 4.01  (.87)        -.013 (.12) 
Diminish Responsibility 3.54 (.96) 3.45 (.90) -.094 (.186) 
 Reputation 4.47 (.81) 4.41 (.83) -.058 (.166) 
 Legitimacy 4.43  (.80) 4.43  (.90)        .00 (.123) 
Deal Responsibility 3.60 (1.26) 3.60 (1.30) .00 (.199) 
 Reputation 4.12 (.92) 4.68 (1.07) .559 (.177)* 
 Legitimacy 4.02  (.82) 4.15  (1.05)      .126 (.133) 
*p<.05 
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Preventable Crisis Cluster 
Within the preventable crisis cluster, there was no significant difference in 
responsibility scores across the three strategy groups at time 2 (F(2,226)=.130, 
ηp2=.001, n.s., observed power .070) as predicted as there is no information on the 
response at this time period.  However, there was also no significant difference in 
responsibility scores at time 3 (F(2,226)=.575, ηp2=.005,  n.s., observed power .145) 
which does not support a main effect for strategy on responsibility within the 
preventable category.   
At time 3 on trend data, the mismatched deny strategy resulted in the highest 
measure for responsibility (M=4.39, SD1.30) which suggests that the deny strategy 
was not believed in this cluster of crisis event and the company was held responsible 
where the event was judged as preventable.  The matched deal strategy had the next 
highest level of responsibility (M=4.18, SD1.08) and as this was higher than the base 
level of agree (M=4.0) suggests the participants recognised through the strategy the 
company was responsible.  The final strategy of diminish was also higher than the 
base agreement level (M=4.11, SD1.42).   
While not significant, the largest difference between the strategies was deny to 
diminish (Mdeny=4.39, SD1.30 Mdiminish=4.11, SD1.42, MDiff=.278, SE.270, n.s.) 
The different strategies were not showing a significant effect overall at time 3, 
however, individual strategies were examined to see if the movement in 
responsibility means across the different strategy types from time 2 to time 3 showed 
the ability of each strategy to maintain responsibility or not.  As a first check, a one 
way ANOVA using the mean difference in responsibility from time 2 to time 3 as 
the dependent variable was run.  This showed no significant influence of strategy on 
the change in responsibility in the preventable category ((F(2,226)=.265, ηp2=.002,  
n.s., observed power .092).   As a final check, each strategy was assessed, looking at 
the changes in responsibility from time 2 to time 3.  The matched strategy of dealing 
with responsibility was hypothesised to maintain responsibility.  While there was a 
slight decline of  0.289 in responsibility scores as shown in Figure 21, the 
significance level for the change was p=.126 which was well outside the boundaries 
set for the hypothesis testing  (M time 2 =4.47, SD=1.21, M time 3 = 4.18, SD=1.08, 
Mdiff=-.289, SE=.188, n.s.).  Tthereby the hypothesis for no change was generally 
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supported.  The mismatched strategy of diminish was hypothesised to not maintain 
responsibility which was also supported with a significant difference (M time 2 =4.52, 
SD=1.48, M time 3 = 4.11, SD=1.42, Mdiff=-.405, SE=.179, p<.05.).  The participants 
believed the excuse provided by the company and therefore reduced their views on 
responsibility even though this is theoretically predicted to be an insufficient 
response for this crisis cluster.  The mismatched deny strategy also saw a slight 
decline, however, no statistically significant movement was identified (M time 2 =4.60, 
SD=1.40, M time 3 = 4.39, SD=1.30, Mdiff=-.222, SE=.179, n.s.).   
 
Figure 21:  Impact of different strategies on responsibility over time in a preventable 
crisis cluster 
As with the victim cluster, the final analysis brought together the impact of cluster 
and strategy on responsibility and the subsequent impact on reputation and 
legitimacy building on the earlier tests for mediation (see Table 29).   
The matched response of deal is hypothesised to maintain stakeholder perceptions of 
crisis responsibility and maintain organisational reputation and legitimacy.  As 
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outlined above the deal strategy within the preventable cluster led to no shift in the 
attribution of responsibility from time 2 to time 3 and reputation and legitimacy were 
maintained from time 2 to time 3 as hypothesised.   
The diminish strategy within the preventable cluster led to a significant decrease in 
responsibility scores yet saw no shift in reputation or legitimacy.  Therefore, the 
hypothesis was not supported.   It may be that while the strategy worked to diminish 
responsibility, the effect size was too small to see a subsequent effect on reputation 
and legitimacy.  This will be tested again in the final experiment. 
The other mismatched strategy of deny saw a non-significant decline in 
responsibility and a subsequent non-significant decline in reputation and legitimacy 
which does not support the hypothesis on mediation. 
Table 29:  Responsibility, reputation and legitimacy scores by response strategy in 
the preventable cluster across time 2 and 3. 
Response 
Strategy  
Variable Time 2 
M(SD) 
Time 3 
M(SD) 
Mdiff (SE) 
Deal Responsibility 4.47 (1.21) 4.18 (1.08) -.289 (.188) 
 Reputation 3.87 (1.13) 4.24 (1.06) .363 (.168) 
 Legitimacy 3.70 (1.02) 3.88 (.95) .179 (.126) 
Diminish Responsibility 4.52 (1.48) 4.11 (1.42) -.405 (.179)* 
 Reputation 3.89 (.817) 4.13 (1.01) .243 (.160) 
 Legitimacy 3.70 (.870) 3.99 (.93) .286 (.120) 
Deny Responsibility 4.60 (1.40) 4.39 (1.30) -.222 (.179) 
 Reputation 4.05 (.837) 3.79 (1.09) -.257 (.160) 
 Legitimacy 4.10 (.97) 3.84 (1.03) -.264 (.120) 
*p<.05 
Combined Clusters 
As the effects of strategy on responsibility were not significant within each of the 
clusters and therefore the mediator effect of responsibility difficult to establish, two 
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further analyses of the relationship between responsibility, reputation and legitimacy 
were undertaken.   
Correlation analysis using means at time 2 and time 3 (see Table 30) and using the 
computed change in time variables (see Table 31) was undertaken.  This analysis 
confirms the significant relationships between responsibility, reputation and 
legitimacy at all time periods.  The predicted direction of the relationships is also 
confirmed with a decline in responsibility scores leading to an increase in reputation 
and legitimacy scores. 
Table 30: Correlation analysis of responsibility, reputation and legitimacy at time 2 
and 3 
 Reputation 
Time 2  
Pearson r 
Legitimacy 
Time 2  
Pearson r 
Reputation 
Time 3  
Pearson r 
Legitimacy 
Time 3  
Pearson r 
Responsibility 
Time 2 
-.347** -.459**   
Responsibility 
Time 3 
  -.581** -.544** 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Table 31: Correlation analysis using change variables across time 2-3 for 
responsibility, reputation and legitimacy  
Time 2-3 Change in Reputation  
Pearson  r 
Change in Legitimacy  
Pearson r 
Change in Responsibility -.301** -.366** 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
The final test involved responsibility at time 2 and time 3 being converted to a 
categorical variable with low, medium and high responsibility categories and this 
variable being used as an independent variable in a one way MANOVA with 
reputation and legitimacy at each time period as the dependent variables. 
For time 2, the multivariate analysis using Pillai’s Trace showed a significant 
relationship between the levels of responsibility and reputation and legitimacy scores 
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(F(4,460)=12.248, ηp2=.096,  p<.05, observed power 1.000).   The univariate 
analysis showed a stronger effect size for legitimacy (F(2,230)=24.217, ηp2=.174,  
p<.05, observed power 1.000) than reputation (F(2,230)=12.500, ηp2=.098,  p<.05, 
observed power .996). 
At time 3, the multivariate analysis also showed a significant relationship with a 
stronger effect size than at time 2 (F(4,458)=19.062, ηp2=.143,  p<.05, observed 
power 1.000).  At time 3, when strategy is in place, the effect of the judgments of 
responsibility on reputation (F(2,229)=40.381, ηp2=.261,  p<.05, observed power 
1.000)  and legitimacy (F(2,229)=29.955, ηp2=.207,  p<.05, observed power 1.000) 
are more comparable but the effect size on reputation at time 3 is considerably larger 
than at time 2. 
As with the tests for reputation and legitimacy, Experiment 2 included a direct 
question to participants on the influence of strategy on their perceptions of 
responsibility for the crisis event.  The participants agreed that the company response 
did influence their perception of responsibility (M=4.73, SD1.54 where M=4.0 is 
agree), thereby the effect size within the model may be limiting the ability to see 
significance among strategy types.   
Summary of Experiment 2 Results 
Experiment 2 demonstrated the importance of analysing the crisis event in 
understanding the impact on an organisation’s reputation and legitimacy, with crisis 
cluster showing a statistically significant effect on reputation and legitimacy over 
time.  This effect is strongest when the crisis event occurs which was time 2 in this 
experiment and reduces once the strategy is introduced.  The results in Experiment 2 
demonstrate the different outcomes within the victim and preventable crisis clusters.  
When read in conjunction with Experiment 1, the effects within the three crisis 
clusters of the SCCT model have been demonstrated.  Support was provided for the 
mediation effect of responsibility on the relationship between crisis cluster and 
reputation and legitimacy.  Where crisis cluster led to judgments of higher levels of 
organisational responsibility for a crisis event, reputation and legitimacy scores were 
lower. 
The direct impact of response strategy on changes in stakeholder perceptions of 
reputation and legitimacy was also demonstrated.  Strategy was shown to have a 
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significant effect on changes in reputation scores following its introduction within 
both crisis clusters.  Within the victim cluster, there was partial support for the 
research hypotheses.  The matched strategy of denying responsibility maintained 
reputation from the time of the crisis event as predicted thereby supporting the 
hypothesis.  No significant results were established for the mismatched strategies, 
however, trend data suggested the positive movement in reputational mean for the 
two step up strategy of dealing with responsibility was in the right direction.  The 
mismatched diminish strategy saw no movement.  Within the preventable cluster, 
support was provided for the matched strategy hypothesis.  For the mismatched 
strategies, trend data supported the predicted direction of declines in reputation 
scores from time 2 to time 3, however, the movements were not statistically 
significant. 
Significant effects on changes in legitimacy scores were established for the 
preventable crisis cluster but not for the victim cluster.   As with reputation, support 
was provided for the matched response hypothesis in the victim cluster.  Trend data 
showed support for the predicted improvement in legitimacy scores for the 
mismatched strategy of dealing with responsibility and no change in scores was 
recorded for the mismatched diminish strategy.   In the preventable cluster, support 
was also provided for the matched response hypothesis with maintenance of 
legitimacy scores across time 2 to time 3.  The mismatched deny strategy saw a 
decline in legitimacy scores as predicted, however, the movement was not 
statistically significant.  The mismatched diminish strategy saw a slight increase 
which is against the predicted trend. 
The predicted relationship between response strategy and changes in responsibility 
which was important in establishing the mediation effect of responsibility in the 
overall model was not supported.  Support was provided for the association between 
responsibility and reputation and legitimacy as hypothesised. 
The association between reputation and legitimacy was further examined in this 
experiment and a revised legitimacy scale representing the different theoretical 
subconstructs discussed in Chapter 2 was tested and confirmed for use in the 
remainder of experiments in this study.  Further support for the theoretical difference 
in the associated constructs of reputation and legitimacy was provided in Experiment 
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2 with the different impacts of the independent variables on these constructs 
explained.   
Experiment 3 Results 
The focus for Experiment 3 was on the accommodative strategies within the “deal” 
category of crisis response strategies as described in Chapter 2.  This category 
includes both the rebuilding strategies of compensation and apologising as well as 
the bolstering strategy of ingratiation.  As the deal category potentially carries the 
largest legal liability for an organisation since it gets closest to admitting 
responsibility, understanding the impact of the different options in this category is 
important.  This experiment had multiple purposes:  to test hypotheses of the effect 
of strategy on the dependent variables of reputation and legitimacy; to consider the 
proposed mediator effect of responsibility; to test the development of scenarios for 
the final experiment and finally to provide a further check on the reliability of the 
scales used in the study.   
Experiment 3 used a 2 (crisis cluster subtype: organisational misdeeds and human 
error product harm) x 3 (response strategy: ingratiation, compassion and apology) 
way design.  The difference with Experiment 3 in comparison to Experiments 1 and 
2 is that the two crisis scenarios are drawn from the same crisis cluster of 
preventable but represent two subtypes of crisis events within this cluster and the 
response strategies all come from the one category of dealing with responsibility.   
The sample for the experiment was 270 students drawn from undergraduate and 
postgraduate classes.  Their ages ranged from 18 – 53 years (M=24, SD 4.42) and the 
gender split was 71% female and 29% male respondents.  Cell sizes for each of the 
six treatments ranged from 38 to 54 and as such were above the level recommended 
to meet the reliability measures for analysis (Bernard, 1994). 
Manipulation Checks 
A series of ANOVA tests were used to check the success of the independent 
variables’ manipulation.  The first manipulation check was conducted to determine if 
the participants were selecting the theoretically described crisis cluster (preventable) 
present in the scenarios.   The scenarios used two crisis subtypes from the 
preventable cluster:  human error product harm which involved the contamination of 
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a product (see Appendix 23) and transgression/organisational misdeed which 
involved bribery and fraud (see Appendix 19).  The latter scenario was used in 
Experiment 2 and had already been established as successfully manipulating the 
independent variables.   As the manipulation check questions were included at time 2 
and time 3, tests for selection of crisis cluster were run at both times. 
Each participant was asked whether the scenario they had read fell into the victim, 
accident or preventable cluster.  None of the participants read scenarios in the victim 
or accident clusters and all participants read scenarios in the preventable cluster so 
that no significant differences were expected across the sample on these questions.  
As outlined in Table 32, the correct crisis cluster of preventable was selected by 
participants in each of the two subtype treatments at time 2.  There was a significant 
difference in the groups when asked whether the crisis was an accident.  Those 
reading the human error product harm scenario which involved a contaminated 
product still disagreed that it was an accident (M<4.0) and had correctly identified 
the scenario in the preventable category but were more likely to see the incident as 
an accident than those reading the fraud scenario.  However, this significance did not 
hold when the participants were tested again at time 3.  This may be demonstrating 
the interaction of strategy and cluster as the strategy was introduced at time 3, 
thereby providing a possible effect on the perception of cluster.  The preventable 
category was clearly identified again by the participants at time 3 and no significant 
results in any category were found as predicted. 
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Table 32: Manipulation check on crisis cluster across time 
Time Manipulation 
Check on Crisis 
Cluster 
Human Error  
Product Harm 
Subtype 
Scenario 
M (SD) 
Transgression 
Subtype 
Scenario M(SD) 
F df 
 
 
2 Victim 2.97 (1.12) 3.06 (1.34) .295 1,268 
 Accident 3.16 (1.12) 2.57 (1.24) 16.650* 1,268 
 Preventable 5.48 (1.13)^ 5.53 (1.08)^ .130 1,268 
3 Victim 2.98 (1.15) 3.20 (1.41) 1.922 1,268 
 Accident 3.14 (1.13) 2.98 (1.49) .966 1,268 
 Preventable 5.38 (1.11)^ 5.39 (1.10)^ .007 1,268 
^=correct cluster; *p<.05; M>4.0=agree 
A second manipulation check using a one way ANOVA was conducted to determine 
whether the participants were selecting the correct responses strategy.  There were 
three variations of the deal strategy used in the experiment:  (1) ingratiation in which 
the organisation thanked stakeholders for their help and reminded them of past 
efforts to help the community; (2) compassion which had been used in the other 
experiments in this series and entails the company offering some form of 
compensation; and (3) apology in which the company accepted full responsibility 
and asked for forgiveness (see Appendices 20-22: 24-26).  The test was carried out at 
time 3.  As shown in Table 33, participants selected the correct strategy in each 
treatment category with a significant difference being demonstrated among the 
manipulation check items within each treatment group.    
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Table 33: Manipulation check on strategy 
Treatment 
(Response 
Strategy) 
 
Ingratiation 
M(SD) 
Compassion 
M(SD) 
Apology 
M(SD) 
F df 
Ingratiation 4.89(1.11)^ 3.61(1.21) 3.77(1.10) 35.49* 2,267 
Compassion 3.33(1.09) 5.30(1.04)^ 3.69(1.19) 77.849* 2,267 
Apology 3.77(1.10) 3.69(1.19) 5.45(.99)^ 76.66* 2,267 
^= correct strategy, *p<.05 
Reliability Analysis 
Internal reliability analyses were run on the items used to operationalise the two 
dependent measures of reputation and legitimacy and the proposed mediator of 
responsibility.   
Responsibility was measured at two times and used a three item scale adapted from 
Griffin, Babin and Darden (1991).  The inter-item reliability for responsibility using 
Cronbach alpha was moderate (α = .62-.66).   
Reputation was again measured across three time periods and was assessed using a 
five-item scale developed from McCroskey (1966) and adapted by Coombs & 
Holladay (1992).  The inter-item reliability for reputation measured by Cronbach 
alpha was moderate with a slightly lower range at time 1 than in the other 
experiments (α = .49-.77).   Given the same reputation scale was used in the two 
previous experiments, no changes were made but the alpha scores were monitored in 
the remaining experiments.   
Legitimacy was also measured across three time periods and was assessed on the 
revised legitimacy scale as described in Experiment 2.  The inter-item reliability for 
legitimacy measured by Cronbach alpha was also moderate (α = .62-.66) and lower 
than that for Experiment 2. 
Testing for Discrete Dependent Variables 
Correlation analysis was conducted at each of the relevant time periods to test the 
association between reputation and legitimacy.  As outlined in Table 34, Pearson r 
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remained between .579 - .605 and was significant across the different scales and 
different time periods.  This level confirms that reputation and legitimacy are 
strongly related (Cohen, 1988) but is at a level that still allows for support for the 
variables being considered theoretically different.    
Table 34: Correlation analysis of reputation and legitimacy across time 
Time Reputation  
M (SD) 
Legitimacy (Revised) 
M (SD) 
Pearson r 
1 4.51 (.85) 4.47 (1.04) .596** 
2 3.97 (.92) 3.73 (.93) .579** 
3 4.24 (1.06) 3.87 (1.02) .605** 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Hypothesis Testing 
The first part of Experiment 3 provides an additional check on the basic hypothesis 
that a matched response will maintain reputation and legitimacy from the time of the 
crisis event.  Initial support for this hypothesis was established in Experiments 1 and 
2.  As all of the three responses tested in Experiment 3 are matched responses from 
the deal response category, this experiment is particularly designed to see if the three 
responses produce the same outcome or whether there is variation within the 
category based on the different aspects of accommodative strategies from 
ingratiation through to compassion and apology.  The separation of the bolstering 
strategy of ingratiation from the other two strategies as outlined in Chapter 2 is of 
particular interest here.      
Relevant Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1.1  
A matched crisis response will maintain stakeholder perceptions of 
organisational reputation and legitimacy recorded immediately following the 
crisis event. 
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Hypothesis 1.3  
All of the matched crisis responses used in a crisis from the preventable 
cluster will have the same influence on organisational reputation and 
legitimacy. 
A series of statistical tests were undertaken to test the hypotheses.   A repeated 
measures MANOVA was undertaken with both dependent variables (reputation and 
legitimacy) across all time periods.  ANOVA tests were then  undertaken using a 
change score for each dependent variable.  The change score represented a computed 
mean based on the change in variable over specific time periods.   A repeated 
measures ANOVA test was then used to assess the impact of the independent 
variables on the variable of responsibility.  This was followed by a further ANOVA 
test using change scores in responsibility.   Correlation tests were then undertaken to 
assess the relationships among responsibility, reputation and legitimacy and a final 
MANOVA test undertaken using computed levels of responsibility as a categorical 
variable and reputation and legitimacy as dependent variables.  These tests are 
described further in the relevant sections.  Unless indicated elsewhere, significance 
levels were set at p<.05 within the different tests.    Where no change in a particular 
dependent variable was hypothesised, the absolute level of change in the variable has 
been examined and reported as well as the specific levels of significance which are 
expected to be well outside the null hypothesis testing level of p<.05. 
To assess potential changes in stakeholder perceptions of organisational reputation 
and legitimacy, a repeated measures MANOVA test was run across time periods.  
The dependent variables of reputation and legitimacy were measured at time 1 (only 
company information), time 2 (crisis event) and time 3 (organisational response).  
The measurement at time 1 gives a baseline measure of reputation and legitimacy 
and should not show any significant differences among the subject groups as all 
participants have received the same information.  Any change in these variables at 
time 2 should be related to the crisis event, however, there should not be any 
significant differences between the subject groups as the two crisis subtypes are in 
the same cluster of preventable crises. The ability of the response strategy to 
maintain the reputation and legitimacy scores from time 2 to time 3 as hypothesised 
requires measurement of these variables at both these times.  These measurements 
178 
 
should also document that there were no significant differences across the participant 
groups segmented by strategy at time 3 as the response strategies are all within the 
same response group of dealing with responsibility.   
Two types of analysis are done in Experiment 3: between the two subtypes of human 
error product harm and organisational misdeeds and within each subtype.   
To test the effect of the interaction of the crisis cluster subtype and the response 
strategy on reputation and legitimacy prior to the consideration of the proposed 
mediator (responsibility), a repeated measures MANOVA was run incorporating 
both dependent variables.  The multivariate analysis using Pillai’s Trace as the test 
statistic showed time was having a significant effect on reputation and legitimacy 
(F(6,259)=2012.812, ηp2=.979, p<.05, observed power 1.00).  The crisis subtype 
also had a significant effect (F(6,259)=3.821, ηp2=.081, p<.05, observed power 
.964), however, response strategy did not show a significant effect 
(F(12,520)=1.384, ηp2=.031, n.s., observed power .768) as expected as the strategies 
were all predicted to influence stakeholders in the same way.   Without the 
significant effect for strategy, there was no significant effect for the two way 
interaction of crisis subtype and response strategy (F(12,520)=1.099, ηp2=.025, n.s., 
observed power .642 ).    
As with the other experiments in this series, a further check was undertaken focusing 
on the period from time 2 to time 3 when the crisis event and the strategy are 
introduced respectively.  This check used computed variables for the difference in 
means for reputation and legitimacy from time 2 to time 3. The results of the one 
way MANOVA using these dependent variables showed that there continued to be a 
significant effect for crisis subtype on the changes in reputation and legitimacy 
(F(6,259)=6.127, ηp2=.044, p<.05, observed power .886). Once again, there was no 
significant effect for response strategy (F(4,528)=2.136, ηp2=.016, n.s., observed 
power .633) as expected.    
The effects of the independent variables on the two dependent variables were then 
examined separately through post hoc analysis using Tukey’s HSD test.  Each cluster 
subtype is reported separately to demonstrate key differences. 
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Reputation 
The full model analysis suggested there was a significant difference among the 
subtypes over time (F(2,263)=8.702, ηp2=.062, p<.05, observed power .968 ) when 
assessing the influence of subtype on reputation.  Looking at the individual time 
periods (see Table 35), there was no significant difference at time 1 as expected 
because the crisis subtype was not introduced until time 2. At time 2, the subtypes 
are significantly different which suggests the participants are assessing the impact of 
each crisis subtype separately.  The organisational misdeed crisis had a stronger 
impact on assigned reputation as evidenced through the lower reputation score.  
However, the subtypes are not significantly different on reputation scores at time 3 
when the crisis response strategy is being assessed which may mean that the 
strategies in the organisational misdeed subtype are having a stronger effect to bring 
the subtypes back into line. The individual crisis subtypes were then examined to 
identify the influence of particular strategies within each subtype. 
Table 35: Differences in reputation scores for each crisis subtype over time 
Time Human Error Product Harm 
M(SD) 
Organisational Misdeeds 
M(SD) 
Mdiff (SE) 
1 4.43 (.82) 4.619 (.87) -.183 (.104) 
2 4.14 (.83) 3.79 (.98) .353 (.112)* 
3 4.21(.95) 4.29 (1.16) -.083 (.131) 
*p<.05 
Human Error Product Harm Subtype 
Within the HEPH subtype, the full model analysis showed time was having a 
significant effect on reputation (F(2,263)=4.548, ηp2=.033, p<.05, observed power 
.865).  Looking at the different time periods, reputation scores declined across the 
HEPH subtype from time 1 to time 2 suggesting information on the crisis event 
negatively affected perceptions of reputation (Mtime1 4.43,  SD .82, Mtime2 4.14, SD 
.83, MDiff -.286, SE .097, p<.05).  There was no significant difference in reputation 
scores across the three strategy groups at time 1 (F(2,264)=.687, ηp2=.005, n.s., 
observed power .255) or time 2 (F(2,264)=.059, ηp2=.000, n.s., observed power 
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.205) as predicted as the participants have received the same information to this 
point.  As hypothesised, there was also no significant difference present at time 3 
across the HEPH subtype (F(2,264)=.683, ηp2=.005, n.s., observed power .255) as 
the strategies should be having a similar effect given they are in the same response 
category. At time 3 on trend data, the compassion strategy resulted in the highest 
score for reputation (M=4.36, SD 1.07), followed by the apology strategy (M=4.15, 
SD .93) with the ingratiation strategy providing the lowest score for reputation 
(M=4.12, SD.87).  This suggests there was a slight benefit in reputational terms in 
the company providing compensation through the compassion strategy, however, it 
also suggests the least involved accommodative strategy of ingratiation which makes 
no claim to responsibility nor provides any compensation to victims, provided a solid 
outcome in reputational terms for the organisation.    However, these differences 
were not significant. 
While the different strategies did not show a significant effect overall at a point in 
time, the individual strategies were examined to see if the movement in reputational 
means across the different strategies from time 2 to time 3 showed the ability of each 
strategy to maintain reputation or not.  The omnibus ANOVA test using the 
difference in reputational means from time 2 to time 3 as the dependent variable 
again confirmed that strategy was not having a significant main effect on the shift in 
reputation in the HEPH subtype (F(2,264)=.589, ηp2=.004, n.s., observed power 
.148).   The ingratiation strategy was predicted to maintain reputation which was 
supported with a very small increase of .01  in mean from time 2 to time 3 at a 
significance level of p=1.00  (Mtime2=4.11, SD .85; Mtime3=4.12, SD.86, Mdiff =.01, 
SE.156, n.s.).  This was also the case for the compassion strategy which showed  a 
small increase of .21 at p=.512  (M time 2 =4.14, SD.85, M time 3 = 4.36, SD1.07, 
Mdiff=.213, SE.171, n.s.) and the apology strategy which showed a very small 
decrease at p=.998 (M time 2 =4.18, SD.80, M time 3 = 4.15, SD.93, Mdiff-.032, SE.186, 
n.s.).  Therefore all strategies behaved similarly and maintained reputation scores 
from time 2 to time 3 as hypothesised.  As with Experiment 2, there was a slight 
increase in reputational score for the compassion strategy which suggested the 
participants did favour the company providing benefits to victims, however, this was 
not a significant increase.  None of the strategies fully repaired the reputational 
damage done from the crisis event itself.  As outlined in Figure 22, all of the 
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treatment groups saw a decline in reputation scores from time 1 to time 2 which is 
related to the reputational damage from the crisis event and the final scores for 
reputation at time 3 were less than those for the company’s pre-crisis scores at time 
1. 
 
Figure 22:  Impact of different strategies on reputation over time in a HEPH subtype 
Organisational Misdeeds Subtype 
Within the organisational misdeeds subtype, the full model analysis showed time 
was having a significant effect on reputation (F(2,263)=35.879, ηp2=.214, p<.05, 
observed power 1.000).  Reputation declined across this subtype from time 1 to time 
2 suggesting information on the crisis event negatively affected perceptions of 
reputation (Mtime1 4.61,  SD .87; Mtime2 3.78, SD .98; MDiff -.822, SE .098, p<.05).  
There was no significant difference in reputation scores across the three strategy 
groups at time 1 (F(2,264)=1.099, ηp2=.008, n.s., observed power)  or time 2 
(F(2,264)=.906, ηp2=.007, n.s., observed power .385) as predicted as the participants 
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have received the same information to this point.  As predicted, there was also no 
significant difference present at time 3 across the organisational misdeeds subtype 
(F(2,264)=.175, ηp2=.001, n.s., observed power .165) as the strategies should be 
having a similar effect given they are in the same response category.  In terms of the 
means at time 3, the compassion strategy resulted in the highest score for reputation 
(M=4.36, SD 1.04), followed by the ingratiation strategy (M=4.28, SD 1.35) with the 
apology strategy providing the lowest score for reputation (M=4.23, SD1.05), 
however, the differences between these means were not significant.   
While the different strategies were not showing a significant effect overall at a point 
in time, the individual strategies were examined to analyse any movement in 
reputational means across the different strategy types from time 2 to time 3.  Such 
movement should be due to the strategy which was introduced at time 3.  The 
omnibus ANOVA test using the difference in reputational means from time 2 to time 
3 suggested strategy was not having a significant effect on the shift in reputation 
scores in the organisational misdeeds subtype (F(2,264)=.689, ηp2=.005, n.s., 
observed power .166).   However, post hoc analysis showed some differences among 
the particular strategy options.  The ingratiation strategy was predicted to maintain 
reputation which was not supported as there was a significant result for a shift in 
mean from time 2 to time 3(Mtime2=3.64, SD 1.15; Mtime3=4.28, SD1.35, Mdiff=.634, 
SE.164, p.<.05).  This was also the case for the compassion strategy (M time 2 =3.86, 
SD.83, M time 3 = 4.36, SD1.04, Mdiff=.500, SE.186, p.<.05).  The   apology strategy, 
however, did maintain reputation as hypothesised with a very small increase of .35 
recorded at a significance level of p=.102  (M time 2 =3.87, SD.91, M time 3 = 4.23, 
SD1.05, Mdiff=.358, SE.169, n.s.).  As outlined in Figure 23, all strategies moved in 
the same direction which was to enhance stakeholder perceptions of reputation 
through higher scores across this time period, however, some strategies saw larger 
shifts than others.  Interestingly, the largest increase in reputation scores was for the 
ingratiation strategy which is not recommended for use as an isolated strategy.  Once 
again, none of the strategies had sufficient power to return the company’s reputation 
to that of time 1 which is pre-crisis.  Thus, the company still suffered reputation 
damage. 
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Figure 23:  Impact of different strategies on reputation over time in an 
organisational misdeeds subtype 
As a final test, Experiment 3 included a direct question to participants on the 
influence of strategy on their perceptions of reputation.  The participants agreed that 
the company response did influence their perception of reputation (M=4.5, SD1.34 
where M=4=agree).  While there was no significant difference on this question 
among those in the different strategy treatments (F(2,269)=.903, ηp2=.007, n.s., 
observed power .223), there was a significant difference among the subtypes on the 
level of this influence (F(1,268)=4.745, ηp2=.017, p<.05, observed power .586).   
Those in the organisational misdeeds treatments showed a higher level of agreement 
on the influence (M=4.72, SD 1.34 where M=4.0=agree) than those in the HEPH 
treatments (M=4.35, SD 1.50) which supports the earlier findings of greater 
difference in strategy impacts on reputation scores in the organisational misdeeds 
category.  
 
184 
 
Legitimacy 
The full model analysis suggested that there was a significant difference on 
legitimacy over time within each subtype (F(2,263)=4.950, ηp2=.036, p<.05, 
observed power .667).  Looking at the individual time periods and across the 
subtypes outlined in Table 36, there was no significant difference at time 1 as 
expected because the crisis subtype was not introduced until time 2. At time 2, there 
continued to be no significant difference between the subtypes which suggests the 
participants were not distinguishing between the subtypes in terms of assessing the 
impact of each crisis on organisational legitimacy.  There was also no significant 
difference at time 3.    
Table 36: Differences in legitimacy scores for each crisis subtype over time 
Time Human Error Product Harm 
M(SD) 
Organisational Misdeeds  
M(SD) 
Mdiff (SE) 
1 4.36 (1.01) 4.59 (1.06) -.220 (.128) 
2 3.78 (.93) 3.68 (.94) .103 (.115) 
3 3.75 (.99) 3.99 (1.04) -.216 (.124) 
*p<.05 
Human Error Product Harm Subtype 
Within the HEPH subtype, the full model analysis showed time was having a 
significant effect on legitimacy (F(2,263)=19.168, ηp2=.127, p<.05, observed power 
1.000). Legitimacy scores declined across the HEPH subtype from time 1 to time 2 
suggesting information on the crisis event negatively affected perceptions of 
legitimacy (Mtime1 4.36,  SD 1.01; Mtime2 3.78, SD .93; MDiff -.595, SE .101, p<.05).  
There was no significant difference in legitimacy scores across the three strategy 
groups at time 1 (F(2,264)=.801, ηp2=.006, n.s., observed power .165) or time 2 
(F(2,264)=1.695, ηp2=.013, n.s., observed power .222) as predicted as the 
participants have received the same information to this point.  Supporting 
Hypothesis 1.3, there was also no significant difference present at time 3 across the 
HEPH subtype (F(2,264)=2.791, ηp2=.021, n.s., observed power .365) as the 
strategies should have a similar effect given they are in the same response category. 
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On trend data at time 3, the apology resulted in the highest score for legitimacy 
(M=3.92, SD 1.06), followed by the compassion strategy (M=3.91, SD1.02) with the 
ingratiation strategy providing the lowest score for legitimacy (M=3.50, SD.87).  
However, this analysis doesn’t take into account the movement in legitimacy from 
the point of crisis at time 2.   
The individual strategies were examined to see if the movement in legitimacy means 
across the different strategy types from time 2 to time 3 showed the ability of each 
strategy to maintain legitimacy at the level of damage already suffered through the 
crisis event.  The omnibus ANOVA test using the difference in legitimacy means 
from time 2 to time 3 as the dependent variable confirmed that strategy was not 
having a significant effect on the shift in legitimacy in the HEPH subtype 
(F(2,264)=2.152, ηp2=.016, n.s., observed power .439).   The ingratiation strategy 
was predicted to maintain legitimacy which was supported with a small decline in 
mean from time 2 to time 3 at a significance level of p=.458 (Mtime2=3.66, SD .97; 
Mtime3=3.50, SD.87; Mdiff =-.169, SE.127, n.s.).  This was also the case for the 
compassion strategy which saw an even smaller decline at p=.929 (M time 2 =3.99, 
SD.86; M time 3 = 3.91, SD1.02; Mdiff=-.076, SE.139, n.s.).  The  apology strategy (M 
time 2 =3.68, SD.94; M time 3 = 3.92, SD1.06; Mdiff=.232, SE.151, n.s.) saw a slightly 
larger increase at a significance level of p=.333.  Given the relatively small size of 
these movements and the significance levels established, the proposition that  all 
strategies maintained legitimacy can be supported.  There was a slight increase in 
legitimacy scores for the apology strategy as outlined in Figure 24 which was against 
the trend of the other strategies.  As with reputation, none of the strategies returned 
the company to its pre-crisis legitimacy scores (time 1). 
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Figure 24:  Impact of different strategies on legitimacy over time in a HEPH subtype 
Organisational Misdeeds Subtype 
Within the organisation misdeeds subtype, the full model analysis showed time was 
having a significant effect on legitimacy (F(2,263)=40.857, ηp2=.237, p<.05, 
observed power .875).  Looking at the different time periods, legitimacy scores 
declined from time 1 to time 2 suggesting information on the crisis event negatively 
affected perceptions of legitimacy (Mtime1 4.59,  SD 1.06; Mtime2 3.68, SD .94; MDiff -
.918, SE .102, p<.05).  There was no significant difference in legitimacy scores 
across the three strategy groups at time 1 (F(2,264)=.069, ηp2=.001, n.s., observed 
power .125) or time 2 (F(2,264)=.891, ηp2=.006, n.s., observed power .265) as 
predicted.  Further supporting Hypothesis 1.3, there was also no significant 
difference present at time 3 across the organisational misdeeds subtype 
(F(2,264)=.510, ηp2=.004, n.s., observed power .222) as the strategies should be 
having a similar effect given they are in the same response category. At time 3, the 
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apology resulted in the highest score for legitimacy (M=4.11, SD 1.00), followed by 
the compassion strategy (M=3.97, SD1.00) with the ingratiation strategy providing 
the lowest score for legitimacy (M=3.90, SD1.10) although their differences were 
not significant.   
An omnibus ANOVA test using the difference in legitimacy means from time 2 to 
time 3 as the dependent variable confirmed that strategy was not having a significant 
effect on the shift in legitimacy in the organisational misdeeds subtype 
(F(2,264)=.628, ηp2=.005, n.s., observed power .155).   The effect size was 
approximately one-third of that recorded for the other subtype.   
The ingratiation strategy was predicted to maintain legitimacy which was supported 
with a very small increase of .206 from time 2 to time 3 at a significance level of 
p=.324 (Mtime2=3.69, SD1.09; Mtime3=3.90, SD1.10, Mdiff =.206, SE.133, n.s.).  This 
was also the case for the apology strategy which had a slightly larger increase with a 
significance level of p=.234 (M time 2 =3.80, SD.82; M time 3 = 4.11, SD1.00; 
Mdiff=.309, SE.137, n.s.).   However, there was a significant difference for the 
compassion strategy (M time 2 =3.53, SD.88; M time 3 = 3.97, SD1.00; Mdiff=.432, 
SE.151, p<.05) which saw an increase in legitimacy scores from time 2 to time 3.  
The significant result for compassion suggests that the participants felt more 
positively towards the company for providing compensation and therefore increased 
their scores for legitimacy as outlined in Figure 25.  As before, none of the strategies 
returned the company to its pre-crisis legitimacy scores.  
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Figure 25:  Impact of different strategies on legitimacy over time in an 
organisational misdeeds subtype 
As with reputation, Experiment 3 included a direct question to participants on the 
influence of strategy on their perceptions of the company’s legitimacy.  The 
participants agreed that the company response did influence their perception of 
legitimacy (M=4.41, SD1.38 where 4=agree).  While there was no significant 
difference on this question among those in the different strategy treatments 
(F(2,269)=2.473, ηp2=.018, n.s., observed power .557), there was a significant 
difference among the subtypes on the level of this influence (F(1,269)=4.500, 
ηp2=.017, p<.05, observed power .561).   Those in the organisational misdeeds 
treatments showed a higher level of agreement on the influence (M=4.57, SD 1.36) 
than those in the HEPH treatments (M=4.25, SD 1.38).   
Responsibility 
The second part of Experiment 3 provides a further test on the influence of the 
potential mediator of responsibility as outlined in Research Question 2. 
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Research Question 2 
How does responsibility mediate the influence of response strategies used 
during crises from different clusters on stakeholder perceptions of 
organisational reputation and legitimacy? 
As there is only one cluster being tested in Experiment 3, the particular focus is on 
the two subtypes within the preventable cluster to see if they have the same influence 
on responsibility. 
In addition, all the response strategies being tested are matched ones (deal strategies 
in the preventable crisis cluster), thus the influence of each strategy should be 
similar. 
Relevant Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 2.1  
A matched crisis response will maintain the level of stakeholder perceptions 
of organisational responsibility and will subsequently maintain the level of 
stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy recorded immediately 
following the crisis event. 
Hypothesis 2.3  
All of the matched crisis responses used in a crisis from the preventable 
cluster will have the same influence on organisational responsibility, 
reputation and legitimacy. 
A number of tests were conducted to consider the role of responsibility.  To assess 
whether stakeholder perceptions of crisis responsibility were being maintained or 
changed by the strategy within each crisis subtype (HEPH and organisational 
misdeeds), a repeated measures ANOVA was run across time periods.  
Responsibility was measured at time 2 (crisis event) and time 3 (organisational 
response).  The measurement at time 2 gives a baseline measure of attributed 
responsibility based on the crisis event and should not show significant differences 
between subject groups based on the crisis subtype as they are from the same cluster.  
The ability of the response strategy to maintain responsibility at time 3 requires 
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measurement of this variable at time 2 and time 3.  Once again, significant 
differences should not be seen across the participant groups at time 3 based on the 
different subtypes or within each subtype as the responses are from the same 
category. 
For the first test, the full model analysis suggested no significant difference between 
the two subtypes used in experiment 3 (F(1,264)=1.892, ηp2=.007, n.s., observed 
power .264).  As the subtypes are in the same cluster, they are theoretically predicted 
to behave the same and this was supported as outlined in Table 37.  There was also 
no significant difference among these subtypes over time (F(1,264)=.542, ηp2=.002, 
observed power .107).  This analysis looked at time 2 when the crisis event occurred 
and time 3 when the response strategy was introduced.   
Table 37: Differences in responsibility scores for each crisis subtype over time 
Time Human Error Product Harm  
M(SD) 
Organisational Misdeeds 
M(SD) 
Mdiff (SE) 
2 4.637 (1.20) 4.517 (1.30) .120 (.155) 
3 4.599 (1.16) 4.368 (1.34) .232 (.154) 
 
To check whether the introduction of the response strategy influenced any change in 
responsibility, the effect of strategy on the difference in responsibility scores from 
time 2 to time 3 was analysed.  A one way ANOVA showed no significant main 
effect for strategy on the change in responsibility scores (F(2,264)=.580, ηp2=.004, 
n.s., observed power .146), nor for subtype (F(1,264)=.486, ηp2=.002, n.s., observed 
power .107) which supports the matched strategy hypothesis. As at the full model 
level there was limited change in responsibility, significant results at the individual 
strategy and subtype levels were unlikely.  However, post hoc analysis was 
undertaken as this was the first test of these particular strategies in this series of 
experiments.   
Human Error Product Harm Subtype 
Within the HEPH subtype, the full model analysis showed time was not having a 
significant effect on responsibility (F(1,264)=.110, ηp2=.000, n.s., observed power 
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.065) with responsibility scores maintained from time 2 to time 3 (Mtime2 4.63,  SD 
1.20; Mtime3 4.59, SD1.16; MDiff -.037, SE .113, n.s.).  There was no significant 
difference in responsibility scores across the three strategy groups at time 2 
(F(2,264)=.688, ηp2=.005, n.s., observed power .145) as predicted as the participants 
have all received the same information at this time.  There was also no significant 
difference at time 3 (F(2,264)=1.231, ηp2=.009, n.s., observed power .222) as 
hypothesised as the strategies should have a similar effect given they are in the same 
response category. At time 3 on trend data, the apology resulted in the highest 
measure for responsibility (M=4.77, SD 1.14) which is explainable as this strategy 
accepts responsibility, followed by the ingratiation strategy (M=4.66, SD 1.08) with 
the compassion strategy providing the lowest score for responsibility (M=4.36, 
SD1.25).     
While the different strategies were not showing a significant effect overall at a point 
in time, the individual strategies were examined to see if the movement in 
responsibility means across the different strategy types from time 2 to time 3 showed 
the ability of each strategy to shift responsibility or not.  A one way ANOVA using 
the mean difference in responsibility as the dependent variable showed no significant 
influence of strategy in the HEPH category (F(2,264)=.097, ηp2=.001, n.s., observed 
power .065).   
As a final check, each strategy was assessed.  The ingratiation strategy was predicted 
to maintain responsibility which was supported with a strongly non-significant result 
at p=.958 for a shift in mean from time 2 to time 3(Mtime2=4.65, SD 1.26; 
Mtime3=4.66, SD1.08; Mdiff =.009, SE.178, n.s.).  As shown in Figure 26, this was 
also the case for the compassion strategy (M time 2 =4.46, SD1.15; M time 3 = 4.36, 
SD1.25; Mdiff=-.104, SE.195, n.s.) which recorded a very small decline at a 
significance level of p=.595 and the apology strategy which also recorded next to no 
change at all at a significance level of p=.934 (M time 2 =4.78, SD1.18; M time 3 = 4.77, 
SD1.14; Mdiff=-.018, SE.212, n.s.).  Therefore all strategies maintained 
responsibility as predicted. 
192 
 
 
Figure 26:  Impact of different strategies on responsibility over time in a HEPH 
subtype  
Organisational Misdeeds Subtype 
Within the organisational misdeeds subtype, the full model analysis showed time 
was not having a significant effect on responsibility (F(1,264)=1.714, ηp2=.006, n.s., 
observed power .244) with responsibility maintained from time 2 to time 3  (Mtime2 
4.51, SD 1.30; Mtime3 4.37, SD1.3;, MDiff -.149, SE .114, n.s.).  As predicted, there 
were no significant differences in responsibility scores across the three strategy 
groups at time 2 (F(2,264)=.039, ηp2=.000, n.s., observed power .010) as the 
participants have all received the same information at this time.  There was also no 
significant difference at time 3 (F(2,264)=1.269, ηp2=.010, n.s., observed power 
.355) as predicted as the strategies should have a similar effect given they are in the 
same response category. At time 3 on trend data, the apology resulted in the highest 
measure for responsibility (M=4.60, SD 1.28) which is explainable as this strategy 
accepts responsibility, followed by the ingratiation strategy (M=4.32, SD 1.48) with 
the compassion strategy providing the lowest score for responsibility (M=4.17, 
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SD1.22).  However, this analysis doesn’t take into account the movement in 
responsibility from the point of crisis at time 2.   
While the different strategies were not showing a significant effect overall at a point 
in time, the individual strategies were examined to see if the movement in 
responsibility means across the different strategy types from time 2 to time 3 show 
the ability of each strategy to shift responsibility or not.  A one way ANOVA using 
the mean difference in responsibility as the dependent variable showed no significant 
influence of strategy in the organisational misdeeds category (F(2,264)=.793, 
ηp2=.006, n.s., observed power .185).   
The ingratiation strategy was predicted to maintain responsibility which was 
supported with a non-significant result at p=.326 for a shift in mean from time 2 to 
time 3(Mtime2=4.51, SD 1.34; Mtime3=4.32, SD1.48; Mdiff =-.184, SE.187, n.s.).  As 
shown in Figure 27, this was also the case for the compassion strategy which saw a 
slight decline of .307 at a significance level of p=.248 (M time 2 =4.48, SD1.35; M time 
3 = 4.17, SD1.22; Mdiff=-.307, SE.212, n.s.) and the apology strategy which saw a 
very slight increase at a significance level of p=.821 (M time 2 =4.55, SD1.26; M time 3 
= 4.60, SD1.28; Mdiff=.043, SE.192, n.s.).  Therefore all strategies maintained 
responsibility as predicted. 
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Figure 27:  Impact of different strategies on responsibility over time in an 
organisational misdeeds subtype  
Combined Clusters 
As no main effects for cluster or strategy were found on responsibility, no further 
tests for responsibility as a mediator were undertaken.  Experiment 3 included a 
direct question to participants on the influence of strategy on judgments of 
organisational responsibility.  The participants agreed that the company response did 
influence their perception of responsibility (M=4.54, SD1.35).  While there was no 
significant difference on this question among those in the different strategy 
treatments (F(2,269)=.866, ηp2=.006, n.s., observed power .165), there was a 
significant difference among the subtypes on the level of this influence 
(F(1,269)=4.521, ηp2=.0174, p<.05, observed power .655).   Those in the 
organisational misdeeds treatments showed a higher level of agreement on the 
influence (M=4.72, SD 1.33) than those in the HEPH treatments (M=4.37, SD 1.36).  
Interestingly this influence appeared to be in the company’s favour with a greater 
reduction in responsibility levels from time 2 to time 3. 
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The influence of responsibility on reputation and legitimacy was examined further 
through correlation analysis.  Correlation analysis at time 2 and time 3 (see Table 38) 
was undertaken as well as a further correlation test using the computed change over 
time variables (see Table 39). 
This analysis confirms the significant relationships between responsibility, 
reputation and legitimacy at time 2 with a predicted increase in responsibility scores 
leading to a decrease in reputation and legitimacy scores.  However, at time 3, 
responsibility is no longer significantly associated with reputation, providing further 
support for the difference between reputation and legitimacy as measured constructs.   
A significant association was only established for legitimacy at this time, again with 
the direction as predicted.  When running the same tests but using the computed 
variables for the change in responsibility over time 2 to time 3 and the change in 
reputation and legitimacy, significant associations were established with both 
reputation and legitimacy. 
Table 38: Correlation analysis of responsibility, reputation and legitimacy at time 2 
and 3 
 Reputation 
Time 2  
Pearson r 
Legitimacy 
Time 2  
Pearson r 
Reputation 
Time 3  
Pearson r 
Legitimacy 
Time 3  
Pearson r 
Responsibility 
Time 2 
-.344** -.496**   
Responsibility 
Time 3 
  -.090 -.311** 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Table 39: Correlation analysis using change variables across time 2-3 for 
responsibility, reputation and legitimacy  
Time 2-3 Change in Reputation  
Pearson  r 
Change in Legitimacy  
Pearson r 
Change in Responsibility -.238** -.301** 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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The final test involved responsibility at time 2 and time 3 being converted to a 
categorical variable with low, medium and high responsibility categories.    The 
categorical responsibility variable was then used as an independent variable in a one 
way MANOVA with reputation and legitimacy at each time period as the dependent 
variables with the means for each grouping displayed in Table 40. 
Table 40: Means for reputation and legitimacy across time for different categories of 
responsibility 
Responsibility 
by category 
Reputation  
Time 2 
M(SD) 
Reputation 
Time 3 
M(SD) 
Legitimacy 
Time 2 
M(SD) 
Legitimacy 
Time 3 
M(SD) 
Low  4.49 (.94) 4.97 (.98) 4.46 (.92) 4.67 (.92) 
Medium  4.07 (.75) 4.16 (.83) 3.87 (.81) 3.91 (.91) 
High  3.68 (.92) 3.93 (1.30) 3.34 (.89) 3.54 (1.06) 
 
For time 2, the multivariate analysis using Pillai’s Trace showed a significant 
relationship between the levels of responsibility and reputation and legitimacy scores 
(F(4,534)=12.400, ηp2=.085,  p<.05, observed power 1.000).   The highest level of 
responsibility saw the lowest associated reputation and legitimacy scores as 
predicted.  The univariate analysis showed a stronger effect size for legitimacy 
(F(2,267)=26.197, ηp2=.164,  p<.05, observed power 1.000) than reputation 
(F(2,267)=12.923, ηp2=.088,  p<.05, observed power .997). 
At time 3, the multivariate analysis also showed a significant relationship albeit with 
a lower effect size than at time 2 (F(4,534)=19.062, ηp2=.064,  p<.05, observed 
power .999).  At time 3, when strategy is in place, the effect of the judgments of 
responsibility on legitimacy (F(2,267)=15.988, ηp2=.107,  p<.05, observed power 
1.000) remain stronger than on  reputation (F(2,267)=8.572, ηp2=.060,  p<.05, 
observed power .966). As at time 2, the higher the level of responsibility assigned to 
the organisation, the lower the reputation and legitimacy scores.    
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Summary of Experiment 3 Results 
 
Experiment 3 provided further support for the importance of fully understanding the 
impact of the crisis event in designing organisational responses.  While the two 
events investigated in this experiment came from the same theoretical cluster, 
differences within the types were evident at different levels of analysis.   The human 
error product harm event was not as cleanly perceived by stakeholders as being in 
the preventable cluster with a number of participants believing it could also have 
been located in the accident cluster.   This raises an important question for crisis 
managers as the crisis event cluster selection is important to ascertain the 
recommended ‘match’ strategy.   
Experiment 3 provided partial support for the hypotheses of matched strategies 
maintaining responsibility, reputation and legitimacy, however there were some 
differences found across the two subtypes and within the three response categories.  
Support was provided for the hypotheses within the human error product harm 
category with all strategies maintaining reputation and legitimacy.  Responsibility 
was also maintained in this category although the mediation effect could not be fully 
established as strategy was not having a significant effect on responsibility.     
There was more volatility in the results for the organisational misdeeds crisis event.  
While there were no significant differences among the strategies on reputation at 
time 3 as expected, there were significant movements in reputation scores for two of 
the strategies from time 2 to time 3 which did not support the hypothesis for 
maintenance of scores.  The movement in scores resulted in higher reputation scores 
for the company so the strategies resulted in some benefit to the company.  Similarly 
for legitimacy, two of the strategies maintained legitimacy scores from time 2 to time 
3 with the third strategy of compassion having a significant increase.  While this did 
not support the maintenance hypothesis, it brought further benefits to the company 
through a higher legitimacy score.   Responsibility scores were also maintained in 
this category. 
The main focus for this study was on whether the strategies provided similar 
outcomes given each of them sees the company dealing with responsibility in a 
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slightly different way.  This was largely supported by the results.  Of particular 
interest is the similar performance of the bolstering strategy of ingratiation against 
the other two strategies of compassion and apology.  Simply reminding people of the 
good deeds of the company through the ingratiation strategy did not have 
significantly different outcomes on reputation and legitimacy to offering a full 
apology for the crisis event.  Given the differences in potential legal liability in these 
two strategies, this is an area of significant interest for crisis managers.     
None of the strategies in either type could reverse the reputational and legitimacy 
damage done to the company through the crisis event.  The scores for reputation and 
legitimacy at time 3 remained less than those at time 1, thus some damage to the 
company remained. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the results for the Stage One experiments which focused on 
the influence of different strategies across different types of crisis events on the 
organisational assets of reputation and legitimacy.  The relevant research questions 
have been addressed and the support for the related hypotheses identified.  The 
results from this chapter form the foundation of the retesting of the SCCT model 
propositions under the specific pre-test post-test methodology adopted for this study.  
The next chapter reports the results for Stage Two of this study.  
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Chapter 5  Stage Two Results 
This chapter reports the results of Stage Two of this study and focuses on the 
variable of responsibility.  One experiment was run in this stage.  The aims of this 
experiment, the sample accessed and the key data analysis techniques used are 
described in detail.  The results of hypothesis testing through the use of multivariate 
statistical analysis are outlined.   Support for the hypotheses is discussed where 
appropriate and forms the basis for the further analysis and discussion of the research 
questions in Chapter 8. 
Stage Two Focus 
Given its central role in the model, Stage Two of this study was focused on the 
variable of responsibility.  In the Stage One experiments, responsibility was assessed 
as mediating the relationship between the independent variables of crisis cluster and 
organisational response and the dependent variables of reputation and legitimacy.  
Small effect sizes were detected in the results and responsibility was reconstituted as 
a categorical variable in these experiments to allow for further analysis. 
To try and establish a more specific link between responsibility and reputation and 
legitimacy, responsibility was reconceived in Stage Two of the study as an 
independent variable and tested as such in Experiment 4.  This allowed explicit 
manipulation of the specific levels of responsibility assigned to the organisation and 
an assessment of the impact of these levels on reputation and legitimacy scores.  
Responsibility was also retested as a dependent variable in Experiment 4 in line with 
the other experiments. This provided a check on the manipulated level of 
responsibility in the scenarios to ensure it was being reflected in the assessed 
responsibility scores from the questionnaire. 
Research Question 
The research question addressed in Experiment 4 was: 
Research Question 3 
How does an organisation’s responsibility for a crisis affect stakeholder 
perceptions of its reputation and legitimacy? 
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Experiment 4 Results 
Experiment 4 used a 1 (crisis cluster: accident) x 2 (levels of responsibility:  fully 
responsible and not responsible) way design.  The levels of responsibility for the 
crisis contained in the scenarios were assigned by an independent third party who 
had investigated the crisis.  Two different scenarios were developed (see Appendices 
28-29).   
The sample for the experiment was 107 students drawn from undergraduate and 
postgraduate classes.  Their ages ranged from 19 – 31 years (M=24, SD3.20) and 
included 82% female and 18% male respondents.  Cell size for each of the two 
treatments were 52 for fully responsible and 55 for not responsible, well above the 
level recommended to meet the reliability measures for analysis (Bernard, 1994).   
Manipulation Checks 
Descriptive statistics were run and a series of ANOVA tests used to check the 
success of the independent variables’ manipulation.  The first manipulation check 
was conducted to determine if participants were selecting the theoretically described 
crisis cluster (accident) present in the scenarios at time 2 (see Appendix 27).   Each 
participant was asked whether the scenario they had read was in the victim, accident 
or preventable cluster.  As outlined in Table 41, the accident cluster was clearly 
identified by the participants at time 2, which was before the participants received 
any information on responsibility for the crisis. 
A further check was undertaken to consider the individual treatments of 
responsibility.  As outlined in Table 41, both treatment groups correctly identified 
the scenario as an accident at time 2 and there was no significant difference between 
the two treatments.  However, by time 3, the participants who had read information 
suggesting the company was “fully responsible” were now more likely to believe the 
crisis event was in the preventable cluster which would align with the description of 
assigned responsibility.  The participants in the “not responsible” treatment still saw 
the crisis event as falling in the accident cluster, closely followed by the victim 
cluster.  As both these clusters carry low levels of organisational responsibility, these 
results were as expected and support the assignment of the crisis clusters by levels of 
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responsibility.  There were significant differences between the treatments on all these 
clusters.   
Table 41: Manipulation check on crisis cluster by treatment over time 
 Total  
M(SD) 
Fully 
Responsible 
M (SD)
Not 
Responsible 
M (SD)
F df 
Time 2      
Victim 3.31 (1.21) 3.36 (1.32) 3.27 (1.06) .154 1,106 
Accident 5.50 (.94) 5.57 (1.03) 5.43 (.85) .589 1,106 
Preventable 3.57 (1.18) 3.65 (1.21) 3.49 (1.15) .505 1,106 
Time 3      
Victim 3.78 (1.77) 2.55 (1.34) 4.94 (1.28) 88.082* 1,106 
Accident 4.39 
(1..85) 
3.38 (1.78) 5.34 (1.35) 41.385* 1,106 
Preventable 4.44 (1.59) 5.38 (1.45) 3.56 (1.16) 51.180* 1,106 
M>4.0=agree, *p<.05 
A third manipulation check was conducted to determine whether the participants 
were identifying each of the two embedded conditions for responsibility. The check 
was carried out at time 3 and participants were asked to agree/disagree with the 
statement that an inquiry had found the company responsible.  Those in the “fully 
responsible” treatment group strongly agreed with the statement (M=5.48, SD=1.24 
where 4.0=agree) and those in the “not responsible” treatment group strongly 
disagreed with the statement (M=2.16, SD=1.15), confirming the successful 
manipulation. 
Reliability Analysis 
Internal reliability analyses were conducted on the items used to operationalise the 
two main dependent measures of reputation and legitimacy as well as responsibility 
in its guise as the manipulation check on whether assigned responsibility in the 
scenario aligned with attributed responsibility through the questionnaire.     
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Reputation was measured across three time periods and was assessed using a five-
item scale developed from McCroskey (1966) and adapted by Coombs & Holladay 
(1992).  The inter-item reliability for reputation measured by Cronbach alpha was 
moderate to strong, particularly at time 3 (α = .67 - .964). 
Legitimacy was also measured across three time periods and was assessed on the 
revised legitimacy scale as described in Experiment 2.  The inter-item reliability for 
legitimacy measured by Cronbach alpha was also strong (α = .910-.972). 
Responsibility was measured twice and used a three item scale adapted from Griffin, 
Babin and Darden (1991).  The inter-item reliability for responsibility using 
Cronbach alpha was strong (α =.881 - .971).    
Testing for Discrete Dependent Variables 
Correlation analysis was run at each of the relevant time periods to test the 
association between reputation and legitimacy. Pearson r remained between .623-
.883 and was significant across the different scales and different time periods.  At 
time 3, there is a near perfect correlation which would not support the theoretical 
claim of different variables, however, this level of correlation has not been seen in 
the other experiments.  The level of correlation will continue to be monitored in the 
subsequent experiments.     
Table 42: Correlation analysis of reputation and legitimacy across time 
Time Reputation  
M (SD) 
Legitimacy 
M (SD) 
Pearson r 
1 4.90 (.64) 4.79 (.76) .623** 
2 3.45 (.99) 3.24 (.87) .692** 
3 3.99 (1.51) 3.75 (1.37) .883** 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Hypothesis Testing 
Experiment 4 is focused on understanding the relationship between different levels 
of responsibility and an organisation’s reputation and legitimacy. 
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Relevant Hypothesis 
The hypothesised relationship is: 
Hypothesis 3.1  
An organisation that is fully responsible for a crisis will be judged by 
stakeholders as having a lower level of reputation and legitimacy than an 
organisation that is not responsible for a crisis. 
A series of statistical tests were undertaken to test the hypotheses.   A repeated 
measures MANOVA was undertaken with both dependent variables (reputation and 
legitimacy) across all time periods followed by univariate analysis for each variable.  
The MANOVA test was then repeated using a change score for each dependent 
variable and an ANOVA test using each discrete variable was undertaken for further 
comparison.  The change score represented a computed mean based on the change in 
variable over specific time periods.   As responsibility was included as both a 
manipulated and measured variable in this particular experiment, a final set of one 
way repeated measures ANOVAs was undertaken focusing on responsibility.  This 
used responsibility as a measured variable at time 2 and time 3 as well as a change 
score for responsibility shifts across this time period.  These tests are described 
further in the relevant sections.  Unless indicated elsewhere, significance levels were 
set at p<.05 within the different tests.     
A repeated measures test was run across time periods.   The dependent variables of 
reputation and legitimacy were measured at time 1 (only company information), time 
2 (crisis event) and time 3 (assignment of responsibility).  The measurement at time 
1 gives a baseline measure of reputation and legitimacy for the organisation before 
the crisis event occurs and should not show any significant differences between 
subject groups as all participants have received the same information.  Any change in 
reputation and legitimacy scores from time 1 to time 2 should be related to the crisis 
event and again should not show any significant differences between subject groups 
as all information is still similar across the groups.  Significant differences should be 
seen across the treatment groups at time 3 as responsibility has been assigned at this 
point and the two different treatments used.      
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A repeated measures MANOVA was run incorporating both dependent variables of 
reputation and legitimacy.  The multivariate analysis using Pillai’s trace showed time 
was having a significant effect on reputation and legitimacy (F(4, 102)=65.848, 
ηp2=.721, p<.05, observed power 1.00).  Level of assigned responsibility was also 
showing a significant effect (F(2,104)=26.017, ηp2=.333, p<.05, observed power 
1.00). 
As with the other experiments, further analysis was undertaken focusing on the 
period from time 2 to time 3 when the level of assigned responsibility became 
known to the participants.  This analysis used computed variables for the difference 
in means for reputation and legitimacy from time 2 to time 3.  The results of the one 
way MANOVA for this specific time period showed that the level of assigned 
responsibility was having a statistically significant effect on the changes in 
reputation and legitimacy (F(2,104)=86.337, ηp2=.624, p<.05, observed power 1.00).   
The effects of the levels of responsibility on the two dependent variables of 
reputation and legitimacy at each time period were then examined separately through 
post hoc analysis using Tukey’s HSD test.   
Reputation 
The full model univariate analysis showed time was having a significant effect on 
reputation (F(2,104)=98.170, ηp2=.654, p<.05, observed power 1.000) as was the 
levels of responsibility (F(1,105)=52.331, ηp2=.333, p<.05, observed power 1.000).  
As outlined in Table 43, reputation scores declined from time 1 to time 2 suggesting 
information on the crisis event negatively affected perceptions of reputation. There 
was no significant difference in reputation scores across the two treatment groups at 
time 1 (F(1,105)=2.757, ηp2=.026, n.s., observed power .377) or time 2 
(F(1,105)=2.317, ηp2=.022 n.s., observed power .326) as predicted.  However, a 
significant difference was present at time 3 as hypothesised (F(1,105)=190.223, 
ηp2=.644, p<.05, observed power 1.000) which confirmed the influence of assigned 
responsibility as having a main effect on perceptions of reputation. 
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Table 43:  Impact of responsibility on reputation over time. 
Time Total 
M(SD) 
Fully Responsible 
M(SD) 
Not Responsible 
M(SD) 
Mdiff (SE) 
1 4.90 (.64) 4.80 (.73) 5.00 (.53) -.206 (.124) 
2 3.45 (.99) 3.60 (1.10) 3.31 (.86) .291 (.124) 
3 3.99 (1.51) 2.74(1.03) 5.17 (.77) -2.42 (.176)* 
*p<.05 
The movement in the reputational means from time 2 to time 3 across the two 
different responsibility treatments will further confirm the influence of each 
treatment.  The ANOVA test using the difference in reputational means from time 2 
to time 3 showed that levels of responsibility was having a significant effect on the 
shift in reputation (F(1,105)=146.013, ηp2=.582, p<.05, observed power 1.00).  The 
“fully responsible” treatment showed a strong significant decline in reputation scores 
as expected from time 2 (M=3.60, SD1.10) to time 3 (M=2.74, SD=1.03; Mdiff = -
.86, SE=.161, p<.05).  Thus, the assignment of responsibility to the organisation saw 
a significant decline in its reputation scores.    
As outlined in Figure 28, the “not responsible” treatment showed a strong significant 
increase in its reputation scores as expected from time 2 (M=3.31, SD.86) to time 3 
(M=5.17, SD=.77; Mdiff = 1.85, SE=.157, p<.05).  The participants rewarded the 
organisation for not being responsible for the crisis event with a significant increase 
in its reputation score from the time of the crisis event.  The additional information 
saw the organisation’s reputation score recover to the point before the crisis event 
occurred (Mtime 3=5.15, SD.77; Mtime 1= 5.00, SD.53; Mdiff=.162, SE.156, n.s.).   
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Figure 28:  Impact of different levels of responsibility on reputation over time. 
Legitimacy 
The full model univariate analysis using Pillai’s Trace showed time was having a 
significant effect on legitimacy (F(2,104)=103.787, ηp2=.666, p<.05, observed 
power 1.000) as was the levels of responsibility (F(1,105)=33.049, ηp2=.239, p<.05, 
observed power 1.000).  As outlined in Table 44, legitimacy declined from time 1 to 
time 2 suggesting information on the crisis event negatively affected perceptions of 
legitimacy. There was no significant difference in legitimacy scores across the two 
treatment groups at time 1 (F(1,105)=.032, ηp2=.000, n.s., observed power .054) or 
time 2 (F(1,105)=2.398, ηp2=.022 n.s., observed power .335) as predicted.  
However, a significant difference was present at time 3 as hypothesised 
(F(1,105)=145.281, ηp2=.580, p<.05, observed power 1.000) which confirmed the 
influence of assigned responsibility as having a main effect on perceptions of 
legitimacy. 
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Table 44:  Impact of responsibility on legitimacy over time. 
Time Total  
M(SD) 
Fully Responsible 
M(SD) 
Not Responsible 
M(SD) 
Mdiff (SE) 
1 4.79 (.76) 4.77 (.83) 4.80 (.69) -.027 (.149) 
2 3.24 (.87) 3.38 (1.05) 3.12 (.65) .261 (.168) 
3 3.75 (1.37) 2.68(.94) 4.76 (.84) -2.08 (.173)* 
*p<.05 
The movement in the legitimacy scores across the different responsibility treatments 
from time 2 to time 3 was then considered.  The ANOVA test using the difference in 
legitimacy means from time 2 to time 3 showed that levels of responsibility was 
having a significant effect on the shift in legitimacy (F(1,105)=140.657, ηp2=.573, 
p<.05, observed power 1.00).  As shown in Figure 29, the “fully responsible” 
treatment showed a strong significant decline as expected from time 2 (M=3.38, 
SD1.05) to time 3 (M=2.68, SD=.94; Mdiff =-.70, SE=.142, p<.05).  Thus, the 
assignment of responsibility to the organisation saw a significant decline in its 
legitimacy score.    
The “not responsible” treatment showed a strong significant increase in its 
legitimacy score as expected from time 2 (M=3.12, SD.65) to time 3 (M=4.76, 
SD=.84; Mdiff = 1.644, SE=.138, p<.05).  As with reputation, the participants 
rewarded the organisation for not being responsible for the crisis event.  Once the 
lack of responsibility was known, the organisation’s legitimacy score recovered to 
the point before the crisis event occurred (Mtime 3=4.76, SD.84; Mtime 1= 4.80, SD.69; 
Mdiff=-.04, SE .161, n.s.).      
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Figure 29:  Impact of different levels of responsibility on legitimacy over time. 
Responsibility 
Assigned responsibility was manipulated as an independent variable in this 
experiment.  However, the responsibility scale was also included in the questionnaire 
to consider the ability of the questions to reflect the assigned responsibility.  
Responsibility was measured at time 2 when the participants were assessing the level 
of responsibility of the crisis cluster (accident) and then again at time 3 when 
participants had information on the organisation’s actual responsibility as assigned 
by the third party investigator. 
A one way repeated measures ANOVA was run to assess the relationship.  The full 
model analysis using Pillai’s Trace showed time was having a significant effect on 
responsibility (F(1,105)=37.119, ηp2=.261, p<.05, observed power 1.000) as was the 
levels of responsibility in the treatment groups (F(1,105)=186.938, ηp2=.640, p<.05, 
observed power 1.000).  As outlined in Table 45, there was no significant difference 
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in responsibility scores across the two treatment groups at time 2 (F(1,105)=.093, 
ηp2=.001, n.s., observed power .060) as predicted as judgments about responsibility 
at this point are based on the crisis event (accident) which was common to both 
treatments.  However, a significant difference was present at time 3 
(F(1,105)=431.894, ηp2=.804, p<.05, observed power 1.000).  This outcome shows 
the manipulations were being correctly reflected in the scale questions on 
responsibility.  This test provides confidence in the internal validity of the 
responsibility scale as the scale questions about responsibility are measuring 
stakeholder views of responsibility accurately. 
Table 45:   Impact of assigned responsibility in scenarios on assessed responsibility 
over time 
Time Total 
M(SD) 
Fully Responsible 
M(SD) 
Not  Responsible 
M(SD) 
Mdiff (SE) 
2 4.88 (1.16) 4.85 (1.17) 4.92 (1.15) -.069 (.226) 
3 4.02 (1.99) 5.85 (.90) 2.29 (.87) -3.56 (.171)* 
*p<.05 
The movement in the responsibility means across the different responsibility 
treatments from time 2 to time 3 was then considered.  The ANOVA test using the 
difference in responsibility means from time 2 to time 3 showed that the levels of 
responsibility were having a significant effect on the shift in measured responsibility 
(F(1,105)=186.938, ηp2=.640, p<.05, observed power 1.00).  As outlined in Figure 
30, the ‘fully responsible’ treatment showed a strong significant increase as expected 
from time 2 (M=4.85, SD1.17) to time 3 (M=5.85, SD=.90; Mdiff = 1.006, SE=.190, 
p<.05).  The ‘not responsible’ treatment showed a strong significant decrease as 
expected from time 2 (M=4.92, SD1.15) to time 3 (M=2.29, SD=.84; Mdiff = -2.624, 
SE=.185, p<.05).   
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Figure 30:  Changes in measured responsibility by treatment group over time 
 
Summary of Experiment 4 Results 
By manipulating responsibility as an independent variable, a strong effect size and 
significant relationships could be demonstrated, over and above the previous 
experiments where participants needed to attribute responsibility without direct 
information on organisational responsibility.  Support was provided through the 
results in Experiment 4 for the internal validity of the scale items for the 
responsibility measure used in this study as they were accurately aligning measured 
responsibility through participant judgments with assigned information in the 
scenarios.  
The results from Experiment 4 confirmed the predicted main effect of responsibility 
on reputation and legitimacy.  The hypothesis was fully supported with the 
organisation that was fully responsible for the crisis event reporting significantly 
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lower scores for reputation and legitimacy than the organisation that was not 
responsible for the event.  Once the assignment of responsibility was known at time 
3 in the experiment, the organisation that was fully responsible saw a further decline 
in its reputation and legitimacy scores from the time of the crisis event.  Thus, 
further damage to the organisation’s reputation and legitimacy was caused through 
the assignment of responsibility.   
The complete opposite was true for the organisation that was held to have no 
responsibility for the crisis event.  Once this information was known at time 3, the 
organisation’s reputation and legitimacy scores increased significantly from the time 
of the crisis event.  This increase was substantial enough to return the organisation’s 
reputation and legitimacy scores to their pre-crisis event levels, meaning no further 
damage to the organisation’s reputation and legitimacy was evident.  In real crisis 
events, this would represent an ideal situation for the organisation. 
As with Experiments 1 – 3, the impact of the crisis event on organisational 
reputation and legitimacy was clearly supported in this experiment with significant 
declines in reputation and legitimacy scores from pre-crisis levels at time 1 to those 
immediately following the crisis event at time 2. 
The results in Experiment 4 need to be considered in light of the assignment of 
responsibility by a third party.  In this case, the independent assessment was done by 
an authority with implied power.  This is different to an organisation using its 
response to a crisis event to either deny or accept responsibility which is likely to 
produce less clarity on the responsibility measure as has been seen in Experiments 1 
– 3.  The organisation is not seen to have independence in the presentation of 
information regarding the crisis event in which it is involved and this conflicted 
position is assessed by stakeholders in their judgments on organisational 
responsibility and the associated reputation and legitimacy. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter described in detail the study’s focus on responsibility in Stage Two of 
the research process.  It has provided an analysis of the differential treatment of 
responsibility as a variable in Experiment 4 when compared with the other 
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experiments in this series and confirmed the influence of responsibility on 
stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy.  Chapter 6 will address Stage 
Three of the research process that focuses on the intensifier variable of relationship 
history.    
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Chapter 6  Stage Three Results 
This chapter reports the results of Stage Three of this four-stage research project.  
This stage of the research was designed to more closely focus on the role of 
relationship history in influencing stakeholder assessments of organisations and their 
perceived responsibility for a crisis event. The foci experiment in this stage, 
Experiment 5, is reported in detail including descriptions of the experiment’s aims, 
its sample, key data analysis techniques used and the independent and dependent 
variables used.  The results of hypothesis testing through the use of multivariate 
statistical analysis are outlined.   Support for the hypotheses is discussed where 
appropriate and forms the basis for the further analysis and discussion of the research 
questions in Chapter 8. 
 Stage Three Focus 
The focus for Stage Three was on the variable of relationship history which 
incorporates relationship character and organisational age as outlined in Chapter 2.  
One experiment, Experiment 5, was run to test relevant hypotheses on the effect of 
relationship history on the dependent variables of reputation and legitimacy and 
whether this effect occurred through the proposed mediator of responsibility.  In 
addition, the experiment permitted further refinement of the scenarios to be used in 
the fourth and final stage of this study and provided a further check on the reliability 
of the scales used in the six experiments. 
Research Questions  
The research questions being addressed in Experiment 5 are: 
Research Question 4  
How does an organisation’s relationship history with its stakeholders 
influence stakeholder perceptions of its reputation and legitimacy? 
Research Question 5  
How do stakeholder perceptions of an organisation’s responsibility mediate 
the influence of itsrelationship history on its reputation and legitimacy? 
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Experiment 5 Results 
Experiment 5 used a 1 (crisis cluster: accident) x 5 (4 relationship history dimensions 
+ control) way design.  The relationship history conditions involved two sub 
categories of organisational age (mature and new) and two sub categories of 
relationship character (positive and negative community relationships).  As bringing 
these different dimensions of relationship history together in the one experiment has 
not been tested before, the different treatments were firstly tested separately.  Thus, 
four different scenarios using relationship history treatments and one control 
scenario with no information on relationship history were developed for this 
experiment with an accident serving as the crisis event across all treatments (see 
Appendices 30 – 38).  Combinations of the relationship history conditions (for 
example, new and negative community relationships) were tested in Experiment 6.  
Only two time periods were used for Experiment 5 as there is no response to the 
crisis event used in this experiment.  Time 1 represented the pre-crisis time period 
with information on the company only available at this time including the particular 
relationship history treatment.  Time 2 represented the crisis event which included 
the description of the crisis and repeated the relationship history treatment. 
The sample for the experiment was 281 students drawn from undergraduate and 
postgraduate classes.  Their ages ranged from 18 – 59 years (M=25, SD 6.11) and 
included 57% female and 43% male respondents.  Cell sizes for each of the six 
possible treatments ranged from 41 to 77, above the level recommended to meet the 
reliability measures for analysis (Bernard, 1994). 
Manipulation Checks 
Descriptive statistics were used to check the success of the independent variables’ 
manipulation.  The first manipulation check was conducted to determine if 
participants were selecting the theoretically described crisis cluster (accident) present 
in the scenarios.   Each participant was asked whether the scenario they had read fell 
into the victim, accident or preventable category.  The accident category was clearly 
identified by the participants at time 2.  
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Table 46: Manipulation check on crisis cluster  
Time Manipulation Check on  
Crisis Cluster 
M (SD) 
2 Victim 3.36 (1.20) 
 Accident 5.22 (1.01) 
 Preventable 3.65 (1.00) 
M>4.0=agree 
A second manipulation check was conducted to determine whether participants were 
identifying each of the embedded conditions for organisational age and relationship 
character. The check was carried out at time 1 and time 2.  Two descriptors had been 
used to reinforce the relationship character variable (praise or criticism by 
community leaders for the organisation’s level of contribution to the community; 
description of different types of community contributions or lack thereof) so two 
questions were used for this manipulation check. The correct description was 
selected in each treatment category at both time periods as demonstrated in Table 47 
by all means being more than 4.0 (=agree). 
Table 47: Manipulation check on conditions of relationship history 
Relationship History Treatment 
 
 Time 1 
M(SD) 
Time 2 
M(SD) 
Organisational age Mature 5.09 (1.18) 4.82 (1.35) 
 New 4.92 (1.38) 4.92 (1.42) 
Relationship character (test question 1) Positive 5.42 (1.49) 5.14 (1.52) 
 Negative 6.18 (1.42) 6.11 (1.36) 
Relationship character (test question 2) Positive 5.88 (1.53) 5.64 (1.42) 
 Negative 6.23 (1.16) 5.85 (1.73) 
M>4.0=agree 
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Reliability Analysis 
Internal reliability analyses were conducted on the items used to operationalise the 
two dependent measures of reputation and legitimacy and the proposed mediator of 
responsibility.   
Responsibility was measured once and employed a three item scale adapted from 
Griffin, Babin and Darden (1991).  The inter-item reliability for responsibility using 
Cronbach alpha was moderate (α = .753).    
Reputation was measured across two time periods and was assessed using a five-item 
scale developed from McCroskey (1966) and adapted by Coombs & Holladay 
(1992).  The inter-item reliability for reputation measured by Cronbach alpha was 
moderate (α = .71-.77). 
Legitimacy was also measured across two time periods. The inter-item reliability for 
legitimacy measured by Cronbach alpha was strong (α = .88-.90). 
Testing for Discrete Dependent Variables 
Correlation analysis was run at each of the relevant time periods to test the 
association between reputation and legitimacy. Pearson r remained between .617 - 
.626 and was significant across the different scales and different time periods, thus 
confirming that reputation and legitimacy were strongly related.   
Table 48: Correlation analysis of reputation and legitimacy across time 
Time Reputation  
M (SD) 
Legitimacy 
(Revised) 
M (SD) 
Pearson r 
1 4.62 (1.06) 4.75 (.91) .617** 
2 4.14 (1.01) 3.94 (.96) .626** 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Hypothesis Testing 
The first part of Experiment 5 tests propositions for how different forms of the 
relationship history variable influence stakeholder perceptions of organisational 
reputation and legitimacy.  While the organising research problem and Experiment 6 
217 
 
look at hypotheses related to the interactions of the two subcomponents of 
relationship history (organisational age and relationship character), Experiment 5 
firstly considers each part of relationship history separately to better understand the 
direct impact of each component before considering interaction effects.   
Relevant Hypotheses 
Two hypotheses were considered in the first part of Experiment 5: 
Hypothesis 4.1  
A mature organisation is more likely to have higher reputation and 
legitimacy scores than a new organisation. 
Hypothesis 4.2  
An organisation with positive prior stakeholder relationships is more likely 
to have higher reputation and legitimacy scores than an organisation with 
negative prior stakeholder relationships. 
Reputation and Legitimacy (pre-crisis) 
To test these hypotheses, a one-way MANOVA was conducted to measure the 
impact of the 5 components of the independent variable of relationship history on the 
dependent variables of organisational reputation and legitimacy at time 1, prior to the 
introduction of the crisis event.  Significant differences between the subject groups 
are expected as the participants have received only one of five different treatments.   
Two sets of comparisons are made related to the two subcomponents of 
organisational age and relationship character.   For organisational age, there should 
be significant differences among mature, new and control treatments.  For 
relationship character, there should be significant differences among positive 
community relations, negative community relations and control treatments.  The 
means for reputation and legitimacy within each treatment group at time 1 are 
outlined in Table 49. 
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Table 49:  Impact of relationship history components on reputation and legitimacy 
prior to a crisis 
Treatment Reputation M(SD) Legitimacy M(SD) 
Mature 4.69 (.98) 4.82 (.89) 
New 4.54 (.67) 4.69 (.81) 
Control 4.56 (1.00) 4.78 (.94) 
Positive 5.27 (.91) 4.95 (.92) 
Negative 3.82 (1.08) 4.45 (.91) 
 
The multivariate analysis using Pillai’s trace showed relationship history was having 
a significant effect on reputation and legitimacy (F(8,552)=9.557, ηp2=.122, p<.05, 
observed power 1.00).  The univariate analysis showed significant difference among 
the treatments used in Experiment 5 for reputation (F(4,276)=20.036, ηp2=.225, 
p<.05, observed power 1.00) and legitimacy (F(4,276)=2.788, ηp2=.039, p<.05, 
observed power .761) at time 1.  This suggests participants were being influenced by 
different information on a company’s relationship history prior to any crisis event 
and this information had a considerably greater impact on the company’s reputation 
than its legitimacy. 
Posthoc analysis using Tukey’s HSD test among the individual treatments showed 
there was no significant difference between the two treatments of organisational age 
on reputation or legitimacy, nor was there any difference between information on 
this variable and the control treatment.  So while the mature treatment did have a 
slightly higher mean as shown in Figures 31 and 32, information on organisational 
age did not appear to influence judgments on reputation and legitimacy.   
There was a significant difference between the two treatments of relationship 
character on reputation and there was also a significant difference between these 
treatments and the control group.  Thus, information on a positive relationship 
provided significant benefits to the company’s reputation over information on a 
negative relationship as well as no information at all as outlined in Figure 31.  
However, this was not the case for legitimacy.  While there was a significant 
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difference between the two treatments of positive and negative relationships, there 
was no significant difference with the control treatment as shown in Figure 32.   
 
Figure 31:  Impact of different components of relationship history on reputation at 
time 1 
 
Figure 32:  Impact of different components of relationship history on legitimacy at 
time 1 
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As shown in Figures 31 and 32, the mature state and the positive relationship 
character gave the highest scores in reputation and legitimacy, with both above the 
control state of no information.    The new state and the negative relationship 
character gave the lowest scores in reputation and legitimacy, both below the control 
state of no information. 
The second part of Experiment 5 considered the influence of responsibility as a 
mediator to the relationship between the components of relationship history and 
reputation and legitimacy.  This part of the experiment required a crisis event to be 
introduced to ascertain organisational responsibility for the crisis. 
Relevant Hypotheses 
The two hypotheses being considered in this part are: 
Hypothesis 5.1  
A new organisation is more likely to be perceived as responsible for a crisis 
and is less likely to maintain its reputation and legitimacy from the time of 
the crisis than a mature organisation. 
Hypothesis 5.2  
An organisation with negative prior stakeholder relationships is more likely 
to be perceived as responsible for a crisis and is less likely to maintain its 
reputation and legitimacy from the time of the crisis than an organisation 
with positive prior stakeholder relationships. 
These hypotheses were tested through a number of analyses.   Firstly, the mediating 
variable of responsibility was measured at time 2 which is the time of the crisis event 
(accident).  A one-way ANOVA was run to measure the impact of the 5 components 
of the independent variable of relationship history on responsibility at this time. 
Significant differences between the subject groups based on the different treatments 
are expected.  For organisational age, there should be significant differences among 
mature, new and control treatments.  For relationship character, there should be 
significant differences among the positive community relations, negative community 
relations and control treatments. 
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To assess whether responsibility was mediating the effect of relationship history on 
reputation and legitimacy as outlined in the earlier parts of the analysis for 
Experiment 5, a MANCOVA was run on the variables of reputation and legitimacy 
at time 2 using the scores for responsibility at time 2 when the crisis event has 
occurred.   
Finally, a repeated measures MANOVA was run to assess any movement in the 
dependent variables of reputation and legitimacy from time 1 to time 2.  Any 
movement should be related to the crisis event and should show significant 
differences between the subject groups based on the different treatments as outlined 
previously.     
Responsibility 
The first part of the hypotheses relates to judgments about responsibility.  The one 
way ANOVA using Pillai’s Trace as the test statistic showed no significant effect of 
relationship history on responsibility at time 2 (F(4,276)=.914, ηp2=.013, n.s., 
observed power .289).  This may suggest that the participants were more influenced 
by the crisis type (accident) than the information on relationship history or the effect 
size is insufficient to show a significant difference.   
Posthoc analysis using Tukey’s HSD test among the individual treatments showed 
there was no significant difference between the two treatments of organisational age 
on responsibility, nor was there any difference between information on this variable 
and the control treatment.  The new organisation treatment did have a higher mean 
for responsibility than the mature and control groups as outlined in Table 50 so the 
trend that the new treatment would be held more responsible appears correct but the 
effect size is not significant. 
There was also no significant difference between the two treatments of relationship 
character on responsibility nor was there a significant difference between these 
treatments and the control group.  However, the negative treatment was predicted to 
produce a higher level of responsibility and this group had the highest mean as 
outlined in Table 50.  The positive relationship group mean was below that of the 
control treatment which suggests the correct trend but not a significant result. 
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Table 50:  Responsibility outcomes for the different relationship history treatments 
Treatment Responsibility  
M(SD) 
Mature 4.12 (1.15) 
New 4.39 (.93) 
Control 4.29 (1.05) 
Positive 4.13 (1.15) 
Negative 4.43 (1.39) 
 
Without a significant main effect of relationship history on to responsibility, no 
mediator effect for responsibility will be seen.  This was confirmed through the 
MANCOVA results as outlined in Table 51 which showed no change in the effect of 
relationship history on reputation and legitimacy with the inclusion of responsibility 
at time 2 as the co-variate. 
Table 51:   Results of MANOVA/MANCOVA using responsibility at time 2 as 
covariate 
Variable df F Effect ηp2 Observed Power 
Relationship History  8,552 10.871* .136 1.000 
Relationship History (with 
responsibility 2 as co-
variate) 
8,550 10.996* .138 1.000 
Responsibility (Time 2) 2,274 46.443* .253 1.000 
*p<.05 
As a final test on the influence of relationship history on responsibility, Experiment 
5 included two direct questions to participants about this influence.  The participants 
agreed that the organisational age (M=4.34, SD1.33 where 4.0=agree) and 
relationship character (M=4.1, SD1.83) did influence their perception of 
responsibility which is supported by the trend data. 
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The main effect of relationship history on each of the dependent variables over time 
was then examined using a repeated measures MANOVA to ascertain whether there 
was movement in reputation or legitimacy following the crisis event.  The 
multivariate analysis showed time was having a significant effect on reputation and 
legitimacy (F(2,275)=104.621, ηp2=.432, p<.05, observed power 1.00) as was 
relationship history (F(8,552)=12.742, ηp2=.156, p<.05, observed power 1.00).  
Further analysis was then undertaken on each of the dependent variables. 
Reputation (post crisis) 
The univariate analysis using Pillai’s Trace showed time was having a significant 
effect on reputation (F(1,276)=61.840, ηp=.183, p<.05, observed power 1.00).  
Looking at the different time periods, reputation declined from time 1 to time 2 
suggesting information on the crisis event negatively affected perceptions of 
reputation (Mtime1 4.58,  SD 1.06; Mtime2 4.11, SD 1.01; MDiff -.463, SE .059, p<.05).  
As reported earlier, there were significant differences in reputation scores across the 
five treatment groups at time 1 (F(4,276)=20.036, ηp2=.225, p<.05) and this 
remained significant at time 2 (F(4,276)=19.842, ηp2=.223, p<.05). The reputation 
scores for each of the treatment groups across the time periods is displayed in Figure 
33. 
224 
 
 
 
Figure 33:  Impact of different components of relationship history on reputation at 
time 1 and time 2 
The posthoc analysis using Tukey’s HSD test among the individual treatments 
showed there was significant difference between the two treatments of organisational 
age on reputation at time 2 (MDiff mature vs new=.518 (.177), p<.05), however there was 
no significant difference between these conditions and the control group (MDiff mature 
vs control=.197 (.187), n.s.;  MDiff new vs control=-.321 (.189), n.s.).  At time 2, the mature 
treatment had the higher mean, above both the control group and the new treatment.   
There was also a significant difference between the two treatments of relationship 
character on reputation (MDiff positive vs negative=1.299 (.155), p<.05), however, the 
difference between the treatments and the control group varied.   There was a 
significant difference between the negative character treatment and the control group 
(MDiff negative vs control=-.827 (.182), p<.05), however, not between the positive 
character treatment and the control group (MDiff positive vs control=.472 (.174), n.s.   
Thus, information on a negative relationship was having a more significant negative 
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impact on reputation than information on a positive relationship and no information 
at all, however, information on a positive relationship was not having a significant 
difference to no information on this trait. 
Looking across the time periods, all treatments showed a significant movement in 
reputational means as outlined in Table 52.   The movement in the control treatment 
can be specifically attributed to the crisis event and the mean differential provides a 
measure of the damage to reputation through the event.   If the mean differential of 
any of the treatments is less than for the control, that treatment is providing some 
level of protection for the organisation against the damage caused solely by the crisis 
event.  If the mean differential is more than for the control, that treatment is not 
providing sufficient protection to counter the effects of the event, although different 
treatments may be providing greater levels of protection than others.  As outlined in 
Table 52, the mature treatment was the only treatment that reduced the level of 
damage to the organisation’s reputation caused through the crisis event.  
Table 52: Reputation outcomes for the different relationship history components 
across time 
Treatment Reputation Time 1 
M(SD) 
Reputation Time 2 
M (SD) 
MDiff across time 
(SE) 
Mature 4.69 (.98) 4.41 (.98) -.283 (.133)* 
New 4.54 (.67) 3.89 (.76) -.653 (.137)* 
Control 4.56 (1.00) 4.21 (.83) -.354 (.151)* 
Positive 5.27 (.91) 4.68 (.88) -.587 (.110)* 
Negative 3.82 (1.08) 3.38 (.97) -.438 (.125)* 
*p<.05 
As hypothesised, the new treatment saw a larger decline in reputation scores than the 
mature treatment and also saw the largest decline of any of the treatments.  Thus the 
hypothesis that a new organisation would be less likely to maintain its reputation 
than a mature organisation was supported.  However, the hypothesis that a negative 
relationship character would impact more than a positive character was not 
supported with a larger decline in reputation scores found for the positive character 
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treatment.   As outlined in Figure 34, the positive character treatment did still record 
a higher mean overall than the negative treatment at time 2 suggesting the 
information on the positive community relationships was still being seen as 
beneficial by the participants when judging the organisation’s reputation. 
 
Figure 34:  Impact of different components of relationship history on reputation over 
time 
As a final test on the influence of organisational age and relationship character on 
reputation, participants were asked direct questions on this influence.  The 
participants agreed that the organisational age (M=4.68, SD1.37 where 4.0=agree) 
and relationship character (M=5.05, SD1.60) did influence their perceptions of 
reputation. 
Legitimacy (post crisis) 
The univariate analysis using Pillai’s Trace showed time was also having a 
significant effect on legitimacy (F(1,276)=207.284, ηp2=.429, p<.05).  Legitimacy 
declined from time 1 to time 2 suggesting information on the crisis event negatively 
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affected perceptions of legitimacy (Mtime1 4.75,  SD .911; Mtime2 3.90, SD .96; MDiff -
.842, SE .059, p<.05).  There were significant difference in legitimacy scores across 
the five treatment groups at time 1 (F(4,276)=2.788,  ηp2=.039, p<.05) and this 
remained significant at time 2 (F(4,276)=9.051, ηp2=.116, p<.05) with the scores for 
each treatment at each time in relation to the control condition displayed in Figure 
35. 
 
Figure 35:  Impact of different components of relationship history on legitimacy at 
time 1 and time 2 
The posthoc analysis using Tukey’s HSD test among the individual treatments 
showed there was significant difference between the two treatments of organisational 
age on legitimacy at time 2 (MDiff mature vs new=.578 (.181), p<.05), however there 
was no significant difference between these conditions and the control group (MDiff 
mature vs control=.480 (.191), n.s.;  MDiff new vs control=-.094 (.193), n.s.).  At time 2, the 
mature treatment had the higher mean as shown in Figure 35, above both the control 
group and the new treatment.   
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There was also a significant difference between the two treatments of relationship 
character on legitimacy (MDiff positive vs negative=.723 (.158), p<.05), however, the 
difference between the treatments and the control group varied.   There was a 
significant difference between the positive character treatment and the control group 
(MDiff positive vs control=.674 (.177), p<.05), however, not between the negative 
character treatment and the control group (MDiff negative vs control=-.049 (.186), n.s.   
Thus, information on a positive relationship was having a more significant 
favourable impact on legitimacy scores than information on a negative relationship 
and no information at all, however, information on a negative relationship was not 
showing a significant difference to no information on this trait. 
Across the time periods, all treatments showed significant movements in legitimacy 
means as outlined in Table 53.   Of note here is the larger movement in legitimacy 
score for the control condition compared with the movement in reputation score for 
this condition.  The crisis event had a larger impact on stakeholder perceptions of 
legitimacy as evidenced by a greater shift in legitimacy scores across the time 
periods.  The mature condition and the positive relationship condition are both 
providing protection against the damage to legitimacy done through the crisis event.   
The negative condition has also recorded a lower mean differential than the control 
condition, however, the difference in scores is less noticeable.  
Table 53: Legitimacy outcomes for the different relationship history components 
across time 
Treatment Legitimacy Time 1 
M(SD) 
Legitimacy Time 2 
M (SD) 
MDiff across time 
(SE) 
Mature 4.82 (.89) 4.18 (.84) -.646 (.132)* 
New 4.69 (.81) 3.60 (.86) -1.09 (.136)* 
Control 4.78 (.94) 3.70 (.83) -1.08 (.150)* 
Positive 4.95 (.92) 4.37 (.95) -.585 (.109)* 
Negative 4.45 (.91) 3.65 (1.02) -.805 (.124)* 
*p<.05 
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As hypothesised, the new treatment saw a larger decline than the mature treatment 
and also saw the largest decline of any of the treatments.  Thus the hypothesis that a 
new organisation would be less likely to maintain its legitimacy score than a mature 
organisation was supported.  The hypothesis that a negative relationship character 
would impact legitimacy scores more than a positive character was also supported 
with a larger decline found for the negative character treatment.   The positive 
character treatment recorded the smallest decline of all the treatments suggesting it 
was protecting the organisation, followed closely by the mature treatment, thus age 
and positive relationships were providing a buffer to legitimacy impacts. 
 
Figure 36:  Impact of different components of relationship history on legitimacy over 
time 
Participants were asked direct questions on the influence of organisational age and 
relationship character on legitimacy.  The participants agreed that the organisational 
age (M=4.60, SD1.30 where 4.0=agree) and relationship character (M=4.56, SD1.78) 
did influence their perception of legitimacy. 
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Summary of Experiment 5 Results 
Experiment 5 allowed for the analysis of the impact of various components of 
relationship history on an organisation’s reputation and legitimacy prior to a crisis 
event and following one.  As a control condition was included in this experiment, the 
analysis can show whether different types of information have an effect over and 
above no information on each of the constructs. 
The results for Experiment 5 supported the influence of relationship history on 
reputation and legitimacy assessments prior to a crisis event with a much stronger 
impact on reputation than legitimacy. 
The impact of information about an organisation’s age did not show a significant 
impact on reputation and legitimacy prior to the crisis and there was no significant 
difference between the treatments with this information and the control condition of 
no information.  Therefore, Hypothesis 4.1 was not supported.  The trend data 
suggested the mature organisation was being scored more highly on reputation and 
legitimacy than the new organisation, however, the results were not significant. 
Hypothesis 5.1 on the impact of relationship character was supported through the 
analysis.  Prior to a crisis event, there were significant differences in the impact on 
reputation between the positive and negative relationship character treatments and 
between these and the control.  Thus, the participants judged the company differently 
once they knew this information with a positive relationship character providing a 
positive impact through higher reputation assessments.  There were also significant 
differences on legitimacy scores as predicted, however, information on relationship 
character in relation to no information did not show a difference.   
As with the previous experiments, the crisis event had a significant effect on 
judgments on reputation and legitimacy with all reputation and legitimacy scores 
across all treatment conditions declining from pre-crisis assessment levels.  
Relationship history continued to have a significant impact following the crisis 
event.  The impact on legitimacy strengthened at time 2 but remained below that for 
reputation.   
For organisational age, there were significant differences between the mature and 
new conditions on reputation and legitimacy scores at time 2, however, the 
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differences were not significant against the control condition.    The mature 
organisation recorded a smaller decline in reputation scores than the new 
organisation, thus providing partial support for Hypothesis 5.1.   The mature 
organisation recorded the smallest decline of any of the conditions and showed a 
smaller decline in reputation scores than the control group which suggests the mature 
state of the organisation was provided some level of protection against the damage of 
the crisis event.  In contrast, the new organisation recorded the largest decline in 
reputation of any of the conditions which suggests no such protective state for a new 
organisation.  For legitimacy, the new organisation saw the largest decline of any of 
the treatment conditions further confirming the lack of protective powers associated 
with a new organisation.  The mature organisation saw a significant decline but this 
decline was smaller than the control condition and the new organisation condition, 
thus further supporting Hypothesis 5.1. 
For reputation and legitimacy scores following the crisis event, relationship character 
was having a significant effect, however, the difference between the treatments and 
the control condition was less clear with different outcomes for reputation and 
legitimacy.  For reputation, information on the positive character resulted in a larger 
decline in reputation scores than information on the negative character which was 
against the predicted trend.  The organisation with a positive relationship appeared to 
be judged more harshly for the crisis event which may suggest participants had 
expected the organisation to be more in control of its environment, providing better 
protection for its workers against the accident that was the subject of the experiment 
scenario.  Information on the negative relationship resulted in the larger decline on 
legitimacy scores as predicted with information on the positive character resulting in 
the smallest decline in legitimacy scores of any of the treatments.  Thus, only partial 
support for Hypothesis 5.2 was established.   
While the main effect for relationship history on reputation and legitimacy was 
established, no such effect was established on responsibility.  The new organisation 
and the negative character organisations recorded the highest levels of organisational 
responsibility for the crisis event but these were not significantly different to the 
other judgments, nor the control condition.   Therefore, full support for Hypotheses 
5.1 and 5.2 cannot be established without the mediation effect of responsibility. 
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While Experiment 5 tested the individual components of relationship history against 
each other and against a control condition, combinations of the components were 
tested in Experiment 6 to determine whether organisational age and relationship 
character interact to influence responsibility, reputation and legitimacy.  
Conclusion 
This chapter reported the results of the third stage of this study, describing the 
experimental treatment of the variable of relationship history and its subattributes of 
relationship character and organisational age.  The statistical analysis used to unpack 
the influence of this variable on stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy 
prior to and after a crisis event was discussed and conclusions on these relationship 
drawn.  The role of organisational responsibility for a crisis and its influence in these 
relationships was also described.  The next chapter reports on the final stage of this 
study which brings together the independent and dependent variables studied in the 
first three stages. 
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Chapter 7 Stage Four Results 
This chapter reports on the last of the four stages of experiments described in 
Chapter 3 to explore the research problem.  This stage involved one experiment, 
Experiment 6.  This experiment is described in detail including a summary of its 
aims, the sample accessed and the key data analysis techniques used. The 
independent and dependent variables used in this experiment are presented and the 
results of hypothesis testing through the use of multivariate statistical analysis are 
outlined.   Support for the hypotheses is discussed where appropriate and forms the 
basis for the further analysis and discussion of the research questions in Chapter 8. 
Stage Four Focus 
Building on the results of the other three stages, Stage Four brought together all of 
the independent and dependent variables into the one experiment, Experiment 6.  
This stage’s focus was on how during different crisis situations, an organisation’s 
crisis response strategy in conjunction with its relationship history impact 
stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy directly through a main effect 
and/or indirectly through the mediator of organisational responsibility.   
Research Questions 
It addresses the following two research questions: 
Research Question 6 
How does an organisation’s relationship history and its response to a crisis 
from different crisis clusters influence stakeholder perceptions of its 
reputation and legitimacy? 
Research Question 7  
How does responsibility mediate the influence of an organisation’s 
relationship history and its response to a crisis from different crisis clusters 
on stakeholder perceptions of its reputation and legitimacy? 
In particular, Experiment 6 extends the work of Coombs and Holladay (2001) on the 
operation of intensifiers in the crisis situation.  Under Coombs’ proposition (2004), if 
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a negative intensifier effect is present, organisations should move from a 
theoretically matched response (matching crisis cluster and response) to a step-up 
strategy which sees the selection of a response strategy originally designed for a 
higher order crisis cluster.  For example, a deny strategy is theoretically predicted to 
match the requirements of a crisis from the victim cluster.  However, if a negative 
intensifier effect is in operation, a strategy from the next highest cluster (diminish) 
should be used to match the higher level of assumed organisational responsibility 
(see Table 7 for full explanation of options).   
The intensifier effect being tested in Experiment 6 is relationship history, with the 
subattributes of organisational age and relationship character.  In Experiment 6, an 
interaction effect of the two subattributes was investigated as the individual effect of 
each subattribute was tested in Experiment 5.  
Experiment 6 Results 
Experiment 6 used a 2 (crisis cluster: victim and accident) x 2 (relationship history - 
organisational age: new and mature) x 2 (relationship history - relationship character: 
negative and positive) x 3 (response strategy: deny, diminish and deal) between 
subjects design.   It tested the interaction of these independent variables on 
stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy and the proposed mediator of 
responsibility.  Pre- and post-test design was used for the dependent variables and 
mediator.  
Participants read a short news story outlining company information and a second 
news story covering a crisis event and completed the first questionnaire which 
measured organisational reputation and legitimacy as well as responsibility for the 
crisis event (Time 1).  The participants then read a third news story which included 
information on the company’s response to the crisis event and completed the second 
questionnaire which measured reputation, legitimacy and responsibility (Time 2).     
Participants then read a final news story which included information on the 
company’s relationship history and reiterating the company’s response to the crisis 
(Time 3).  The final questionnaire was then completed which again measured 
reputation, legitimacy and responsibility.  Manipulation checks were undertaken as 
appropriate within the questionnaires. 
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To inform the two research questions being examined in Experiment 6, specific 
hypotheses were investigated.  
Hypothesis 6.1  
In the presence of a positive intensifier, a matched strategy will at least 
maintain stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy from the time of 
the crisis event. 
Hypothesis 6.2 
In the presence of a negative intensifier, a matched strategy will not maintain 
stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy from the time of the crisis 
event. 
Hypothesis 6.3 
In the presence of a negative intensifier, a step up strategy will provide a more 
positive outcome than a matched strategy on stakeholder perceptions of 
reputation and legitimacy. 
Hypothesis 7.1  
In the presence of a positive intensifier, a matched strategy will at least 
maintain stakeholder perceptions of responsibility and subsequently will at least 
maintain stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy from the time of 
the crisis event. 
Hypothesis 7.2 
In the presence of a negative intensifier, a matched strategy will not maintain 
stakeholder perceptions of responsibility and subsequently will not maintain 
stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy from the time of the crisis 
event. 
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Hypothesis 7.3 
In the presence of a negative intensifier, a step up strategy will provide more 
positive outcomes than a matched strategy for stakeholder perceptions of 
responsibility and subsequently provide more positive outcomes than a matched 
strategy on stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy. 
Four possible intensifier effects of relationship history were constructed for this 
experiment: 
1. Mature and positive relationship character 
2. Mature and negative relationship character 
3. New and positive relationship character 
4. New and negative relationship character 
 
Intensifier 1 is hypothesised to have the most positive effects on reputation and 
legitimacy as it brings together the positive attributes of maturity and positive 
relationships with the community.  Intensifier 4 is hypothesised to have the most 
negative effects on reputation and legitimacy as it brings together the negative 
elements of the liability of newness and negative relationships with the community.   
Intensifiers 2 and 3 should provide some positive effects as they have one of the 
positive elements of each of the subattributes of relationship history. The relative 
strength of the age attribute over the relationship character attribute will determine 
whether the combined intensifier effect is positive or negative.  Inconclusive results 
were achieved in Experiment 5 to guide the direction of the hypothesis for these two 
intensifiers.  Based on the results of the earlier experiments, at the time of the crisis 
event, intensifier 3 (new and positive) would be expected to have a more positive 
effect on reputation over intensifier 2 (mature and negative), however, intensifier 3 
and intensifier 2 would have the same effect on legitimacy.  As Experiment 5 only 
tested the individual components, the interaction effect of age and relationship 
character may result in different outcomes to those of the individual components by 
reinforcing either the positive or negative components of each.   
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The sample for the experiment was 559 students drawn from undergraduate and 
postgraduate classes.  Their ages ranged from 18 – 63 years (M=24, SD 5.36) and 
included 64% female and 36% male respondents.  Cell sizes for the 24 treatments 
ranged from 20 – 30 participants.  A good balance of the different treatments of the 
independent variables across the sample was achieved as outlined in Table 54. 
 
Table 54:  Percentage of participants in each treatment for each independent 
variable 
Independent Variable Treatments 
(% of sample) 
Crisis cluster Victim 50.4% 
Accident 49.6% 
Response strategy Deny 33% 
Diminish 33% 
Deal 34% 
Relationship character Positive 52.6% 
Negative 47.4% 
Organisational age New 50.8% 
Mature 49.2% 
 
Manipulation Checks 
As with the previous experiments, descriptive statistics were run and a series of 
ANOVA tests used to check the success of the independent variables’ manipulation.   
The first manipulation check was conducted to determine if the participants were 
selecting the theoretically described crisis cluster (victim or accident) present in the 
scenarios (see Appendices 39,55).   Significant differences were expected as each 
participant had only read one scenario.  As outlined in Table 55, the correct cluster 
was clearly identified by the participants at all times through the experiment.   
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Table 55: Manipulation check on crisis cluster across time 
Time Manipulation 
Check (Crisis 
Cluster) 
Victim Crisis 
Cluster 
Scenario 
M(SD) 
Accident Crisis 
Cluster Scenario 
M(SD) 
F df 
1 Victim 4.87 (1.22) ^ 3.59 (1.39) 132.815* 1/556 
 Accident 2.69 (1.49) 5.28 (1.23) ^ 498.564* 1/556 
2 Victim 4.93 (1.35) ^ 3.77 (1.43) 97.005* 1/556 
 Accident 2.80 (1.58) 5.22(1.22) ^ 404.882* 1/556 
3 Victim 4.93 (1.31) ^ 3.78 (1.50) 92.013* 1/556 
 Accident 3.02 (1.62) 5.25 (1.40) ^ 294.156* 1/556 
^= correct cluster *p<.05; M>4.0=agree 
A second manipulation check was conducted to determine whether the participants 
were selecting the theoretically described strategy responses (deny, diminish, deal) 
as each participant only read one of the strategy types.  The deny treatment involved 
the company using the scapegoat strategy of blaming someone else (see Appendices 
40,56); the diminish treatment had the company offering an excuse (see Appendices 
45,61); and the deal strategy involved the company using the compassion strategy 
which included offering some form of compensation (see Appendices 50,66).  The 
check was carried out at time 2 and 3.  As outlined in Table 56, participants selected 
the correct strategy in each treatment category with a significant difference being 
demonstrated among the strategies in each of the groupings.  
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Table 56: Manipulation check on strategy 
Time Treatment 
(Response 
Strategy) 
 
Deny 
M (SD) 
Diminish 
M (SD) 
Deal 
M(SD) 
F df 
2 Deny 5.98 (1.42) ^ 3.93 (1.89) 3.50 (1.67) 115.306* 2/553 
 Diminish 5.05 (1.67) 6.06 (1.25) ^ 5.28 (1.55) 22.693* 2/553 
 Deal 2.88 (1.51) 4.27 (1.45) 5.96 (1.45) ^ 204.556* 2/553 
3 Deny 6.01 (1.39) ^ 3.87 (1.76) 3.55 (1.69) 123.329* 2/553 
 Diminish 4.90 (1.65) 5.94 (1.23) ^ 5.32 (1.51) 22.973* 2/553 
 Deal 2.86 (1.49) 3.90 (1.57) 5.83 (1.46) ^ 183.564* 2/553 
^= correct strategy, *p<.05, M>4.0=agree 
Two further manipulation checks were run on each of the subcomponents of the 
relationship history independent variable:  organisational age and relationship 
character.  For organisational age, the manipulation question asked whether 
participants agreed the company had a long operating history, thus, those in the 
mature treatment should agree (M>4.0) and those in the new treatment should 
disagree (M<4.0).   The correct treatment was identified with significant differences 
among the two groups. 
Table 57: Manipulation check on organisational age 
New Mature F df 
3.26 (1.73) 5.63 (1.28) 332.004* 1/551 
*p<.05, M>4.0=agree 
Two relationship character questions were used to test the second manipulation for 
relationship history.   Those in the positive treatment groups should agree with the 
statements (M>4.0) and those in the negative treatment groups should disagree 
(M<4.0).   This was supported in the manipulation check with significant differences 
between the groups. 
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Table 58: Manipulation check on relationship character 
Question Positive Negative F df 
1 5.67 (1.49) 1.96 (1.33) 938.654* 1/551 
2 5.83 (1.47) 1.88 (1.39) 1044.374* 1/551 
*p<.05, M>4.0=agree 
Reliability Analysis 
Internal reliability analyses using Cronbach α were run on the items used to 
operationalise the two dependent measures of reputation and legitimacy and the 
proposed mediator of responsibility.  Tests were undertaken at each of the three time 
periods under study in Experiment 6 and confirmed strong internal reliability as 
outlined in Table 59. 
Table 59:  Internal reliability analysis across time 
Item Time 1 α Time 2 α Time 3 α 
Reputation .714 .827 .851 
Legitimacy .864 .911 .940 
Responsibility .762 .810 .840 
 
Testing for Discrete Dependent Variables 
Correlation analysis was run at each of the relevant time periods to test the 
association between reputation and legitimacy as outlined in Table 60.    Correlation 
is lowest at time 1 before additional material and factors are introduced into the 
scenarios.   As predicted, there is strong association between the variables yet some 
level of difference as suggested by the theoretical description of the variables is 
evident.  This is consistent with the findings in the previous experiments.  
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Table 60:  Correlation analysis of reputation and legitimacy across time 
Time Reputation 
M (SD) 
Legitimacy 
M (SD) 
Pearson r 
1 4.65 (.92) 4.40 (.86) .546** 
2 4.66 (1.01) 4.43 (.98) .637** 
3 4.37 (1.29) 4.36 (1.20) .766** 
  ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
Hypothesis Testing 
The design of Experiment 6 proposes a four way interaction among crisis cluster, 
response strategy and the two components of relationship history (organisational age 
and relationship character).  This interaction is predicted to have an effect on 
reputation and legitimacy as well as an indirect effect through the mediator of 
responsibility. 
There are three different time periods in Experiment 6:  time period 1 when the crisis 
event occurs, time period 2 where the company responds and time period 3 when the 
company’s relationship history details are revealed in conjunction with its response.   
Thus, the full interaction effect should be present at time 3.   
Before addressing the full interaction and hypotheses, each time period and the 
relevant variables will be discussed briefly to provide a foundation for the workings 
behind the model. 
Time 1: Crisis Event 
At time one, the participants were exposed to one of two crisis events from the crisis 
clusters of victim and accident.   A one-way MANOVA analysis using Pillai’s Trace 
as the test statistic showed that crisis cluster had a significant main effect on 
reputation (F (1,557)=4.706, ηp2=.008, p<.05, observed power .581)  and 
legitimacy(F (1,557)=39.773, ηp2=.067, p<.05, observed power 1.000).  Reputation 
and legitimacy scores were higher in the victim category (MRep=4.73, SD .91 
MLeg=4.56, SD.92) than the accident category (MRep=4.56, SD .92 MLeg=4.17, SD.83) 
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suggesting the participants were judging the company which was seen to be the 
victim in the crisis incident less harshly. 
Crisis cluster also had a significant main effect on judgments of responsibility for the 
crisis (F (1,557)=149.103, ηp2=.211, p<.05, observed power 1.000).  Less 
responsibility was assigned to the company who was seen to be the victim in the 
crisis (MResp=3.16, SD1 .16) than for the company that was seen to have suffered an 
accident (MResp=4.38, SD1.19).   This aligns with the formulation of the crisis 
clusters which were originally built on levels of responsibility (see Coombs & 
Holladay, 2002). 
Given the link between responsibility and reputation and legitimacy demonstrated in 
the earlier experiments, this lower judgment of responsibility for the victim category 
supports a higher reputation and legitimacy score which was established.  
Correlation analysis showed a significant correlation at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
between responsibility at time 1 and reputation (r=-.323) and legitimacy (r=-.324).   
Thus the more responsibility the organisation was seen to have for the crisis, the 
lower scores they achieved on reputation and legitimacy judgments.   
The mediation effect of responsibility was confirmed through a MANCOVA 
analysis at time 1 as outlined in Table 61.  Partial mediation was established for the 
multivariate analysis with a reduction in the effect size of the relationship between 
cluster and reputation and legitimacy following the introduction of responsibility as a 
co-variate.   
Table 61:   Results of MANOVA/MANCOVA on reputation and legitimacy using 
responsibility at time 1 as covariate 
Variable df F Effect ηp2 Observed Power 
Cluster  2,556 20.960* .070 1.000 
Cluster (with responsibility 
as co-variate) 
2,555 11.491* .040 .993 
Responsibility (Time 1) 2,555 33.280* .107 1.000 
*p<.05 
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The univariate analysis displayed in Table 62 showed partial mediation for 
legitimacy and full mediation for reputation with the change from a significant effect 
on reputation to a non-significant effect following the introduction of responsibility 
as a covariate.    
Table 62:   Results of univariate analysis within MANOVA/MANCOVA on reputation 
and legitimacy using responsibility at time 1 as covariate 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable  
df F Effect 
ηp2 
Observed 
Power 
Reputation Cluster  1,557 4.706* .008 .581 
 Cluster (with 
responsibility as co-
variate) 
1,556 2.546 .005 .357 
 Responsibility 
(Time 1) 
1,556 62.247* .101 1.000 
Legitimacy Cluster 1,557 39.773* .067 1.000 
 Cluster (with 
responsibility as co-
variate) 
1,556 9.564* .017 1.000 
 Responsibility 
(Time 1) 
1,556 33.793* .057 1.000 
*p<.05 
Time 2: Strategy Intervention 
At time 2, the company responded to the crisis event.  Three responses were used 
across the participant groups: a response that denied responsibility and passed the 
blame to another organisation; a response that diminished responsibility by offering 
an excuse for the incident and lack of intention; and a response that dealt with the 
crisis by offering compassion for those involved and compensation.  A one-way 
MANOVA was undertaken to assess the impact of crisis cluster and response 
strategy on reputation and legitimacy. 
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Response strategy had a significant main effect on reputation (F (2,556)=37.634, 
ηp2=.119, p<.05)  and legitimacy (F (2,556)=10.022, ηp2=.035, p<.05) at time 2.  For 
reputation, the most accommodative strategy of dealing with responsibility through 
compensation saw the highest score on reputation (MRepDeal =5.10, SD 1.1) with the 
denial strategy resulting in the lowest score (MRepDeny=4.17, SD1.03).  For 
legitimacy, the denial strategy also resulted in the lowest score (MLegDeny=4.17, 
SD.98), however, the diminish (MLegDiminish=4.58, SD.97), and deal (MLegDeal=4.55, 
SD.93) responses resulted in similar outcomes. 
Crisis cluster had a significant main effect on legitimacy (F (1,557)=21.308, 
ηp2=.037, p<.05, observed power .996)  but not reputation (F (1,557)=1.508, 
ηp2=.003, n.s., observed power .232)  at time 2, providing further support for the 
theoretical claims of differences in the dependent variables. 
Using Pillai’s trace in a multivariate analysis of variance, there was a significant 
two-way interaction effect between the crisis cluster and the response strategy at 
time 2 for legitimacy (F (2,553)=3.34, ηp2=.01, p<.05, observed power .631) but not 
for reputation (F (2,553)=2.687, ηp2=.01, n.s., observed power .532) as expected 
given the lack of main effect.  The means for each of the clusters and strategies on 
reputation and legitimacy are displayed in Table 63.   
For legitimacy, the deal strategy run by a company in the victim category 
(MLegDealVictim=4.86, SD.85) resulted in a much more favourable score than the same 
strategy in the accident category (MLegDealAccident=4.24, SD.92).   Given the match 
strategy for the victim category is deny, the two step up strategy of deal is having the 
strongest benefit in terms of producing higher legitimacy scores.   
The diminish strategy also led to different outcomes for legitimacy scores in the 
different categories.   The diminish strategy in the victim category 
(MLegDiminishVictim=4.77, SD.96) produced a much more favourable score than the 
diminish strategy in the accident category (MLegDiminishAccident=4.38, SD.94).   The 
diminish strategy is the match strategy for the accident category so should provide 
some level of protection to the company’s legitimacy, however, the diminish strategy 
for the victim category is a step up strategy, suggesting the additional approach by 
the company in responding to the crisis was rewarded by the participants. 
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Table 63: Reputation and legitimacy scores for each strategy within each crisis 
cluster at time 2 
Crisis 
Cluster 
Strategy Reputation 
M (SD) 
Legitimacy 
M(SD) 
Victim Deny* 4.20 (.96) 4.23 (.95) 
 Diminish 4.65 (.98) 4.77 (.96) 
 Deal 5.30 (1.06) 4.86 (.85) 
Accident Deny 4.15 (1.09) 4.11 (1.01) 
 Diminish* 4.74 (.92) 4.38 (.94) 
 Deal 4.91 (1.12) 4.24 (.92) 
*=Match strategy, M=4.0= agree 
As outlined in Table 63, the matched strategy of deny in the victim category 
provided the least favourable score for reputation and legitimacy with the step up 
strategies of diminish (one step up) and deal (two steps up) providing more 
favourable outcomes. 
The matched strategy of diminish in the accident category provided more favourable 
scores than the step down strategy of deny, however the step up deal strategy only 
provided a more favourable outcome on reputation.    
Across Time Periods 1 and 2: Reputation and Legitimacy 
By using the repeated measures analysis, the protective powers of the strategy can be 
assessed.  At time 1, the company has suffered damage to its reputation and 
legitimacy through the crisis event.   The response strategy run by the company at 
time 2 will either increase this damage leading to lower scores for reputation and 
legitimacy than at time 1, reduce this damage leading to higher scores for reputation 
and legitimacy than at time 1 or have no effect which should see a maintenance of 
scores across the time periods.   A MANOVA analysis on the computed variables for 
the change in reputation and legitimacy scores across the time periods showed 
strategy was having a significant effect on the change in these variables (F 
(4,1106)=13.094, ηp2=.045, p<.05, observed power 1.000) with the largest effect 
being seen on the change in reputation  (F (2,553)=26.776, ηp2=.088, p<.05, 
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observed power 1.000) compared with the change in legitimacy (F (2,553)=4.235, 
ηp2=.015, p<.05, observed power .741).  Each of the variables of reputation and 
legitimacy have been examined separately. 
Looking first at the victim cluster, the matching deny strategy has been hypothesised 
to maintain the reputation scores, that is, do no further damage to the company’s 
reputation.  This is a minimum requirement for a recommended strategy with any 
increase in reputation scores seen as an additional benefit.   As outlined in Table 64, 
there was a significant decline in reputation score from time 1 to time 2 for the match 
strategy of deny so the hypothesis was not supported.  The deny strategy did not do 
enough in meeting stakeholder expectations and therefore could not protect the 
company’s reputation.  However, the one step up diminish strategy did maintain the 
reputation score therefore no further damage to the company was caused by 
implementing the diminish strategy.  The two step up strategy of dealing with 
responsibility provided the most benefits to the company in terms of reducing the 
reputational damage from the crisis event.  There was a significant increase in 
reputation scores following the implementation of the deal strategy so the 
participants rewarded the company for doing more than was expected. 
In the accident cluster, the match strategy of diminish did maintain the reputation 
score as outlined in Table 64, therefore no further damage was suffered by the 
organisation.  The reputation score saw a small absolute change of .03 at a non 
significant p level of .325.  The deny strategy which is an insufficient strategy under 
the model saw a significant decline in reputation scores from time 1 to time 2 as 
predicted.  Therefore, the participants were punishing the company for running an 
insufficient strategy.  The step up strategy of dealing with responsibility saw a 
significant increase in reputation scores as predicted.  This means participants 
rewarded the company for doing more than was required and this strategy provided 
the highest protection of the organisation’s reputation. 
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Table 64:  Difference in reputation and legitimacy mean scores across time periods 
1 and 2 
Dependent 
Variable 
Crisis Cluster Response 
Strategy 
Mean 
Difference 
(Standard 
Error) 
Time 2 – Time 
1 
Reputation Victim Deny -.458 (.10)* 
  Diminish .013 (.10) 
  Deal .404 (.10)* 
 Accident Deny -.264 (.10)* 
  Diminish .037 (.10) 
  Deal .345 (.10)* 
Legitimacy Victim Deny -.206 (.07)* 
  Diminish .081 (.07) 
  Deal .130 (.07) 
 Accident Deny .022 (.08) 
  Diminish .071 (.08) 
  Deal .126 (.07) 
*p<.05 (-ve score = reduction in scores over time) 
The second examination was on the dependent variable of legitimacy as also outlined 
in Table 64.  Within the victim cluster, the matching deny strategy failed to protect 
the company from further damage with a significant decline in legitimacy scores 
from time 1 to time 2.  As with reputation, the one step up diminish strategy was 
needed to maintain the score therefore no further damage to the company’s 
legitimacy was caused by implementing the diminish strategy.  However, unlike 
reputation, no further benefit was brought to the company from the two step up 
strategy of dealing with responsibility with a non-significant result for change in 
legitimacy score from time 1 to time 2.  The change was in the predicted direction 
but did not meet the significance test. 
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In the accident cluster, the match strategy of diminish did maintain the legitimacy 
score with a small change in absolute levels of .07 at p=.265, therefore no further 
damage was suffered by the organisation.  However, there was no significant shift in 
scores for the other two strategies either.   On trend data, the step up strategy of 
dealing with responsibility saw the largest increase but it was not significant. 
Time 2: Impacts on Responsibility 
The final examination at time 2 was for responsibility.   Of interest here was whether 
the organisational strategy implemented changed the attributions of responsibility 
driven by the crisis itself. 
Crisis cluster continued to have a significant main effect on responsibility (F 
(1,553)=43.933, ηp2=.07, p<.05, observed power 1.00) which was established in time 
1.   Lower judgments of responsibility were evident in the victim category (M=3.271 
SD1.20) compared with the accident category (M=3.95 SD1.27). 
Response strategy, however, did not have a significant main effect on responsibility 
(F (2,553)=1.105, ηp2=.004, n.s., observed power 1.00) at time 2 and there was no 
significant two-way interaction for cluster and strategy (F (2,553)=1.715, ηp2=.006, 
n.s., observed power .361).   Within each strategy, cluster is having an effect but 
there is no main effect of strategy on responsibility. 
Looking at the trend data, the greatest difference in responsibility scores at time 2 
was evident in the victim category between the deny strategy (M=3.39 SD1.23) and 
the deal strategy (M=3.05 SD1.22).   These represent the two extremes of the 
response categories and therefore should provide the most difference.     
The lowest level of responsibility across the set was in the victim category for the 
deal strategy which suggests the participants saw the company offering 
compensation and compassion for victims as a goodwill gesture rather than a claim 
to responsibility.  The highest levels of responsibility were assigned to the accident 
category for the matched diminish strategy and the one step up deal strategy.    This 
suggests participants are assessing the deal strategy in particular within the context 
of crisis cluster and a univariate analysis of the deal strategy did show a significant 
contrast between the victim category and the accident category for this strategy (F 
(1,553)=27.224, ηp2=.047, p<.05, observed power .999).   When run in the victim 
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category, the deal strategy is seen as suggesting goodwill (M=3.05 SD 1.22) however 
when it is run in the accident category, it appears to be being seen as an acceptance 
of responsibility with a higher mean for organisational responsibility (M=3.98, SD 
1.30). 
Correlation analysis showed a significant correlation at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
between responsibility at time 2 and reputation (r=-.481) and legitimacy (r=-.499).   
Thus the more responsibility the organisation was seen to have for the crisis, the 
lower scores they achieved on reputation and legitimacy judgments.  This association 
was stronger at time 2 than time 1 which suggests there is some impact of strategy 
influencing participants’ decisions. 
The mediation effect of responsibility at time 2 was assessed through a MANCOVA 
analysis as outlined in Table 65.  As with time 1, partial mediation was established 
for the multivariate analysis with a reduction in the effect size of the relationship 
between cluster and reputation and legitimacy following the introduction of 
responsibility as a co-variate.   
Table 65:   Results of MANOVA/MANCOVA on reputation and legitimacy using 
responsibility at time 2 as covariate 
Variable df F Effect ηp2 Observed Power 
Cluster  2,556 13.157* .045 .998 
Cluster (with responsibility 
as co-variate) 
2,555 7.794* .027 .951 
Responsibility (Time 2) 2,555 108.182* .280 1.000 
*p<.05 
The univariate analysis displayed in Table 66 showed the impact on legitimacy was 
primarily impacting the mediation results.  This confirms the earlier analysis which 
did not support a main effect of cluster on reputation at time 2.  Full mediation for 
legitimacy was established with the change from a significant effect on legitimacy to 
a non-significant effect following the introduction of responsibility as a covariate.    
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Table 66:   Results of univariate analysis within MANOVA/MANCOVA on reputation 
and legitimacy using responsibility at time 2 as covariate 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable  
df F Effect 
ηp2 
Observed 
Power 
Reputation Cluster  1,557 1.508 .003 .232 
 Cluster (with 
responsibility as co-
variate) 
1,556 4.813* .009 .591 
 Responsibility 
(Time 2) 
1,556 171.608* .236 1.000 
Legitimacy Cluster 1,557 21.308* .037 .996 
 Cluster (with 
responsibility as co-
variate) 
1,556 2.600 .005 .363 
 Responsibility 
(Time 2) 
1,556 160.419* .224 1.000 
*p<.05 
As no significant relationship between strategy and responsibility was established 
earlier, MANCOVA tests were not run for strategy, nor the two-way interaction of 
strategy and cluster. 
 
Across Time Periods 1 and 2: Responsibility 
As with reputation and legitimacy, a repeated measures analysis was used to assess 
the protective powers of the strategy on levels of responsibility.  At question here is 
whether the strategy has increased the levels of responsibility attributed to the 
company, reduced these levels or had no effect.   This should be evidenced by 
increases or decreases in responsibility scores from time 1 to time 2.  These results 
are outlined in Table 67. 
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Table 67:  Difference in responsibility mean scores across time periods 1 and 2 
Dependent 
Variable 
Crisis Cluster Response 
Strategy 
Mean Difference 
(Standard Error) 
M(SE)Time 2 –  
M(SE)Time 1 
Responsibility Victim Deny .156 (.123) 
  Diminish .326 (.122)* 
  Deal -.154 (.122)* 
 Accident Deny -.385 (.124)* 
  Diminish -.471 (.124)* 
  Deal -.414 (.122)* 
*p<.05; a negative score means a reduction in responsibility  
Within the victim cluster, the match strategy of denial maintained responsibility at 
the level first assessed by the crisis cluster with a nonsignificant increase as 
predicted.  The step up strategy of diminish saw a significant increase in the 
assessments of responsibility by the participants.   However, the two step up strategy 
saw a significant decrease in judgments of responsibility.  For the accident cluster, 
all strategies saw significant declines in judgments of responsibility. 
A summary of the relationships established through the analysis of the impacts on 
reputation, legitimacy and responsibility across time 1 and time 2 is outlined in 
Table 68.  As can be seen in this table, legitimacy is impacted less than reputation 
over this time period.    
  
252 
 
Table 68: Summary of associations from time 1 to time 2 
Crisis 
Cluster 
Response 
Strategy 
Change in 
Responsibility
(Time 1-2) 
Change in 
Reputation 
(Time 1-2) 
Change in 
Legitimacy 
(Time 1-2) 
Victim Deny^ Maintain Decrease* Decrease* 
 Diminish Increase* Maintain Maintain 
 Deal Decrease* Increase* Maintain 
Accident Deny Decrease* Decrease* Maintain 
 Diminish^ Decrease* Maintain Maintain 
 Deal Decrease* Increase* Maintain 
^=matched strategy, *p<.05 = significant movements 
Time 3: Exposure to the Intensifier Effect 
At time 3, the focus is on the full interaction effects of the independent variables of 
crisis cluster, response strategy and the two dimensions of relationship history 
through relationship character and organisational age.  These effects will operate on 
judgments of reputation and legitimacy either directly or through the proposed 
mediator of organisational responsibility.   
Comparisons of these effects can be made at time 3 as well as through an assessment 
of changes in the dependent variables and the mediator across the different time 
periods in the experiment.   The repeated measures analysis helps provide a more 
detailed understanding of the impacts by assessing the changes and influences at 
each point in time. 
A MANOVA using Pillai’s trace as the test statistic with the dependent variables of 
reputation and legitimacy showed significant main effects at time 3 for all 
independent variables: crisis cluster (F (2,528)=11.79, ηp2=.043, p<.05, observed 
power .995), response strategy (F (4,1058)=9.896, ηp2=.036, p<.05, observed power 
1.000), relationship history: relationship character (F (2,528)=2.00, ηp2=.334, p<.05, 
observed power 1.000) and relationship history: organisational age (F (2,528)=3.057, 
ηp2=.011, p<.05, observed power .590).   
253 
 
The univariate analysis using Pillai’s trace was then examined to identify differences 
between impacts on reputation and legitimacy.    The results of this analysis are 
outlined in Table 69.    Crisis cluster had a significant main effect on legitimacy but 
not reputation.  Response strategy had a significant main effect on reputation but not 
legitimacy.  Relationship character and age had significant main effects on both 
variables.   
Significant interactions were then examined.  The two way interaction between the 
two subcomponents of relationship history was significant on both reputation and 
legitimacy.  The four way hypothesised interaction among crisis cluster, strategy, 
and the two sub attributes of relationship history (relationship character and 
organisational age) had a significant effect on legitimacy at time 3 but not reputation.  
No other interactions met the significance test at p<.05. 
Table 69:   Effects of independent variables on reputation and legitimacy at time 3 
Independent Variable (s) Dependent 
Variable 
(Time 3) 
df F Effect 
size 
(ηp2) 
 
Observed 
Power 
Crisis Cluster Reputation 
Legitimacy
1/529
1/529
.525 
15.959* 
.001 
.029 
.112 
.979 
Response Strategy Reputation 
Legitimacy
2/529
2/529
10.964* 
2.578 
.040 
.010 
.991 
.514 
Relationship Character Reputation 
Legitimacy
1/529
1/529
231.406* 
217.323* 
.304 
.291 
1.000 
1.000 
Organisational Age Reputation 
Legitimacy
1/529
1/529
3.869* 
5.984* 
.007 
.011 
.501 
.685 
RelChar * Age Reputation 
Legitimacy
1/529
1/529
4.876* 
3.613* 
.009 
.007 
.596 
.550 
Cluster*Strategy*RelChar*Age Reputation 
Legitimacy
2/529
2/529
1.779 
3.800* 
.007 
.014 
.373 
.691 
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*p≤.05 
Crisis Cluster 
For crisis cluster, reputation scores at time 3 were similar across the two clusters 
(MRepVictim=4.38, SD 1.30 MRepAccident=4.36, SD1.27) whereas the legitimacy score for 
the victim category was significantly higher than that for the accident category 
(MLegVictim=4.50, SD 1.17 MLegAccident=4.22, SD1.21) which continued the trend for 
legitimacy from time 2.   
Response Strategy 
For response strategy, the deny strategy resulted in the lowest reputation score at 
time 3 and the deal strategy saw the highest reputation score (MRepDeny=4.11, SD 1.23 
MRepDeal=4.53, SD1.34).    For legitimacy, however, the deal strategy saw the lowest 
score and the diminish strategy resulted in the highest legitimacy score. 
(MLegDeal=4.25, SD 1.18 MLegDiminish=4.45, SD1.22).     
Table 70 brings together the cluster and response strategy outcomes for reputation 
and legitimacy at time 3.    The matched strategy of denying responsibility in the 
victim category resulted in the lowest reputation and legitimacy scores whereas the 
matched strategy in the accident category saw the highest reputation and legitimacy 
scores. 
Table 70: Reputation and legitimacy scores across different clusters and responses 
at time 3 
Cluster Strategy Reputation 
M(SD) 
Legitimacy 
M(SD) 
Victim Deny^ 4.14 ( 1.26) 4.39 (1.17) 
 Diminish 4.36 (1.29 4.68 (1.21) 
 Deal 4.38 (1.30) 4.44 (1.12) 
Accident Deny 4.08 (1.20) 4.20 (1.21) 
 Diminish^ 4.54 (1.20) 4.39 (1.21) 
 Deal 4.44 (1.35) 4.07 (1.21) 
^= Match strategy 
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Relationship History 
Significant differences among the four potential intensifiers of relationship history 
can be examined across the complete sample and within each cluster for each of the 
dependent variables.    
Across the sample, there is a significant difference among the predicted most 
positive intensifier (Intensifier 1: mature and positive relationship character) and the 
predicted most negative intensifier (Intensifier 4: new and negative relationship 
character) on reputation and legitimacy.  The difference between these two 
combinations is outlined in Table 71.  The negative intensifier is resulting in a 
significantly lower reputation and legitimacy score than the positive intensifier at 
time 3. 
Table 71:  Comparison of positive and negative intensifiers on reputation and 
legitimacy 
Dependent 
Variable 
Intensifier 1 
(positive intensifier) 
M(SE) 
Intensifier 4 
(negative intensifier) 
M(SE) 
MDiff (SE) 
Reputation 5.222 (.088) 3.643 (.091) 1.58 (.127)* 
Legitimacy 5.147 (.08) 3.662 (.08) 1.48 (.12)* 
*p<.05 
Other significant differences were found among the four combinations.  The largest 
significant differences between the combinations on each of the dependent variables 
are represented in Table 72.  The relationship character trait is present in more of the 
significant differences than the age trait suggesting it is having the largest impact of 
the two subattributes of relationship history.  The interaction of age and relationship 
character is also present in the significant differences. 
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Table 72:  Comparison of the largest significant differences among intensifiers on 
reputation and legitimacy 
Dependent 
Variable 
Intensifier  (A) Intensifier (B) MDiff
(A-B) 
Traits showing 
difference 
Reputation Mature and 
negative 
Mature and 
positive 
-1.59* Relationship character 
 New and 
negative 
Mature and 
positive 
-1.54* Age 
Relationship character 
 Mature and 
negative 
New and positive -1.29* Age  
Relationship character 
Legitimacy New and 
negative 
Mature and 
positive 
-1.46* Age 
Relationship character 
 Mature and 
negative 
Mature and 
positive 
-1.41* Relationship character 
 New and 
negative 
New and positive -1.15* Relationship character 
*p<.05 
Differences within each cluster were then examined.  Within the victim crisis cluster, 
the lowest reputational score was for the mature and negative character treatment 
(M=3.54 SD 1.06) and the highest was for the mature and positive character 
treatment (M=5.34 SD 1.02).   The lowest legitimacy score was for the new and 
negative character treatment (M=3.79 SD 1.01) and the highest was for the mature 
and positive character treatment (M=5.31 SD.97). 
Within the accident crisis cluster, the lowest reputational score was for the mature 
and negative character treatment (M=3.64 SD 1.16) and the highest was for the 
mature and positive treatment (M=5.1 SD 1.2).  The lowest legitimacy score was for 
the mature and negative character treatment (M=3.45 SD .90) and the highest was 
for the mature and positive character treatment (M=4.97 SD 1.10).  
257 
 
Thus the most positive intensifier (Intensifier 1: mature and positive) provided the 
best outcome for reputation and legitimacy in both crisis clusters as predicted.  The 
most negative intensifier varied between the new and negative combination 
(Intensifier 4) as predicted and the mature and negative combination (Intensifier 2).    
When examining the impact of relationship history when used with different 
strategies at time 3, there is a significant difference among the predicted most 
negative intensifier (Intensifier 4: new and negative relationship character) and the 
predicted most positive intensifier (Intensifier 1: mature and positive relationship 
character) on reputation and legitimacy.  The difference between these two 
combinations when used in each of the three strategies is outlined in Table 73.  The 
negative intensifier (Intensifier 4) is resulting in a significantly lower reputation and 
legitimacy score in each of the strategies than the positive intensifier (Intensifier 1) 
at time 3 as expected. 
Table 73:  Comparison of different strategy types and positive and negative 
intensifiers on reputation and legitimacy at time 3 
Dependent 
Variable 
Strategy Intensifier 
1 (positive 
intensifier)
M(SE) 
Intensifier 4 
(negative 
intensifier)  
M(SE) 
MDiff (SE)  
(1-4) 
Reputation Deny 4.89 (1.02) 3.43 (.97) 1.46 (.219)* 
 Diminish 5.28 (1.11) 3.66 (.89) 1.62(.218) * 
 Deal 5.49 (1.19) 3.84 (1.09) 1.65 (.218)* 
Legitimacy Deny 5.05 (.99) 3.59 (1.05) 1.46 (.209)* 
 Diminish 5.25 (1.04) 3.79 (.95) -1.46 (.209)* 
 Deal 5.10 (1.15) 3.63 (.90) -1.47 (.209)* 
*p<.05 
Interaction Effects at Time 3 
At time 3, the participants have been exposed to the cluster, the strategy and the 
relationship history intensifier treatments which combined the two subattributes.   A 
significant interaction of these four independent variables was established for 
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legitimacy, however, the significance test was not fulfilled for the impact on 
reputation.  Significant interactions were also established for relationship character 
and age on both reputation and legitimacy as outlined in Table 69.  The different 
combinations within the 24 scenarios produced for Experiment 6 (see Appendices 
41-44; 46-49; 51-54; 57-60; 62-65; 67-70) will now be discussed in preparation for 
the full hypotheses tests. 
As outlined in Table 74, there are significant differences between the most positive 
intensifier (Intensifier 1: mature and positive relationship character) and the most 
negative intensifier (Intensifier 4: new and negative relationship character) on 
reputation and legitimacy in each of the crisis clusters and across each response 
strategy.   The presence of the negative intensifier always resulted in a significantly 
lower reputation and legitimacy score than when the participant has been exposed to 
the positive intensifier. 
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Table 74:   Differences in reputation and legitimacy means between intensifier 1 and 
4  
Dependent 
Variable 
Cluster Strategy Intensifier 
1 (positive) 
M(SD) 
Intensifier 4 
(negative) 
M(SD) 
MDiff (SE) 
Reputation Victim Deny^ 5.00 (1.26) 3.59 (1.13) 1.41 (.317)* 
  Diminish 5.25 (1.24) 3.40 (.90) 1.85(.323) * 
  Deal 5.76 (.80) 3.93 (1.16) 1.650 (.218)* 
 Accident Deny 4.80 (1.13) 3.28 (.77) 1.51 (.304)* 
  Diminish^ 5.30 (1.03) 3.93 (.80) 1.37 (.299)* 
  Deal 5.20 (1.47) 3.71 (1.01) 1.49 (.323)* 
Legitimacy Victim Deny^ 5.24 (.92) 3.84 (1.20) 1.39 (.298)* 
  Diminish 5.34 (1.10) 3.72 (.97) 1.61 (.305)* 
  Deal 5.36 (.92) 3.81 (.93) 1.54 (.280)* 
 Accident Deny 4.90 (1.04) 3.33 (.84) 1.56(.286)* 
  Diminish^ 5.19 (1.01) 3.86 (.94) 1.32 (.282)* 
  Deal 4.83 (1.31) 3.38 (.82) 1.44 (.305)* 
^=Matched strategy *p<.05 
When examining all four intensifier treatments, the positive intensifier of mature and 
positive relationship character always resulted in the highest scores for reputation 
and legitimacy regardless of crisis cluster and strategy.  However, the lowest scores 
for reputation and legitimacy are not as consistent as outlined in Table 75.  Both the 
new and negative relationship character intensifier (Intensifier 4) and the mature and 
negative relationship character intensifier (Intensifier 2) provided the lowest scores 
on reputation and legitimacy across the different combinations. 
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Table 75:  Frequency counts for highest and lowest scores by intensifier 
Negative Intensifiers Lowest Score on 
Reputation 
Lowest Score on 
Legitimacy 
New and Negative 
Relationship Character 
(Intensifier 4) 
3 4 
Mature and Negative 
Relationship Character 
(Intensifier 2) 
3 2 
 
The main difference is evident in the victim cluster where the negative intensifier 
combinations in conjunction with the deal strategy are providing a different outcome 
on reputation to the outcome on legitimacy.    In this cluster, for reputation, the 
mature and negative relationship character intensifier (Intensifier 2) provided the 
lowest score and for legitimacy the new and negative relationship character 
intensifier (Intensifier 4) provided the lowest.  While of interest in the trend data, 
there is no significant difference between the mature and negative relationship 
character intensifier and the new and negative relationship character intensifier on 
these scores, therefore the comparison of the different intensifiers in these cells is not 
significant. 
As outlined in Table 74, the highest reputation and legitimacy scores within the 
victim crisis cluster took place when the deal strategy was used by an organisation 
with the most positive intensifier of maturity and a positive relationship character 
(Intensifier 1).  For the accident crisis cluster, the highest reputation and legitimacy 
scores were achieved when the diminish strategy was used by an organisation with 
the most positive intensifier of maturity and a positive relationship character 
(Intensifier 1).   
Across Time Period Analysis: Influences of Intensifier on Strategy Outcomes 
While providing information on the comparative outcomes at a point in time (i.e. 
Time 3) is useful, further analysis is needed to understand whether participant 
perceptions on reputation and legitimacy changed with the additional information on 
the organisation or whether the perceptions established at time 2 when the strategy 
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was introduced were unchanged.  By comparing the outcomes at time 2 and time 3 of 
the experiment, the impacts on reputation and legitimacy for each of the 
combinations can be unpacked. 
A repeated measures MANOVA analysis using crisis cluster, response strategy and 
the relationship history subvariables of organisational age and relationship character 
was undertaken.  The univariate analysis within the MANOVA showed that time 
was having a significant effect on reputation (F (1,529)=53.56, ηp2=.092, p<.05, 
observed power 1.000) and legitimacy (F (1,529)=8.250, ηp2=.015, p<.05, observed 
power .818) across time periods 2 to 3. 
For reputation, there are 12 different combinations within each of the victim and 
accident crisis clusters.  These are 3 (strategy) x 2 (relationship history: 
organisational age) x 2 (relationship history: relationship character).  Overall there 
are 24 different combinations representing the 24 different scenarios used in 
Experiment 6.    Looking within these groups, significant shifts in reputation scores 
from time 2 to time 3 were evident in 8 of the combinations within the victim cluster 
and 10 of the combinations within the accident cluster.  For legitimacy, significant 
shifts were established in 11 of the combinations in each of the victim and accident 
clusters.    Therefore, in total, 18 of the treatments saw significant shifts on 
reputational scores across time 2 and time 3 and 22 of the treatments saw significant 
shifts on legitimacy scores across time 2 and time 3. 
Table 76 highlights the largest significant declines in reputation and legitimacy 
scores across time 2 to time 3.  As can be seen in this table, the quantum of the 
declines in legitimacy are less than the declines in reputation.   The new and negative 
relationship condition (Intensifier 4) accounted for 8 of the 12 largest declines listed. 
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Table 76:  Largest significant declines in reputation and legitimacy scores across 
time 2 to time 3 by intensifier category 
Dependent 
Variable 
Cluster Strategy Relationship 
History 
MDiff (SE)  
(Time 3 – Time 2) 
Reputation Accident Deal New and negative -1.55 (.22)* 
 Victim Deal Mature and positive -1.55 (.24)* 
 Victim Deal New and negative -1.47 (.19)* 
 Victim Deny Mature and negative -1.40 (.22)* 
 Accident Diminish New and Negative -1.20 (.23)* 
 Accident Diminish Mature and negative -1.20 (.25)* 
Legitimacy Victim Deal New and negative -1.07 (.14)* 
 Accident Deal New and negative -.990 (.17)* 
 Victim Deal Mature and negative -.989 (.18)* 
 Accident   Deny New and negative -.833 (.17)* 
 Victim Diminish New and negative -.760 (.17)* 
 Accident Diminish New and negative -.628 (.17)* 
*p<.05, a negative score indicates a decline in scores over time. 
 
Table 77 highlights the largest significant increases in reputation and legitimacy 
scores across time 2 to time 3.  The mature and positive relationship condition 
(Intensifier 1) accounted for 7 of the 12 largest increases listed. 
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Table 77:  Largest significant increases in reputation and legitimacy scores across 
time 2 to time 3 by intensifier category 
Dependent 
Variable 
Cluster Strategy Relationship 
History 
Mean Difference 
(SE)  
(Time 3 – Time 2) 
Reputation Victim Deny Mature and positive .850 (.21)* 
 Victim Deny New and positive .792 (.21)* 
 Accident Deny New and positive .747 (.24)* 
 Accident Diminish New and positive .705 (.24)* 
 Accident Deny Mature and positive .628 (.19)* 
 Victim Diminish Mature and positive .457 (.23)* 
Legitimacy Victim Deny New and positive .819 (.16)* 
 Accident Deny Mature and positive .697 (.15)* 
 Accident Deny New and positive .674 (.18)* 
 Victim Deny Mature and positive .650 (.16)* 
 Accident Diminish Mature and positive .613 (.14)* 
 Victim Deal Mature and positive .432 (.17)* 
*p<.05, a positive score indicates an increase in scores over time 
Table 78 outlines the eight conditions for which there was no significant change in 
reputation and/or legitimacy scores from time 2 to time 3.   These are all conditions 
involving the positive relationship character treatment.   Thus, having positive 
information compared with having no information may not always see a shift in 
stakeholder perceptions, however, having negative information always results in a 
negative shift.   This confirms the results from Experiment 5 where there was a 
significant difference between the negative character treatment and the control group 
of no information at the time of the crisis event but not between the positive 
character treatment and the control group. 
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Table 78:  Intensifier conditions showing no significant movement across time 2 to 
time 3 
Dependent 
Variable 
Cluster Strategy Relationship History 
Reputation Victim Diminish New and positive 
 Victim Diminish Mature and positive 
 Victim Deal New and positive 
 Victim Deal Mature and positive 
 Accident Deal New and positive 
 Accident Deal Mature and positive 
Legitimacy Victim Deal New and positive 
 Accident Deal New and positive 
 
By examining the influences on reputation and legitimacy over the different time 
periods, the different impacts of the independent variables as they are introduced can 
be established.  The final test on the variables of reputation and legitimacy for the 
hypotheses requires a comparison of time period 1 and time period 3 to better 
understand the full protective powers of the different strategies and their value in the 
intensified environment where relationship history is known.    
To test Hypotheses 6.1 and 6.2, the matched strategy in each of the crisis clusters 
needs to be examined (victim – deny; accident-diminish).   The reputation and 
legitimacy scores can be compared across the time periods.   At time 1 to time 2, the 
ability of the strategy alone to protect the organisation against the damage from the 
crisis event can be established.  From time 2 to time 3, the impact of the intensifiers 
(positive and negative) can be established which helps explain whether strategy 
alone is influencing the outcomes or whether strategy plus the information on the 
intensifiers is having an effect.  Comparing time period 1 to time period 3 allows an 
assessment of whether the strategy in light of the intensifier information can limit the 
damage to the organisation as suggested in the underlying propositions of the SCCT 
model.  The results of this analysis are outlined in Table 79. 
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Table 79:  Shifts in reputation and legitimacy from time 1 to time 3 for matched 
strategies with different intensifier conditions  
Cluster Matched 
Strategy 
Intensifier Reputation 
MDiff (SE) 
Time 3 – 
Time 1) 
Increase/ 
Decrease 
Legitimacy 
MDiff (SE) 
Time 3 – 
Time 1) 
Increase/ 
Decrease 
Victim Deny Mature 
and 
positive 
.367 (.23) Increase .69(.19)* Increase 
  Mature 
and 
negative 
-1.70 
(.24)* 
Decrease -.81 (.19)* Decrease
  New and 
positive 
.392 (.22) Increase .47 (.18)* Increase 
  New and 
negative 
-1.40 
(.24)* 
Decrease -.74(.20)* Decrease
Accident Diminish Mature 
and 
positive 
.63 (.20)* Increase .72(.16)* Increase 
  Mature 
and 
negative 
-1.22 
(.26)* 
Decrease -.85(.21)* Decrease
  New and 
positive 
.66(.25)* Increase .59(.21)* Increase 
  New and 
negative 
-1.26(.24)* Decrease -.58 (.19)* Decrease
*p<.05 
Relevant Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 6.1  
In the presence of a positive intensifier, a matched strategy will at least 
maintain stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy from the time of 
the crisis event. 
For the victim category, the matched strategy (deny) in the presence of the positive 
intensifier of mature and positive relationship character (Intensifier 1) maintained the 
organisational reputation from the time of the crisis event.   A very slight increase in 
reputation of 0,3 was recorded at time 3 which is on trend but this shift was non-
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significant at a p value of .485.   A significant increase in legitimacy was recorded 
which is accounted for within the hypothesis. 
Thus, Hypotheses 6.1 was supported for the most positive predicted intensifier as 
reputation was maintained and legitimacy scores were increased.   
The new and positive relationship intensifier (Intensifier 3) led to a significant 
increase in legitimacy scores for the matched strategy run in the victim category.  
This intensifier helped the participants believe the denial by the company thereby 
protecting it from further damage.  The impact on reputation was in the right 
direction but was non-significant.  The mature and negative relationship character 
(Intensifier 2) however saw significant declines in reputation and legitimacy scores 
which may suggest that the participants saw the organisation having long term 
negative relationships with the community, thereby demonstrating a long pattern of 
poor behaviour.    
For the accident cluster, the matched strategy (diminish) in the presence of the 
positive intensifier of mature and positive relationship character  (Intensifier 1) saw a 
significant increase in both reputation and legitimacy scores from the time of the 
crisis event.   As the hypothesis was to at least maintain these scores, hypothesis 6.1 
was supported for the most positive intensifier (Intensifier 1). 
Similar patterns for the new and positive relationship intensifier (Intensifier 3) and 
the mature and negative relationship intensifiers (Intensifier 2) were seen in the 
accident cluster to the victim cluster,  however the impacts of new and positive was 
significant on reputation as well as legitimacy in this cluster.  Thus Intensifier 3 
acted as a positive intensifier and Intensifier 2 acted as a negative intensifier. 
Hypothesis 6.2  
In the presence of a negative intensifier, a matched strategy will not maintain 
stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy from the time of the crisis 
event. 
As outlined in Table 79, for the victim cluster, the matched strategy (deny) in the 
presence of the negative intensifier of new and negative relationship character 
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(Intensifier 4) saw a significant decline in both reputation and legitimacy scores from 
the time of the crisis event, thus supporting the hypothesis.    
For the accident cluster, the matched strategy (diminish) in the presence of the 
negative intensifier of new and negative relationship character (Intensifier 4) also 
saw a significant decline in both reputation and legitimacy scores from the time of 
the crisis event, thus supporting the hypothesis.    
As outlined above, the intensifier of mature and negative relationships (Intensifier 2) 
resulted in significant decreases in reputation and legitimacy scores across the two 
crisis clusters, thus acting as a negative intensifier. 
To test the final hypothesis for research question six, a comparison needs to be made 
between the matched strategy and the step up strategy.   For the victim cluster, the 
match strategy is deny and the step up strategy is diminish and for the accident 
cluster the match strategy is diminish and the step up strategy is deal.   This test 
occurs at time 3 and Table 80 outlines the results for all of the intensifier 
combinations for reputation and legitimacy at this time. 
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Table 80: Reputation and legitimacy means for match and step up strategies across 
clusters at Time 3 
Cluster Intensifiers Reputation 
for match 
strategy at 
time 3 
M(SD) 
Reputation 
for step up 
strategy at 
time 3 
M(SD) 
Legitimacy 
for match 
strategy 
M(SD) 
Legitimacy 
for step up 
strategy 
M(SD) 
Victim New and 
negative 
3.59 (1.13) 3.40 (.90) 3.84 (1.2) 3.72 (.97) 
 New and 
positive 
4.69 (.88) 4.86 (1.23) 4.69 (1.01) 5.23 (1.07) 
 Mature and 
negative 
3.10 (1.14) 3.81 (.81) 3.63 (.82) 4.29 (.96) 
 Mature and 
positive 
5.00 (.89) 5.25 (1.24) 5.24 (.92) 5.34 (1.10) 
Accident New and 
negative 
3.93 (.80) 3.71 (1.01) 3.86 (.94) 3.38 (.82) 
 New and 
positive 
4.94 (1.01) 5.15 (1.03) 4.73 (1.05) 4.52 (1.17) 
 Mature and 
negative 
3.54 (1.02) 3.90 (1.19) 3.26 (.77) 3.67 (.97) 
 Mature and 
positive 
5.30 (1.03) 5.20 (1.47) 5.19 (1.01) 4.83 (1.31) 
 
Hypothesis 6.3  
In the presence of a negative intensifier, a step up strategy will provide a more 
positive outcome than a matched strategy on stakeholder perceptions of 
reputation and legitimacy. 
Taking the most negative intensifier first (Intensifier 4: new and negative 
relationship character), the step up strategy in the victim (deny to diminish) and 
accident (diminish to deal) clusters did not provide a more positive outcome on 
reputation or legitimacy scores, therefore not supporting the hypothesis. 
As mature and negative relationship character (Intensifier 2) had previously been 
identified as acting as a negative intensifier, it was also assessed against the 
hypothesis.  For this intensifier, the step up strategy did provide a more positive 
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outcome on reputation and legitimacy in both clusters, thereby supporting the 
hypothesis. 
To achieve a more positive outcome in the most negative intensifier situation 
(Intensifier 4: new and negative relationship character), a two step up strategy 
needed to be employed in the victim cluster.  However, the positive outcome was 
only for reputation with no change in legitimacy.  That is, the deal strategy needed to 
be used as outlined in Table 81 for reputation.  The results for legitimacy are 
outlined in Table 82.  This suggests the interaction between the liability of newness 
and the negative relationship character was creating strong negative perceptions of 
the organisation for the participants and the strategy had to do a lot more than would 
normally have been expected for the type of crisis event to see a shift in reputation 
and legitimacy scores.   
Table 81: Reputation means for all strategy and intensifier combinations in victim 
cluster at Time 3 
Cluster Intensifiers Reputation for 
deny strategy 
M(SD) 
Reputation 
for diminish 
strategy 
M(SD) 
Reputation for 
deal strategy 
M(SD) 
Victim New and 
negative 
3.59 (1.13) 3.40 (.90) 3.93 (1.16)^ 
 New and 
positive 
4.69 (.88) 4.86 (1.23)^ 5.23 (1.03) 
 Mature and 
negative 
3.10 (1.14) 3.81 (.81)^ 3.70 (1.11) 
 Mature and 
positive 
5.00 (.89) 5.25 (1.24)^ 5.76 (.80) 
Match = deny; One step up = diminish; Two steps up = deal 
^ first strategy required to achieve higher outcome than match 
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Table 82: Legitimacy means for all strategy and intensifier combinations in victim 
cluster at Time 3 
Cluster Intensifiers Legitimacy for 
deny strategy 
M(SD) 
Legitimacy 
for  diminish 
strategy 
M(SD) 
Legitimacy 
for deal 
strategy  
M(SD) 
Victim New and negative 3.84 (1.2) 3.72 (.97) 3.81 (.93) 
 New and positive 4.69 (1.01) 5.23 (1.07)^ 4.75 (1.13) 
 Mature and 
negative 
3.63 (.82) 4.29 (.96)^ 4.00 (.74) 
 Mature and 
positive 
5.24 (.92) 5.34 (1.10)^ 5.35 (.92) 
Match = deny; One step up = diminish; Two steps up = deal 
^ first strategy required to achieve higher outcome than match 
Responsibility 
Research Question 7 and related hypotheses address the mediator role for 
responsibility. 
The impact of the independent variables of crisis cluster, response strategy and 
relationship history (organisational age and relationship character) on responsibility 
as a dependent variable was assessed first.  A univariate ANOVA using Pillai’s trace 
with the dependent variable of responsibility at time 3 showed significant main 
effects for crisis cluster (F (1,529)=51.303, ηp2=.088, p<.05, observed power 1.000) 
and relationship character (F (1,529)=54.371, ηp2=.093, p<.05, observed power 
1.000)  but not for response strategy (F (2,529)=.717, ηp2=.003, n.s., observed power 
.171) nor organisational age (F (1,529)=1.363, ηp2=.003, n.s., observed power .214).   
At time 3, participants held the company in the victim cluster less responsible 
(M=3.29 SD.1.26) than the company in the accident cluster (M=4.04 SD1.32) which 
supports the theoretical assumption behind the categorisation on cluster.  
Participants also held the company that had a positive relationship character (M=3.28 
SD.07) less responsible than the company that had a negative relationship character 
(M=4.07 SD.07) as expected.   
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The trend data for organisational age was as predicted with the mature company 
recording a slightly lower level of responsibility (M=3.61 SD.07) than the new 
company (M=3.74 SD.07) however the difference was not significant.  Therefore, 
within the two components of relationship history, the effect of organisational age is 
not as clear as that for relationship character. 
There were no significant two way, three way or four way interactions when 
assessing the impact of the independent variables on responsibility at time 3.  The 
three way interaction of strategy*relationship character*age was just outside the 
significance level at p=.06. 
Within the victim cluster, the matched strategy of deny when run by an organisation 
with the most negative intensifier (Intensifier 4: new and negative relationship 
character) is recording a significantly higher responsibility score than an organisation 
with the most positive intensifier (Intensifier 1: mature and positive relationship 
character) as outlined in Table 83.    This also holds true for the two other strategy 
options in this cluster.   For the accident cluster, the matched strategy of diminish 
with the negative intensifier is showing a higher responsibility score than with the 
positive intensifier, however, the difference is not significant.   For the accident 
cluster, the other two strategy options are showing significant differences.    
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Table 83: Responsibility scores at time 3 across cluster, strategy and intensifier 
treatments 
Dependent 
Variable 
Cluster Strategy Intensifier 
1 
(positive) 
M(SD) 
Intensifier 
4 
(negative) 
M(SD) 
MDiff (SE) 
(1-4) 
Responsibility Victim Deny^ 2.59 (.74) 3.52  (1.41) -.927 (.37)* 
  Diminish 3.00 (1.17) 4.16 (1.13) -1.167 
(.37)* 
  Deal 2.65 (1.12) 3.65 (1.50) -1.004 
(.34)* 
 Accident Deny 3.62 (1.32) 4.47 (1.02) -.856 (.35)* 
  Diminish^ 4.06 (1.45) 4.52 (1.29) -.459 (.35) 
  Deal 3.44 (1.61) 4.50 (1.21) -1.056 
(.37)* 
^=Matched strategy *p<.05, negative score=Intensifier 4 has higher responsibility 
score than Intensifier 1 
In the victim cluster, the positive intensifier of mature and positive relationship 
character (Intensifier 1) always resulted in the lowest score for responsibility against 
the other three intensifier combinations.  However, in the accident cluster, the 
intensifier of a new organisation with a positive relationship character  (Intensifier 3) 
provided the lowest responsibility score for the deny and diminish strategies with the 
mature and positive relationship character (Intensifier 1) only providing the lowest 
responsibility score for the deal strategy.  This may suggest that the participants are 
weighting the positive relationship character aspect more heavily than the age 
component.  The earlier analysis found a significant relationship between 
relationship character and responsibility but not between age and responsibility 
which would support this finding. 
For the negative intensifiers, the highest scores on responsibility were mostly 
generated by the new and negative relationship character condition (Intensifier 4) 
closely followed by the mature and negative character intensifier (Intensifier 2), 
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again suggesting the larger influence of the relationship character aspect of 
relationship history. 
The largest significant differences between the intensifier combinations within each 
cluster are listed in Table 84.  A difference in relationship character is present in 
more of these combinations than age with an interaction of age and relationship 
character present in five of the comparisons. 
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Table 84:  Comparison of the largest differences among intensifiers on responsibility 
within each cluster. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Cluster Strategy Intensifier  
(A) 
Intensifier 
(B) 
MDiff 
(A-B) 
Traits 
showing 
difference 
Responsibility Victim Diminish New and 
negative 
Mature 
and 
positive 
1.16 
(.37)* 
Age 
Rel Char 
 Victim Deny Mature 
and 
negative 
Mature 
and 
positive 
1.11 
(.36)* 
Rel Char 
 Victim  Deal Mature 
and 
negative 
Mature 
and 
positive 
1.01 
(.38)* 
Rel Char 
 Victim Deal New and 
negative 
Mature 
and 
positive 
1.00 
(.34)* 
Age 
Rel Char 
 Victim Diminish New and 
negative 
New and 
positive 
.994 
(.35)* 
Rel Char 
 Victim Deal Mature 
and 
negative  
New and 
positive 
.957 
(.37)* 
Age 
Rel Char 
 Victim Deal New and 
negative 
New and 
positive 
.945 
(.34)* 
Rel Char 
 Victim Deny New and 
negative 
Mature 
and 
positive 
.927 
(.37)* 
Age 
Rel Char 
 Accident Deny Mature 
and 
negative 
New and 
positive 
1.07 
(.39)* 
Age 
Rel Char 
 Accident Diminish New and 
negative 
New and 
positive 
1.08 
(.39)* 
Rel Char 
 Accident Deal New and 
negative 
Mature 
and 
positive 
1.05 
(.37)* 
Age 
Rel Char 
 Accident Deny New and 
negative 
New and 
positive 
1.02 
(.39)* 
Rel Char 
*p<.05, positive score = Intensifier A has higher responsibility score than Intensifier 
B 
Further analysis was undertaken to identify whether participant perceptions on 
responsibility changed with the additional information on the organisation or 
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whether the perceptions established at time 2 when the strategy was introduced were 
unchanged.  By comparing the outcomes at time 2 and time 3 of the experiment, the 
impacts on responsibility for each of the combinations can be unpacked. 
A repeated measures MANOVA analysis across time 2 and time 3 using crisis 
cluster, response strategy and the relationship history subvariables of organisational 
age and relationship character was undertaken.  The univariate analysis within the 
MANOVA showed that time was not having a significant effect on responsibility (F 
(1,529)=2.837, ηp2=.005, n.s., observed power .390) in the full model.  
As with the analysis at time 3, significant main effects on the change in 
responsibility from time 2 to time 3 were only established for crisis cluster (F 
(1,529)=54.510, ηp2=.093, p<.05, observed power 1.000) and relationship character 
(F (1,529)=19.445, ηp2=.035, p<.05, observed power .933)  but not for response 
strategy (F (2,529)=.873, ηp2=.003, n.s., observed power .200) nor organisational 
age (F (1,529)=.410, ηp2=.001, n.s., observed power .098).  There was a significant 
three way interaction between strategy*cluster*age (F (2,529)=3.398, ηp2=.013, 
p<.05, observed power .639).  No other interactions were significant. 
While the overall analysis was not showing a significant interaction effect among the 
four independent variables on responsibility over time (F (2,529)=1.527, ηp2=.006, 
n.s., observed power .325), each of the 24 individual treatments were examined to 
identify any significant relationships within pairs of treatments.  
There were 10 of the possible 24 treatments where a significant shift in responsibility 
occurred from time 2 to time 3.   There were four significant declines in 
responsibility as outlined in Table 85.  The most positive intensifier (Intensifier 1: 
mature and positive character) accounted for two of these declines.  There were six 
significant increases in responsibility as outlined in Table 86 with the most negative 
intensifier (Intensifier 4: new and negative) accounting for four of the six. 
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Table 85:  Significant declines in responsibility from time 2 to time 3 
Dependent 
Variable 
Cluster Strategy Relationship 
History 
Mean Difference 
(SE)  
(Time 3 – Time 2) 
Responsibility Victim Deny Mature and positive -.583 (.21)* 
 Victim Deal New and positive -.551 (.21)* 
 Accident Deny Mature and positive -.391 (.19)* 
 Accident Diminish New and positive -.632 (.24)* 
*p<.05 
Table 86:  Significant increases in responsibility from time 2 to time 3 
Dependent 
Variable 
Cluster Strategy Relationship 
History 
Mean Difference 
(SE)  
(Time 3 – Time 2) 
Responsibility Victim Diminish New and negative .788 (.22)* 
 Victim Deal New and negative .767 (.19)* 
 Accident Deny New and negative .683 (.22)* 
 Accident Deny Mature and negative .567 (.23)* 
 Accident Diminish New and negative .508 (.22)* 
 Accident Diminish Mature and negative .852 (.24)* 
*p<.05 
Assessing Responsibility as a Mediator 
Having tested the impact of the independent variables of crisis cluster, strategy and 
relationship history on responsibility as a dependent variable, further analysis was 
undertaken to ascertain the impact of responsibility as an independent variable on the 
dependent variables of reputation and legitimacy.  This is necessary to establish the 
mediator effect. 
Correlation analysis showed a significant correlation at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
between responsibility at time 3 and reputation (r=-.474) and legitimacy (r=-.553).   
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Thus the more responsibility the organisation was seen to have for the crisis, the 
lower scores they achieved on reputation and legitimacy judgments.  This association 
was similar to the levels recorded at time 2.  A further check was undertaken using 
the computed change variables.  Again, a significant correlation was established 
between the change in responsibility from time 2 to time 3 and the change in 
reputation (r=-.472) and the change in legitimacy (r=-.516). 
As cluster and relationship character had shown in an earlier analysis to have main 
effects on reputation and legitimacy and also to have had main effects on 
responsibility, these two variables were tested through MANCOVA to examine a 
mediation effect for responsibility.   
The first test on cluster is outlined in Tables 87 and 88.  The multivariate analysis 
showed limited mediation for cluster with very little change in the effect once the 
covariate of responsibility was added. 
Table 87:   Results of MANOVA/MANCOVA on reputation and legitimacy using 
responsibility at time 3 as covariate 
Variable df F Effect ηp2 Observed Power 
Cluster  2,550 8.677* .031 .969 
Cluster (with responsibility 
as co-variate) 
2,549 7.765* .028 .950 
Responsibility (Time 3) 2,549 123.294* .310 1.000 
*p<.05 
The univariate analysis displayed in Table 88 showed no mediation for reputation 
but full mediation for legitimacy with the change from a significant effect on 
legitimacy to a non-significant effect following the introduction of responsibility as a 
covariate.   This was consistent with the earlier tests for mediation which showed 
that responsibility was mediating the effect of cluster on legitimacy but not on 
reputation. 
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Table 88:   Results of univariate analysis within MANOVA/MANCOVA on reputation 
and legitimacy using responsibility at time 3 as covariate 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable  
df F Effect 
ηp2 
Observed 
Power 
Reputation Cluster  1,551 .033 .000 .054 
 Cluster (with 
responsibility as co-
variate) 
1,550 12.128* .022 .935 
 Responsibility 
(Time 3) 
1,550 174.675* .241 1.000 
Legitimacy Cluster 1,551 7.831* .014 .798 
 Cluster (with 
responsibility as co-
variate) 
1,550 1.105 .002 .183 
 Responsibility 
(Time 3) 
1,550 33.793* .057 1.000 
 
The second test for mediation using relationship character as the independent 
variable is outlined in Tables 89 and 90.  The multivariate analysis showed partial 
mediation for relationship character with a reduction in the effect size once the 
covariate of responsibility was added. 
Table 89:   Results of MANOVA/MANCOVA on reputation and legitimacy using 
responsibility at time 3 as covariate 
Variable df F Effect ηp2 Observed Power 
Relationship Character  2,550 128.679* .319 1.000 
Relationship Character (with 
responsibility as co-variate) 
2,549 95.349* .265 1.000 
Responsibility (Time 3) 2,549 95.349* .258 1.000 
*p<.05 
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The univariate analysis displayed in Table 90 showed the partial mediation working 
across both reputation and legitimacy.  While all relationships remained significant, 
there was a decrease in effect size with the co-variate in place. 
Table 90:   Results of univariate analysis within MANOVA/MANCOVA on reputation 
and legitimacy using responsibility at time 3 as covariate 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable  
df F Effect 
ηp2 
Observed 
Power 
Reputation Relationship 
character 
1,551 219.714* .285 1.000 
 Relationship 
character (with 
responsibility as co-
variate) 
1,550 161.963* .227 1.000 
 Responsibility 
(Time 3) 
1,550 106.382* .162 1.000 
Legitimacy Relationship 
character 
1,551 211.673* .278 1.000 
 Relationship 
character (with 
responsibility as co-
variate) 
1,550 154.351* .219 1.000 
 Responsibility 
(Time 3) 
1,550 183.288* .250 1.000 
 
As with reputation and legitimacy, the final test on the variable of responsibility for 
the hypotheses requires a comparison of time period 1 and time period 3 to better 
understand the full protective powers of the different strategies and their value in the 
intensified environment where relationship history is known.    
To test Hypotheses 7.1 and 7.2, the matched strategy in each of the clusters needs to 
be examined (victim – deny; accident-diminish).   The responsibility, reputation and 
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legitimacy scores can be compared across the time periods.   At time 1 to time 2, the 
ability of the strategy alone to impact responsibility and protect the organisation 
against the damage from the crisis event can be established.  From time 2 to time 3, 
the impact of the intensifiers (positive and negative) can be established which helps 
explain whether strategy alone is influencing responsibility, reputation and 
legitimacy or whether strategy plus the information on the intensifiers is having an 
effect.  Comparing time period 1 to time period 3 allows an assessment of whether 
the strategy in light of the intensifier information can limit the damage to the 
organisation from the crisis event. 
Relevant Hypotheses 
Each of the three hypotheses will now be discussed. 
Hypothesis 7.1  
In the presence of a positive intensifier, a matched strategy will at least 
maintain stakeholder perceptions of responsibility and subsequently will at least 
maintain stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy from the time of 
the crisis event. 
As outlined in Table 91, a matched strategy in the victim cluster (deny) in 
conjunction with the most positive intensifier of mature and positive relationship 
character (Intensifier 1) saw a significant decrease in responsibility assigned to the 
organisation.  This supports the first part of hypothesis 7.1 which had as a minimum 
that responsibility would be maintained. 
For the accident cluster, the matched strategy (diminish) in conjunction with the 
most positive intensifier of mature and positive relationship character (Intensifier 1) 
also saw a significant decline in responsibility adding further support to the 
hypothesis. 
The new and positive relationship character intensifier (Intensifier 3) had benefits in 
the accident category with a significant decline in responsibility, however, the same 
treatment in the victim cluster was only supported on trend data with a non-
significant decline. 
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Table 91:  Changes in responsibility from time 1 to time 3 for matched strategies in 
each cluster. 
Cluster Matched 
Strategy 
Intensifier Responsibility 
MDiff (SE) 
(Time 3 – Time 1) 
Responsibility  
Increase/Decrease 
(Time 3 – Time 1) 
Victim Deny Mature and 
positive 
-.764 (.24)* Decrease 
  Mature and 
negative 
1.04 (.25)* Increase 
  New and 
positive 
-.288 (.23) Maintain (non 
significant decrease) 
  New and 
negative 
.26 (.26) Maintain (non 
significant increase) 
Accident Diminish Mature and 
positive 
-.656 (.21)* Decrease 
  Mature and 
negative 
-.111 (.28) Maintain (non 
significant decrease) 
  New and 
positive 
-.886 (.27)* Decrease 
  New and 
negative 
.143 (.26) Maintain (non 
significant increase 
*p<.05 
To address the second part of the hypothesis, a summary of the relationships between 
changes in responsibility and changes in reputation and legitimacy is outlined in 
Table 92.  This draws from the more detailed data provided earlier in testing 
significant and non-significant shifts in the dependent variables (reputation and 
legitimacy) and the proposed mediator of responsibility. 
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Table 92:  Summary of changes in responsibility, reputation and legitimacy from 
time 1 to time 3. 
Cluster Matched 
Strategy 
Intensifier Responsibility 
Increase/ 
Decrease 
Reputation 
Increase/ 
Decrease 
Legitimacy 
Increase/ 
Decrease 
Victim Deny Mature and positive 
(1) 
Decrease* Maintain 
(non 
significant 
increase) 
Increase* 
  Mature and negative 
(2) 
Increase* Decrease* Decrease* 
  New and positive (3) Maintain (non 
significant 
decrease) 
Maintain 
(non 
significant 
increase) 
Increase* 
  New and negative (4) Maintain (non 
significant 
increase) 
Decrease* Decrease* 
Accident Diminish Mature and positive 
(1) 
Decrease* Increase* Increase* 
  Mature and negative 
(2) 
Maintain (non 
significant 
decrease) 
Decrease* Decrease* 
  New and positive (3) Decrease* Increase* Increase* 
  New and negative (4) Maintain (non 
significant 
increase 
Decrease* Decrease* 
*p<.05 
Under Hypotheses 7.1, the matched strategy in each category in conjunction with the 
most positive intensifier of mature and positive relationship character (Intensifier 1) 
should not provide any further damage to the organisation from the crisis event itself 
(time 1) as measures of responsibility, reputation and legitimacy will be at least 
maintained at these levels.  This allows for upside benefit to be achieved through 
lowering responsibility with a subsequent increase in reputation and legitimacy.   
This hypothesis has partial support in the victim cluster.  The deny strategy in 
conjunction with the most positive intensifier (Intensifier 1: mature and positive 
relationship character) saw a significant decrease in responsibility from the time of 
the crisis and a subsequent significant increase in legitimacy, however, the increase 
in reputation was on trend but not significant.  The hypothesis was fully supported in 
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the accident cluster with a significant decline in responsibility and a subsequent 
significant increase in reputation and legitimacy. 
The new and positive character intensifier (Intensifier 3) appears to be acting as a 
positive intensifier in this context as well with significant results for the accident 
cluster and on trend results for the victim cluster. 
Drawing from Table 92, the second hypothesis can be assessed. 
Hypothesis 7.2 
In the presence of a negative intensifier, a matched strategy will not maintain 
stakeholder perceptions of responsibility and subsequently will not maintain 
stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy from the time of the crisis 
event. 
A matched strategy in the victim cluster (deny) in conjunction with the most 
negative intensifier of new and negative relationship character (Intensifier 4) saw a 
slight increase in responsibility, thereby potentially bringing further damage to the 
organisation.  However, the result was non-significant so the hypothesis can only be 
supported on trend data.    There was a significant decline in reputation and 
legitimacy across this time period which supports the second part of the hypothesis. 
For the accident cluster, the matched strategy (diminish) in conjunction with the 
most negative intensifier of new and negative relationship character (Intensifier 4) 
also saw a slight increase in responsibility albeit not significant and a similar 
significant decline in reputation and legitimacy so there is partial support for the 
hypothesis across the clusters. 
For the victim cluster, the mature and negative relationship character intensifier 
(Intensifier 2) had the most negative effect with a significant increase in 
responsibility and a significant decline in reputation and legitimacy.    As outlined 
earlier, this is suggesting the participants saw the negative relationship behaviour as 
operating for a long period of time and therefore penalised the company for this 
behaviour.  This relationship is less clear for the accident cluster, although 
significant declines in reputation and legitimacy were recorded for the mature and 
negative relationship character intensifier (Intensifier 2). 
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Hypothesis 7.3 
In the presence of a negative intensifier, a step up strategy will provide more 
positive outcomes than a matched strategy on stakeholder perceptions of 
responsibility and subsequently provide more positive outcomes than a matched 
strategy on stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy. 
For responsibility, a more positive outcome is a lower responsibility score for the 
step up strategy when compared with the match strategy.   The hypothesis was not 
supported in the victim category for the negative intensifier of new and negative 
relationship character (Intensifier 4) with a higher score for responsibility being 
recorded when the step up strategy was used (see Table 93).  A step up strategy did 
provide benefits in the new and positive relationship treatment (Intensifier 3) with 
subsequent higher scores for reputation and legitimacy (see Table 80) and the mature 
and negative relationship treatment (Intensifier 2), again with higher scores for 
reputation and legitimacy (see Table 80).   The hypothesis was also not supported in 
the accident cluster for the most negative intensifier (Intensifier 4).   The step up 
strategy of deal in this category resulted in the same level of responsibility as the 
matched strategy (see Table 93), although reputation and legitimacy scores were 
lower (see Table 80).    
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Table 93: Responsibility scores for matched vs step up strategy for intensifier 
categories within each cluster 
Cluster Intensifiers Responsibility for 
match strategy at 
time 3 
M(SD) 
Responsibility for 
step up strategy at 
time 3 
M(SD) 
Victim New and negative 3.52 (1.41) 4.16 (1.13) 
 New and positive 3.28 (1.00) 3.17 (1.39) 
 Mature and negative 3.71 (1.18) 3.42 (.99) 
 Mature and positive 2.59 (.74) 3.00 (1.17) 
Accident New and negative 4.52 (1.29) 4.50 (1.21) 
 New and positive 3.93 (1.42) 3.62 (1.19) 
 Mature and negative 4.29 (.80) 4.25 (1.30) 
 Mature and positive 4.06 (1.45) 3.44 (1.61) 
Victim cluster: match = deny; step up = diminish; Accident cluster: match = diminish; step 
up= deal 
For the victim cluster, the two step up strategy of dealing with responsibility did not 
provide any greater benefits as outlined in Table 94.  This is to be expected as the 
deal strategy accepts responsibility, thereby participant perceptions of responsibility 
should at least be maintained or increased. 
Table 94: Responsibility scores at time 3 for all strategy options and intensifier 
categories within the victim cluster 
Cluster Intensifiers Responsibility 
for deny 
strategy 
M(SD) 
Responsibility 
for diminish 
strategy 
M(SD) 
Responsibility 
for deal 
strategy 
M(SD) 
Victim New and 
negative 
3.52 (1.41) 4.16 (1.13) 3.65 (1.50) 
 New and 
positive 
3.28 (1.00) 3.17 (1.39)^ 2.71 (1.23) 
 Mature and 
negative 
3.71 (1.18) 3.42 (.99)^ 3.66 (1.16) 
 Mature and 
positive 
2.59 (.74) 3.00 (1.17) 2.65 (1.12) 
Match = deny; One step up = diminish; Two steps up = deal 
^ first strategy required to achieve lower score on responsibility than match 
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Reconsidering the Role of Responsibility 
Responsibility had been hypothesised as a mediator in the relationship between a 
range of independent variables (crisis cluster, strategy, relationship character, 
organisational age) and the dependent variables of reputation and legitimacy. 
The tests for mediation across the six experiments have shown limited mediation for 
responsibility and mostly for the crisis cluster variable.  However, most analysis has 
shown links between responsibility and reputation and legitimacy. 
A final test within Experiment 6 was run to assess responsibility as a moderating 
variable rather than a mediator.  This test was run at two time periods to assess the 
presence of significant interaction effects between responsibility and the other 
independent variables.  Responsibility at time 2 and time 3 was recomputed as a 
categorical variable as outlined in Experiment 2.  Responsibility was assessed at 
three levels (low, medium and high). 
For time 2 when the crisis event and the strategy are in place, a one-way MANOVA 
was undertaken using cluster, strategy and the categorical variable of responsibility 
as the independent variables and reputation and legitimacy as the dependent 
variables.  A significant interaction was found for strategy and responsibility (F 
(8,1082)=2.347, ηp2=.017, p<.05, observed power .892) for the multivariate analysis 
using Pillai’s Trace as the test statistic.  The univariate analysis within the 
MANOVA showed the two way interaction was having a significant effect on 
reputation (F (4,541)=3.539, ηp2=.025, p<.05, observed power .867) with the effect 
on legitimacy just outside the significance test levels used in this experiment (F 
(4,541)=2.221, ηp2=.016, p=.06, observed power .653).   
At time 3, when the relationship history conditions are in place, there were a number 
of significant three way interactions on reputation and legitimacy at the multivariate 
level as outlined in Table 95.  The three way interaction for cluster, strategy and 
responsibility was not significant at the univariate level for reputation (F 
(4,482)=2.002, ηp2=.016, n.s., observed power .600) nor legitimacy (F 
(4,482)=1.845, ηp2=.015, n.s., observed power .560).   The three way interaction for 
strategy, relationship character and responsibility was significant for both reputation 
(F (4,482)=2.479, ηp2=.020, p<.05, observed power .70) and legitimacy (F 
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(4,482)=4.275, ηp2=.034, p<.05, observed power .928) with a stronger effect size for 
legitimacy.    The three way interaction with the other subattribute of relationship 
history (organisational age), strategy and responsibility was significant for reputation 
(F (4,482)=2.339, ηp2=.019, p<.05, observed power .678) but not legitimacy (F 
(4,482)=1.984, ηp2=.016, n.s., observed power .596), recognising the stronger link 
established through this experiment between relationship character and responsibility 
compared with organisational age and responsibility.  For the final three way 
interaction of relationship character, organisational age and responsibility, the 
univariate analysis was significant for both reputation (F (4,482)=3.688, ηp2=.015, 
p<.05, observed power .677) and legitimacy (F (4,482)=4.151, ηp2=.017, p<.05, 
observed power .732) 
Table 95:  Time 3 interactions with responsibility as a moderator at the multivariate 
level  
Significant Interactions df F Effect  
ηp2 
Observed Power 
Cluster*strategy*responsibility 8,964 2.571* .021 .922 
Strategy*relationship 
character*responsibility 
8,964 2.307* .019 .885 
Strategy*age*responsibility 8,964 2.275* .019 .880 
Relationship 
character*age*responsibility 
4,964 2.910* .012 .786 
*p<.05 
These interactions support the variable of responsibility as a moderator in the overall 
model, acting with strategy in the intensified environment (through organisational 
age and relationship character) to impact stakeholder judgments on reputation and 
legitimacy. 
Summary of Experiment 6 Results 
The final experiment in the study’s series again confirmed the importance of the 
crisis event in setting stakeholder perceptions of an organisation’s responsibility for 
a crisis and its reputation and legitimacy.  Prior to any response by an organisation in 
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crisis, an organisation seen to be a victim had lower levels of responsibility assigned 
to it by the participants in the study when compared with an organisation that had 
experienced an accident.  Similarly, the organisation experiencing the victim crisis 
achieved higher scores for reputation and legitimacy when compared with an 
organisation experiencing an accident. 
The organisation’s response was also established as having a main effect on 
reputation and legitimacy and was acting in conjunction with the type of crisis event 
for judgments on legitimacy.  In general, denial strategies run by organisations in 
crisis saw the assignment of lower scores on reputation and legitimacy by the 
participants in this study when compared with the more accommodative strategies of 
trying to diminish responsibility or dealing with it directly through compensation.  
Strategy also had an effect on the change in reputation and legitimacy judgments 
made by the participants pre and post the crisis event. Confirming the results of the 
previous experiments, strategy was not shown to be having a significant effect on 
judgments of responsibility.    Significant relationships were established, however, 
for the effect of levels of responsibility on judgments of reputation and legitimacy.   
The main focus for Experiment 6 was on the impact of the intensifier of relationship 
history on the outcomes for organisations experiencing different types of crisis 
events and trying to select an effective strategy that addresses stakeholder concerns.  
A significant interaction was found between the two subcomponents of relationship 
history (organisational age and relationship character) for the effect on reputation 
and legitimacy, supporting the formation of the four different intensifier conditions 
that were tested in Experiment 6.  The combination of a new organisation with a 
negative relationship character was found to have a detrimental effect on judgments 
on reputation and legitimacy, whereas a mature organisation with a positive 
relationship character was rewarded by the participants with higher reputation and 
legitimacy scores.  A mature organisation with negative relationship character was 
generally judged more harshly than a new organisation with the same relationship 
character, suggesting participants saw maturity not as a protective category but as 
one which suggests long term negative behaviour by the organisation in question.  
Under this context, the predicted protection of the maturity status for the 
organisation turned into a harm factor. 
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The first hypothesis tested in Experiment 6 related to the ability of the match strategy 
in each of the clusters to maintain reputation and legitimacy scores in the presence of 
a positive intensifier.  This was supported for both the victim and accident clusters.  
The most positive intensifier of a mature organisation with a positive relationship 
character had the strongest effect in these categories.  The combination of a new 
organisation that had a positive relationship character was also classified by the 
participants as creating a positive environment for the organisation in which 
reputation and legitimacy judgments were made, although the results were only 
significant for legitimacy and on trend for reputation. 
The second hypothesis examined the effect on reputation and legitimacy for the 
organisation when a negative intensifier was operating.  Reputation and legitimacy 
scores were predicted to not be maintained when the most negative intensifier of a 
new organisation with a negative relationship character was operating which was 
supported with significant decreases for both the victim and the accident clusters.  
Similar results were also established for the next most negative intensifier of a 
mature organisation with negative relationship character.   
The third hypothesis tested the proposition that a step up strategy would provide 
better outcomes for an organisation than a matched strategy in the presence of a 
negative intensifier such as a new organisation with a negative relationship character.   
This was not supported for the most negative intensifier for either the victim or 
accident cluster.  The negative effects of this intensifier were too strong to allow a 
one step up strategy to achieve a better outcome.  The participants expected the 
organisation with this negative relationship history to do considerably more and take 
on an even more accommodative strategy if there was going to be any benefit to the 
organisation in trying to achieve a higher reputation and legitimacy score.   This test 
showed the power of the different intensifiers in action as the one step up strategy 
was sufficient for the negative intensifier of mature and negative relationship 
character.  Thus, negative intensifiers cannot be considered all in one category but 
need to be placed on a continuum of negative impacts from strongly negative 
through to mildly negative.  
Experiment 6 provided further examination of the role of responsibility in judgments 
on reputation and legitimacy and the ability of different factors such as the crisis 
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event or the organisation’s response to influence such judgments.  In Experiment 6, 
the organisation that had the more negative relationship character was held to be 
more responsible for the crisis event.  Relationship character was having a stronger 
impact on judgments of responsibility than the other component of relationship 
history (organisational age).  On trend data, the more mature organisation was held 
less responsible for the crisis event but the results for mature versus new were not 
significant.  Judgments on organisational responsibility were established as 
mediating the relationship between relationship character and reputation and 
legitimacy.   
The positive intensifier enhanced the protective powers of the recommended strategy 
under the SCCT model in the accident cluster by not seeing any further increases in 
responsibility or declines in reputation or legitimacy from that linked directly to the 
crisis event.  As such, the recommended strategy met the expectations of 
stakeholders in terms of an organisation’s response.  Support was also provided for 
this proposition in the victim cluster although the impact on reputation could only be 
established on trend data. 
Environments where negative intensifiers were present saw significant declines in 
reputation and legitimacy for organisations that used the recommended strategy, 
however, the link through responsibility was less well established.    The 
recommended strategy did not sufficiently meet the expectations of participants so 
further damage was done to the organisation through lower reputation and legitimacy 
scores.   
In the victim category, the organisation could not reduce the negative effects of its 
lack of maturity and negative relationship character by enacting the next most 
accommodative strategy.  This step up strategy saw a significant increase in 
responsibility scores.  The step up strategy did have the ability to maintain or lower 
responsibility when one of the less negative intensifiers were in place, again 
supporting the need to conceptualise a continuum of negative effects.    For the 
accident category, the step up strategy again only had a positive outcome when used 
with the least negative of the intensifiers.   
While some indications of responsibility of a mediator were established in 
Experiment 6, particularly in relation to crisis cluster and relationship character, 
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responsibility was established as interacting with the crisis cluster and organisational 
strategy to affect judgments on reputation and legitimacy.  Thus, the findings of 
Experiment 6 suggest organisational responsibility for a crisis has both a mediating 
and a moderating role in understanding the relationships between a crisis event and 
the organisation’s response to it and stakeholder judgments on the organisation’s 
reputation and legitimacy. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has documented the results from the last stage of experiments in this 
study.  A detailed description of the Stage Four Experiment 6 was provided and key 
findings summarised.  The various relationships established through hypothesis 
testing of the independent variables of crisis cluster, strategy and relationship history 
with the dependent variables of reputation and legitimacy have been highlighted.   
The proposed mediator role for organisational responsibility has been tested and 
discussed and the extension to this proposition that responsibility has both a 
mediating and a moderating role established. 
Support for each of the hypothesis has been outlined where confirmed and 
alternative propositions drawn from the data provided where support was not 
established.    
In Chapter 8, the research findings will be considered in the context of existing 
literature, to develop conclusions on the research questions and hypotheses, and 
highlight theoretical and managerial implications of the findings.      
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Chapter 8   Discussion, Limitations and Recommendations 
This chapter provides an overview of the research conclusions for this study based 
on the organising problem established in Chapter 1.  The discussion draws on the 
detailed research findings of the six experiments outlined in Chapters 4 - 7, and the 
guiding literature from Chapter 2. 
This study employed experimental method to extend and refine our understanding of 
the relationships and influences contained within one of crisis communication’s 
dominant models, the SCCT (Coombs & Holladay, 2001).  The SCCT model has 
developed as one of the major organising paradigms in crisis communication over 
the last decade and has increasingly become the focus for empirical research in this 
field.  This study’s particular focus was to unpack the scope and limitations of the 
‘protective powers’ of response strategy (Coombs, 2010) for organisations in crisis.   
In doing so, it takes a stakeholder-centred approach by focusing on the perceptions 
of stakeholders as opposed to the views of organisations.  The study tests the 
adequacy of the explanatory powers of the model and its related propositions, as 
reported in current literature, within the frame of influences on stakeholder 
perceptions.  It extends the scope of the model to consider a more refined approach 
to our understanding of relationship history as a contextual factor in crisis 
communication and management and its role in influencing stakeholder perceptions.  
This study has also responded to the need to consider legitimacy outcomes for 
organisations in crisis given the growing interest in this field in the public relations 
discipline and, in doing so, reinvigorates investigations of this discrete construct 
within the SCCT model.  While this study works primarily within the SCCT model, 
the key SCCT factors represent the features of many crisis management models and 
thus, this study’s findings also contribute to the broader field of crisis response 
strategy.   
Firstly, this chapter takes the key findings from across the four stages of experiments 
used to examine the relationship of key variables, and discusses how these findings 
contribute to the refinement of the SCCT model and influences on stakeholder 
perceptions during crisis events.  It identifies how this study supports the findings 
from other studies in crisis response research.  Where applicable, explanations for 
contrary findings are provided.  In doing so, this chapter responds to each of the 
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seven research questions that guided this study, identifying important relationships 
between the independent variables of crisis cluster, response strategy and 
relationship history with its two sub-attributes (organisational age and relationship 
character) and the dependent variables of reputation and legitimacy.  It also 
addresses the role of organisational responsibility in understanding these 
relationships.  Secondly, the chapter addresses the contributions made to theory 
development and testing and the implications for managerial practice based on the 
current SCCT propositions and its guidelines for crisis managers.  Thirdly, avenues 
for further research are identified before finally noting the limitations to the study 
and its findings. 
Addressing the Organising Problem and Research Questions 
This study was designed within the organising research problem of: 
How does an organisation’s selection of a crisis response strategy and that 
organisation’s relationship history influence stakeholder perceptions of its 
responsibility in different crisis situations, and, subsequently, its intangible 
assets of reputation and legitimacy? 
Crises are by nature ambiguous situations that require decision-making without full 
knowledge of the factors influencing the event, therefore, predictive models that help 
managers understand the impacts of their choices are highly valued.  Rhee and 
Valdez (2009) highlight the critical need in management studies to better understand 
the contextual factors surrounding events that can damage an organisation’s 
reputation such as a crisis and confirm the difficulty organisations face in repairing 
such damage should it occur.  Differentials exist for organisations trying to respond 
to such crises based on their own characteristics and the response they decide to 
make.  As outlined by Hale et al (2005), management responses may be successful 
and mitigate against damage to reputation or they may be unsuccessful, aggravating 
damage already in play from the triggering event.  Rhee and Valdez (2009) call for 
further consideration of the theorised propositions in reputation-repair models 
through empirical testing, not only to understand the influence of individual 
contextual factors but to also map their relationship to each other. 
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This study’s design provided for the systematic interrogation of the way different 
information on a crisis event, an organisation’s response to that event and the 
particular characteristics of the organisation facing the crisis influence stakeholder 
judgments of that organisation’s reputation and legitimacy.  One of the key drivers of 
this study was to understand the ability of particular response strategies to protect 
against the danger to an organisation’s reputation and legitimacy of a crisis event and 
whether this protection was supported or reduced by a company’s relationship 
history with its community stakeholders.  A more thorough understanding of this 
influence is needed to better guide the managerial selection of an effective 
organisational response to a crisis to protect reputation and legitimacy and a more 
sophisticated model of such responses.    
Testing Reputation and Legitimacy within the SCCT 
The organisational assets of reputation and legitimacy are under threat during a 
crisis, hence the desire to build response models to protect these assets.  Reputation 
and legitimacy have been represented in the literature as theoretically different 
constructs (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Staw & Epstein, 2000) and this study 
tested this claim empirically within the SCCT crisis model.  Challenges to both 
reputation and legitimacy through crisis events were considered in the model’s early 
development (see for example, Coombs & Holladay, 1996), however, few later 
studies revisited the legitimacy concept, preferring instead to focus on reputation 
(Coombs, 2006; Pace et al, 2010; Verhoeven et al, 2012). 
The legitimacy construct used in this study was drawn from the work of Massey 
(2001) and Elsbach (1994) who both undertook legitimacy research directly with 
stakeholders.  This construct included items on the qualities of an organisation and 
its external endorsement which are similar in nature to reputational constructs, 
therefore, strong association between the constructs was expected.  However, the 
legitimacy construct also included aspects on normative activity, that is, what 
behaviour is expected of an organisation, representing a moral approach to 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) outlined in Chapter 2.  Thus, the mix of these aspects 
should account for a level of difference between the constructs.  It may be more 
pronounced at certain times of the pre-crisis and post-crisis event timeline, 
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depending on the information being processed by the stakeholders in making 
judgments on the organisation and its responsibility for the crisis event.   
The results across the six experiments confirmed the strong association between 
reputation and legitimacy.  Where there was a shift in stakeholder perceptions of one 
of the constructs, the same direction of influence was seen in the other construct, as 
expected with this strong association.  However, the intensity of the shift did vary 
resulting in significant main effects for one construct being established in some of 
the experiments but not for the other (as reported in the results in Chapters 4 – 7).   
Of particular note was the main effect for strategy which was established more for 
the reputation construct than the legitimacy construct, suggesting the focus of the 
strategies in the SCCT was less well matched to the normative behaviour aspects of 
the legitimacy construct and consequently could not drive a shift in stakeholder 
perceptions of legitimacy. 
The differences in the constructs were also demonstrated through correlation analysis 
run across the Stage One experiments, identifying the relationship between 
stakeholder judgments on the organisation’s level of responsibility for the crisis 
event and its reputation and legitimacy.   This analysis showed a higher correlation 
between levels of responsibility and levels of legitimacy than with levels of 
reputation.  This suggests judgments on responsibility were aligning closely with the 
normative expectations of organisational behaviour represented in the legitimacy 
construct.   Choi and Shepherd (2005) suggest that such congruence between the 
organisational behaviour and the expectations of its stakeholders should have a 
positive impact on legitimacy.  
The Protective Powers of Response Strategy in Different Crisis Events: Refining 
the SCCT matched strategy proposition through repeated measures design    
While crisis researchers often define the crisis lifecycle in different ways (see for 
example Fink, 1986; Mitroff, 1994; Coombs, 2007), similarities can be drawn on at 
least three key points: before the crisis event, the crisis event itself and the 
organisation’s response to that event (or lack thereof).  This study has used these 
critical time points in its design to track the judgments of the participants in the 
study.  By doing so, it illuminates not only comparative outcomes based on the 
choices made by organisations in crisis but shows whether and how stakeholder 
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judgments are influenced by these choices at critical stages of the decision-making 
process.     
Research Question 1 
How do crisis response strategies used in response to crises from different 
crisis clusters influence stakeholder perceptions of organisational reputation 
and legitimacy?   
Coombs (2007b) has suggested that through crisis response testing and modelling it 
should be possible to select the most effective communication strategy to protect the 
reputational damage to an organisation from a crisis event.  Hence the proposition 
behind the SCCT model that recommends organisations should select a strategy that 
matches the level of responsibility determined by the type of crisis event it is facing. 
The model posits that by doing so, the organisation should at least match the 
expectations of stakeholders, thereby establishing congruency between the parties.  
However, it has been unclear in earlier research as to what impact the selection of a 
strategy actually has on a company’s reputation and legitimacy that has already been 
damaged by an event.  This is due to the limited studies that compare pre and post-
crisis outcomes.  Further refinement of the matched strategy propositions within the 
SCCT is possible once the impact at different time periods is known. 
The crisis manager’s decision-making starts with the crisis event.  Stage One 
(Experiments 1 – 3) of this study’s research process documented the impact of 
different types of crises contained within the theoretical structure of a crisis cluster 
on a company’s reputation and legitimacy.  Having established a baseline measure 
for reputation and legitimacy pre-crisis, the impact of the crisis event was shown 
consistently with significant declines recorded for all crisis clusters (victim, accident, 
preventable).  These declines represented the reputational and legitimacy damage 
caused by the event itself and confirmed the hypothesised main effect of crisis 
cluster on reputation and legitimacy as outlined in Figure 37.   
While previous studies have focused on the impact of crisis events on reputation, this 
study has shown that these events also represent an immediate challenge to an 
organisation’s legitimacy and this challenge is present with different intensity for 
different types of crises.   
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Figure 37: Main effect of crisis cluster on stakeholder perceptions of reputation and 
legitimacy established in this study 
Once faced with a crisis, the organisation needs to determine its response.  Within 
the SCCT model, this response is either a theoretically matched strategy or an 
unmatched strategy based on the levels of responsibility attributed to the 
organisation due to the nature of the crisis event.  Coombs (2010) acknowledges that 
while the SCCT offers a number of strategy recommendations, only a ‘small 
percentage’ (p.722) of them have been tested empirically, hence the need for studies 
such as this focused on the outcomes of response strategy.  By tracing the effects 
over time, this study has unpacked the likely impact each strategy has on redressing 
the damage caused by the crisis event.  This work better explains what running a 
matched or a mismatched strategy will mean for an organisation to help guide its 
decision-making. 
One significant result of Experiments 1-3 is that crisis response strategy was 
confirmed as having a main effect on reputation.  The introduction of different 
strategies resulted in clearly different reputational outcomes for the organisation.  
Response strategy was less clearly established as having an effect on legitimacy with 
significant differences in outcomes only found in one cluster of crisis, the 
preventable cluster where organisational responsibility for the crisis event is high.  
Experiment 6 confirmed the earlier effect for reputation and did find a significant 
effect for legitimacy, albeit with a much smaller effect size.  The response strategies 
recommended in the SCCT appear less well designed to influence the more complex 
nature of stakeholder perceptions of legitimacy once they have been influenced by 
the crisis event.   
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Figure 38: Main effect of response strategy on stakeholder perceptions of reputation 
and legitimacy established in this study 
Given the selection of an appropriate response strategy is predicated on the crisis 
event, a two-way interaction between crisis cluster and strategy was expected in 
these experiments.  Mixed support was provided for this proposition across the 
study.  The Stage One experiments (Experiments 1 – 3) did not support this 
proposition with no significant effect for the two-way interaction on reputation and 
legitimacy.   This is consistent with the recent findings of Claeys et al (2010) and 
Verhoeven et al (2012) who examined the effects on reputation.  This study has 
extended their work by considering also the effect on legitimacy.   While 
Experiments 1 – 3 tested the effects of strategy in all three clusters, a maximum of 
two clusters was tested in any one experiment and drew from the clusters of victim 
and preventable.  When a different combination of clusters was tested in Experiment 
6 (victim and accident), a significant two-way interaction was established for 
legitimacy but not for reputation.  Thus, the underpinning assumptions of the cluster 
definitions which assume certain levels of responsibility appear to be critical to the 
interaction with strategy which is seen to address those levels of responsibility.  The 
assumptions of the victim and accident clusters are similar in that they position low 
to medium levels of organisational responsibility whereas the assumption of the 
preventable cluster is high organisational responsibility, thereby creating a different 
environment through which strategy is assessed.   
The hypothesised relationships under examination in the study were designed to 
draw out the impacts of the matched vs mismatched strategies.  By undertaking the 
repeated measures analysis, the actual effect of the strategy could be established.  
For each of the victim, accident and preventable crisis clusters, the matched strategy 
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maintained stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy from the time of the 
crisis event as predicted in the Stage One experiments.  This means that by selecting 
the matched strategy the organisation could have comfort that no further damage to 
its reputation and legitimacy was going to occur.  Damage had already occurred 
based on the crisis event so the response strategy held stakeholder perceptions of 
reputation and legitimacy constant at this point.   
One of the stated goals of the SCCT is to guide managers in selecting an appropriate 
response strategy (Coombs, 2006).  The findings from Experiments 1 -3 suggest a 
refinement of the broad guidance to managers drawn from the model which implies 
the ‘significant effect on the outcome of crisis’ (Coombs, 2010, p. 28) from 
implementing effective response strategies.  The guidance drawn from this study 
should be to set very modest goals as outcomes for their strategy intervention and 
not expect their response to recoup all or almost all of the damage done and return 
the company’s reputation and legitimacy to close to pre-crisis levels.  In considering 
the implications of these results, it should be remembered that the judgments made 
in Experiments 1 – 3 were over a very short period of time with the participants 
being asked to comment on the company immediately upon finding out new 
information.   Retesting after some longer period of time may result in different 
outcomes as the immediate effect of the information deteriorates. 
As the mismatched strategies represent different options across the three crisis 
clusters, some different outcomes were found among the groups in this study.  
However, the findings support the findings of Lee (2004) who found limited 
differences between the mismatched strategies in light of their very different 
approaches from, for example, denying responsibility through to offering 
compensation to victims. 
For a crisis in which the organisation was deemed by the participants to be a victim 
and therefore had low responsibility for the crisis, the only strategy response that led 
to a significant positive shift in stakeholder perceptions of reputation was the 
accommodative strategy of compensation to the victims.   In this case, the victims 
were the company’s employees and their families so there may be a reasonable 
expectation that they be looked after even though the company wasn’t directly 
responsible.   This appeared to have been recognised by the participants with this 
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goodwill gesture by the company being rewarded with a significant increase in 
reputation scores from the time of the crisis event which returned the company’s 
reputation to its pre-crisis levels.  The company would need to consider its options 
carefully if the victims were not linked to the company as adopting a strategy of 
denying responsibility for the event or providing an excuse led to no further damage 
to the company’s reputation and legitimacy which may be an acceptable outcome 
when balanced against the financial and legal ramifications of more accommodative 
strategies involving compensation. 
For an accident where attributed responsibility is mid-range in intensity, the diminish 
strategy of making an excuse for the accident saw reputation and legitimacy 
maintained at the point of the crisis event with no further damage to these assets 
suffered by the organisation.  This may be sufficient for an organisation that has 
some level of responsibility for the incident in the short term with other strategies 
introduced at a later date to rebuild the company’s reputation and legitimacy.  The 
deal strategy of providing compensation saw a significant increase in reputation and 
again returned the company to its pre-crisis reputation level.    
For crisis events viewed by stakeholders as preventable, there were very limited 
differences in outcomes between the most accommodative strategy of providing 
compensation and the diminish strategy of offering an excuse.  Judgments of 
responsibility are strongly directed towards the organisation in this category and 
once made, the organisation may find it difficult to change such judgments. This 
finding supports the work of Haigh and Dardis (2008) who found no benefit for an 
organisation in running highly accommodative strategies over lower level strategies 
such as an excuse.  Coombs (2007) has also acknowledged that attempts to lower 
responsibility in times of heightened levels of negativity may be fruitless.  This study 
has responded to the call by Haigh and Dardis (2008) for more empirical testing of 
these dynamics as the impact of each of the strategies has been mapped through the 
repeated measures analysis. 
The preventable cluster is underresearched given its importance to today’s business 
environment.  Major business crises such as Enron, Citigroup, JP Morgan, Barclays 
and the LIBOR scandal and the many groups caught up in the Global Financial 
Crisis have highlighted the implications to business of fraud and organisational 
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misdeeds.  This study has provided a particular focus on this cluster through 
Experiment 3 which examined two different crisis events within the cluster.  Three 
different recommended strategies were assessed within each of these crisis events.  
The two crisis events did not behave the same as evidenced by a significant effect for 
the crisis subtype on reputation and legitimacy.  Harsher judgments were applied by 
the stakeholders to the organisation which had been involved in an alleged fraudulent 
contract negotiation when compared with an organisation whose employee had made 
a mistake and produced a product that harmed consumers.   The latter was 
considered more closely to that of an accident which is understandable as there did 
not appear to be any intent behind the employee’s actions.   This analysis raises the 
challenge of trying to position the crisis types within their clusters which is a key 
decision of the crisis manager.  If the crisis types are viewed as a continuum rather 
than as discrete categories of difference, the crisis types closest to the original 
dividing lines of each category may need further attention when determining which 
strategy is most likely to have a positive effect.   
While Coombs (2007b, 2009) has separated out the ingratiation strategy from the 
rebuild strategies in more recent discussions of the SCCT model, the findings of 
Experiment 3 suggest the outcomes from its use may not support such differential 
treatment.  The ingratiation strategy which reminds stakeholders of previous good 
deeds was not held to provide significant differences in reputation and legitimacy 
outcomes to those of the compassion strategy which includes a level of 
compensation for victims or to a full apology taking responsibility for the crisis 
event.  These strategies were applied in a preventable crisis where attributions of 
responsibility are high, so once again, the initial attribution of responsibility may be 
so strong as to limit the effect of any particular strategy.  Shifting the focus for the 
respondents from the crisis event to the company’s previous good deeds saw no 
further damage caused to the company’s reputation and legitimacy.  As identified 
earlier, suffering no further damage is a minimum goal for the organisation.  The 
ingratiation strategy did not provide any additional benefit of repairing the damage 
experienced from the event but then neither did the other recommended strategies.  
The execution of the ingratiation strategy in practice may be more difficult as media 
representation of the strategy may reflect a more negative approach than was 
produced in this study’s media articles.  However, the results of this study suggest its 
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use should be reconsidered in controlled channels of communication such as 
websites and e-newsletters where the company can determine the message 
communicated to stakeholders.  
Explicating the Role of Organisational Responsibility in Crisis Response Models: 
Responsibility as a Mediator 
The role of organisational responsibility and its influence on stakeholder perceptions 
of reputation and legitimacy has been a central focus in this study.  Given the crisis 
clusters in the SCCT are formulated around the assumed levels of attributed 
responsibility and a number of strategy response models used by crisis managers are 
designed to address levels of responsibility (e.g. deny it, shift it, accept it), a better 
understanding of the role of responsibility is critical to further development of 
effective crisis models.    
Research Question 2 
How does responsibility mediate the influence of response strategies used 
during crises from different clusters on stakeholder perceptions of 
organisational reputation and legitimacy? 
Research Question 3 
How does an organisation’s responsibility for a crisis affect stakeholder 
perceptions of its reputation and legitimacy? 
Correlation analysis throughout this series of studies found a strong association 
between organisational responsibility and reputation and legitimacy.  Where 
stakeholders judged on organisation to be highly responsible for a crisis event, they 
judged the company’s reputation and legitimacy more harshly.  This supports the 
findings of Verhoeven et al (2012), Coombs and Holladay (2002) and Lyon and 
Cameron (2004) who all found a similar link between strong responsibility and 
damage to lower reputation and demonstrates the relevance of these findings to the 
related construct of legitimacy.        
In contrast to many of the previous works within crisis models (Dean, 2004; Lee, 
2004; Massey, 1997; McDonald, 2005), the majority of experiments in this study 
tried to mimic the lived experience of non-victim stakeholders as much as possible 
303 
 
where the stakeholders need to decide for themselves whether an organisation that 
has experienced a crisis event is responsible for that crisis or not.  This decision is 
often informed through media reports as used in this study.  The ambiguous nature of 
early information in a crisis event may make these initial judgments weaker than 
when clear responsibility for a crisis event can be assigned but this is the reality that 
crisis managers have to face when determining their early response strategies.   
The experiments in Stage One of this study demonstrated that stakeholders were 
making clear decisions on organisational responsibility based on early information 
about a crisis event.  Responsibility scores were consistently higher for crises in the 
preventable cluster and lower in the victim cluster as expected, reinforcing the work 
of Claeys et al (2010) and Kim et al (2009) who assessed the clusters’ link with 
responsibility and found differences between the assigned responsibility in each of 
the different clusters they studied.  Claeys et al (2010) studied all three clusters and 
Kim et al (2009) studied two different clusters.  Through further analysis in this 
study, responsibility was established as mediating the influence of the crisis event on 
stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy as outlined in Figure 39. 
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Figure 39: Mediation effect of organisational responsibility in the relationship 
between crisis cluster and stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy 
established in this study 
The analysis of multiple time periods in these experiments, which was integral to the 
design of this study, shows that once judgments on responsibility are made, it is 
quite difficult for a company to use its response to change them.  There was very 
little movement in responsibility judgments across the series of experiments in Stage 
One from the time of the crisis event to the time of the company’s response.  This 
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supports Jorgensen’s (1996) original contention through structural equation 
modelling that found no path between response strategy and responsibility. 
The additional contribution made by the Stage Two experiment in this study is that 
judgments of responsibility can be influenced but that influence comes from 
unambiguous determinations of responsibility made by an independent authority, not 
by the company itself.   The data from multiple time periods in Experiment 4 show 
the level of this influence within the tested crisis cluster of accident.  Dean (2004) 
has linked this effect to the discounting principle where an apparent causal inference 
(based on the crisis event details) will be discounted if an alternative, plausible 
explanation (the definitive statement of responsibility) is present. While denials and 
acceptances of responsibility by the organisations in crisis had limited effect in the 
Stage One experiments, the statements of full or no responsibility by an independent 
authority led to significant changes in responsibility levels in Experiment 4.  This 
change then led to significant shifts in judgments on reputation and legitimacy.  In 
the absence of any further information, being judged as not responsible was 
sufficient to return stakeholder judgments on reputation and legitimacy to pre-crisis 
levels, thereby emphasising the importance of judgments of responsibility on 
organisational outcomes.  This highlights the continued importance of testing for 
influence on responsibility in crisis response and repair models (see for example 
Rhee & Valdez, 2009). 
The analysis throughout the Stage One experiments and the specific time period 
analysis for Experiment 6 in Stage Four showed no main effect for strategy on 
judgments on responsibility.  The organisational strategy statements in response to 
the crisis by themselves did not have sufficient impact to shift the strong judgments 
made from the impact of the crisis event.  This result appears to be counter to the 
link between strategy and responsibility found in McDonald (2005) although a 
comparison of the design of her experiments and the ones in this study help to 
explain this apparent contradiction.  McDonald used a wider range of strategies 
including ‘no comment’ and ‘confession’, neither of which were used in this study 
outside one instance in Experiment 3 where apology was used.  The strategies in 
common across the two studies were shown in McDonald’s study to lead to 
significantly different outcomes to the no comment and confession treatments hence 
the main effect for strategy.  While the strategies in common were different to the 
305 
 
other strategies used in McDonald’s study, they weren’t different from each other in 
her study.  Thus, there was a clustering of these strategies that showed similar 
outcomes.  When tested as a group, they would show non-significant results which 
was what occurred in this study, hence greater similarities between the results of the 
two studies may be drawn.    
Drawing on the work of Hamilton and Sanders (1992), McDonald (2005) postulated 
that people may suspend judgments on organisations in crisis until a response is 
made that directly addresses the issue of responsibility.  This helped explain the 
more positive than expected rating given by participants in her experiments to ‘no 
comment’ in the testing of different strategies and their effects on consumer 
outcomes including responsibility.   The time series data obtained in the six 
experiments run in this study would run counter to this suggestion as strong 
attributions of responsibility were consistently found in the experiments based only 
on information surrounding the crisis event.  The experimental design showed that 
once made, this level of responsibility was very difficult to shift, representing the 
large effect size for crisis cluster.  Given the strong link between responsibility and 
reputation and legitimacy challenges, a deeper understanding of factors that 
influence responsibility judgments is necessary if more positive reputation and 
legitimacy outcomes are to be achieved. 
Exploring the Impact of an Expanded Relationship History Construct: 
Considering the Additional Influence of Organisational Age  
Supporting or detracting information about a company in crisis that frames the 
decision-making on its responsibility for that crisis may be important in explaining 
crisis outcomes.  In the early stage experiments in this study, the response strategy 
by itself was not shifting judgments on responsibility but some impacts on reputation 
and legitimacy were recorded.  Thus, contextual factors such as company 
information that may more strongly influence responsibility judgments could see a 
stronger shift in reputation and legitimacy, either positively or negatively.  Rhee and 
Valdez (2009) have called for further research into these factors and, in particular, 
the interaction among them.     
This study has addressed this call through its focus on the ability of a situational 
factor to intensify the environment where organisational judgments are being made.  
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While the literature tends to focus on factors that could produce negative judgments 
for organisations, the intensifier approach could also lead to more positive 
judgments.  The particular focus for this study was on relationship history as an 
intensifier.  As outlined in Chapter 2, relationship history was conceptualised as 
having two components:  the age of the organisation drawing from the earlier work 
of Massey (2004) and Rhee and Valdez (2009), and the nature of its relationship 
with the community as researched by Coombs and Holladay (2001) and Lyon and 
Cameron (2004).  The interaction of these two components was hypothesised to 
strengthen the effects of the singular treatments.   
Stage Three of this study explored the impacts of relationship history.  The impact of 
relationship history on stakeholder judgments of reputation and legitimacy was 
tested before a crisis event in Experiment 5 and following one in Experiments 5 and 
6 in line with the study’s overall design approach to test impact over time.  
Knowledge of the benefits of the relationship history construct can help public 
relations managers develop their ongoing communication strategy with stakeholders 
as well as in a time of crisis. 
If relationship history is to act as an intensifier during a crisis situation, its effect may 
be seen through a direct relationship on reputation and legitimacy or indirectly 
through changing attributions of responsibility.  Initial work (see for example, 
Coombs & Holladay, 2001) suggested the indirect route whereas latter tests have 
suggested a greater influence through a main effect (Coombs, 2006).  Both these 
possibilities were explored in this study as there are limited empirical tests of both 
options and these tests have focused mostly on reputation and not legitimacy. 
Research Question 4  
How does an organisation’s relationship history with its stakeholders 
influence stakeholder perceptions of its reputation and legitimacy? 
Research Question 5  
How do stakeholder perceptions of an organisation’s responsibility mediate 
the influence of its relationship history on its reputation and legitimacy? 
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Organisational Age – Pre and Post Crisis 
Significant results were not achieved on the influence of organisational age on 
reputation and legitimacy during normal operating circumstances.  On trend data, the 
mature organisation had higher scores for reputation and legitimacy but there was 
little difference with the control state of no information.  However, once a crisis 
event happened, the organisation’s age did show an effect on judgments of 
reputation and legitimacy as outlined in Figure 40.  The crisis event appeared to have 
triggered the stakeholders’ search for more information on which to judge the 
company and the organisation’s age was then taken into consideration.   
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Figure 40:  Effect of organisational age in a crisis event on stakeholder perceptions 
of reputation and legitimacy established in this study   
The mature organisation experiencing a crisis event was given a higher reputational 
score than a new organisation experiencing the same event.  The organisation’s 
maturity protected its reputation against the crisis event with a decline in reputation 
post the crisis event that was smaller than for the control situation which represented 
just the crisis event.   The new organisation suffered a much larger decline than both 
the mature organisation and the control.  The crisis event also triggered more 
detailed judgments for legitimacy.  The mature organisation’s legitimacy was better 
protected during the crisis than that of the new organisation and the mature 
organisation suffered less damage with a smaller decline in its legitimacy score than 
the control condition. This suggests the information on maturity provided some 
additional benefit to the company than no information at all. 
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Relationship Character – Pre and Post Crisis 
Prior to a crisis event, the second subattribute of relationship history under study - 
relationship character - was found to have a significant effect on reputation and 
legitimacy.  Significant differences were established for information on whether the 
company had a positive relationship character or a negative relationship character on 
both dependent variables, however, information on relationship character when 
compared with no information was significant only for reputation.  Thus, this 
information was important in the stakeholders forming judgments about the 
company’s reputation.  
In this study, the importance of relationship character remained significant once the 
crisis event occurred.  There were significant differences between the positive and 
negative relationship character treatments on judgments on reputation following the 
crisis event.  This supports the findings of Coombs and Holladay (2010) who found 
that when testing different types of accidents (technical error accidents vs human 
error accidents), the halo of a favourable prior reputation which is operationalised in 
a very similar way to this study’s relationship character construct seemed to override 
the increased attributions of crisis responsibility given to the human induced accident 
and the reputational threat it posed to the organisation in crisis.   In their experiment, 
attributions of crisis responsibility increased based on the crisis type yet post-crisis 
reputation scores stayed the same as an alternate organisation with lower attributions 
of crisis responsibility, contrary to the generally accepted assumptions of stronger 
responsibility leading to lower reputation scores.  Coombs and Holladay (2010) 
argue that the halo became the frame through which the crisis event was seen rather 
than the actual event itself.  However this halo effect only worked in the favour of 
the organisation with a favourable pre-crisis reputation.  A negative pre-crisis 
reputation depressed post-crisis reputation scores and eliminated any difference in 
responsibility scores that should have been linked to the different causes of the crisis.   
By measuring reputation and/or responsibility at one time, Coombs and Holladay 
(2010) can compare across different organisations and show a difference in the 
outcomes at that point for each.  However, what exactly is happening to each of the 
organisations undergoing the crisis remains unclear and, therefore, the impact of 
each of the contributing factors are difficult to map effectively.   
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It is in explaining this latter part that this study sought to make its major 
contribution.  Across its different stages, this study has shown the impact of the 
crisis event itself in terms of the reputational and legitimacy damage to the 
organisation and then the protective powers of different strategy choices to stop 
further damage or reduce the damage already done, either in the presence of no 
further information about the organisation or with positive or negative information 
about the company.  This study has shown the influence of each of the contributing 
factors at each stage to draw causal links between the information the stakeholders 
are receiving and the judgments they are making. 
Experiment 5 in Stage Three appeared to show a version of the paradox effect (Lyon 
& Cameron, 1999; Dean, 2004) discussed in Chapter 2 as the organisation with a 
positive relationship character saw a greater decline in its reputation following the 
crisis event.  As approached through expectancy violation theory (Burgoon, 1978), 
events that violate previous expectations are more salient and attract greater attention 
from stakeholders.  Thus, the participants in the study had expected more of an 
organisation with a positive history and when a negative event happened, they 
penalised the company strongly for supposedly letting the crisis event occur.  There 
was no longer congruence between the stakeholder expectations and the 
organisational action and this led to negative judgments.  The paradox did not hold 
true however for legitimacy judgments with the negative relationship character 
recording a larger decline than the positive condition.  For legitimacy, the positive 
relationship character protected the organisation against the impact of the crisis event 
with the decline in its legitimacy less than that for the crisis event by itself.  The 
legitimacy construct contains normative behaviour components which establish the 
organisation’s operations within that of its sector in terms of what is acceptable 
behaviour.  So while the crisis event may have been seen to be in conflict with the 
company’s positive background, it may not have been sufficiently challenging to 
influence judgments on the company within a broader comparative base of 
appropriate organisational standards.  Thus, the impacts on reputation and legitimacy 
would provide related yet different outcomes with the positive character protecting 
the organisation’s legitimacy to a much greater level than its reputation.   
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Figure 41:  Main effects of relationship character prior to and during a crisis event 
on stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy established in this study   
Interaction Effects of the Sub-Attributes of Relationship History 
The effects of the two components of relationship history were confirmed in 
Experiment 6.  Both relationship character and organisational age had significant 
main effects on reputation and legitimacy, with the stronger effect being recorded for 
relationship character.  A two-way interaction between relationship character and 
organisational age was also established as having a significant effect on reputation 
and legitimacy during a crisis event as outlined in Figure 42.    
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Figure 42:  Main effects of relationship character and organisational age on 
stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy and the two-way interaction 
within the relationship history construct during a crisis event established in this 
study.   
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The combination of a mature organisation with a positive relationship character was 
the most positive intensifier, thereby supporting higher judgments on reputation and 
legitimacy.  The most negative intensifier varied across crisis clusters between the 
predicted new organisation with negative relationship character intensifier and the 
mature organisation with the negative relationship character.  The latter suggests that 
the participants saw the mature organisation with a negative relationship character as 
behaving badly over a longer period of time which intensified the negativity of the 
construct.  In this context, maturity was a negative element rather than a protective 
one. 
Rhee and Valdez (2009) have theoretically considered the influence of organisational 
age in reputation damaging events, suggesting that the more accountability or 
reliability expected of older firms gives prominence to their errors.  Within this 
context, age is seen as a negative factor of influence.  This is also broadly grounded 
within expectancy violation theory (Burgoon, 1978).  However, they note that the 
conflicting literatures around maturity as a positive (e.g. age dependence theory) and 
maturity as a negative (e.g. expectancy violation theory) makes it difficult to draw 
propositions on how age impacts stakeholder judgments on organisational actions.  
The results from this study give some empirical guidance on age as an organisational 
asset and/or liability in a crisis situation, however, further detailed investigation is 
required to clarify the initial assumptions.  
Links to Responsibility 
In considering the paths of influence for relationship history, the Stage Three 
experiment confirmed the main effect for relationship history and did not support an 
indirect effect through responsibility.  That is, judgments on responsibility did not 
mediate the impact of relationship history on stakeholder perceptions of reputation 
and legitimacy.  No significant effect was found for relationship history on 
judgments of responsibility.  Given levels of responsibility for these tests was left to 
the participants to decide and not directed as in Experiment 4, the results may have 
been influenced by the effect size capable of being achieved in the test conditions.  
On trend data, the mature organisation and the positive relationship character 
organisation had levels of responsibility lower than the control condition from the 
event only and the new organisation and the negative relationship character 
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conditions had higher levels of responsibility than the control which supported the 
original hypotheses, although these differences were not significant.  The Stage 
Three experiment, Experiment 5, tested the impact of relationship history on 
responsibility judgments in the absence of an organisational response similar to the 
Coombs and Holladay (2010) study on the framing of crises through the protective 
halo of a positive pre-crisis reputation.  Whether stakeholder judgments on the 
effectiveness of the strategy were impacted by knowledge of the organisation’s 
relationship history was tested in the final stage (Experiment 6) and makes a further 
contribution to the explanatory work of the framing ability of relationship history 
commenced by Coombs and Holladay (2010).  This study also expanded the concept 
of relationship history through the examination of organisational age as a moderating 
factor with relationship character and tested the effect of relationship history across 
different crisis clusters. 
Revisiting the Effectiveness of Strategy Recommendations in an Intensified 
Environment: Damage Mitigation, Aggravation and Repair 
The SCCT model suggests a situational factor such as relationship history will 
intensify the environment in which stakeholders are assessing an organisation in 
crisis.  This intensification will challenge the effectiveness of the model’s 
recommended matched response strategy, thus necessitating the implementation of a 
higher level response.  However, further refinement of the model and subsequent 
advice to managers drawn from the model has been limited by the inability of many 
studies to show exactly what impact different response strategies have in an 
intensified and non-intensified environment.  This study’s methodological approach 
of experimental investigation using measurement across time was designed to 
address this limitation to further model development.        
Research Question 6  
How does an organisation’s relationship history and its response to a crisis 
from different crisis clusters influence stakeholder perceptions of its 
reputation and legitimacy? 
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Research Question 7  
How does responsibility mediate the influence of an organisation’s 
relationship history and its response to a crisis from different crisis clusters 
on stakeholder perceptions of its reputation and legitimacy? 
Main effects for all of the independent variables tested in this study (crisis cluster, 
response strategy, organisational age and relationship character) on either one or 
both of the dependent variables or responsibility were established in the final 
experiment as outlined in Figure 43. 
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Figure 43: Main effects on stakeholder perceptions of reputation and legitimacy 
established in Experiment 6 
Some of the hypothesised significant interactions were also established.  A four-way 
interaction was found for crisis cluster, strategy, organisational age and relationship 
character on the dependent variable of legitimacy.  The two subattributes of 
relationship history (organisational age and relationship character) were also 
established as interacting to impact stakeholder perceptions of an organisation’s 
reputation and legitimacy following a crisis event.    The two significant interactions 
established in the final experiment are outlined in Figure 44, alongside the key main 
effects for strategy and crisis cluster established earlier.   
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Figure 44: Significant interaction effects and key main effects established in 
Experiment 6  
As the previous experiments in this series had shown, the reparative powers of many 
of the response strategies were limited.  Some of the strategies were effective in 
reducing further damage to the organisation but there were few instances when the 
damage caused by the event could be reversed.   However, the final experiment 
showed that more effective protection came when the strategy was run by an 
organisation which had the positive attributes of maturity (organisational age) and 
positive relationships with community stakeholders (relationship character). 
Damage Reduction and Repair through Positive Intensifier 
For the victim cluster, the matched strategy (deny) in the presence of the positive 
intensifier of a mature organisation with positive relationship character was 
sufficient to reduce the reputational damage done from the crisis event.  Once the 
participants learned that the organisation was mature and had a positive relationship 
with the community, they assessed the organisational response more positively.  
Some of the damage from the crisis event was reversed with a significant increase in 
reputation and legitimacy scores from the time of the crisis event for this 
combination of relationship history and response. A similar result occurred for the 
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accident cluster.  Thus, the positive relationship history created a favourable frame 
for the organisation in crisis through which stakeholder judgments were made. 
A three-way interaction of strategy, relationship character and organisational age on 
organisational responsibility was just outside the significance test at p=.06.   The 
mediation tests through responsibility helped explain the additional protective 
powers of the strategy when run in an environment where stakeholders knew 
relevant information on the company’s relationship history.   As outlined in Figure 
45, responsibility was established as mediating the influence of the relationship 
character aspect of relationship history on stakeholder judgments of legitimacy.  The 
relationship character information intensified the environment in which the 
stakeholder judgments were made and this effect was sufficient to see a shift in 
allocations of organisational responsibility which also then led to a shift in 
legitimacy scores.   A positive intensification was more likely to lower responsibility 
and see an increase in legitimacy scores whereas a negative intensification was more 
likely to increase responsibility with a subsequent decline in legitimacy scores. 
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Figure 45: Two mediation paths through responsibility established in Experiment 6 
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Aggravation Effect of Negative Intensifier 
The potential for a positive frame is an important aspect for a public relations 
manager to understand and exploit both prior to a crisis event and during one.  
However, greater management attention is likely to be focused on the situational 
factors that may lead to a negatively intensified environment as the stakes are higher.  
This environment could reduce the effectiveness of a planned organisational strategy 
and/or lead to further unintended damage to the organisation.  The Stage Four 
experiment in this study confirmed the predicted influence of a negative intensifier.  
A new organisation with a negative relationship character was consistently seen as 
operating within a negatively intensified environment with harsher stakeholder 
judgments on responsibility, reputation and legitimacy.  This environment makes it 
very difficult for any organisational response to protect the company.   The matched 
strategy in the face of this negative information could not hold stakeholder 
judgments on reputation and legitimacy and further damage was done to the 
organisation when it ran this strategy.  Contrary to the predictions by Coombs (2004) 
within the SCCT model, a step up strategy did not provide a more positive outcome 
as the negative judgments through this particular construction of relationship history 
were too strong.  The negative information created a complete negative envelope 
around the organisation. In the face of such strong negativity, the organisation had to 
run a response at the other end of the strategy spectrum to see any benefits to its 
reputation and legitimacy.    Thus, organisations knowing that they suffer from these 
negative intensifier conditions would need to have very modest goals for their 
organisational strategy and look for other approaches to rebuild their reputation and 
legitimacy post the crisis event. 
Continuum Approach to Relationship History and its Impact on Strategy Outcomes 
The results from this study support the conceptualisation of the relationship history 
construct as a continuum.   At the most positive end is the organisation that is mature 
and has positive relationships with the community.   This organisation has a 
protective halo through which the organisational strategy is assessed.  So for 
example, when an organisation with this protection provides an excuse for a crisis 
such as a factory explosion, its lack of intent is believed with an increase in its 
reputation and legitimacy scores from the time of the crisis event and a decline in its 
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assigned responsibility.   The participants in this study appeared willing to accept 
that an accident could happen to anyone and the organisation should be given 
another chance.  At the other end of the continuum is the organisation that is new 
and has already been seen to have negative relationships with the community.  A 
negative frame is present when the stakeholders are making their judgments.  When 
the organisation runs exactly the same strategy as the organisation with the positive 
frame, it continues to be held responsible for the crisis event and sees a significant 
decrease in its reputation and legitimacy.  There was no benefit of the doubt given to 
the organisation with the negative frame.   
With the ends of the continuum anchored, the intensifier effects of the other 
combinations can be considered.  The new organisation that had already established 
positive relationships with the community had started to establish its protective 
frame but this wasn’t as strong as for the mature organisation across different crisis 
types.  This slightly weaker frame when combined with a recommended (matched) 
strategy saw judgments on responsibility either being maintained or declining and 
the subsequent reputation and legitimacy increasing.  So this combination was 
closest to the positive end of the continuum as outlined in Figure 46. 
The final combination of a mature organisation with negative relationships with the 
community saw a reverse of the assumed protection of increased age.  In this case, 
the maturity of the organisation was seen to reflect ongoing negative relationships 
with the community, that is, a pattern of behaviour that was seen as a negative by the 
participants in the study.  So while not consistently creating as negative an 
impression as the new organisation with negative relationship characteristics, this 
relationship history combination was still seen as a negative intensifier which made 
it more difficult for the organisational response to bring any benefits to the 
organisation.  Thus, this combination needs to sit closer to the negative end of the 
continuum.    
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Figure 46: Continuum of relationship history intensifier effect 
In examining reputation damaging events, Rhee and Valdez (2009) specifically call 
for empirical testing of contextual factors such as organisational age so that 
managers and researchers can better understand why two firms that experience the 
same event suffer different outcomes.  If different firms experience different levels 
of difficulty in repairing their reputation due to the relevant contextual factors, they 
will need to use different crisis strategies.  This is similar to the logic chain built into 
the SCCT model (Coombs & Holladay, 2001).    The analysis of the relationship 
history construct in this series of experiments demonstrating specific types of 
intensifier effects adds to the body of knowledge on these factors.      
Strategy Choices and Contextual Factors: Refining the Step Up Recommendations of 
SCCT 
Learning from others and the benefits or disadvantages of different organisational 
characteristics are important components in developing effective business strategy.  
However, when faced with a crisis situation, the crisis manager must deal with the 
state of the organisation as it is and thus, they are primarily concerned with the 
choices they have at the time and the expected outcomes of different strategies.  This 
problem was also examined in this study to identify how the intensifying effect of 
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relationship history could change organisational outcomes.  While the increased 
negativity of different intensifier combinations was demonstrated in Experiment 6 by 
comparing the outcomes when different organisations ran the same strategy, it was 
equally confirmed when assessing the outcomes for different strategies within each 
organisation.  An organisation with the most negative intensifier (new and negative 
relationship character) needed to move two steps along the response continuum (that 
is, from the deny to deal posture) if it was to see any positive movement in its 
reputation score and even that extreme move from a strategy that denies 
responsibility to one that deals with high levels of responsibility still didn’t see any 
movement in its legitimacy standing.  The negative assessment on relationship 
character was severely overshadowing any other assessment the stakeholders could 
make.  Whereas for the second most negative intensifier of a mature organisation 
with a negative relationship character, moving one step along the strategy continuum 
(deny – diminish; diminish – deal) did have a positive outcome.  This gives partial 
support to Coombs (2004) broader proposition within the SCCT that an organisation 
operating in an intensified environment needs to run a higher level strategy but 
cautions managers against taking such action without a full assessment of the 
strength of the negative intensification.  That is, not all relationship history 
intensifiers are the same, therefore, a step up strategy might work with one type of 
intensifier but not for a different intensifier. 
Considering Responsibility as a Moderator 
Responsibility was conceptualised in this study as a mediator, given its underlying 
link to the formation of the crisis clusters and its central focus in much of the 
strategy development.  While the tests for mediation on cluster were established in a 
number of places, the conditions were not met for strategy in Stage Four of this 
study.  This is despite an examination of many of the 24 different conditions in the 
final experiment showing significant differences among many of the combinations of 
cluster, strategy and relationship history.   
This may suggest that responsibility is acting with strategy to influence reputation 
and legitimacy judgments rather than mediating this relationship.  While not the goal 
of this study, the conceptualisation of responsibility as a moderator was established 
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in the final experiment with the four significant interaction effects outlined in Figure 
47.   
Legitimacy
Reputation
Responsibility
Strategy
Crisis 
Cluster
Organisational 
Age
Relationship 
Character
 
Figure 47:  Interaction effects with responsibility as a moderator established in 
Experiment 6     
As is demonstrated in this figure, responsibility is linked with all of the independent 
variables in this study, confirming its centrality to the understanding of changes in 
judgments of reputation and legitimacy.  In each of the four interactions established, 
the high levels of organisational responsibility when combined with the other 
independent variables (e.g. cluster and strategy; strategy and organisational age; 
strategy and relationship character or organisational age and relationship character) 
resulted in lower scores for reputation and legitimacy.  Similarly, the low levels of 
organisational responsibility combinations resulted in higher scores for reputation 
and legitimacy.  The results for the mid range scores for responsibility and the results 
in the accident cluster which by definition has less clear assignment of responsibility 
were less definitive and led to mixed results that were sometimes resulting in lower 
reputation and legitimacy scores than the low levels of responsibility and sometimes 
showing little difference.  This study has taken steps towards a better understanding 
of these relationships but further detailed research is needed before a full explanation 
of the complexities of the relationships can be provided.    
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Theoretical Contributions and Managerial Implications  
The findings from this study make a number of contributions to theory development 
and testing in crisis management and assessments of professional practice.   
Demonstrating Impacts on Stakeholder Perceptions: Explicating Crisis Event 
Damage and Protective Powers of Strategy through Methodology 
Firstly, through the methodological approach of pre- and post-crisis testing and 
repeated measures analysis, this study has responded to calls for more time series 
research in crisis management (Fediuk et al, 2010; Pace et al, 2010) to better 
understand how stakeholders respond to company actions during a crisis event.  
Specifically, this study has shown how stakeholder judgments on organisational 
reputation and legitimacy and the associated attribution of organisational 
responsibility for a crisis change over time, and the influence of different types of 
information on these changes.   While many crisis researchers comment on the 
danger to organisational assets of a crisis situation, this study has shown the direct 
impact of different crisis events on stakeholder judgments on  reputation and 
legitimacy with pre-crisis scores declining significantly in the face of the crisis 
event.    Differential declines were reported for different types of crisis confirming 
the importance of understanding the consequences of the crisis event in crisis 
management models. 
This study has also contributed to a stronger theoretical understanding of the 
organisational response strategy work of researchers such as Bradford and Garrett 
(1995), Coombs and Holladay (1996), Coombs and Schmidt (2000), Dean (2004), 
Lee (2004, 2005) and Lyon and Cameron (1998, 2004) by examining the impact of 
different categories of response on stakeholder attributions of responsibility, 
reputation and legitimacy within the one experimental setting and tracking the 
changes in stakeholder judgments over time.  The distinct methodological approach 
applied in this study has elucidated the extent of the protective powers of response 
strategy and showed the relatively limited effect response strategy by itself has on 
stakeholder judgments once the initial attributions of responsibility for a crisis are 
established.  While the matched strategy approach of Coombs (2007) was supported 
generally through this study, the findings should help crisis researchers and crisis 
managers see the limited effect of strategy within the different crisis types, thus 
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necessitating the setting of modest goals for the outcome of the immediate crisis 
response.  This study’s findings show that the protective powers of strategy need to 
be understood in terms of protecting against further damage from a crisis event as 
well as repairing all damage done through the crisis.  This study contributes to a 
better theoretical understanding of the mechanisms that drive mitigation versus 
aggravation (Rhee & Valdez, 2009).  It does this by showing how strategy 
intervention alone impacts stakeholder judgments on reputation, legitimacy and 
responsibility as well as when strategy is assessed in conjunction with other 
contextual factors.  This contribution needs to be considered in the context of only a 
limited range of variables being tested in this study as is common in the 
experimental tradition.  Strategy may have a greater impact on other variables which 
are also important for the overall management of the crisis by an organisation, but 
these were not tested in this study. 
 Refinement of Intensifier Impact and Relevant Factors Influencing Relationship 
History Assessments 
Intensifiers have been identified as an important piece of the crisis management 
puzzle (Coombs, 2010) and are cited widely as needing to be considered in strategy 
selection (see for example, Crandall et al, 2010; Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Dean, 2004, 
Massey, 2001).  However, there has been very limited research to date that has 
explicated the impact crisis intensifiers have on how stakeholders assess 
organisations in crisis and their post-crisis actions. This study has made a significant 
contribution to the understanding of one of the recognised crisis intensifiers, the pre-
crisis organisational attribute of relationship history (Lyon & Cameron, 1998, 2004; 
Coombs & Holladay, 2001, 2010).  It has provided a detailed analysis of how 
relationship character acts on judgments of organisational reputation and legitimacy 
both pre and post-crisis and has shown the mediating role that organisational 
responsibility for a crisis plays in these judgments.  Coombs & Holladay (2001) 
proposed that intensifiers operate either directly or indirectly on reputation albeit 
limited research in this area has been undertaken to help clarify the effect and its 
path.  Earlier research favoured an indirect effect (Coombs & Holladay, 2001) given 
the strong hypothesised links with responsibility, later research favoured a direct 
effect on reputation (Coombs, 2006) whereas more recent explanations have again 
implied a mediated effect (Coombs, 2010).  The direct effect was confirmed in this 
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study for organisational reputation, however, an indirect effect through responsibility 
was established for the organisational asset of legitimacy.    
Given the broader recognition of the potential impact of relationship history as an 
intensifier, this study sought to contribute to the understanding of the dimensions of 
this intensifier and what may strengthen or weaken its effect.  This study has 
contributed to a recasting of this intensifier by also considering the impact of an 
organisation’s age within the auspices of relationship history as liability of newness 
for organisations had been linked through prior studies to negative legitimacy 
judgments.  This study’s results show the impact of an organisation’s age on 
judgments of its reputation and legitimacy and how age-related information acts in 
conjunction with the organisation’s relationship character as an intensifier in a crisis 
situation.  Maturity and positive relationships with the community were found to 
create a strong positive frame for an organisation which provided a buffer against 
negative stakeholder judgments in a crisis.  On the other hand, a new organisation 
that had poor relationships with the community had no protection against negative 
judgments and suffered significant damage to its reputation and legitimacy.  A 
continuum of the dimensions of the relationship history intensifier has been proposed 
and can be further tested with other crisis types and strategies as well as other 
intensifiers.     The continuum approach developed in this study could now be used 
to map the impact of other intensifiers, whilst recognising the influences of both 
positive and negative attributes of any intensifier. 
Deeper Understanding of the Impact to Organisations of Stakeholder Perceptions 
of Crisis Responsibility 
Coombs (2010) argues that responsibility is the central feature of the SCCT 
modelling as understanding how people attribute crisis responsibility to an 
organisation is ‘critical for an organisation in crisis’ (An et al, 2011, p. 71).  This 
study has made a significant contribution to better understanding the modelling of 
the dynamics of stakeholder judgments on organisational responsibility for a crisis.  
The study has confirmed how a crisis event leads to judgments on organisational 
responsibility that, once made, are very difficult for an organisation to change 
through its own statements.   
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Change in stakeholder judgments was demonstrated though when third party 
assignment of responsibility was made and the repeated measures analysis drawing 
from multiple data collection periods showed the extent of this change.  The role of 
responsibility as a mediator was extensively tested across multiple crisis types and 
strategy options as well as with the intensifier of relationship history.  The crisis 
event and the relationship character aspect of relationship history were found to be 
acting on the organisational assets of reputation and legitimacy through 
responsibility, with differential impacts for each of the dependent variables.  While 
the logic of many of the crisis response models imply mediation through 
responsibility, there has been limited empirical testing of this specific relationship.  
Most testing of the relationship between responsibility and relevant dependent 
variables has been through correlation methods.  While correlation at specific 
periods of time was used in this study as well, the experimental design of multiple 
intervention points and the associated repeated measures analysis has provided more 
explicit testing of the mediation role played by responsibility in stakeholder 
judgments following a crisis event.    This experiment has also expanded the 
previous tests of the role of responsibility on reputation to that of its role in 
legitimacy judgments. 
Empirical Tests of Stakeholder Perceptions of Reputation and Legitimacy as 
Discrete Constructs 
This study has provided additional evidence to support the claims by Deephouse and 
Suchman (2008) and Staw and Epstein (2000) of the distinctiveness of the different 
organisational assets of reputation and legitimacy.  These differences have rarely 
been tested through empirical studies directly with stakeholders given the limited 
number of direct stakeholder studies within legitimacy research.  While strong 
associations were found through the studies, areas of difference emerged.  In general, 
larger effects sizes were established for the influence of response strategy on 
reputation judgments than on legitimacy, which may suggest greater stability in 
judgments of legitimacy once made or the limited ability of the response strategies to 
address the complexity of the legitimacy construct which covers organisational 
qualities, external endorsement and normative activity.  An et al (2011) drawing 
from work of Boyd (2000) and Hearit (1994) suggest that organisations select 
response strategies ‘not only to minimize organisational crisis responsibility and 
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damage to the organisation’s reputation, but also to re-establish the organisation’s 
legitimacy’ (p. 71), thus the analysis of this path of influence through studies such as 
this one is of interest to crisis researchers and managers.  
 Confirming SCCT Matching Propositions for the Organisational Asset of 
Legitimacy 
Legitimacy management is a growing area of interest within the public relations 
academic community (see for example Bartlett et al, 2007; Holmstrom, 2005) as 
organisations look for competitive advantage in a fast changing business 
environment.  However, Suchman (1995) suggests the management of legitimacy by 
organisations in crisis is the least researched area within the broader legitimacy 
domain (Suchman, 1995).  Testament to Suchman’s claim is the lack of 
organisational legitimacy as an identified subject area in the recently published 
Handbook of Crisis Communication (Coombs & Holladay, 2010) despite in excess 
of 700 pages of analysis on crisis management.  This study has contributed to the 
growing body of work in legitimacy management by specifically testing the effect of 
the underlying propositions of one of the most researched crisis models on 
legitimacy judgments.  Given the association between reputation and legitimacy, the 
propositions of the model were expected to hold true for legitimacy, however, it is 
important to test such assumptions in model development (Coombs & Holladay, 
2010).  This study showed that the basic propositions within the SCCT model 
including that of an intensifier effect had similar effects on reputation and 
legitimacy, however, the strength of these effects were often different, reflecting the 
differences in the constructs.   Thus, organisations in crisis need to be conscious of 
the actions they are taking to protect their organisational assets and that different 
actions may be needed depending on what they are trying to achieve.   
This study has also contributed to the emerging area of direct stakeholder research 
on legitimacy, leveraging from the earlier work of third party and desk audit research 
on this construct.  The findings of this study show that stakeholders are making 
discrete judgments on an organisation’s legitimacy status and these judgments are 
influenced by situational factors such as an organisation’s relationships with the 
community.   
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Demonstrating the Outcomes of Strategy Choices – Enhancing Managerial 
Guidance Drawn from the SCCT for Protection and Repair 
The collective and specific findings of this study provide guidance for crisis 
managers on their planning for a potential crisis event as well as the selection of their 
response during a crisis event.  The findings help crisis managers using the SCCT 
framework to more specifically match their selection to their goals which may 
include stabilising the crisis situation and protecting against further damage or trying 
to repair the damage already done.  Coombs (2010) argues that crisis communication 
research is meant to be applied and more evidence-based research is needed in the 
discipline to overcome advice that is grounded on speculation or accepted wisdom.   
The findings of this study confirm the need for crisis managers to consider the 
damage that may be suffered by their organisation in different types of crisis events.   
This damage occurs to both the organisation’s reputation and legitimacy.  While the 
SCCT model has recommended the use of a matched strategy, this study has shown 
that the matched strategy at best is likely to maintain judgments on reputation and 
legitimacy determined by stakeholders at the time of the crisis event.  That is, the 
protective powers of the matched strategy were that no further harm was done as 
congruence between the organisation’s actions and stakeholder expectations was 
achieved.  Crisis managers need to be cautioned against assuming this protection 
extends to the repair of the damage done through the crisis event.  To take the 
organisation back to its pre-crisis levels, highly accommodative strategies needed to 
be implemented which have the potential to create further liabilities for the 
organisation over and above those associated with the damage to their reputation and 
legitimacy.  Achieving better outcomes with even the most highly accommodative 
strategies were not guaranteed as results varied across different crisis types making 
their use even riskier for a crisis manager facing the uncertainty and ambiguity 
surrounding a crisis event. 
When considering the use of the accommodative strategies in crises where 
organisational responsibility was high, the results of this study suggest that crisis 
managers do not need to rush to a full apology in order to protect their reputation or 
legitimacy from further damage.  The three accommodative strategies used in this 
study of offering compensation to victims, offering a full apology and simply 
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reminding the stakeholders of the previous good works of the organisation had very 
similar effects on the reputation and legitimacy judgments made by stakeholders 
following the crisis event.  Thus stemming further damage to the organisation could 
be achieved without the response strategy leading the company into territory of 
greater legal liability.   Reputation and legitimacy damage from the event was still 
experienced by the organisation so the benefit of taking aggressive action to try and 
recover this and potentially failing compared with accepting some of this damage in 
the short term and looking for longer term options to repair the damage needs to be 
considered.      
The demonstration through this study of both the positive and negative intensifier 
effect of relationship history provides crisis managers with further support for the 
value of their ongoing work in building a goodwill bank (Dowling, 2002) for their 
organisation before a crisis event occurs.  The benefits of good community relations 
when compared with the liabilities of poor community relations were clearly 
demonstrated in this study.  Very succinct statements on relationship character in 
particular were provided in this study but even this limited detail was sufficient to 
show significant difference between the treatment groups and to bring out the 
relative impacts on stakeholder judgments of reputation, legitimacy and 
organisational responsibility.  Crisis managers within organisations that have strong 
community relationships can exploit this asset during a crisis event and can provide 
much more detailed support for their relationships through mass media and direct 
communication channels.  The findings of this study would recommend that mature 
organisations with strong community relationships make this information well 
known during a crisis event as both their age and their relationship character worked 
in the organisation’s favour during a crisis.  However, crisis managers who work 
with organisations who are new and have poor community relationships need to 
understand the severity of these negative attributions on any assessments of their 
organisation and any attempts to present an organisational response during a crisis.  
The goals set by crisis managers in these organisations need to be far less 
aspirational than their counterparts working for mature organisations with good 
community relationships.   
The results of this study would caution crisis managers against too readily accepting 
the generally quoted advice within the SCCT of stepping up their response strategy 
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in the presence of a negative intensifier until further research has demonstrated the 
benefits of such a strategy.  While no harm to reputation and legitimacy may come 
from such a step up strategy, it is not clear from this study that any clear benefits 
would be achieved that outweigh the potential disadvantages that could come from 
publicly accepting greater levels of responsibility for a crisis.    Further research is 
needed to more clearly identify the advantages and disadvantages of these options, 
particularly for companies in the higher responsibility categories of crisis event.   
Avenues for Further Research 
A number of avenues for further research have been identified already in the analysis 
of the findings for this study, mirroring the call by Coombs (2010) for ongoing 
research on the recommendations for communication strategy and tactics of the 
SCCT model.   Some of the key categories for further research are discussed below. 
Comparing Crisis Types and Strategy Options 
The propositions tested in this study have been done so within a limited range of 
crisis events and with a limited number of response options.  Further testing across 
more of the crisis types within the relevant clusters and with all of the theorised 
response options will help to provide a stronger foundation for the relationships 
established in the crisis response models.    Response strategies have also been 
assessed in isolation in this study.  Further testing with combinations of responses as 
recommended by Claeys et al (2010) as well as the use of instructing information 
(Sturges, 1994) will provide crisis managers with further guidance on effective 
options during crisis. 
Implications of Attributed Responsibility  
While this study has contributed to a stronger understanding of how to adequately 
model the role of responsibility in influencing stakeholder assessments during crisis, 
further research is needed to better understand the mediation and/or moderation role 
of this important variable.  Many of the organisational response frameworks are 
designed around the ability of the response to either meet or impact stakeholder 
judgments on organisational responsibility, however, this study and a number of 
other recent studies (see for example Kim et al, 2009) have failed to establish this 
direct relationship.  Stakeholder-directed research has been identified as an important 
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part of the crisis management research agenda (Fediuk et al, 2010) as too much of 
this discipline’s earlier focus has been on company-directed research through case 
studies which make assumptions on what organisations thought they were doing 
versus how stakeholders interpreted what they were doing.   More direct stakeholder 
research on responsibility judgments is important if the full potential of the response 
models is to be realised in deepening theory and contributing to practice.   
Influence of Organisational Age 
This study has demonstrated the attention paid by stakeholders to organisational age 
once a crisis event occurred.  While not significant to stakeholder assessments pre-
crisis, this organisational attribute became important when the participants were 
trying to make sense of the crisis event with the mature organisation scoring higher 
on reputation and legitimacy than the new organisation.  To try and establish the 
strongest effects possible within the experimental condition, the descriptions for this 
construct were set at extremes with the new organisation being two to three years old 
and the mature organisation being twenty years old.  Further research on a range of 
different age limits would help map this construct for greater use in the crisis 
response models.  Qualitative research through interviews or focus groups would 
also further our understanding of why the organisational age attribute became 
significant after the crisis event but was not as important beforehand.  Given the 
information on age in the treatment scenarios was very brief, the participants may be 
using age as a quasi-measure for some other organisational attribute such as 
reliability or visibility as proposed in Rhees and Valdez (2009) theoretical modelling 
which could be drawn out with more direct contact with the participants.       
Expanding Contexts and Stakeholders 
The relationships established in this study have been done so through experiments on 
a hypothetical company using students as representatives of a non-victim stakeholder 
group.  Further research is needed to test these propositions with real companies in 
real crisis events with a larger and more representative sample of the community to 
confirm the predicted outcomes of the SCCT model.  With more members of the 
community accessing their media through non-print formats (social media, online 
media, broadcast media), research with stimuli material in other formats would also 
strengthen the managerial implications of this study’s findings. 
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Limitations 
Like all research, the findings of this study need to be considered in the context of its 
goals and its design limitations.  As its starting point, this study sought to refine the 
propositions and recommendations contained within the SCCT model given its 
widespread use within the crisis literature and to provide explanatory depth to 
strategy outcomes and the intensifier effect of relationship history.  In doing so, the 
study’s design was primarily generated from the existing literature on the model 
which draws together the key concepts represented in the model.  A crisis event is a 
highly complex environment involving many stakeholders and many paths of 
influence on the outcomes for organisations.  Thus, no one model can explain all 
levels of this complexity or the related influencing factors.  The findings of this 
study are limited by its focus on the key components within the SCCT model, 
however, there is still much testing needed to fully explicate the paths of influence 
for these identified components.           
A number of limitations relate to the use of experimental design and the sampling 
strategy as outlined in Chapter 3.  The use of experimental methods creates an 
artificial experience for the participants in the study, hence the judgments they make 
in this created environment may not match their judgments during a real crisis event.  
However, some crisis researchers (for example, Coombs & Holladay, 2001) suggest 
that reading media articles about a crisis event as used in this study may be quite 
close to a realistic representation of how many non-victim stakeholders experience a 
crisis, therefore, the method may not be as dissimilar from the lived experience as 
first thought.   The participant responses may also be influenced by topic resonance 
with some topics used in the scenarios more relevant or more distant to the sample 
groups.     
The absence of a formal control group in the experimental method used in this study 
limits the internal validity (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1996), however, this limitation 
was weighed against the practical issues of introducing control mechanisms in all 
experiments thereby substantially increasing the required sample size.  The size of 
the samples achieved across the six experiments met the recommendations for 
minimum sample sizes per cell under investigation (Bernard, 1994; Tabachnik & 
Fidell, 2001), however, larger sample sizes for the more complex experiments may 
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have drawn out more of the hypothesised relationships that were established on trend 
data but did not meet the significance tests.   
The study used student samples for the experiments which led to some sacrifices on 
external validity.  The students were drawn from multiple disciplines within multiple 
universities and across undergraduate and postgraduate classes to enhance the 
diversity of the sample although it is recognised that the discipline foci and student 
characteristics may have had some level of influence on their responses.  While 
common in similar studies (Massey, 2001; Coombs, 2004; Dean, 2004, Haigh & 
Brubaker, 2010), the results from the student population cannot be generalised to a 
wider community. 
The study also used a hypothetical company for its stimuli with information on the 
company limited to reduce the effect of confounding variables.  While useful for the 
experimental design, real organisations cannot limit what is known and not known 
about them, particularly in the technology driven social media environment.  Thus, 
the impact of other variables on strategy selection would need to be considered in 
any guidance to crisis managers.   
While significant relationships can be established through appropriate analysis, 
effect sizes within social science studies are often small.  Thus, the managerial 
implications of the findings need to be considered in terms of the realistic difference 
in outcomes based on small effects.  As shown through Experiment 4, changing the 
variables under investigation to directed rather than assessed by the participants 
substantially changed the effect sizes, however, this does not represent real practice 
of the association between the variables.   
While more than 20 different combinations of the four independent variables under 
study were used in the final experiment, this study has been limited primarily to 
three types of crisis events and thus, interpretation of the results should be 
undertaken within that constraint and not readily generalised to other crisis types 
such as rumours or product tampering.  Further testing with other events would be 
useful to confirm the results.  Similarly, only a limited number of organisational 
responses were used, with a number of options available to companies (such as 
attacking the accuser and justification) not assessed.  Very limited testing of a full 
apology was undertaken in this study and this strategy was not used in the final 
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experiment so its possible interaction with relationship history would still need to be 
assessed.   
The scales used in this experiment for the dependent variables of reputation and 
legitimacy were replications of those used in similar experiments to assist 
comparative outcomes. However, there is no single accepted scale for either of these 
constructs, nor complete agreement on what they represent given they are 
multidimensional social constructions (see for example, Fombrun & Shanley, 1990).  
Strong associations were found across the experiments for reputation and legitimacy 
as related constructs although differences in the strength of the outcomes were 
demonstrated on a number of occasions.  The correlation of these dependent 
variables while useful from a theoretical standpoint may also have reduced the power 
of the MANOVA tests used throughout this study (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2001), thus 
statistically significant relationships may have been overlooked in the analysis. 
The study has used a test-retest methodology to collect data which may lead 
participants to focus more closely on the variables under study than they would in a 
field environment (Babbie, 2004).  This limitation was considered against the benefit 
of being able to test the changes in the key variables as outlined earlier which is a 
major contribution of this study to the crisis management literature. 
Finally, the possibility of confounding variables (Stone-Romero & Rosopa, 2008) 
also limits the study’s findings.  The decisions of stakeholders in a crisis situation are 
complex and may involve a range of factors.  The experimental nature of this project 
tried to focus attention on the variables under study with care taken to limit any 
additional information that was provided as contextual information on the company 
and the crisis event, however, it is possible that other non-tested variables accounted 
for some of the decisions made. 
Conclusion 
This study has examined the relationships between an organisation’s relationship 
history attributes and its response in the face of different crisis situations and 
judgments made by its stakeholder on organisational reputation and legitimacy.    It 
has provided detailed analysis to understand the impact of particular strategy choices 
on reputation and legitimacy outcomes and the influencing factor of judgments on 
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organisational responsibility.  By doing so, it has helped explain the extent of and 
limit to the protective powers of an organisation’s response following a crisis event 
and how these powers are influenced by situational factors.  The implications of this 
analysis for theory development and professional practice in crisis management have 
been demonstrated. 
In terms of management practice, the proposed study provides crisis managers with 
information by which to understand the potential outcomes of different crisis 
response strategies based on the specific characteristics of their organisation and the 
crisis they are facing.   This approach has the potential to reduce the risk of 
inappropriate strategy selection and help protect the organisational assets of 
reputation and legitimacy which are highly valued in the competitive global business 
environment. 
The research findings and analysis contained in this study add to the body of 
knowledge on crisis management and provide a strong foundation for further 
research in understanding the impacts and outcomes of an organisation’s response 
during a crisis event.   
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Appendix 1: Sample Consent Form 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION for QUT RESEARCH PROJECT 
Responses, relationships and responsibility: Examining influences on 
organizational assets during crisis. (5NR) 
Research Team Contacts
Associate Professor Robina Xavier Professor Lisa Bradley
Phone: 617 31382972 Phone: 617 31381271
Email: r.xavier@qut.edu.au Email: lm.bradley@qut.edu.au
 
Description 
This project  is being undertaken as part of a PhD project  for Robina Xavier.   The purpose of  this 
project  is  to  better  understand  the  impact  of  a  company’s  response  during  a  crisis  event.    The 
research team requests your assistance because  it  is  important that we test some of the accepted 
practices  in crisis management with a  large number of participants  to better  inform  research and 
practice in this area. 
Participation 
Your participation  in  this project  is  voluntary.  If  you do  agree  to participate,  you  can withdraw  from 
participation at any time during the project without comment or penalty. Your decision to participate will 
in no way impact upon your current or future relationship with QUT or any other university (for example 
your grades).   
Your participation will involve reading some information and completing a set of questionnaires.  As 
you will be participating anonymously,  it will not be possible  for you  to withdraw  the  completed 
questionnaires once you have  submitted  them.    It  should  take you no  longer  than 20 minutes  to 
read the attached material and complete the questionnaires.  The project is being conducted in your 
class.   
Expected benefits 
It is expected that this project will not benefit you directly, however, it may benefit organisations faced 
with crisis and future cohorts of students learning about crisis management. 
Risks 
There are no risks beyond normal day‐to‐day living associated with your participation in this project. 
The attached material deals with a hypothetical company and a hypothetical situation.  It is not intended 
to replicate any actual event or organisation. 
Confidentiality 
All comments and responses are anonymous and will be treated confidentially.  The names of individual 
persons are not required in any of the responses. 
Consent to Participate 
The return of the completed questionnaire is accepted as an indication of your consent to participate in 
this project. 
Questions / further information about the project 
Please contact the researcher team members named above to have any questions answered or  if you 
require further information about the project. 
Concerns / complaints regarding the conduct of the project 
QUT is committed to researcher integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects.  However, if you 
do  have  any  concerns  or  complaints  about  the  ethical  conduct  of  the  project  (Ethics  Approval  No: 
0900001098)  you  may  contact  the  QUT  Research  Ethics  Unit    on  +61  7  3138  5123    or  email 
ethicscontact@qut.edu.au. The Research Ethics Unit is not connected with the research project and can 
facilitate a resolution to your concern in an impartial manner. 
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 Appendix 2:   Sample Instructions to Participants 
 
INSTRUCTIONS TO PARTICIPANTS 
 
Dear Participant 
Thank you for participating in this study.   
You have received a package of information which includes: 
 A news article profiling a company 
 A news article reporting on a crisis event for that company 
 A news article reporting on an inquiry into the crisis event. 
The articles in this package relate to a company called BellaFoods.  BellaFoods is a 
hypothetical company and all events and responses described in this package are 
hypothetical.  They are not designed to reflect any real company or event. 
Please read each news article carefully and answer the questionnaire immediately 
following each article before proceeding to the next.    Please circle the appropriate 
number that reflects your answer on the questionnaire.  Each scale is the same 
with a (1) representing that you strongly agree with the statement and a (7) 
representing that you strongly disagree with the statement.   
At the end of the package there are a few questions that will help us describe the 
group of participants in this study.   
Thank you once again for your help with this project. 
Kind regards 
 
Robina Xavier 
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Appendix 3:    Standard Company Information 
 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW   20 August, 2011 
 
BELLA FOODS 
BellaFoods Pty Ltd produces a wide range of 
preprepared meals for the retail and wholesale 
sectors.   Based in Brisbane, Queensland, the 
company has manufacturing plants in Brisbane, 
Cairns and Melbourne and employs just under 
2,000 people.  BellaFoods products are 
marketed in Australia, Asia and Europe under 
the label, Bella.  Its marketing strategy 
highlights its use of all Australian produce.  
Apart from its retail and corporate catering 
activities, the company also manufactures 
products for two other major food companies for 
sale in the domestic and export markets.   
BellaFoods was started by siblings, Jonathan 
and Isabella Toledos.  Jonathan is the Chief 
Executive Officer and Isabella is the National 
Marketing Director.        
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Appendix 4:  Pre-Crisis Questionnaire 
Please circle the number that best reflects your answer to the following 
questions.  The number (1) represents that you strongly agree with the 
statement whereas the number (7) represents that you strongly disagree with the 
statement. 
 
BellaFoods is concerned with the well-being of its stakeholders and the general public. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods is basically dishonest. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Under most circumstances, I would be likely to believe what BellaFoods says. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods is not concerned with the well-being of its stakeholders and the general 
public. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Bella Foods is a safe organisation. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Bella Foods is a legitimate organisation. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Bella Foods is a credible organisation. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Bella Foods is a good organisation. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods should be allowed to make prepared meals. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Bella Foods should be allowed to continue operations. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Most of the general public would approve of BellaFoods’ operating procedures. 
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Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods follows government regulations relevant to its industry. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Most of BellaFoods’ employees would recommend working for the organisation to their 
friends. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Most of the general public would approve of BellaFoods if asked their opinion. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods is committed to meeting food manufacturing industry standards in its 
operations. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Most employees would continue working for BellaFoods  even if they could get a job 
with another  organisation in the food manufacturing industry. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
 
NOW PLEASE READ THE NEXT NEWS REPORT AND COMPLETE THE 
FOLLOWING QUESTIONNAIRE  
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Appendix 5:   Post-Crisis Questionnaire 
Please circle the number that best reflects your answer to the following 
questions.  The number (1) represents that you strongly agree with the 
statement whereas the number (7) represents that you strongly disagree with the 
statement. 
Circumstances, not BellaFoods,  were responsible for the crisis. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
The blame for the crisis lies with BellaFoods. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
The  blame for the crisis lies in the circumstances, not with BellaFoods. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods is concerned with the well-being of its stakeholders and the general public. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods is basically dishonest. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
I do not trust BellaFoods to tell the truth about the incident. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Under most circumstances, I would be likely to believe what BellaFoods says. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods is not concerned with the well-being of its stakeholders and the general 
public. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Bella Foods is a safe organisation. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Bella Foods is a legitimate organisation. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Bella Foods is a credible organisation. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
 
 
366
Bella Foods is a good organisation. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods should be allowed to make prepared meals. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Bella Foods should be allowed to continue operations. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Most of the general public would approve of BellaFoods’ operating procedures. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods follows government regulations relevant to its industry. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Most of BellaFoods’ employees would recommend working for the organisation to 
their friends. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Most of the general public would approve of BellaFoods if asked their opinion. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods is committed to meeting food manufacturing industry standards in its 
operations. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Most employees would continue working for BellaFoods  even if they could get a job 
with another  organisation in the food manufacturing industry. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods is a victim in the bribery crisis. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
The bribery crisis was an accident. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods could have prevented the bribery crisis. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
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Appendix 6:  Post-Response Questionnaire 
Please circle the number that best reflects your answer to the following 
questions.  The number (1) represents that you strongly agree with the 
statement whereas the number (7) represents that you strongly disagree with the 
statement. 
 
Circumstances, not BellaFoods, were responsible for the crisis. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
The blame for the crisis lies with BellaFoods. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
The  blame for the crisis lies in the circumstances, not with BellaFoods. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods is concerned with the well-being of its stakeholders and the general public. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods is basically dishonest. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
I do not trust BellaFoods to tell the truth about the incident. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Under most circumstances, I would be likely to believe what BellaFoods says. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods is not concerned with the well-being of its stakeholders and the general 
public. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Bella Foods is a safe organisation. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Bella Foods is a legitimate organisation. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Bella Foods is a credible organisation. 
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Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Bella Foods is a good organisation. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods should be allowed to make prepared meals. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods should be allowed to continue operations. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Most of the general public would approve of BellaFoods’ operating procedures. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods follows government regulations relevant to its industry. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Most of BellaFoods’ employees would recommend working for the organisation to 
their friends. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Most of the general public would approve of BellaFoods if asked their opinion. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods is committed to meeting food manufacturing industry standards in its 
operations. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
Most employees would continue working for BellaFoods  even if they could get a job 
with another  organisation in the food manufacturing industry. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods is a victim in the bribery crisis. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
The bribery crisis was an accident. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods could have prevented the bribery crisis. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
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BellaFoods reminded stakeholders of their past efforts to help the community before the 
bribery crisis. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods showed compassion to those affected by the bribery crisis.  
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods took full responsibility for the bribery crisis and asked for forgiveness. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods’ statement in response to the bribery crisis has influenced my perception of 
the company’s reputation. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods’ statement in response to the bribery crisis has influenced my perception of 
the company’s legitimacy. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
BellaFoods’ statement in response to the bribery crisis has influenced my 
perception of responsibility for the crisis. 
Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Strongly Disagree 
 
Additional information 
 
In which course type are you enrolled?  Undergraduate Postgraduate 
What is your gender?                   Male  Female 
In what year were you born? (e.g. 1989)  __________ 
What is your ethnicity? 
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander Caucasian Hispanic Asian 
 African 
Other (please describe)  _____________________________________________ 
END OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION.   PLEASE RETURN THE 
PACK TO YOUR LECTURER. 
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Appendix 7:  Experiment 1 Crisis Event 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW        20 September, 2009 
Accident at Food Plant  
Kills One 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
One person is confirmed dead and three others 
have been hospitalised following an accident at a 
food manufacturing plant at Rocklea yesterday. 
Afternoon traffic was thrown into chaos as 
emergency vehicles rushed to the site following an 
explosion at the BellaFoods manufacturing plant at 
4.15pm.  While there has been no confirmation 
from authorities as to the cause of the explosion, it 
is believed that a food preparation vat exploded 
under high pressure, killing the operator of the vat 
and injuring nearby workers. 
The name of the deceased employee has not been 
released.  Three employees were taken to hospital 
with severe burns while others were treated on site 
for abrasions and minor burns. 
The site was immediately evacuated following the 
accident with the plant’s more than 150 workers 
spilling out into Lassiter Street, Rocklea.  One 
employee who didn’t wish to be identified said the 
explosion happened just after shift change. 
“We had just started the late shift when suddenly 
there was a large bang and the whole building 
shook,” he said.  “There was steam everywhere and 
people started screaming and I just ran as fast as I 
could to get out.”  
It is understood that the plant will remain closed 
today with investigations into the cause of the 
accident set to start immediately.       
BellaFoods manufactures preprepared meals for the 
Australian and export markets.  The Brisbane plant 
is one of three in Australia and also houses the 
company’s head office. 
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Appendix 8:  Experiment 1 Deny Response 
  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW      21 September, 2009 
  
Employee Killed in Tank 
Accident 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
Police have confirmed that a tank used to process 
food under high pressure exploded yesterday at the 
Rocklea plant of BellaFoods, killing one person 
and seriously injuring three others.   
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that 
the accident happened shortly after 4.15pm 
yesterday, with the exploding tank killing its 
operator and injuring a number of others.    
“Our investigations are focusing on the tank at 
present and what led to the explosion,” Detective 
Hawker said.  “We are checking all maintenance 
records at the plant as well as the previous shift 
reports to see if anything can be identified that 
might have caused the accident.” 
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that he 
was confident that the police would find nothing in 
the company’s operations that could have led to the 
accident.   
“We enforce the highest safety levels in our plants 
at all times,” Mr Toledos said.  “If there was 
something wrong with that tank, it wasn’t our fault.  
We should all be asking questions of the people 
who made the tank.  They are the ones responsible 
for this.” 
The deceased worker’s details have not been 
released.   Three other employees remain in 
hospital following the accident. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the accident.  The 
Brisbane based company manufactures preprepared 
meals for domestic and export markets.   
 
 
372
Appendix 9:  Experiment 1 Diminish Response 
 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW 21 September, 2009 
 
Employee Killed in Tank 
Accident 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
Police have confirmed that a tank used to process 
food under high pressure exploded yesterday at the 
Rocklea plant of BellaFoods, killing one person 
and seriously injuring three others.   
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that 
the accident happened shortly after 4.15pm 
yesterday, with the exploding tank killing its 
operator and injuring a number of others.    
“Our investigations are focusing on the tank at 
present and what led to the explosion,” Detective 
Hawker said.  “We are checking all maintenance 
records at the plant as well as the previous shift 
reports to see if anything can be identified that 
might have caused the accident.” 
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that 
the explosion was a tragic accident.   
“We take all safety precautions in our factories but 
unfortunately sometimes accidents happen when 
you are working with machinery,” Mr Toledos 
said.  “We never intended for this to happen.” 
The deceased worker’s details have not been 
released.   Three other employees remain in 
hospital following the explosion. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the accident.  The 
Brisbane based company manufactures preprepared 
meals for domestic and export markets.   
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Appendix 10:  Experiment 1 Deal Response 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW        21 September, 2009 
Employee Killed in Tank 
Accident 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
Police have confirmed that a tank used to process 
food under high pressure exploded yesterday at the 
Rocklea plant of BellaFoods, killing one person 
and seriously injuring three others.   
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that 
the accident happened shortly after 4.15pm 
yesterday, with the exploding tank killing its 
operator and injuring a number of others.    
“Our investigations are focusing on the tank at 
present and what led to the explosion,” Detective 
Hawker said.  “We are checking all maintenance 
records at the plant as well as the previous shift 
reports to see if anything can be identified that 
might have caused the accident.” 
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that 
the company’s immediate focus was on helping its 
injured employees and the family of the deceased 
man. 
“We all want to know what caused the accident but 
right now, we just want to take care of our people,” 
Mr Toledos said.  “We are providing medical 
assistance and counselling to all who need it and 
will continue to pay our staff while the plant 
remains closed as we don’t want them to suffer any 
further hardship.  We will do everything we can to 
help the family of our employee who died in the 
accident.” 
The deceased worker’s details have not been 
released.  Three other employees remain in hospital 
following the explosion. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the accident.  The 
Brisbane based company manufactures preprepared 
meals for domestic and export markets. 
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Appendix 11:  Experiment 2 Crisis Event (A) 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW        13 April, 2010  
Shooting at Food Plant Kills One 
By Michael Tunsley 
One person is confirmed dead and three others 
have been hospitalised following a shooting at a 
food manufacturing plant at Rocklea yesterday. 
Afternoon traffic was thrown into chaos as police 
and emergency vehicles rushed to the site 
following sounds of gunfire at the BellaFoods 
manufacturing plant at 4.15pm.  While there has 
been no confirmation from authorities as to the 
details of the shooting, it is believed that a former 
employee entered the premises around 4.00pm, 
proceeded to the production line and shot his 
former supervisor and two of his fellow workers.   
After a 30 minute standoff with police, a man was 
taken into custody. 
The name of the deceased employee has not been 
released.  Three employees were taken to hospital, 
two with gunshot wounds and one suffering from a 
suspected heart attack.  Others were treated on site 
for shock.   
The site was immediately evacuated following the 
shooting with the plant’s more than 150 workers 
spilling out into Lassiter Street, Rocklea.  One 
employee who didn’t wish to be identified said the 
shooting happened just after shift change. 
“We had just started the late shift when we heard a 
loud noise that sounded like shots being fired,” he 
said.  “There was steam everywhere as one of the 
bullets went through a high pressure pipe and 
people started screaming and I just ran as fast as I 
could to get out.”  
It is understood that the plant will remain closed 
today with investigations into the cause of the 
shooting set to start immediately.       
BellaFoods manufactures preprepared meals for the 
Australian and export markets.  The Brisbane plant 
is one of three in Australia and also houses the 
company’s head office. 
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Appendix 12: Experiment 2 (A) Deny Response 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW            14 April, 2010 
Former Employee Kills Supervisor in 
Factory Shooting 
By Michael Tunsley 
Police have charged a 45 year old man from the Brisbane 
suburb of Sherwood with murder, attempted murder and 
grievous bodily harm over the shootings at the Rocklea 
plant of BellaFoods on Monday.  One person was killed 
in the shooting and three others  were taken to hospital, 
two with gunshot wounds and one suffering a suspected 
heart attack.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that the 
shooting happened shortly after 4.15pm on Monday, 
when the man, a former employee of BellaFoods who had 
been dismissed from the company before Easter, entered 
the premises and shot his former supervisor and two 
colleagues on the production line.      
“Our investigations are still ongoing but we can confirm 
that the man entered the premises with the firearm before 
proceeding to the production line,” Detective Hawker 
said.  “At this stage we do not know the motive behind 
the shooting.”  
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos denied his 
company was responsible in any way for the shootings 
and said that he was confident the police would find 
nothing in the company’s operations or safety procedures 
that could have led to the shooting.   
“We should all be asking questions of the man in 
custody,” Mr Toledos said.  “He is the one totally 
responsible for this. We enforce the highest safety levels 
in our plants at all times.  The shooting is not our fault 
and we have done nothing wrong.”  
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
shooting. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the shooting.  The Brisbane 
based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.   
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Appendix 13:  Experiment 2(A) Diminish Response 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW            14 April, 2010 
Former Employee Kills Supervisor in 
Factory Shooting 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
Police have charged a 45 year old man from the Brisbane 
suburb of Sherwood with murder, attempted murder and 
grievous bodily harm over the shootings at the Rocklea 
plant of BellaFoods on Monday.  One person was killed 
in the shooting and three others  were taken to hospital, 
two with gunshot wounds and one suffering a suspected 
heart attack.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that the 
shooting happened shortly after 4.15pm on Monday, 
when the man, a former employee of BellaFoods who had 
been dismissed from the company before Easter, entered 
the premises and shot his former supervisor and two 
colleagues on the production line.      
“Our investigations are still ongoing but we can confirm 
that the man entered the premises with the firearm before 
proceeding to the production line,” Detective Hawker 
said.  “At this stage we do not know the motive behind 
the shooting.”  
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the 
shooting was a tragic accident that could have happened 
to any organisation.   
“We take all safety precautions in our factories but 
unfortunately sometimes accidents happen when people 
are involved,” Mr Toledos said.  “We never intended for 
this to happen.” 
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
shooting. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the shooting.  The Brisbane 
based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.   
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Appendix 14:  Experiment 2 (A) Deal Response 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW               14 April, 2010 
Former Employee Kills Supervisor in 
Factory Shooting 
By Michael Tunsley 
Police have charged a 45 year old man from the Brisbane 
suburb of Sherwood with murder, attempted murder and 
grievous bodily harm over the shootings at the Rocklea 
plant of BellaFoods on Monday.  One person was killed 
in the shooting and three others  were taken to hospital, 
two with gunshot wounds and one suffering a suspected 
heart attack.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that the 
shooting happened shortly after 4.15pm on Monday, 
when the man, a former employee of BellaFoods who had 
been dismissed from the company before Easter, entered 
the premises and shot his former supervisor and two 
colleagues on the production line.      
“Our investigations are still ongoing but we can confirm 
that the man entered the premises with the firearm before 
proceeding to the production line,” Detective Hawker 
said.  “At this stage we do not know the motive behind 
the shooting.”  
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the 
company’s immediate focus was on helping its injured 
employees and the family of the deceased man. 
“We all want to know what led to the shooting but right 
now, we just want to take care of our people,” Mr 
Toledos said.  “We are providing medical assistance and 
counselling to all who need it and will continue to pay 
our staff while the plant remains closed as we don’t want 
them to suffer any further hardship.  We will do 
everything we can to help the family of our employee 
who died in the shooting.” 
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.  
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
explosion. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the shooting.  The Brisbane based 
company manufactures preprepared meals for domestic and 
export markets. 
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Appendix 15:  Experiment 2 (B) Crisis Event 
 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW                 13 April, 2010  
Army Contract in Question Following 
Bribery Allegations 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
BellaFoods may have its multi-million dollar contract to supply the 
Australian Army with prepackaged food put under review, 
following allegations today that the company recently dismissed a 
senior manager for professional misconduct.   
While the Australian Army refused to comment on the status of the 
contract, sources within the Army suggested it may put its five 
year contract with BellaFoods under review following allegations 
that the company has breached the probity provisions in its 
contract.   
The contract, signed in January, is believed to represent a 
significant portion of BellaFoods business and saw the company 
add 200 workers to its production lines.   
Allegations have been rife within the food manufacturing industry 
in the last week that BellaFoods National Purchasing Manager, 
John Taylor, 52, had been sacked for taking bribes from suppliers.   
Questions have been raised about BellaFoods’ internal governance 
procedures which allowed Mr Taylor to set up the alleged network 
of kickbacks.  It is believed the company set up an internal 
investigation in March following a tip off from an employee who 
worked with Mr Taylor. 
One employee who didn’t wish to be identified said the bribery 
allegations were well known within the company. 
“It was a pretty open secret within certain circles,” he said. “We 
had an internal joke that you had to be one of ‘Taylor’s Team’ to 
get any of BellaFoods’ business.  It got worse once we got the 
Army’s contract as everyone wanted to work with us then.” 
Mr Taylor joined BellaFoods in 2005 having previously worked 
with two national supermarket chains.  He has declined all requests 
to comment on his departure from BellaFoods.   
BellaFoods manufactures preprepared meals for the Australian and 
export markets.  The Brisbane plant is one of three in Australia and 
also houses the company’s head office. 
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Appendix 16:  Experiment 2 (B) Deny Response 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW            14 April, 2010 
Army Places BellaFoods Contract 
Under Review 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
BellaFoods could lose its multi-million dollar contract to supply 
the Australian Army with prepackaged food, with the company 
facing allegations of bribery by a former senior manager. 
The Australian Army today confirmed that it had placed its five 
year contract with BellaFoods under review, following questions 
surrounding the company’s internal governance procedures.  An 
Army spokesperson confirmed that allegations had been raised that 
BellaFoods had breached the probity provisions in its contract.   
“All suppliers to the Army are expected to operate at a high 
standard of ethical practice and questions have been raised about 
BellaFoods’ performance under its contract.  It is important that 
these allegations are investigated fully.” 
Allegations have been rife within the food manufacturing industry 
in the last week that BellaFoods National Contracts Manager, John 
Taylor, 52, had been sacked for taking bribes from suppliers.   
Questions have been raised about BellaFoods’ internal governance 
procedures which allowed Mr Taylor to set up the alleged network 
of kickbacks.   
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos denied his company was 
responsible in any way for the actions of Mr Taylor. 
 “Whatever Mr Taylor did, he did all on his own.  He is the only 
person you should be asking about this,” Mr Toledos said.  “We 
knew nothing of his actions.  We enforce the highest level of 
ethical practice in all of our business dealings.  None of this is our 
fault.” 
The Brisbane based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.  The contract is believed to represent 
a significant portion of BellaFoods business and saw the company 
add 200 workers to its production lines.   
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Appendix 17:  Experiment 2 (B) Diminish Response 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW             14 April, 2010 
Army Places BellaFoods Contract 
Under Review 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
BellaFoods could lose its multi-million dollar contract to supply 
the Australian Army with prepackaged food, with the company 
facing allegations of bribery by a former senior manager. 
The Australian Army today confirmed that it had placed its five 
year contract with BellaFoods under review, following questions 
surrounding the company’s internal governance procedures.  An 
Army spokesperson confirmed that allegations had been raised that 
BellaFoods had breached the probity provisions in its contract.   
“All suppliers to the Army are expected to operate at a high 
standard of ethical practice and questions have been raised about 
BellaFoods’ performance under its contract.  It is important that 
these allegations are investigated fully.” 
Allegations have been rife within the food manufacturing industry 
in the last week that BellaFoods National Contracts Manager, John 
Taylor, 52, had been sacked for taking bribes from suppliers.   
Questions have been raised about BellaFoods’ internal governance 
procedures which allowed Mr Taylor to set up the alleged network 
of kickbacks.   
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the bribery 
allegations were an unfortunate accident that could have happened 
to any organisation.   
“We never intended for this to occur,” Mr Toledos said.  “We 
require all our employees to meet the highest ethical standards at 
all time, but unfortunately sometimes things just happen when 
individuals are involved.”  
The Brisbane based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.  The contract is believed to represent 
a significant portion of BellaFoods business and saw the company 
add 200 workers to its production lines.   
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Appendix 18: Experiment 2(B) Deal Response 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW                  14 April, 2010 
Army Places BellaFoods Contract 
Under Review 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
BellaFoods could lose its multi-million dollar contract to supply 
the Australian Army with prepackaged food, with the company 
facing allegations of bribery by a former senior manager. 
The Australian Army today confirmed that it had placed its five 
year contract with BellaFoods under review, following questions 
surrounding the company’s internal governance procedures.  An 
Army spokesperson confirmed that allegations had been raised that 
BellaFoods had breached the probity provisions in its contract.   
“All suppliers to the Army are expected to operate at a high 
standard of ethical practice and questions have been raised about 
BellaFoods’ performance under its contract.  It is important that 
these allegations are investigated fully.” 
Allegations have been rife within the food manufacturing industry 
in the last week that BellaFoods National Contracts Manager, John 
Taylor, 52, had been sacked for taking bribes from suppliers.  
Questions have been raised about BellaFoods’ internal governance 
procedures which allowed Mr Taylor to set up the alleged network 
of kickbacks.   
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the company’s 
immediate focus was on co-operating fully with the Army in its 
review as well as working with its suppliers and employees. 
“We all want to know exactly how this happened but right now, we 
just want to ensure the needs of all of those involved are taken care 
of,” Mr Toledos said.  “We will look to compensate any group that 
may have suffered a loss through this process.  This has also been a 
stressful time for our employees.  In some cases, their work has 
been questioned and a number of others believe their future 
employment may be at risk.  We will provide support to all who 
need it.” 
The Brisbane based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.  The contract is believed to represent 
a significant portion of BellaFoods business and saw the company 
add 200 workers to its production lines.   
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Appendix 19:  Experiment 3 Crisis Event (A) 
 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW                16 August, 2010  
Army Contract in Question Following 
Bribery Allegations 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
BellaFoods may have its multi-million dollar contract to supply the 
Australian Army with prepackaged food put under review, 
following allegations today that the company recently dismissed a 
senior manager for professional misconduct.   
While the Australian Army refused to comment on the status of the 
contract, sources within the Army suggested it may put its five 
year contract with BellaFoods under review following allegations 
that the company has breached the probity provisions in its 
contract.   
The contract, signed in March, is believed to represent a significant 
portion of BellaFoods business and saw the company add 200 
workers to its production lines.   
Allegations have been rife within the food manufacturing industry 
in the last week that BellaFoods National Purchasing Manager, 
John Taylor, 52, had been sacked for taking bribes from suppliers.   
Questions have been raised about BellaFoods’ internal governance 
procedures which allowed Mr Taylor to set up the alleged network 
of kickbacks.  It is believed the company set up an internal 
investigation in June following a tip off from an employee who 
worked with Mr Taylor. 
One employee who didn’t wish to be identified said the bribery 
allegations were well known within the company. 
“It was a pretty open secret within certain circles,” he said. “We 
had an internal joke that you had to be one of ‘Taylor’s Team’ to 
get any of BellaFoods’ business.  It got worse once we got the 
Army’s contract as everyone wanted to work with us then.” 
Mr Taylor joined BellaFoods in 2005 having previously worked 
with two national supermarket chains.  He has declined all requests 
to comment on his departure from BellaFoods.   
BellaFoods manufactures preprepared meals for the Australian and 
export markets.  The Brisbane plant is one of three in Australia and 
also houses the company’s head office. 
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Appendix 20:  Experiment 3(A) Ingratiation Response 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW          17 August, 2010 
Army Places BellaFoods Contract 
Under Review 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
BellaFoods could lose its multi-million dollar contract to supply 
the Australian Army with prepackaged food, with the company 
facing allegations of bribery by a former senior manager. 
The Australian Army today confirmed that it had placed its five 
year contract with BellaFoods under review, following questions 
surrounding the company’s internal governance procedures.  An 
Army spokesperson confirmed that allegations had been raised that 
BellaFoods had breached the probity provisions in its contract.   
“All suppliers to the Army are expected to operate at a high 
standard of ethical practice and questions have been raised about 
BellaFoods’ performance under its contract.  It is important that 
these allegations are investigated fully.” 
Allegations have been rife within the food manufacturing industry 
in the last week that BellaFoods National Contracts Manager, John 
Taylor, 52, had been sacked for taking bribes from suppliers.   
Questions have been raised about BellaFoods’ internal governance 
procedures which allowed Mr Taylor to set up the alleged network 
of kickbacks.   
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that his company had 
always been a strong supporter of the community and had always 
tried to work towards improving the environment in which the 
company operates.    
“I would like to thank all those who are supporting our company in 
what is a difficult time,” Mr Toledos said.  “We have always tried 
to get involved in our community and support those who needed 
our assistance.” 
The Brisbane based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.  The contract is believed to represent 
a significant portion of BellaFoods business and saw the company 
add 200 workers to its production lines.   
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Appendix 21: Experiment 3(A) Compensation Response 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW                17 August, 2010 
Army Places BellaFoods Contract 
Under Review 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
BellaFoods could lose its multi-million dollar contract to supply 
the Australian Army with prepackaged food, with the company 
facing allegations of bribery by a former senior manager. 
The Australian Army today confirmed that it had placed its five 
year contract with BellaFoods under review, following questions 
surrounding the company’s internal governance procedures.  An 
Army spokesperson confirmed that allegations had been raised that 
BellaFoods had breached the probity provisions in its contract.   
“All suppliers to the Army are expected to operate at a high 
standard of ethical practice and questions have been raised about 
BellaFoods’ performance under its contract.  It is important that 
these allegations are investigated fully.” 
Allegations have been rife within the food manufacturing industry 
in the last week that BellaFoods National Contracts Manager, John 
Taylor, 52, had been sacked for taking bribes from suppliers.  
Questions have been raised about BellaFoods’ internal governance 
procedures which allowed Mr Taylor to set up the alleged network 
of kickbacks.   
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the company’s 
immediate focus was on co-operating fully with the Army in its 
review as well as working with its suppliers and employees. 
“We all want to know exactly how this happened but right now, we 
just want to ensure the needs of all of those involved are taken care 
of,” Mr Toledos said.  “We will look to compensate any group that 
may have suffered a loss through this process.  This has also been a 
stressful time for our employees.  In some cases, their work has 
been questioned and a number of others believe their future 
employment may be at risk.  We will provide support to all who 
need it.” 
The Brisbane based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.  The contract is believed to represent 
a significant portion of BellaFoods business and saw the company 
add 200 workers to its production lines.   
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Appendix 22: Experiment 3(A) Apology Response 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW          17 August, 2010 
Army Places BellaFoods Contract 
Under Review 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
BellaFoods could lose its multi-million dollar contract to supply 
the Australian Army with prepackaged food, with the company 
facing allegations of bribery by a former senior manager. 
The Australian Army today confirmed that it had placed its five 
year contract with BellaFoods under review, following questions 
surrounding the company’s internal governance procedures.  An 
Army spokesperson confirmed that allegations had been raised that 
BellaFoods had breached the probity provisions in its contract.   
“All suppliers to the Army are expected to operate at a high 
standard of ethical practice and questions have been raised about 
BellaFoods’ performance under its contract.  It is important that 
these allegations are investigated fully.” 
Allegations have been rife within the food manufacturing industry 
in the last week that BellaFoods National Contracts Manager, John 
Taylor, 52, had been sacked for taking bribes from suppliers.   
Questions have been raised about BellaFoods’ internal governance 
procedures which allowed Mr Taylor to set up the alleged network 
of kickbacks.   
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the company took 
full responsibility for the bribery case arising.   
“We take full responsibility for this incident and sincerely 
apologise to the Australian Army and anyone else who has been 
impacted by these events,” Mr Toledos said.  “We hope we can be 
forgiven for our mistake and can now move forward.”   
The Brisbane based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.  The contract is believed to represent 
a significant portion of BellaFoods business and saw the company 
add 200 workers to its production lines.   
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Appendix 23:  Experiment 3(B) Crisis Event 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW         14 September, 2010  
Focus on Preventable Food Mix Up in 
Aged Care Death 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
Authorities are investigating the death of a resident in a Brisbane 
aged care facility following concerns that a local food 
manufacturer failed to prevent the wrong ingredients being put in 
meals which led to severe allergic reactions when the meals were 
consumed.  
Three other residents of the Three Hill Aged Care Facility in 
Springsure were also hospitalised last week following the luncheon 
service at the facility on Thursday.   
The Department of Health confirmed today that they have been in 
contact with BellaFoods, the supplier of pre-packaged food to the 
facility.  The Department has requested information on 
BellaFoods’  internal controls for the production of a range of 
products including those which contain additives that may cause 
allergic reactions in some members of the population.    
Particular focus is on how the company prevents the wrong 
ingredients being used in the specialist  production lines.   
BellaFoods manufactures the food for the Three Hill centre at its 
Rocklea plant in Brisbane.   An employee at the Rocklea plant who 
didn’t wish to be identified said that a number of inspectors visited 
the plant yesterday, and held meetings with management and staff 
and appeared to be interested in the production records of the 
special meals part of the facility. 
“No one told us what was really going on but there was a lot of 
extra activity in the plant yesterday,” he said.  “We produce special 
meals for people with allergies and there is a rumour going around 
that there was a breakdown in our procedures which are designed 
to prevent the wrong ingredients being added and someone put a 
food additive in the wrong processing line.”    
BellaFoods manufactures preprepared meals for the Australian and 
export markets.  The Brisbane plant is one of three in Australia and 
also houses the company’s head office. 
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Appendix 24:  Experiment 3(B) Ingratiation Response 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW            15 September, 2010 
BellaFoods Fails to Prevent Food Mix 
Up  
By Michael Tunsley 
 
BellaFoods’ production of prepackaged food for people with 
allergies has been suspended while the Queensland Department of 
Health investigates the company’s link to the death of an elderly 
resident of an aged care facility last week.   
The Department confirmed today that it had issued a temporary 
suspension order over the Brisbane-based company while it 
investigated whether the company failed to prevent the wrong 
ingredients being used in one of the company’s key production lines. 
 “Effective procedures should be in place to prevent any mix up of 
ingredients in a food line,” a Departmental spokesperson said.  “Our 
initial investigations suggest that BellaFoods failed to prevent this in 
one of its key production lines. 
“While it is still early in our investigations, we believe that one of 
BellaFoods’ employees may have allowed a food additive to be put 
into the production line which makes special meals for people with 
allergies,” he said.   “This could have serious consequences for 
people with allergies, particularly those whose health is already 
compromised through age or illness so we need to be clear about the 
company’s procedures for preventing such an occurrence before we 
allow BellaFoods to resume production.” 
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that his company had 
always been a strong supporter of the community and had always 
tried to work towards improving the environment in which the 
company operates.    
“I would like to thank all those who are supporting our company in 
what is a difficult time,” Mr Toledos said.  “We have always tried to 
get involved in our community and support those who needed our 
assistance.” 
The Brisbane based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.  The Brisbane plant is one of three in 
Australia and also houses the company’s head office. 
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Appendix 25: Experiment 3(B) Compassion Response 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW              15 September, 2010 
BellaFoods Fails to Prevent Food Mix 
Up  
By Michael Tunsley 
 
BellaFoods’ production of prepackaged food for people with 
allergies has been suspended while the Queensland Department of 
Health investigates the company’s link to the death of an elderly 
resident of an aged care facility last week.   
The Department confirmed today that it had issued a temporary 
suspension order over the Brisbane-based company while it 
investigated whether the company failed to prevent the wrong 
ingredients being used in one of the company’s key production lines. 
 “Effective procedures should be in place to prevent any mix up of 
ingredients in a food line,” a Departmental spokesperson said.  “Our 
initial investigations suggest that BellaFoods failed to prevent this in 
one of its key production lines. 
“While it is still early in our investigations, we believe that one of 
BellaFoods’ employees may have allowed a food additive to be put 
into the production line which makes special meals for people with 
allergies,” he said.   “This could have serious consequences for 
people with allergies, particularly those whose health is already 
compromised through age or illness so we need to be clear about the 
company’s procedures for preventing such an occurrence before we 
allow BellaFoods to resume production.” 
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the company’s 
immediate focus was on co-operating fully with the Health 
Department as well as working with its employees. 
“We all want to know exactly how this happened but right now, we 
just want to ensure the needs of all of those involved are taken care 
of,” Mr Toledos said.  “We will look to compensate anyone who may 
have suffered a loss through this process, particularly any of the 
residents of the Three Hill facility or their families.  This has also been 
a stressful time for our employees.  In some cases, their work has been 
questioned and a number of others believe their future employment 
may be at risk.  We will provide support to all who need it.” 
The Brisbane-based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.  The Brisbane plant is one of three in 
Australia and also houses the company’s head office. 
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Appendix 26:  Experiment 3(B) Apology Response 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW               15 September, 2010 
BellaFoods Fails to Prevent Food Mix 
Up  
By Michael Tunsley 
 
BellaFoods’ production of prepackaged food for people with 
allergies has been suspended while the Queensland Department of 
Health investigates the company’s link to the death of an elderly 
resident of an aged care facility last week.   
The Department confirmed today that it had issued a temporary 
suspension order over the Brisbane-based company while it 
investigated whether the company failed to prevent the wrong 
ingredients being used in one of the company’s key production lines. 
 “Effective procedures should be in place to prevent any mix up of 
ingredients in a food line,” a Departmental spokesperson said.  “Our 
initial investigations suggest that BellaFoods failed to prevent this in 
one of its key production lines. 
“While it is still early in our investigations, we believe that one of 
BellaFoods’ employees may have allowed a food additive to be put 
into the production line which makes special meals for people with 
allergies,” he said.   “This could have serious consequences for 
people with allergies, particularly those whose health is already 
compromised through age or illness so we need to be clear about the 
company’s procedures for preventing such an occurrence before we 
allow BellaFoods to resume production.” 
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the company took 
full responsibility for the food safety case arising.   
“We take full responsibility for this incident and sincerely apologise to 
the residents of the Three Hill facility and their families and anyone 
else who has been impacted by these events,” Mr Toledos said.  “We 
hope we can be forgiven for our mistake and can now move forward.”   
The Brisbane-based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.  The Brisbane plant is one of three in 
Australia and also houses the company’s head office. 
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Appendix 27: Experiment 4 Crisis Event 
 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW    23 August, 2011 
Accident at Food Plant Kills One 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
One person is confirmed dead and three others have 
been hospitalised following an accident at a food 
manufacturing plant at Rocklea yesterday. 
Afternoon traffic was thrown into chaos as emergency 
vehicles rushed to the site following an explosion at the 
BellaFoods manufacturing plant at 4.15pm.  While there 
has been no confirmation from authorities as to the 
cause of the explosion, it is believed that a food 
preparation vat exploded under high pressure, killing the 
operator of the vat and injuring nearby workers. 
The name of the deceased employee has not been 
released.  Three employees were taken to hospital with 
severe burns while others were treated on site for 
abrasions and minor burns. 
The site was immediately evacuated following the 
accident with the plant’s more than 150 workers spilling 
out into Lassiter Street, Rocklea.  One employee who 
didn’t wish to be identified said the explosion happened 
just after shift change. 
“We had just started the late shift when suddenly there 
was a large bang and the whole building shook,” he said.  
“There was steam everywhere and people started 
screaming and I just ran as fast as I could to get out.”  
It is understood that the plant will remain closed today 
with investigations into the cause of the accident set to 
start immediately.       
BellaFoods manufactures preprepared meals for the 
Australian and export markets.  The Brisbane plant is 
one of three in Australia and also houses the company’s 
head office. 
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Appendix 28: Experiment 4 Not Responsible  
 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW  21 September, 2011 
 BellaFoods Not Responsible in 
Tank Accident Death 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
An official report from Workplace Health and Safety 
Queensland has found Bellafoods not responsible for the 
death of one of its employees in a tank explosion last 
month. 
A tank used to process food under high pressure 
exploded at the Rocklea plant of BellaFoods, killing its 
operator and injuring a number of others.   
The report said that a number of investigations were 
undertaken to look for the cause of the explosion.   
“Following these investigations, we find that BellaFoods 
is not at all responsible for the death of the tank operator 
and for the injuries sustained by three other employees,” 
the report says. 
BellaFoods manufactures preprepared meals for the 
Australian and export markets.  The Brisbane plant is 
one of three in Australia and also houses the company’s 
head office.  
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Appendix 29:  Experiment 4 Fully Responsible  
 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW 21 September, 2011 
 BellaFoods Fully Responsible in 
Tank Accident Death 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
An official report from Workplace Health and Safety 
Queensland has found Bellafoods fully responsible in 
the death of one of its employees in a tank explosion last 
month. 
A tank used to process food under high pressure 
exploded at the Rocklea plant of BellaFoods, killing its 
operator and injuring a number of others.   
The report said that a number of investigations were 
undertaken to look for the cause of the explosion.   
“Following these investigations, we find that BellaFoods 
is fully responsible for the death of the tank operator and 
for the injuries sustained by three other employees,” the 
report says. 
BellaFoods manufactures preprepared meals for the 
Australian and export markets.  The Brisbane plant is 
one of three in Australia and also houses the company’s 
head office.  
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Appendix 30: Experiment 5 Crisis Event and Control 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW             22 March, 2011 
Accident at Food Plant Kills One 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
One person is confirmed dead and three others have 
been hospitalised following an accident at a food 
manufacturing plant at Rocklea yesterday. 
Afternoon traffic was thrown into chaos as emergency 
vehicles rushed to the site following an explosion at the 
BellaFoods manufacturing plant at 4.15pm.  While there 
has been no confirmation from authorities as to the 
cause of the explosion, it is believed that a food 
preparation vat exploded under high pressure, killing the 
operator of the vat and injuring nearby workers. 
The name of the deceased employee has not been 
released.  Three employees were taken to hospital with 
severe burns while others were treated on site for 
abrasions and minor burns. 
The site was immediately evacuated following the 
accident with the plant’s more than 150 workers spilling 
out into Lassiter Street, Rocklea.  One employee who 
didn’t wish to be identified said the explosion happened 
just after shift change. 
“We had just started the late shift when suddenly there 
was a large bang and the whole building shook,” he said.  
“There was steam everywhere and people started 
screaming and I just ran as fast as I could to get out.”  
It is understood that the plant will remain closed today 
with investigations into the cause of the accident set to 
start immediately.       
BellaFoods manufactures preprepared meals for the 
Australian and export markets.  The Brisbane plant is 
one of three in Australia and also houses the company’s 
head office. 
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Appendix 31:  Experiment 5 Positive Community Relationships  
 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW           15  March, 2011 
 
BELLA FOODS 
BellaFoods Pty Ltd produces a wide range of preprepared 
meals for the retail and wholesale sectors.   Based in 
Brisbane, Queensland, the company has manufacturing 
plants in Brisbane, Cairns and Melbourne and employs 
just under 2,000 people.  BellaFoods products are 
marketed in Australia, Asia and Europe under the label, 
Bella.  Its marketing strategy highlights its use of all 
Australian produce.  Apart from its retail and corporate 
catering activities, the company also manufactures 
products for two other major food companies for sale in 
the domestic and export markets.   BellaFoods was started 
by siblings, Jonathan and Isabella Toledos.  Jonathan is 
the Chief Executive Officer and Isabella is the National 
Marketing Director.     
BellaFoods has been praised by community leaders for its 
contributions to the communities in which it operates.  It 
provides annual scholarships to disadvantaged university 
students to further their studies in business and encourages 
staff to volunteer with community groups.  BellaFoods 
also donates food each week to three charity-operated 
food kitchens for Brisbane residents in need.   
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Appendix 32:  Experiment 5 Event and Positive Community 
Relationships 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW                 22 March, 2011 
Accident at Food Plant Kills One 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
One person is confirmed dead and three others have been 
hospitalised following an accident at a food manufacturing plant at 
Rocklea yesterday. 
Afternoon traffic was thrown into chaos as emergency vehicles 
rushed to the site following an explosion at the BellaFoods 
manufacturing plant at 4.15pm.  While there has been no 
confirmation from authorities as to the cause of the explosion, it is 
believed that a food preparation vat exploded under high pressure, 
killing the operator of the vat and injuring nearby workers. 
The name of the deceased employee has not been released.  Three 
employees were taken to hospital with severe burns while others 
were treated on site for abrasions and minor burns. 
The site was immediately evacuated following the accident with the 
plant’s more than 150 workers spilling out into Lassiter Street, 
Rocklea.  One employee who didn’t wish to be identified said the 
explosion happened just after shift change. 
“We had just started the late shift when suddenly there was a large 
bang and the whole building shook,” he said.  “There was steam 
everywhere and people started screaming and I just ran as fast as I 
could to get out.”  
It is understood that the plant will remain closed today with 
investigations into the cause of the accident set to start immediately.       
BellaFoods manufactures preprepared meals for the Australian and 
export markets.  The Brisbane plant is one of three in Australia and 
also houses the company’s head office.  BellaFoods has been praised 
by community leaders for its contributions to the communities in 
which it operates.  It provides annual scholarships to disadvantaged 
university students to further their studies in business and encourages 
staff to volunteer with community groups.  BellaFoods also donates 
food each week to three charity-operated food kitchens for Brisbane 
residents in need.   
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Appendix 33: Experiment 5 Negative Community Relationships 
 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW           15  March, 2011 
 
BELLA FOODS 
BellaFoods Pty Ltd produces a wide range of preprepared 
meals for the retail and wholesale sectors.   Based in 
Brisbane, Queensland, the company has manufacturing 
plants in Brisbane, Cairns and Melbourne and employs 
just under 2,000 people.  BellaFoods products are 
marketed in Australia, Asia and Europe under the label, 
Bella.  Its marketing strategy highlights its use of all 
Australian produce.  Apart from its retail and corporate 
catering activities, the company also manufactures 
products for two other major food companies for sale in 
the domestic and export markets.   BellaFoods was started 
by siblings, Jonathan and Isabella Toledos.  Jonathan is 
the Chief Executive Officer and Isabella is the National 
Marketing Director.     
BellaFoods has been criticised by community leaders for 
its lack of support for the communities in which it 
operates.  It has frequently refused requests to participate 
in community programs including scholarships to support 
disadvantaged youth and does not encourage staff to 
volunteer for community related activities.  BellaFoods 
has also recently been criticised for refusing to participate 
in a program where food manufacturers donate food to 
charity operated food kitchens. 
  
 
 
397
Appendix 34: Experiment 5 Crisis Event and Negative Community 
Relationships 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW                 22 March, 2011 
Accident at Food Plant Kills One 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
One person is confirmed dead and three others have been 
hospitalised following an accident at a food manufacturing plant at 
Rocklea yesterday. 
Afternoon traffic was thrown into chaos as emergency vehicles 
rushed to the site following an explosion at the BellaFoods 
manufacturing plant at 4.15pm.  While there has been no 
confirmation from authorities as to the cause of the explosion, it is 
believed that a food preparation vat exploded under high pressure, 
killing the operator of the vat and injuring nearby workers. 
The name of the deceased employee has not been released.  Three 
employees were taken to hospital with severe burns while others 
were treated on site for abrasions and minor burns. 
The site was immediately evacuated following the accident with the 
plant’s more than 150 workers spilling out into Lassiter Street, 
Rocklea.  One employee who didn’t wish to be identified said the 
explosion happened just after shift change. 
“We had just started the late shift when suddenly there was a large 
bang and the whole building shook,” he said.  “There was steam 
everywhere and people started screaming and I just ran as fast as I 
could to get out.”  
It is understood that the plant will remain closed today with 
investigations into the cause of the accident set to start immediately.       
BellaFoods manufactures preprepared meals for the Australian and 
export markets.  The Brisbane plant is one of three in Australia and 
also houses the company’s head office.  BellaFoods has been 
criticised by community leaders for its lack of support for the 
communities in which it operates.  It has frequently refused requests 
to participate in community programs including scholarships to 
support disadvantaged youth and does not encourage staff to 
volunteer for community related activities.  BellaFoods has also 
recently been criticised for refusing to participate in a program 
where food manufacturers donate food to charity operated food 
kitchens. 
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Appendix 35: Experiment 5 Mature Age 
 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW           15  March, 2011 
 
BELLA FOODS 
BellaFoods Pty Ltd produces a wide range of preprepared 
meals for the retail and wholesale sectors.   Based in 
Brisbane, Queensland, the company has manufacturing 
plants in Brisbane, Cairns and Melbourne and employs 
just under 2,000 people.  BellaFoods products are 
marketed in Australia, Asia and Europe under the label, 
Bella.  Its marketing strategy highlights its use of all 
Australian produce.  Apart from its retail and corporate 
catering activities, the company also manufactures 
products for two other major food companies for sale in 
the domestic and export markets.   BellaFoods was started 
by siblings, Jonathan and Isabella Toledos.  Jonathan is 
the Chief Executive Officer and Isabella is the National 
Marketing Director.     The company has been in operation 
for 20 years.   
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Appendix 36:  Experiment 5 Crisis Event and Mature Age 
 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW           22 March, 2011 
Accident at Food Plant Kills One 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
One person is confirmed dead and three others have 
been hospitalised following an accident at a food 
manufacturing plant at Rocklea yesterday. 
Afternoon traffic was thrown into chaos as emergency 
vehicles rushed to the site following an explosion at the 
BellaFoods manufacturing plant at 4.15pm.  While there 
has been no confirmation from authorities as to the 
cause of the explosion, it is believed that a food 
preparation vat exploded under high pressure, killing the 
operator of the vat and injuring nearby workers. 
The name of the deceased employee has not been 
released.  Three employees were taken to hospital with 
severe burns while others were treated on site for 
abrasions and minor burns. 
The site was immediately evacuated following the 
accident with the plant’s more than 150 workers spilling 
out into Lassiter Street, Rocklea.  One employee who 
didn’t wish to be identified said the explosion happened 
just after shift change. 
“We had just started the late shift when suddenly there 
was a large bang and the whole building shook,” he said.  
“There was steam everywhere and people started 
screaming and I just ran as fast as I could to get out.”  
It is understood that the plant will remain closed today 
with investigations into the cause of the accident set to 
start immediately.       
BellaFoods manufactures preprepared meals for the 
Australian and export markets.  The Brisbane plant is 
one of three in Australia and also houses the company’s 
head office. The company has been in operation for 20 
years. 
 
  
 
 
400
Appendix 37: Experiment 5 New Age 
 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW           15  March, 2011 
 
BELLA FOODS 
BellaFoods Pty Ltd produces a wide range of preprepared 
meals for the retail and wholesale sectors.   Based in 
Brisbane, Queensland, the company has manufacturing 
plants in Brisbane, Cairns and Melbourne and employs 
just under 2,000 people.  BellaFoods products are 
marketed in Australia, Asia and Europe under the label, 
Bella.  Its marketing strategy highlights its use of all 
Australian produce.  Apart from its retail and corporate 
catering activities, the company also manufactures 
products for two other major food companies for sale in 
the domestic and export markets.   BellaFoods was started 
by siblings, Jonathan and Isabella Toledos.  Jonathan is 
the Chief Executive Officer and Isabella is the National 
Marketing Director. The company has been in operation 
for three years. 
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Appendix 38: Experiment 5 Crisis Event and New Age 
 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW            22 March, 2011 
Accident at Food Plant Kills One 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
One person is confirmed dead and three others have 
been hospitalised following an accident at a food 
manufacturing plant at Rocklea yesterday. 
Afternoon traffic was thrown into chaos as emergency 
vehicles rushed to the site following an explosion at the 
BellaFoods manufacturing plant at 4.15pm.  While there 
has been no confirmation from authorities as to the 
cause of the explosion, it is believed that a food 
preparation vat exploded under high pressure, killing the 
operator of the vat and injuring nearby workers. 
The name of the deceased employee has not been 
released.  Three employees were taken to hospital with 
severe burns while others were treated on site for 
abrasions and minor burns. 
The site was immediately evacuated following the 
accident with the plant’s more than 150 workers spilling 
out into Lassiter Street, Rocklea.  One employee who 
didn’t wish to be identified said the explosion happened 
just after shift change. 
“We had just started the late shift when suddenly there 
was a large bang and the whole building shook,” he said.  
“There was steam everywhere and people started 
screaming and I just ran as fast as I could to get out.”  
It is understood that the plant will remain closed today 
with investigations into the cause of the accident set to 
start immediately.       
BellaFoods manufactures preprepared meals for the 
Australian and export markets.  The Brisbane plant is 
one of three in Australia and also houses the company’s 
head office. The company has been in operation for 
three years.  
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Appendix 39: Experiment 6 Victim Event  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW  7 March, 2012  
Shooting at Food Plant Kills One 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
One person is confirmed dead and three others 
have been hospitalised following a shooting at a 
food manufacturing plant at Rocklea yesterday. 
Afternoon traffic was thrown into chaos as police 
and emergency vehicles rushed to the site 
following sounds of gunfire at the BellaFoods 
manufacturing plant at 4.15pm.  While there has 
been no confirmation from authorities as to the 
details of the shooting, it is believed that a former 
employee entered the premises around 4.00pm, 
proceeded to the production line and shot his 
former supervisor and two of his fellow workers.   
After a 30 minute standoff with police, a man was 
taken into custody. 
The name of the deceased employee has not been 
released.  Three employees were taken to hospital, 
two with gunshot wounds and one suffering from a 
suspected heart attack.  Others were treated on site 
for shock.   
The site was immediately evacuated following the 
shooting with the plant’s more than 150 workers 
spilling out into Lassiter Street, Rocklea.  One 
employee who didn’t wish to be identified said the 
shooting happened just after shift change. 
“We had just started the late shift when we heard a 
loud noise that sounded like shots being fired,” he 
said.  “There was steam everywhere as one of the 
bullets went through a high pressure pipe and 
people started screaming and I just ran as fast as I 
could to get out.”  
It is understood that the plant will remain closed 
today with investigations into the cause of the 
shooting set to start immediately.       
BellaFoods manufactures preprepared meals for the 
Australian and export markets.  The Brisbane plant is 
one of three in Australia and also houses the company’s 
head office. 
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Appendix 40:  Experiment 6 Victim Event Deny Response 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW    8 March, 2012 
Former Employee Kills Supervisor in 
Factory Shooting: BellaFoods Denies 
Responsibility 
By Michael Tunsley 
Police have charged a 45 year old man from the Brisbane 
suburb of Sherwood with murder, attempted murder and 
grievous bodily harm over the shootings at the Rocklea 
plant of BellaFoods on Tuesday.  One person was killed 
in the shooting and three others  were taken to hospital, 
two with gunshot wounds and one suffering a suspected 
heart attack.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that the 
shooting happened shortly after 4.15pm on Tuesday, 
when the man, a former employee of BellaFoods who had 
been dismissed from the company recently, entered the 
premises and shot his former supervisor and two 
colleagues on the production line.      
“Our investigations are ongoing but we can confirm that 
the man entered the premises with the firearm before 
proceeding to the production line,” Detective Hawker 
said.  “At this stage we do not know the motive behind 
the shooting.”  
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos denied his 
company was responsible in any way for the shootings 
and said that he was confident the police would find 
nothing in the company’s operations or safety procedures 
that could have led to the shooting.   
“We should all be asking questions of the man in 
custody,” Mr Toledos said.  “He is the one totally 
responsible for this. We enforce the highest safety levels 
in our plants at all times.  The shooting is not our fault 
and we have done nothing wrong.”  
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
shooting. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the shooting.  The Brisbane based 
company manufactures preprepared meals for domestic and 
export markets.   
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Appendix 41:   Experiment 6 Victim Event, Deny Response, Mature and Positive Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW    9 March, 2012 
Shooting at company with 20 year history 
and good community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of a shooting at its 
Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 20 years and 
has been praised by community leaders for its 
contributions to the communities in which it operates.  It 
provides annual scholarships to disadvantaged university 
students to further their studies in business and 
encourages staff to volunteer with community groups.  
BellaFoods also donates food each week to three charity-
operated food kitchens for Brisbane residents in need. 
Police have charged a 45 year old man from the Brisbane 
suburb of Sherwood with murder, attempted murder and 
grievous bodily harm over the shootings at the Rocklea 
plant of BellaFoods on Tuesday.  One person was killed 
in the shooting and three others  were taken to hospital, 
two with gunshot wounds and one suffering a suspected 
heart attack.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that the 
man, a former employee of BellaFoods who had been 
dismissed from the company recently, entered the 
premises and shot his former supervisor and two 
colleagues on the production line.      
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos denied his 
company was responsible in any way for the shootings 
and said that he was confident the police would find 
nothing in the company’s operations or safety procedures 
that could have led to the shooting.   
“We should all be asking questions of the man in 
custody,” Mr Toledos said.  “He is the one totally 
responsible for this. We enforce the highest safety levels 
in our plants at all times.  The shooting is not our fault 
and we have done nothing wrong.”  
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   Three 
other employees remain in hospital following the shooting. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the shooting.  The Brisbane based 
company manufactures preprepared meals for domestic and 
export markets.   
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Appendix 42:   Experiment 6 Victim Event, Deny Response, New and Positive Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW        9 March, 2012 
Shooting at company with 2 year history 
and good community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of a shooting at its 
Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 2 years and has 
been praised by community leaders for its contributions 
to the communities in which it operates.  It provides 
annual scholarships to disadvantaged university students 
to further their studies in business and encourages staff to 
volunteer with community groups.  BellaFoods also 
donates food each week to three charity-operated food 
kitchens for Brisbane residents in need. 
Police have charged a 45 year old man from the Brisbane 
suburb of Sherwood with murder, attempted murder and 
grievous bodily harm over the shootings at the Rocklea 
plant of BellaFoods on Tuesday.  One person was killed 
in the shooting and three others  were taken to hospital, 
two with gunshot wounds and one suffering a suspected 
heart attack.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that the 
man, a former employee of BellaFoods who had been 
dismissed from the company recently, entered the 
premises and shot his former supervisor and two 
colleagues on the production line.      
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos denied his 
company was responsible in any way for the shootings 
and said that he was confident the police would find 
nothing in the company’s operations or safety procedures 
that could have led to the shooting.   
“We should all be asking questions of the man in 
custody,” Mr Toledos said.  “He is the one totally 
responsible for this. We enforce the highest safety levels 
in our plants at all times.  The shooting is not our fault 
and we have done nothing wrong.”  
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   Three 
other employees remain in hospital following the shooting. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the shooting.  The Brisbane based 
company manufactures preprepared meals for domestic and 
export markets.   
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Appendix 43:   Experiment 6 Victim Event, Deny Response, Mature and Negative Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW         9 March, 2012 
Shooting at company with 20 year history 
and poor community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of a shooting at its 
Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 20 years and has 
been criticised by community leaders for its lack of support 
for the communities in which it operates.  It has frequently 
refused requests to participate in community programs 
including scholarships to support disadvantaged youth and 
does not encourage staff to volunteer for community related 
activities.  BellaFoods has also recently been criticised for 
refusing to participate in a program where food 
manufacturers donate food to charity operated food kitchens. 
Police have charged a 45 year old man from the Brisbane 
suburb of Sherwood with murder, attempted murder and 
grievous bodily harm over the shootings at the Rocklea plant 
of BellaFoods on Tuesday.  One person was killed in the 
shooting and three others  were taken to hospital, two with 
gunshot wounds and one suffering a suspected heart attack.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that the man, a 
former employee of BellaFoods who had been dismissed 
from the company recently, entered the premises and shot 
his former supervisor and two colleagues on the production 
line.      
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos denied his company 
was responsible in any way for the shootings and said that he 
was confident the police would find nothing in the 
company’s operations or safety procedures that could have 
led to the shooting.   
“We should all be asking questions of the man in custody,” Mr 
Toledos said.  “He is the one totally responsible for this. We 
enforce the highest safety levels in our plants at all times.  The 
shooting is not our fault and we have done nothing wrong.”  
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   Three 
other employees remain in hospital following the shooting. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while investigations 
continue into the shooting.  The Brisbane based company 
manufactures preprepared meals for domestic and export markets.      
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Appendix 44:   Experiment 6 Victim Event, Deny Response, New and Negative Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW    9 March, 2012 
Shooting at company with 2 year history 
and poor community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of a shooting at its 
Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 2 years and has 
been criticised by community leaders for its lack of support 
for the communities in which it operates.  It has frequently 
refused requests to participate in community programs 
including scholarships to support disadvantaged youth and 
does not encourage staff to volunteer for community related 
activities.  BellaFoods has also recently been criticised for 
refusing to participate in a program where food 
manufacturers donate food to charity operated food kitchens. 
Police have charged a 45 year old man from the Brisbane 
suburb of Sherwood with murder, attempted murder and 
grievous bodily harm over the shootings at the Rocklea plant 
of BellaFoods on Tuesday.  One person was killed in the 
shooting and three others  were taken to hospital, two with 
gunshot wounds and one suffering a suspected heart attack.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that the man, a 
former employee of BellaFoods who had been dismissed 
from the company recently, entered the premises and shot 
his former supervisor and two colleagues on the production 
line.      
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos denied his company 
was responsible in any way for the shootings and said that he 
was confident the police would find nothing in the 
company’s operations or safety procedures that could have 
led to the shooting.   
“We should all be asking questions of the man in custody,” 
Mr Toledos said.  “He is the one totally responsible for this. 
We enforce the highest safety levels in our plants at all 
times.  The shooting is not our fault and we have done 
nothing wrong.”  
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   Three 
other employees remain in hospital following the shooting. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while investigations 
continue into the shooting.  The Brisbane based company 
manufactures preprepared meals for domestic and export markets.      
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Appendix 45:   Experiment 6 Victim Event, Diminish Response  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW    8 March, 2012 
Former Employee Kills Supervisor in 
Factory Shooting: BellaFoods Says Tragic 
Event Never Intended 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
Police have charged a 45 year old man from the Brisbane 
suburb of Sherwood with murder, attempted murder and 
grievous bodily harm over the shootings at the Rocklea 
plant of BellaFoods on Tuesday.  One person was killed 
in the shooting and three others  were taken to hospital, 
two with gunshot wounds and one suffering a suspected 
heart attack.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that the 
shooting happened shortly after 4.15pm on Tuesday, 
when the man, a former employee of BellaFoods who had 
been dismissed from the company recently, entered the 
premises and shot his former supervisor and two 
colleagues on the production line.      
“Our investigations are ongoing but we can confirm that 
the man entered the premises with the firearm before 
proceeding to the production line,” Detective Hawker 
said.  “At this stage we do not know the motive behind 
the shooting.”  
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the 
shooting was a tragic event that could have happened to 
any organisation.   
“We take all safety precautions in our factories but 
unfortunately sometimes tragic events happen when 
people are involved,” Mr Toledos said.  “We never 
intended for this to happen.” 
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
shooting. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the shooting.  The Brisbane 
based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.   
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Appendix 46:   Experiment 6 Victim Event, Diminish Response, Mature and Positive Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW   9 March, 2012 
Shooting at company with 20 year history 
and good community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of a shooting at its 
Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 20 years and has 
been praised by community leaders for its contributions to 
the communities in which it operates.  It provides annual 
scholarships to disadvantaged university students to further 
their studies in business and encourages staff to volunteer 
with community groups.  BellaFoods also donates food each 
week to three charity-operated food kitchens for Brisbane 
residents in need. 
Police have charged a 45 year old man from the Brisbane 
suburb of Sherwood with murder, attempted murder and 
grievous bodily harm over the shootings at the Rocklea plant 
of BellaFoods on Tuesday.  One person was killed in the 
shooting and three others  were taken to hospital, two with 
gunshot wounds and one suffering a suspected heart attack.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that the man, a 
former employee of BellaFoods who had been dismissed 
from the company recently, entered the premises and shot 
his former supervisor and two colleagues on the production 
line.      
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the 
shooting was a tragic event that could have happened to any 
organisation.   
“We take all safety precautions in our factories but 
unfortunately sometimes tragic events happen when people 
are involved,” Mr Toledos said.  “We never intended for this 
to happen.” 
 The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
shooting. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the shooting.  The Brisbane 
based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.   
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Appendix 47:   Experiment 6 Victim Event, Diminish Response, New and Positive Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW     9 March, 2012 
Shooting at company with 2 year history 
and good community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of a shooting at its 
Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 2 years and has 
been praised by community leaders for its contributions 
to the communities in which it operates.  It provides 
annual scholarships to disadvantaged university students 
to further their studies in business and encourages staff to 
volunteer with community groups.  BellaFoods also 
donates food each week to three charity-operated food 
kitchens for Brisbane residents in need. 
Police have charged a 45 year old man from the Brisbane 
suburb of Sherwood with murder, attempted murder and 
grievous bodily harm over the shootings at the Rocklea 
plant of BellaFoods on Tuesday.  One person was killed 
in the shooting and three others  were taken to hospital, 
two with gunshot wounds and one suffering a suspected 
heart attack.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that the 
man, a former employee of BellaFoods who had been 
dismissed from the company recently, entered the 
premises and shot his former supervisor and two 
colleagues on the production line.      
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the 
shooting was a tragic event that could have happened to 
any organisation.   
“We take all safety precautions in our factories but 
unfortunately sometimes tragic events happen when 
people are involved,” Mr Toledos said.  “We never 
intended for this to happen.” 
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
shooting. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the shooting.  The Brisbane 
based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.   
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Appendix 48:   Experiment 6 Victim Event, Diminish Response, Mature and Negative 
Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW     9 March, 2012 
Shooting at company with 20 year history 
and poor community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of a shooting at its 
Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 20 years and has 
been criticised by community leaders for its lack of support for 
the communities in which it operates.  It has frequently refused 
requests to participate in community programs including 
scholarships to support disadvantaged youth and does not 
encourage staff to volunteer for community related activities.  
BellaFoods has also recently been criticised for refusing to 
participate in a program where food manufacturers donate food 
to charity operated food kitchens. 
Police have charged a 45 year old man from the Brisbane 
suburb of Sherwood with murder, attempted murder and 
grievous bodily harm over the shootings at the Rocklea plant of 
BellaFoods on Tuesday.  One person was killed in the shooting 
and three others  were taken to hospital, two with gunshot 
wounds and one suffering a suspected heart attack.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that the man, a 
former employee of BellaFoods who had been dismissed from 
the company recently, entered the premises and shot his former 
supervisor and two colleagues on the production line.      
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the shooting 
was a tragic event that could have happened to any 
organisation.   
“We take all safety precautions in our factories but 
unfortunately sometimes tragic events happen when people are 
involved,” Mr Toledos said.  “We never intended for this to 
happen.” 
 The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   Three 
other employees remain in hospital following the shooting. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the shooting.  The Brisbane based 
company manufactures preprepared meals for domestic and 
export markets.   
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Appendix 49:   Experiment 6 Victim Event, Diminish Response, New and Negative Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW    9 March, 2012 
Shooting at company with 2 year history 
and poor community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of a shooting at its 
Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 2 years and has 
been criticised by community leaders for its lack of support 
for the communities in which it operates.  It has frequently 
refused requests to participate in community programs 
including scholarships to support disadvantaged youth and 
does not encourage staff to volunteer for community related 
activities.  BellaFoods has also recently been criticised for 
refusing to participate in a program where food manufacturers 
donate food to charity operated food kitchens. 
Police have charged a 45 year old man from the Brisbane 
suburb of Sherwood with murder, attempted murder and 
grievous bodily harm over the shootings at the Rocklea plant 
of BellaFoods on Tuesday.  One person was killed in the 
shooting and three others  were taken to hospital, two with 
gunshot wounds and one suffering a suspected heart attack.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that the man, a 
former employee of BellaFoods who had been dismissed from 
the company recently, entered the premises and shot his 
former supervisor and two colleagues on the production line.      
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the shooting 
was a tragic event that could have happened to any 
organisation.   
“We take all safety precautions in our factories but 
unfortunately sometimes tragic events happen when people 
are involved,” Mr Toledos said.  “We never intended for this 
to happen.” 
 The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   Three 
other employees remain in hospital following the shooting. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the shooting.  The Brisbane based 
company manufactures preprepared meals for domestic and 
export markets.   
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Appendix 50:   Experiment 6 Victim Event, Deal Response 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW  8 March, 2012 
Former Employee Kills Supervisor in 
Factory Shooting: BellaFoods says Focus 
on Helping Employees/Families 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
Police have charged a 45 year old man from the Brisbane 
suburb of Sherwood with murder, attempted murder and 
grievous bodily harm over the shootings at the Rocklea plant 
of BellaFoods on Tuesday.  One person was killed in the 
shooting and three others  were taken to hospital, two with 
gunshot wounds and one suffering a suspected heart attack.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that the 
shooting happened shortly after 4.15pm on Tuesday, when 
the man, a former employee of BellaFoods who had been 
dismissed from the company recently, entered the premises 
and shot his former supervisor and two colleagues on the 
production line.      
“Our investigations are ongoing but we can confirm that the 
man entered the premises with the firearm before proceeding 
to the production line,” Detective Hawker said.  “At this 
stage we do not know the motive behind the shooting.”  
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the 
company’s immediate focus was on helping its injured 
employees and the family of the deceased man. 
“We all want to know what led to the shooting but right 
now, we just want to take care of our people,” Mr Toledos 
said.  “We are providing medical assistance and counselling 
to all who need it and will continue to pay our staff while the 
plant remains closed as we don’t want them to suffer any 
further hardship.  We will do everything we can to help the 
family of our employee who died in the shooting.” 
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.  
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
explosion. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the shooting.  The Brisbane 
based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets. 
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Appendix 51:   Experiment 6 Victim Event, Deal Response, Mature and Positive Intensifier  
 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW    9 March, 2012 
Shooting at company with 20 year history 
and good community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of a shooting at its 
Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 20 years and has 
been praised by community leaders for its contributions to the 
communities in which it operates.  It provides annual 
scholarships to disadvantaged university students to further 
their studies in business and encourages staff to volunteer with 
community groups.  BellaFoods also donates food each week 
to three charity-operated food kitchens for Brisbane residents 
in need. 
Police have charged a 45 year old man from the Brisbane 
suburb of Sherwood with murder, attempted murder and 
grievous bodily harm over the shootings at the Rocklea plant 
of BellaFoods on Tuesday.  One person was killed in the 
shooting and three others  were taken to hospital, two with 
gunshot wounds and one suffering a suspected heart attack.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that the man, a 
former employee of BellaFoods who had been dismissed from 
the company recently, entered the premises and shot his 
former supervisor and two colleagues on the production line.      
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the 
company’s immediate focus was on helping its injured 
employees and the family of the deceased man. 
“We all want to know what led to the shooting but right now, 
we just want to take care of our people,” Mr Toledos said.  
“We are providing medical assistance and counselling to all 
who need it and will continue to pay our staff while the plant 
remains closed as we don’t want them to suffer any further 
hardship.  We will do everything we can to help the family of 
our employee who died in the shooting.” 
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   Three 
other employees remain in hospital following the shooting. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the shooting.  The Brisbane based 
company manufactures preprepared meals for domestic and 
export markets.   
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Appendix 52:   Experiment 6 Victim Event, Deal Response, New and Positive Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW    9 March, 2012 
Shooting at company with 2 year history 
and good community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of a shooting at its 
Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 2 years and has 
been praised by community leaders for its contributions to the 
communities in which it operates.  It provides annual 
scholarships to disadvantaged university students to further 
their studies in business and encourages staff to volunteer with 
community groups.  BellaFoods also donates food each week 
to three charity-operated food kitchens for Brisbane residents 
in need. 
Police have charged a 45 year old man from the Brisbane 
suburb of Sherwood with murder, attempted murder and 
grievous bodily harm over the shootings at the Rocklea plant 
of BellaFoods on Tuesday.  One person was killed in the 
shooting and three others  were taken to hospital, two with 
gunshot wounds and one suffering a suspected heart attack.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that the man, a 
former employee of BellaFoods who had been dismissed from 
the company recently, entered the premises and shot his 
former supervisor and two colleagues on the production line.      
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the 
company’s immediate focus was on helping its injured 
employees and the family of the deceased man. 
“We all want to know what led to the shooting but right now, 
we just want to take care of our people,” Mr Toledos said.  
“We are providing medical assistance and counselling to all 
who need it and will continue to pay our staff while the plant 
remains closed as we don’t want them to suffer any further 
hardship.  We will do everything we can to help the family of 
our employee who died in the shooting.” 
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   Three 
other employees remain in hospital following the shooting. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the shooting.  The Brisbane based 
company manufactures preprepared meals for domestic and 
export markets.   
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Appendix 53:   Experiment 6 Victim Event, Deal Response, Mature and Negative Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW    9 March, 2012 
Shooting at company with 20 year history 
and poor community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of a shooting at its 
Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 20 years and has 
been criticised by community leaders for its lack of support 
for the communities in which it operates.  It has frequently 
refused requests to participate in community programs 
including scholarships to support disadvantaged youth and 
does not encourage staff to volunteer for community related 
activities.  BellaFoods has also recently been criticised for 
refusing to participate in a program where food manufacturers 
donate food to charity operated food kitchens. 
Police have charged a 45 year old man from the Brisbane 
suburb of Sherwood with murder, attempted murder and 
grievous bodily harm over the shootings at the Rocklea plant 
of BellaFoods on Tuesday.  One person was killed in the 
shooting and three others  were taken to hospital, two with 
gunshot wounds and one suffering a suspected heart attack.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that the man, a 
former employee of BellaFoods who had been dismissed from 
the company recently, entered the premises and shot his 
former supervisor and two colleagues on the production line.      
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the 
company’s immediate focus was on helping its injured 
employees and the family of the deceased man. 
“We all want to know what led to the shooting but right now, 
we just want to take care of our people,” Mr Toledos said.  
“We are providing medical assistance and counselling to all 
who need it and will continue to pay our staff while the plant 
remains closed as we don’t want them to suffer any further 
hardship.  We will do everything we can to help the family of 
our employee who died in the shooting.” 
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   Three 
other employees remain in hospital following the shooting. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the shooting.  The Brisbane based 
company manufactures preprepared meals for domestic and 
export markets.   
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Appendix 54:   Experiment 6 Victim Event, Deal Response, New and Negative Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW    9 March, 2012 
Shooting at company with 2 year history 
and poor community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of a shooting at its 
Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 2 years and has 
been criticised by community leaders for its lack of support 
for the communities in which it operates.  It has frequently 
refused requests to participate in community programs 
including scholarships to support disadvantaged youth and 
does not encourage staff to volunteer for community related 
activities.  BellaFoods has also recently been criticised for 
refusing to participate in a program where food manufacturers 
donate food to charity operated food kitchens. 
Police have charged a 45 year old man from the Brisbane 
suburb of Sherwood with murder, attempted murder and 
grievous bodily harm over the shootings at the Rocklea plant 
of BellaFoods on Tuesday.  One person was killed in the 
shooting and three others  were taken to hospital, two with 
gunshot wounds and one suffering a suspected heart attack.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that the man, a 
former employee of BellaFoods who had been dismissed from 
the company recently, entered the premises and shot his 
former supervisor and two colleagues on the production line.      
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the 
company’s immediate focus was on helping its injured 
employees and the family of the deceased man. 
“We all want to know what led to the shooting but right now, 
we just want to take care of our people,” Mr Toledos said.  
“We are providing medical assistance and counselling to all 
who need it and will continue to pay our staff while the plant 
remains closed as we don’t want them to suffer any further 
hardship.  We will do everything we can to help the family of 
our employee who died in the shooting.” 
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   Three 
other employees remain in hospital following the shooting. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the shooting.  The Brisbane based 
company manufactures preprepared meals for domestic and 
export markets.   
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Appendix 55:   Experiment 6 Accident Event  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW 7 March, 2012  
 Accident at Food Plant Kills One 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
One person is confirmed dead and three others 
have been hospitalised following an accident at a 
food manufacturing plant at Rocklea yesterday. 
Afternoon traffic was thrown into chaos as police 
and emergency vehicles rushed to the site 
following an explosion at the BellaFoods 
manufacturing plant at 4.15pm.  While there has 
been no confirmation from authorities as to the 
cause of the explosion, it is believed that a food 
preparation vat exploded under high pressure, 
killing the operator of the vat and injuring nearby 
workers. 
The name of the deceased employee has not been 
released.  Three employees were taken to hospital 
with severe burns while others were treated on site 
for abrasions and minor burns. 
The site was immediately evacuated following the 
accident with the plant’s more than 150 workers 
spilling out into Lassiter Street, Rocklea.  One 
employee who didn’t wish to be identified said the 
explosion happened just after shift change. 
“We had just started the late shift when suddenly 
there was a large bang and the whole building 
shook,” he said.  “There was steam everywhere and 
people started screaming and I just ran as fast as I 
could to get out.”  
It is understood that the plant will remain closed 
today with investigations into the cause of the 
accident set to start immediately.       
BellaFoods manufactures preprepared meals for the 
Australian and export markets.  The Brisbane plant 
is one of three in Australia and also houses the 
company’s head office.   
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Appendix 56:   Experiment 6 Accident Event, Deny Response 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW    8 March, 2012 
Employee Killed in Tank Accident:  
BellaFoods Denies Responsibility 
By Michael Tunsley 
 
Police have confirmed that a tank used to process food 
under high pressure exploded on Tuesday at the Rocklea 
plant of BellaFoods, killing one person and seriously 
injuring three others.   
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that the 
accident happened shortly after 4.15pm on Tuesday, with 
the exploding tank killing its operator and injuring a 
number of others.    
“Our investigations are focusing on the tank at present 
and what led to the accident,” Detective Hawker said.  
“We are checking all maintenance records at the plant as 
well as the previous shift reports to see if anything can be 
identified that might have caused the explosion.” 
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos denied his 
company was responsible in any way for the explosion 
and said that he was confident the police would find 
nothing in the company’s operations or safety procedures 
that could have led to the explosion.   
“We should all be asking questions of the people who 
made the tank,” Mr Toledos said.  “They are the ones 
totally responsible for this.  We enforce the highest safety 
levels in our plants at all times.  The explosion is not our 
fault and we have done nothing wrong.”  
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
explosion. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the accident.  The Brisbane 
based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.   
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Appendix 57:   Experiment 6 Accident Event, Deny Response, Mature and Positive Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW   9 March, 2012 
Accident at company with 20 year history 
and good community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of an explosion at 
its Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 20 years and 
has been praised by community leaders for its 
contributions to the communities in which it operates.  It 
provides annual scholarships to disadvantaged university 
students to further their studies in business and 
encourages staff to volunteer with community groups.  
BellaFoods also donates food each week to three charity-
operated food kitchens for Brisbane residents in need. 
Police have confirmed that a tank used to process food 
under high pressure exploded on Tuesday at the Rocklea 
plant of BellaFoods.  One person was killed in the 
accident and three others were taken to hospital suffering 
serious injuries.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that 
investigations into the accident were ongoing and were 
focusing on the tank and what led to the explosion. 
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos denied his 
company was responsible in any way for the explosion 
and said that he was confident the police would find 
nothing in the company’s operations or safety procedures 
that could have led to the explosion.   
“We should all be asking questions of the people who 
made the tank,” Mr Toledos said.  “They are the ones 
totally responsible for this.  We enforce the highest safety 
levels in our plants at all times.  The explosion is not our 
fault and we have done nothing wrong.”  
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
explosion. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the accident.  The Brisbane 
based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.   
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Appendix 58:   Experiment 6 Accident Event, Deny Response, New and Positive Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW  9 March, 2012 
Accident at company with 2 year history 
and good community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of an explosion at 
its Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 2 years and 
has been praised by community leaders for its 
contributions to the communities in which it operates.  It 
provides annual scholarships to disadvantaged university 
students to further their studies in business and 
encourages staff to volunteer with community groups.  
BellaFoods also donates food each week to three charity-
operated food kitchens for Brisbane residents in need. 
Police have confirmed that a tank used to process food 
under high pressure exploded on Tuesday at the Rocklea 
plant of BellaFoods.  One person was killed in the 
accident and three others were taken to hospital suffering 
serious injuries.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that 
investigations into the accident were ongoing and were 
focusing on the tank and what led to the explosion. 
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos denied his 
company was responsible in any way for the explosion 
and said that he was confident the police would find 
nothing in the company’s operations or safety procedures 
that could have led to the explosion.   
“We should all be asking questions of the people who 
made the tank,” Mr Toledos said.  “They are the ones 
totally responsible for this.  We enforce the highest safety 
levels in our plants at all times.  The explosion is not our 
fault and we have done nothing wrong.”  
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
explosion. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the accident.  The Brisbane 
based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.   
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Appendix 59:   Experiment 6 Accident Event, Deny Response, Mature and Negative Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW    9 March, 2012 
Accident at company with 20 year history 
and poor community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of an explosion at its 
Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 20 years and has 
been criticised by community leaders for its lack of support 
for the communities in which it operates.  It has frequently 
refused requests to participate in community programs 
including scholarships to support disadvantaged youth and 
does not encourage staff to volunteer for community related 
activities.  BellaFoods has also recently been criticised for 
refusing to participate in a program where food 
manufacturers donate food to charity operated food kitchens. 
Police have confirmed that a tank used to process food under 
high pressure exploded on Tuesday at the Rocklea plant of 
BellaFoods.  One person was killed in the accident and three 
others were taken to hospital suffering serious injuries.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that 
investigations into the accident were ongoing and were 
focusing on the tank and what led to the explosion. 
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos denied his company 
was responsible in any way for the explosion and said that 
he was confident the police would find nothing in the 
company’s operations or safety procedures that could have 
led to the explosion.   
“We should all be asking questions of the people who made 
the tank,” Mr Toledos said.  “They are the ones totally 
responsible for this.  We enforce the highest safety levels in 
our plants at all times.  The explosion is not our fault and we 
have done nothing wrong.”  
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
explosion. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the accident.  The Brisbane 
based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.   
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Appendix 60:   Experiment 6 Accident Event, Deny Response, New and Negative Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW    9 March, 2012 
Accident at company with 2 year history 
and poor community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of an explosion at 
its Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 2 years and 
has been criticised by community leaders for its lack of 
support for the communities in which it operates.  It has 
frequently refused requests to participate in community 
programs including scholarships to support disadvantaged 
youth and does not encourage staff to volunteer for 
community related activities.  BellaFoods has also 
recently been criticised for refusing to participate in a 
program where food manufacturers donate food to charity 
operated food kitchens. 
Police have confirmed that a tank used to process food 
under high pressure exploded on Tuesday at the Rocklea 
plant of BellaFoods.  One person was killed in the 
accident and three others were taken to hospital suffering 
serious injuries.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that 
investigations into the accident were ongoing and were 
focusing on the tank and what led to the explosion. 
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos denied his 
company was responsible in any way for the explosion 
and said that he was confident the police would find 
nothing in the company’s operations or safety procedures 
that could have led to the explosion.   
“We should all be asking questions of the people who 
made the tank,” Mr Toledos said.  “They are the ones 
totally responsible for this.  We enforce the highest safety 
levels in our plants at all times.  The explosion is not our 
fault and we have done nothing wrong.”  
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
explosion. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the accident.  The Brisbane 
based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.   
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Appendix 61:   Experiment 6 Accident Event, Diminish Response  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW    8 March, 2012 
Employee Killed in Tank Accident:  
BellaFoods Says Tragic Event Never 
Intended  
By Michael Tunsley 
 
Police have confirmed that a tank used to process food 
under high pressure exploded on Tuesday at the Rocklea 
plant of BellaFoods, killing one person and seriously 
injuring three others.   
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that the 
accident happened shortly after 4.15pm on Tuesday, with 
the exploding tank killing its operator and injuring a 
number of others.    
“Our investigations are focusing on the tank at present 
and what led to the accident,” Detective Hawker said.  
“We are checking all maintenance records at the plant as 
well as the previous shift reports to see if anything can be 
identified that might have caused the explosion.” 
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the 
explosion was a tragic event that could have happened to 
any organisation.   
“We take all safety precautions in our factories but 
unfortunately sometimes tragic events happen when you 
are working with machinery,” Mr Toledos said.  “We 
never intended for this to happen.” 
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
explosion. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the accident.  The Brisbane 
based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.   
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Appendix 62:   Experiment 6 Accident Event, Diminish Response, Mature and Positive 
Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW     9 March, 2012 
Accident at company with 20 year history 
and good community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of an explosion at 
its Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 20 years and 
has been praised by community leaders for its 
contributions to the communities in which it operates.  It 
provides annual scholarships to disadvantaged university 
students to further their studies in business and 
encourages staff to volunteer with community groups.  
BellaFoods also donates food each week to three charity-
operated food kitchens for Brisbane residents in need. 
Police have confirmed that a tank used to process food 
under high pressure exploded on Tuesday at the Rocklea 
plant of BellaFoods.  One person was killed in the 
accident and three others were taken to hospital suffering 
serious injuries.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that 
investigations into the accident were ongoing and were 
focusing on the tank and what led to the explosion. 
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the 
explosion was a tragic event that could have happened to 
any organisation.   
“We take all safety precautions in our factories but 
unfortunately sometimes tragic events happen when you 
are working with machinery,” Mr Toledos said.  “We 
never intended for this to happen.” 
 The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
explosion. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the accident.  The Brisbane 
based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.   
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Appendix 63:   Experiment 6 Accident Event, Diminish Response, New and Positive Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW     9 March, 2012 
Accident at company with 2 year history 
and good community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of an explosion at 
its Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 2 years and 
has been praised by community leaders for its 
contributions to the communities in which it operates.  It 
provides annual scholarships to disadvantaged university 
students to further their studies in business and 
encourages staff to volunteer with community groups.  
BellaFoods also donates food each week to three charity-
operated food kitchens for Brisbane residents in need. 
Police have confirmed that a tank used to process food 
under high pressure exploded on Tuesday at the Rocklea 
plant of BellaFoods.  One person was killed in the 
accident and three others were taken to hospital suffering 
serious injuries.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that 
investigations into the accident were ongoing and were 
focusing on the tank and what led to the explosion. 
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the 
explosion was a tragic event that could have happened to 
any organisation.   
“We take all safety precautions in our factories but 
unfortunately sometimes tragic events happen when you 
are working with machinery,” Mr Toledos said.  “We 
never intended for this to happen.” 
 The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
explosion. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the accident.  The Brisbane 
based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.   
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Appendix 64:   Experiment 6 Accident Event, Diminish Response, Mature and Negative 
Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW    9 March, 2012 
Accident at company with 20 year history 
and poor community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of an explosion at 
its Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 20 years and 
has been criticised by community leaders for its lack of 
support for the communities in which it operates.  It has 
frequently refused requests to participate in community 
programs including scholarships to support disadvantaged 
youth and does not encourage staff to volunteer for 
community related activities.  BellaFoods has also 
recently been criticised for refusing to participate in a 
program where food manufacturers donate food to charity 
operated food kitchens. 
Police have confirmed that a tank used to process food 
under high pressure exploded on Tuesday at the Rocklea 
plant of BellaFoods.  One person was killed in the 
accident and three others were taken to hospital suffering 
serious injuries.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that 
investigations into the accident were ongoing and were 
focusing on the tank and what led to the explosion. 
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the 
explosion was a tragic event that could have happened to 
any organisation.   
“We take all safety precautions in our factories but 
unfortunately sometimes tragic events happen when you 
are working with machinery,” Mr Toledos said.  “We 
never intended for this to happen.” 
 The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
explosion. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the accident.  The Brisbane 
based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.   
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Appendix 65:   Experiment 6 Accident Event, Diminish Response, New and Negative Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW    9 March, 2012 
Accident at company with 2 year history 
and poor community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of an explosion at 
its Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 2 years and 
has been criticised by community leaders for its lack of 
support for the communities in which it operates.  It has 
frequently refused requests to participate in community 
programs including scholarships to support disadvantaged 
youth and does not encourage staff to volunteer for 
community related activities.  BellaFoods has also 
recently been criticised for refusing to participate in a 
program where food manufacturers donate food to charity 
operated food kitchens. 
Police have confirmed that a tank used to process food 
under high pressure exploded on Tuesday at the Rocklea 
plant of BellaFoods.  One person was killed in the 
accident and three others were taken to hospital suffering 
serious injuries.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that 
investigations into the accident were ongoing and were 
focusing on the tank and what led to the explosion. 
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the 
explosion was a tragic event that could have happened to 
any organisation.   
“We take all safety precautions in our factories but 
unfortunately sometimes tragic events happen when you 
are working with machinery,” Mr Toledos said.  “We 
never intended for this to happen.” 
 The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
explosion. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the accident.  The Brisbane 
based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.   
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Appendix 66:   Experiment 6 Accident Event, Deal Response 
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW  8 March, 2012 
Employee Killed in Tank Accident:  
BellaFoods says Focus on Helping 
Employees/Families  
By Michael Tunsley 
 
Police have confirmed that a tank used to process food 
under high pressure exploded on Tuesday at the Rocklea 
plant of BellaFoods, killing one person and seriously 
injuring three others.   
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that the 
accident happened shortly after 4.15pm on Tuesday, with 
the exploding tank killing its operator and injuring a 
number of others.    
“Our investigations are focusing on the tank at present 
and what led to the accident,” Detective Hawker said.  
“We are checking all maintenance records at the plant as 
well as the previous shift reports to see if anything can be 
identified that might have caused the explosion.” 
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the 
company’s immediate focus was on helping its injured 
employees and the family of the deceased man. 
“We all want to know what led to the explosion but right 
now, we just want to take care of our people,” Mr 
Toledos said.  “We are providing medical assistance and 
counselling to all who need it and will continue to pay 
our staff while the plant remains closed as we don’t want 
them to suffer any further hardship.  We will do 
everything we can to help the family of our employee 
who died in the explosion.” 
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
explosion. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the accident.  The Brisbane 
based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.   
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Appendix 67:   Experiment 6 Accident Event, Deal Response, Mature and Positive Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW    9 March, 2012 
Accident at company with 20 year history 
and good community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of an explosion at 
its Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 20 years and 
has been praised by community leaders for its 
contributions to the communities in which it operates.  It 
provides annual scholarships to disadvantaged university 
students to further their studies in business and 
encourages staff to volunteer with community groups.  
BellaFoods also donates food each week to three charity-
operated food kitchens for Brisbane residents in need. 
Police have confirmed that a tank used to process food 
under high pressure exploded on Tuesday at the Rocklea 
plant of BellaFoods.  One person was killed in the 
accident and three others were taken to hospital suffering 
serious injuries.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that 
investigations into the accident were ongoing and were 
focusing on the tank and what led to the explosion. 
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the 
company’s immediate focus was on helping its injured 
employees and the family of the deceased man. 
“We all want to know what led to the explosion but right 
now, we just want to take care of our people,” Mr 
Toledos said.  “We are providing medical assistance and 
counselling to all who need it and will continue to pay 
our staff while the plant remains closed as we don’t want 
them to suffer any further hardship.  We will do 
everything we can to help the family of our employee 
who died in the explosion.” 
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
explosion. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the accident.  The Brisbane 
based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.   
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Appendix 68:   Experiment 6 Accident Event, Deal Response, New and Positive Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW   9 March, 2012 
Accident at company with 2 year history 
and good community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of an explosion at 
its Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 2 years and 
has been praised by community leaders for its 
contributions to the communities in which it operates.  It 
provides annual scholarships to disadvantaged university 
students to further their studies in business and 
encourages staff to volunteer with community groups.  
BellaFoods also donates food each week to three charity-
operated food kitchens for Brisbane residents in need. 
Police have confirmed that a tank used to process food 
under high pressure exploded on Tuesday at the Rocklea 
plant of BellaFoods.  One person was killed in the 
accident and three others were taken to hospital suffering 
serious injuries.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that 
investigations into the accident were ongoing and were 
focusing on the tank and what led to the explosion. 
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the 
company’s immediate focus was on helping its injured 
employees and the family of the deceased man. 
“We all want to know what led to the explosion but right 
now, we just want to take care of our people,” Mr 
Toledos said.  “We are providing medical assistance and 
counselling to all who need it and will continue to pay 
our staff while the plant remains closed as we don’t want 
them to suffer any further hardship.  We will do 
everything we can to help the family of our employee 
who died in the explosion.” 
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
explosion. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the accident.  The Brisbane 
based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.   
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Appendix 69:   Experiment 6 Accident Event, Deal Response, Mature and Negative Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW   9 March, 2012 
Accident at company with 20 year history 
and poor community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of an explosion at its 
Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 20 years and has 
been criticised by community leaders for its lack of support 
for the communities in which it operates.  It has frequently 
refused requests to participate in community programs 
including scholarships to support disadvantaged youth and 
does not encourage staff to volunteer for community related 
activities.  BellaFoods has also recently been criticised for 
refusing to participate in a program where food 
manufacturers donate food to charity operated food kitchens. 
Police have confirmed that a tank used to process food under 
high pressure exploded on Tuesday at the Rocklea plant of 
BellaFoods.  One person was killed in the accident and three 
others were taken to hospital suffering serious injuries.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that 
investigations into the accident were ongoing and were 
focusing on the tank and what led to the explosion. 
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the 
company’s immediate focus was on helping its injured 
employees and the family of the deceased man. 
“We all want to know what led to the explosion but right 
now, we just want to take care of our people,” Mr Toledos 
said.  “We are providing medical assistance and counselling 
to all who need it and will continue to pay our staff while the 
plant remains closed as we don’t want them to suffer any 
further hardship.  We will do everything we can to help the 
family of our employee who died in the explosion.” 
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
explosion. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the accident.  The Brisbane 
based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.   
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Appendix 70:   Experiment 6 Accident Event, Deal Response, New and Negative Intensifier  
AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REVIEW     9 March, 2012 
Accident at company with 2 year history 
and poor community relations  
By Michael Tunsley 
BellaFoods, the company at the centre of an explosion at its 
Rocklea factory, has been in operation for 2 years and has 
been criticised by community leaders for its lack of support 
for the communities in which it operates.  It has frequently 
refused requests to participate in community programs 
including scholarships to support disadvantaged youth and 
does not encourage staff to volunteer for community related 
activities.  BellaFoods has also recently been criticised for 
refusing to participate in a program where food 
manufacturers donate food to charity operated food kitchens. 
Police have confirmed that a tank used to process food under 
high pressure exploded on Tuesday at the Rocklea plant of 
BellaFoods.  One person was killed in the accident and three 
others were taken to hospital suffering serious injuries.     
Detective Superintendent Bruce Hawker said that 
investigations into the accident were ongoing and were 
focusing on the tank and what led to the explosion. 
BellaFoods CEO, Mr Jonathan Toledos said that the 
company’s immediate focus was on helping its injured 
employees and the family of the deceased man. 
“We all want to know what led to the explosion but right 
now, we just want to take care of our people,” Mr Toledos 
said.  “We are providing medical assistance and counselling 
to all who need it and will continue to pay our staff while the 
plant remains closed as we don’t want them to suffer any 
further hardship.  We will do everything we can to help the 
family of our employee who died in the explosion.” 
The deceased worker’s details have not been released.   
Three other employees remain in hospital following the 
explosion. 
The BellaFoods plant remained closed today while 
investigations continue into the accident.  The Brisbane 
based company manufactures preprepared meals for 
domestic and export markets.   
 
